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国际顶刊 | 《英国政治科学杂志》2020年第4期

政治学人 政治学人 2022-07-01

让每一个人自由地理解政治

让世界各地的学人成果互联互通

让政治学人的核心关切得到传播

让闪烁的政治学人共享这片充满思考和情怀的天空

政治学人始终在路上

本期国际化部为大家带来了《英国政治科学杂志》2020年第3期文章编译。

编译属国际化部译者志愿提供,如有不妥欢迎指正;如对我们的工作有什么建议,欢迎到后台留言;如有转载请注明出处。学术公益是一条很长的路,我们诚邀您同行,欢迎留言您希望编译的政治学期刊,感谢您的支持。

PART 2

期刊简介


British Journal of Political Science(英国政治科学杂志)自1971年创刊并由剑桥大学出版社出版,其旨在涵盖包括包括政治理论、政治行为、公共政策和国际关系在内的政治学及相关学科(社会学,社会心理学,经济学和哲学)的前沿学术成果。期刊拥有超过40年的出版声誉,被公认为该领域的主要期刊之一。

期刊2018年影响因子为4.292,五年影响因子为3.276(在165种期刊中排名第六)。其主编包括加利福尼亚大学的Shaun Bowler、美国宾夕法尼亚州立大学的Sona Golder、英国埃塞克斯大学的Robert Johns与英国伯明翰大学的RenéLindstädt。


PART 2

期刊目录


  1. Party Polarization, Ideological Sorting and the Emergence of the US Partisan Gender Gap

    党派极化、意识形态分化和美国党派性别差距的浮现 

  2. Does Social Disagreement Attenuate Partisan Motivated Reasoning? A Test Case Concerning Economic Evaluations

    社会分歧是否削弱了党派动机的推理?一个关于经济评价的测试案例

  3. Core Political Values and the Long-Term Shaping of Partisanship

    核心政治价值观和党派偏见的长期塑造

  4. Personnel Politics: Elections, Clientelistic Competition and Teacher Hiring in Indonesia

    人事政治:印尼的选举、庇护竞争和教师招聘

  5. Compulsory Voting: A Defence

    强制投票:一种辩护

  6. Beyond Opportunity Costs: Campaign Messages, Anger and Turnout among the Unemployed

    机会成本之外:竞选信息、愤怒和失业人群的投票率

  7. Constrained Presidential Power in Africa? Legislative Independence and Executive Rule Making in Kenya, 1963–2013

    非洲总统权力受限?1963-2013年肯尼亚立法独立和执行规则制定

  8. Presidents’ Sex and Popularity: Baselines, Dynamics and Policy Performance

    总统的性别和受欢迎程度:基线、动力和政策表现

  9. Are Transfer-Dependent Governments More Creditworthy? Reassessing the Fiscal Federal Foundations of Subnational Default Risk

    依赖转移支付的政府更有信誉吗?重新评估次国家违约风险的联邦财政基础

  10. The Future is a Moving Target: Predicting Political Instability

    未来是一个不断变化的目标:预测政治不稳定

  11. Risk and Self-Respect

    风险和自尊

  12. The Development of Students’ Engagement in School, Community and Democracy

    在学校、社区和民主中学生参与的发展

  13. Revolutionary Homophobia: Explaining State Repression against Sexual Minorities

    革命性的同性恋恐惧症:解释国家对性少数群体的镇压

  14. Policy Preferences after Crime Victimization: Panel and Survey Evidence from Latin America

    犯罪受害者的政策偏好:来自拉丁美洲的面板数据和调查证据

  15. Does Counter-Attitudinal Information Cause Backlash? Results from Three Large Survey Experiments

    逆态度信息会引起反弹吗?基于三个大型调查实验的结果

  16. What Makes People Worry about the Welfare State? A Three-Country Experiment

    是什么让人们担心福利国家?一个三国的实验

  17. Do Islamic State’s Deadly Attacks Disengage, Deter, or Mobilize Supporters?

    伊斯兰国的致命袭击会让支持者脱离、阻止或动员他们吗?

  18. Cognitive Biases and Communication Strength in Social Networks: The Case of Episodic Frames

    社交网络中的认知偏差和沟通强度:情景框架的例子


PART 3

精选译文


01 党派极化、意识形态分化和美国党派性别差距的浮现

【题目】

Party Polarization, Ideological Sorting and the Emergence of the US Partisan Gender Gap

【作者】

Daniel Q. Gillion, University of Pennsylvania

Jonathan M. Ladd, Georgetown University

Marc Meredith, University of Pennsylvania

【摘要】

This article argues that the modern American partisan gender gap – the tendency of men to identify more as Republicans and less as Democrats than women – emerged largely because of mass-level ideological party sorting. As the two major US political parties ideologically polarized at the elite level, the public gradually perceived this polarization and better sorted themselves into the parties that matched their policy preferences. Stable pre-existing policy differences between men and women caused this sorting to generate the modern US partisan gender gap. Because education is positively associated with awareness of elite party polarization, the partisan gender gap developed earlier and is consistently larger among those with college degrees. The study finds support for this argument from decades of American National Election Studies data and a new large dataset of decades of pooled individual-level Gallup survey responses.


这篇文章认为,现代美国党派中的性别差异——男性更倾向于认为自己是共和党人,而女性更倾向于认为自己是民主党人——很大程度上是由于大众层面的政党意识形态选择造成的。随着美国两大政党精英阶层意识形态的两极分化,公众逐渐意识到了这种两极分化并更好地将自己划分到符合其政策偏好的政党阵营之中。男性和女性之间已经存在的稳定的政策偏好差异导致了这一分化并进而产生了现代美国的党派性别差异。由于教育程度与精英政党分化意识呈正相关,党派性别差距在拥有大学学位的人群中出现得更早,而且在持续扩大。这项研究从几十年间的美国全国选举研究数据和一个新的大型数据集中找到了支持这一论点的证据,这些数据集包含了时间跨度几十年的盖洛普个人调查反馈。

02 社会分歧是否削弱了党派动机的推理?一个关于经济评价的测试案例

【题目】

Does Social Disagreement Attenuate Partisan Motivated Reasoning? A Test Case Concerning Economic Evaluations

【作者】

Joshua Robison, Aarhus University

【摘要】

Research on partisan motivated reasoning shows that citizens perceive the world differently based upon their partisan allegiances. Here we marshal evidence from several national surveys to investigate whether partisan motivated reasoning is attenuated among partisans situated within disagreeable political discussion networks. While our analyses suggest that exposure to interpersonal disagreement is associated with weaker partisan identities, we find limited evidence that disagreement attenuates partisan differences in knowledge or retrospective evaluations of the economy. This suggests that interpersonal disagreement is unlikely to help reduce partisan motivated reasoning. Our results thus speak to important debates concerning the influence of social discussion on political attitudes, the nature of partisan motivated reasoning and the ability of citizens to hold elites accountable.


对党派动机推理的研究表明,公民对世界的看法因其所属党派的不同而不同。在这里,我们整理了几个全国性调查的证据,以调查处于令人不快的政治讨论网络中的党派动机的推理是否减弱了。虽然我们的分析表明,面临人际分歧与较弱的党派身份有关,但我们发现,有限的证据表明,分歧会减弱党派在知识或对经济的回顾性评估上的差异。这表明,人与人之间的分歧不太可能有助于减少对出于党派动机的推理。因此,我们的研究结果就社会讨论对政治态度的影响、党派动机推理的本质以及公民让精英负起责任的能力等问题展开了重要探讨。 


03 核心政治价值观和党派偏见的长期塑造

【题目】

Core Political Values and the Long-Term Shaping of Partisanship

【作者】

Geoffrey Evans, University of Oxford

Anja Neundorf, University of Oxford

【摘要】

Party identification has been thought to provide the central organizing element for political belief systems. This article makes the contrasting case that core values concerning equality and government intervention versus individualism and free enterprise are fundamental orientations that can themselves shape partisanship. The authors evaluate these arguments in the British case using a validated multiple-item measure of core values, using ordered latent class models to estimate reciprocal effects with partisanship on panel data from the British Household Panel Study, 1991–2007. The findings demonstrate that core values are more stable than partisanship and have far stronger cross-lagged effects on partisanship than vice versa in both polarized and depolarized political contexts, for younger and older respondents, and for those with differing levels of educational attainment and income, thus demonstrating their general utility as decision-making heuristics.


政党认同一直被认为是政治信仰体系的核心组织要素。本文对比了关于平等和政府干预的核心价值观与个人主义和自由企业的基本取向,它们本身可以形成党派之争。作者在英国案例中评估了这些论点,使用一种有效的核心价值观的多项测量,并使用有序的隐类模型来评估党派对1991-2007年间英国家庭小组研究数据的相互影响。研究结果表明核心价值观更稳定的党派之争和交叉滞后影响党派之争仍远远超过在极化和去极化的政治语境下,年轻的和年长的受访者对于那些受教育程度和收入水平的差异,从而证明他们的总体效用决策的启发。


04 人事政治:印尼的选举、庇护竞争和教师招聘

【题目】

Personnel Politics: Elections, Clientelistic Competition and Teacher Hiring in Indonesia

【作者】

Jan H Pierskalla, The Ohio State University

Audrey Sacks, World Bank

【摘要】

What is the effect of increased electoral competition on patronage politics? If programmatic appeals are not credible, institutional reforms that move politics from an elite- to a mass-focused and more competitive environment increase patronage efforts. This leads to an overall surge and notable spike in discretionary state hiring in election years. The study tests this prediction in the context of Indonesia’s decentralized education sector. The authors exploit the exogenous phasing in and timing of elections in Indonesian districts for causal identification. They find evidence of election-related increases in the number of contract teachers on local payrolls and increases in civil service teacher certifications, which dramatically increases salaries. These effects are particularly pronounced for districts in which the former authoritarian ruling party is in competition with new entrants.


增加选举竞争对互惠政治的影响是什么?如果计划诉求不可信,将政治从精英阶层转移到大众关注和更有竞争力的环境的体制改革则会增加互惠力度。这导致了在大选年整体雇佣的激增尤其是州政府的自由雇佣。这项研究在印度尼西亚教育部门分权的背景下检验了这一预测。作者利用外生的分阶段和印尼地区选举的时间来确定因果关系。他们发现,有证据表明,与选举相关的当地合同制教师数量以及公务员教师证书数量的增加,大幅提高了工资。这些影响在前威权执政党与新成立政党间存在竞争的地区尤其明显。


05 强制投票:一种辩护

【题目】

Compulsory Voting: A Defence 

【作者】

Lachlan M Umbers, University of New South Wales

【摘要】

Turnout is in decline in established democracies around the world. Where, in the mid-1800s, 70–80 percent of eligible voters regularly participated in US Presidential elections, turnout has averaged just 53.7 percent since 1972. Average turnout in general elections in the UK has fallen from 76.6 percent during the period 1945–92, to 64.7 percent since 1997. Average turnout in Canadian federal elections has fallen from 74.5 percent during the period 1940–79, to 62.5 percent since 2000. For most democrats, these numbers are a cause for alarm. Compulsory voting is amongst the most effective means of raising turnout. However, compulsory voting is also controversial. Most of us think that coercion may only be employed against the citizenry if it is backed by a justification of the right kind. Opponents of compulsory voting charge that no such justification is available. This article resists this line of argument in two ways. First, I offer an argument from free-riding which, though gestured towards by others, and widely criticized, has yet to be defended in any depth. Second, I consider a range of objections to compulsory voting as such, arguing that none succeeds.


投票率在世界各地已经建立民主的国家中正在下降。在19世纪中期,有70%到80%的合格选民定期参加美国总统选举,而自1972年以来,平均投票率只有53.7%。英国大选的平均投票率从1945-92年期间的76.6%下降到1997年以来的64.7%。加拿大联邦选举的平均投票率已经从1940-79年期间的74.5%下降到2000年以来的62.5%。对大多数民主党人来说,这些数字值得警惕。强制投票是提高投票率的最有效手段之一。然而,强制投票也是有争议的。我们大多数人认为,只有在有正确的理由支持的情况下,胁迫才可能被用来对付公民。强制投票的反对者认为没有这样的理由。本文从两个方面驳斥了这种论点。首先,我提出了一个关于搭便车的观点,尽管有人对此表示赞同,也受到了广泛的批评,但还没有得到任何更深入的辩护。其次,我考虑了对强制投票的一系列反对意见,认为没有人会成功。


06 机会成本之外:竞选信息、愤怒和失业人群的投票率

【题目】

Beyond Opportunity Costs: Campaign Messages, Anger and Turnout among the Unemployed

【作者】

S. Erdem Aytaç, Koç University

Eli Gavin Rau, Yale University

Susan Stokes, University of Chicago

【摘要】

Are people under economic stress more or less likely to vote, and why? With large observational datasets and a survey experiment involving unemployed Americans, we show that unemployment depresses participation. But it does so more powerfully when the unemployment rate is low, less powerfully when it is high. Whereas earlier studies have explained lower turnout among the unemployed by stressing the especially high opportunity costs these would-be voters face, our evidence points to the psychological effects of unemployment and of campaign messages about it. When unemployment is high, challengers have an incentive to blame the incumbent, thus eliciting anger among the unemployed. Psychologists have shown anger to be an approach or mobilizing emotion. When joblessness is low, campaigns tend to ignore it. The jobless thus remain in states of depression and self-blame, which are demobilizing emotions.


处于经济压力下的人们更倾向于投票吗?为什么?通过大量的观察数据集和一项涉及失业美国人的调查实验,我们发现失业率的增加降低了投票参与率。当失业率较低时,这种关联更明显,而当失业率较高时,这种作用就不那么有力了。早期的研究通过强调这些准选民所面临的特别高的机会成本来解释失业人群投票率较低的原因,而我们的证据则指向了失业以及与之相关的竞选信息所带来的心理影响。当失业率高企时,挑战者有动机指责现任总统,从而引发失业者的愤怒。心理学家已经证明愤怒是一种方法或调动情绪。当失业率较低时,竞选活动往往会忽视它。因此,失业者仍然处于抑郁和自责的状态,这是对情绪的调动。


07 非洲总统权力受限?1963-2013年肯尼亚立法独立和执行规则制定

【题目】

Constrained Presidential Power in Africa? Legislative Independence and Executive Rule Making in Kenya, 1963–2013

【作者】

Ken Ochieng’ Opalo, Georgetown University

【摘要】

Do institutions constrain presidential power in Africa? Conventional wisdom holds that personalist rule grants African presidents unchecked powers. Consequently, there is very little research on African institutions such as legislatures and their impact on executive authority. In this article, the author uses original data on the exercise of presidential authority (issuance of subsidiary legislation) to examine how legislative independence conditions presidential rule making in Kenya. The study exploits quasi-exogenous changes in legislative independence, and finds that Kenyan presidents issue relatively more Legal Notices under periods of legislative weakness, but are constrained from doing so under periods of legislative independence. These findings shed new light on institutional politics in Kenya, and illustrate how executive–legislative relations in the country conform to standard predictions in the literature on unilateral executive action.


非洲的制度是否限制了总统权力?传统观点认为,个人主义规则赋予非洲总统不受限制的权力。因此,很少有关于非洲机构的研究,如立法机构及其对行政权力的影响。在本文中,作者利用总统权力行使(附属立法的发布)的原始数据来考察立法独立性如何影响肯尼亚总统统治的制定。本研究利用立法独立性的准外生变化,发现在立法弱势时期,肯尼亚总统发布的法律公告较多,而在立法独立时期,总统发布的法律公告较少。这些发现为肯尼亚的制度政治提供了新的启示,并说明该国的行政立法关系如何符合有关单边行政行为的文献中的标准预测。


08 总统的性别和受欢迎程度:基线、动力和政策表现

【题目】

Presidents’ Sex and Popularity: Baselines, Dynamics and Policy Performance

【作者】

Ryan E Carlin, Georgia State University

Miguel Carreras, University of California, Riverside

Gregory J Love, University of Mississippi

【摘要】

Public approval is a crucial source of executive power in presidential systems. Does the public support female and male presidents similarly? Combining insights from gender and politics research with psychological evidence, this study theorizes sex-based differentials in popularity based on more general expectations linking gender stereotypes to diverging performance evaluations. Using quarterly analyses of eighteen Latin American democracies, South Korea and the Philippines, the analyses compare the levels, dynamics, and policy performance of macro-approval for male and female presidents. As expected, female presidents are less popular, experience exaggerated approval dynamics and their approval is more responsive to security and corruption (though not economic) outcomes. These findings have clear implications for our understandings of mass politics, political accountability and presidentialism.


在总统制中,公众的认可是行政权力的重要来源。公众对女性总统和男性总统的支持是否相似?这项研究结合了性别和政治研究的见解和心理学证据,基于更普遍的期望将性别刻板印象与不同的绩效评估联系起来,从而将受欢迎程度的性别差异理论化。通过对18个拉丁美洲民主国家、韩国和菲律宾的季度分析,本文比较了男性和女性总统宏观认可的水平、动力和政策表现。正如预期的那样,女总统不那么受欢迎,她们的支持率被夸大,而且她们的支持率对安全和腐败(尽管不是经济)的结果更敏感。这些发现对我们理解大众政治、政治问责制和总统主义有明显的启示。


09 依赖转移支付的政府更有信誉吗?重新评估次国家违约风险的联邦财政基础

【题目】

Are Transfer-Dependent Governments More Creditworthy? Reassessing the Fiscal Federal Foundations of Subnational Default Risk

【作者】

Kyle Hanniman, Queen’s University, Kingston, Ontario, Canada

【摘要】

Many fiscal federal scholars argue, often implicitly, that transfer dependence generally bolsters subnational creditworthiness by signalling a higher likelihood of national bailouts for distressed governments. This article argues that dependence fails to bestow general benefits on local borrowers because it suggests an inability to generate additional revenues in the event of fiscal distress, and because this inability does not, contrary to the expectations of many, necessarily translate into higher bailout expectations. Ultimately it is the nature, not the level, of transfers that affects local creditworthiness, whether through bailout or non-bailout channels. Stable and predictable payments, including robust equalization systems, support local creditworthiness, while volatile and unpredictable transfers do not. The article supports these arguments with a review of documents issued by the major international credit rating agencies and cross-national statistical analyses of bailout probabilities and standalone credit ratings issued by Moody’s Investors Service. It also discusses the implications of the findings for work on the fiscal discipline of subnational governments.


许多财政联邦学者(通常是含蓄地)认为,转移依赖通常会提高地方政府对陷入困境的政府实施国家纾困的可能性,从而增强地方政府的信誉。这篇文章认为,依赖不能给当地借款人带来普遍好处,因为它表明,在财政困难的情况下,无力产生额外的收入,而且,与许多人的预期相反,这种无力并不必然转化为更高的纾困预期。归根结底,是转移的性质,而不是程度,影响着当地的信誉,无论是通过纾困还是非纾困渠道。稳定和可预测的支付,包括健全的均衡体系,有助于提高当地的信誉,而不稳定和不可预测的转移支付则不能。本文通过审阅主要国际信用评级机构发布的文件、对救助概率的跨国统计分析以及穆迪投资者服务公司(Moody 's Investors Service)发布的独立信用评级,支持了上述观点。报告还讨论了调查结果对地方政府财政纪律工作的影响。


10 未来是一个不断变化的目标:预测政治不稳定

【题目】

The Future is a Moving Target: Predicting Political Instability

【作者】

Drew Bowlsby, Erica Chenoweth, Cullen Hendrix, Jonathan D. Moyer

【摘要】

Previous research by Goldstone et al. (2010) generated a highly accurate predictive model of state-level political instability. Notably, this model identifies political institutions – and partial democracy with factionalism, specifically – as the most compelling factors explaining when and where instability events are likely to occur. This article reassesses the model’s explanatory power and makes three related points: (1) the model’s predictive power varies substantially over time; (2) its predictive power peaked in the period used for out-of-sample validation (1995–2004) in the original study and (3) the model performs relatively poorly in the more recent period. The authors find that this decline is not simply due to the Arab Uprisings, instability events that occurred in autocracies. Similar issues are found with attempts to predict nonviolent uprisings (Chenoweth and Ulfelder 2017) and armed conflict onset and continuation (Hegre et al. 2013). These results inform two conclusions: (1) the drivers of instability are not constant over time and (2) care must be exercised in interpreting prediction exercises as evidence in favor or dispositive of theoretical mechanisms.


Goldstone等人(2010)之前的研究生成了一个高度准确的、关于国家级政治不稳定性的预测模型。值得注意的是,这一模型将政治制度——特别是部分民主与派系主义——确定为用以解释不稳定事件在何时何地可能发生的最引人注目的因素。本文对模型的解释力进行了重新评估,并提出了三个相关的观点:(1)模型的预测力随时间的变化而显著变化;(2)其预测能力在原始研究中用于样本外验证的时间段内(1995-2004)达到顶峰;(3)该模型在较近的时间段表现相对较差。作者发现,这种降低不仅仅是由于阿拉伯起义——独裁国家发生的不稳定事件。在预测非暴力起义(Chenoweth和Ulfelder 2017)和武装冲突的发生和延续(Hegre et al. 2013)的尝试中也发现了类似的问题。这些结果提供了两个结论:(1)不稳定性的驱动因素并非随时间的推移而恒;(2)在解释预测练习时必须小心谨慎,以作为支持或决定理论机制的证据。


11 风险和自尊

【题目】

Risk and Self-Respect

【作者】

Alice Baderin, Lucy Barnes

【摘要】

What is the nature of the experience of risk? Risk can impose distinctive burdens on individuals: making us anxious, impairing our relationships and limiting our ability to plan our lives. On the other hand, risky situations are sometimes exciting, liberating and even empowering. The article explores the idea that risk can result in benefits for the individuals who bear it. Specifically, we evaluate John Tomasi’s claim that the experience of economic risk is a precondition of individual self-respect. Philosophical claims about the social bases of self-respect such as Tomasi’s have not been subjected to sufficient empirical scrutiny. The article exemplifies an alternative approach, by integrating philosophical argument with the analysis of large-scale survey data. Whilst Tomasi’s claim has force in some contexts, evidence from the economic domain shows that risk tends to undermine rather than to support self-respect.


风险体验的本质是什么?风险会给个体带来特殊负担:让我们焦虑,损害我们的人际关系,限制我们规划生活的能力。另一方面,危险的情况有时是令人兴奋的,具有解放性的,甚至富有力量的。这篇文章探讨了一个观点,即风险可以为承担风险的个人带来利益。具体地说,我们评估了约翰·托马西的主张,即承受经济风险的经历是个人自尊的先决条件。像托马西那样关于自尊的社会基础的哲学主张,还没有受到充分的经验主义审查。本文举例说明了另一种方法,即将哲学论证与大规模调查数据分析相结合。虽然托马西的主张在某些情况下有一定的说服力,但来自经济领域的证据表明,风险往往会削弱而不是支持自尊。


12 在学校、社区和民主中学生参与的发展

【题目】

The Development of Students’ Engagement in School, Community and Democracy

【作者】

John B. Holbein, D. Sunshine Hillygus, Matthew A. Lenard, Christina Gibson-Davis, Darryl V. Hill

【摘要】

This article explores the origins of youth engagement in school, community and democracy. Specifically, it considers the role of psychosocial or non-cognitive abilities, like grit or perseverance. Using a novel original large-scale longitudinal survey of students linked to school administrative records and a variety of modeling techniques – including sibling, twin and individual fixed effects – the study finds that psychosocial abilities are a strong predictor of youth civic engagement. Gritty students miss less class time and are more engaged in their schools, are more politically efficacious, are more likely to intend to vote when they become eligible, and volunteer more. Our work highlights the value of psychosocial attributes in the political socialization of young people.


本文探讨了青少年参与学校、社区和民主的起源。具体来说,它考虑了社会心理或非认知能力的作用,比如勇气或毅力。通过对与学校行政记录有关的学生进行一项新颖、大规模的纵向调查和运用各种建模技术——包括兄弟姐妹、双胞胎和个人固定效应——研究发现,社会心理能力是青年公民参与的一个强有力的预测因素。坚韧的学生旷课时间更少,在学校里更投入,在政治上更有效率,当他们有资格时更有意愿投票,也更愿意做志愿者。我们的研究突出了青少年政治社会化中心理社会属性的价值。


13 革命性的同性恋恐惧症:解释国家对性少数群体的镇压

【题目】

Revolutionary Homophobia: Explaining State Repression against Sexual Minorities

【作者】

Joshua Tschantret

【摘要】

Why do unthreatening social groups become targets of state repression? Repression of lesbian, gay, bisexual and transgender (LGBT) people is especially puzzling since sexual minorities, unlike many ethnic minorities, pose no credible violent challenge to the state. This article contends that revolutionary governments are disproportionately oppressive toward sexual minorities for strategic and ideological reasons. Since revolutions create domestic instability, revolutionaries face unique strategic incentives to target ‘unreliable’ groups and to demonstrate an ability to selectively punish potential dissidents by identifying and punishing ‘invisible’ groups. Moreover, revolutionary governments are frequently helmed by elites with exclusionary ideologies – such as communism, fascism and Islamism – which represent collectivities rather than individuals. Elites adhering to these views are thus likely to perceive sexual minorities as liberal, individualistic threats to their collectivist projects. Statistical analysis using original data on homophobic repression demonstrates that revolutionary governments are more likely to target LGBT individuals, and that this effect is driven by exclusionary ideologues. Case study evidence from Cuba further indicates that the posited strategic and ideological mechanisms mediate the relationship between revolutionary government and homophobic repression.


为什么没有威胁的社会群体会成为国家镇压的目标?对女同性恋、男同性恋、双性恋和变性人(LGBT)的压制尤其令人费解,因为性少数群体与许多少数民族不同,他们没有对国家构成可靠的暴力挑战。这篇文章认为,由于战略和意识形态的原因,革命性政府对性少数群体进行不成比例的压迫。由于革命造成了国内的不稳定,革命者面临着独特的战略激励,以“不可靠的”群体为目标,并通过识别和惩罚“不可见的”群体来证明自己有能力去选择性地惩罚潜在的持不同政见者。此外,革命性政府经常由具有排他性意识形态的精英领导管理——比如共产主义、法西斯主义和伊斯兰主义——这些代表集体而不是个人。因此,坚持这些观点的精英们很可能将性少数派视为自由的、个人主义的对他们集体主义计划的威胁。对同性恋镇压的原始数据进行统计分析后,结论表明:革命性政府更有可能把目标对准LGBT个体,而这种效果是由排外的意识形态所驱动的。来自古巴的案例研究证据进一步表明,所设的战略和意识形态机制调解了革命性政府和同性恋镇压之间的关系。


14 犯罪受害者的政策偏好:来自拉丁美洲的面板数据和调查证据

【题目】

Policy Preferences after Crime Victimization: Panel and Survey Evidence from Latin America

【作者】

Giancarlo Visconti

【摘要】

Can crime victimization increase support for iron-fist crime-reduction policies? It is difficult to assess the political effects of crime, mainly because of the presence of unmeasured confounders. This study uses panel data from Brazil and strategies for reducing sensitivity to hidden biases to study how crime victims update their policy preferences. It also examines survey data from eighteen Latin American countries to improve the external validity of the findings. The results show that crime victims are more likely to support iron-fist or strong-arm measures to reduce crime, such as allowing state repression. Affected citizens are also found to value democracy less, which might explain their willingness to accept the erosion of basic rights in favor of radical measures to combat delinquency. These findings reveal that exposure to crime can change what people think the state should be allowed to do, which can have important political implications


犯罪被害人能否增加对铁拳减刑政策的支持?之前,犯罪的政治影响很难评估,这主要是由于存在无法衡量的混杂因素。这项研究使用来自巴西的面板数据和降低对隐藏偏见敏感性的策略来研究犯罪受害者政策偏好的改变。它还审查了来自18个拉丁美洲国家的调查数据,以提高调查结果的外部有效性。调查结果显示,犯罪受害者更倾向于支持采取铁腕手段来减少犯罪,比如允许国家镇压。研究发现,受影响的公民也不太重视民主,这可能解释了为什么他们愿意接受基本权利受到侵蚀,而支持采取激进措施打击犯罪。这些发现表明,接触犯罪会改变人们对国家应该被允许做什么的看法,这可能具有重要的政治意义。


15 逆态度信息会引起反弹吗?基于三个大型调查实验的结果

【题目】

Does Counter-Attitudinal Information Cause Backlash? Results from Three Large Survey Experiments

【作者】

Andrew Guess

Alexander Coppock

【摘要】

Several theoretical perspectives suggest that when individuals are exposed to counter-attitudinal evidence or arguments, their pre-existing opinions and beliefs are reinforced, resulting in a phenomenon sometimes known as ‘backlash’. This article formalizes the concept of backlash and specifies how it can be measured. It then presents the results from three survey experiments – two on Mechanical Turk and one on a nationally representative sample – that find no evidence of backlash, even under theoretically favorable conditions. While a casual reading of the literature on information processing suggests that backlash is rampant, these results indicate that it is much rarer than commonly supposed.


一些理论观点表明,当个体接触到逆态度的证据或论点时,他们原有的观点和信念会得到强化,从而导致一种有时被称为“反弹”的现象。这篇文章使“反弹”这个概念正式化,并具体地说明它如何可以被衡量。然后,它展示了三个调查实验的结果——两个基于土耳其机器人,一个基于有全国代表性的样本——即使在理论上有利的条件下,也没有发现可以证实“反弹”的证据。随意阅读一下信息处理方面的文献就会发现,人们对信息处理的抵触情绪非常强烈,但这些结果表明,这种情况比通常认为的要少见得多。


16 是什么让人们担心福利国家?一个三国的实验

【题目】

What Makes People Worry about the Welfare State? A Three-Country Experiment

【作者】

Achim Goerres

Rune Karlsen

Staffan Kumlin

【摘要】

Welfare states are exposed to a host of cost-inducing ‘reform pressures’. An experiment implemented in Germany, Norway and Sweden tests how various reform pressure frames affect perceptions about the future financial sustainability of the welfare state. Such perceptions have been shown to moderate electoral punishment for welfarereform, but littleis known about their origins.Hypotheses are formulated in dialogue with newer research on welfare state change, as well as with older theory expecting more stability in policy and attitudes (the ‘new politics’ framework). Research drawing on ‘deservingness theory’ is also consulted. The results suggest large variations in impact across treatments. The most influential path to effective pressure framing is to ‘zoom in’ on specific economic pressures linked to undeserving groups (above all immigration, but also to some extent low employment). Conversely, a message emphasizing pressure linked to a very deserving group (population aging) had little effect. A second conceivable path to pressure framing entails ‘zooming out’–making messages span a diverse and more broadly threatening set of challenges. This possibility, however, received weaker support.


福利国家面临着大量成本诱导的“改革压力”。在德国、挪威和瑞典实施的一项实验,测试了各种改革压力框架如何影响人们对福利国家未来财政可持续性的看法。这些观点已经被证明可以缓和对福利改革的选举惩罚,但人们对其起源知之甚少。假设是在与较新的关于福利国家变化研究的对话,或者是期望政策和态度更稳定的较老的理论(“新政治”框架)的对话中形成的。同时也参考了“应得性理论”的研究。研究结果表明,不同治疗方法的影响存在很大差异。有效构建压力框架最具影响力的途径是“放大”与不值得关注的群体相关的具体经济压力(首先是移民,但在一定程度上也包括低就业率);相反,强调一个非常值得的群体(人口老龄化)有关的压力几乎没有效果。第二种可以想象的形成压力框架的途径是“缩小”——使信息跨越一系列多样的、更广泛的威胁挑战。然而,人们对这种可能性的支持力度较弱。


17 伊斯兰国的致命袭击会让支持者脱离、阻止或动员他们吗? 

【题目】

Do Islamic State’s Deadly Attacks Disengage, Deter, or Mobilize Supporters?

【作者】

Joan Barceló

Elena Labzina

【摘要】

What are the consequences of committing violent attacks for terrorist organizations? Terrorist attacks might broaden the base of supporters by increasing the perceived group efficacy. However, terrorist attacks might also lead its supporters to believe that the organization is excessively violent or involvement may become too dangerous. This article employs a unique dataset with 300,842 observations of 13,321 Twitter accounts linked to the Islamic State (IS), collected during a 127-day period, to empirically investigate the impact of terrorist attacks on the number of the organization’s supporters. By exploiting the exogenous timing of terrorist attacks as a natural experiment, we find that the number of followers of IS-related Twitter accounts significantly reduces in the aftermath of the attacks. Additionally, we provide some suggestive evidence to disentangle two mechanisms: disengagement – a change in supporters’ beliefs – and deterrence – demobilization due to fear. Because we do not find support for the latter, we conclude that the disengagement effect might explain our main result.


恐怖组织实施暴力袭击的后果是什么?恐怖袭击可能会通过提高人们对群体效力的感知来扩大支持者的基础。然而,恐怖袭击也可能导致其支持者认为该组织过于暴力或这种参与变得过于危险。本文使用了一个独特的数据集,在127天的时间里收集了13321个与伊斯兰国(IS)相关的Twitter账户的300842个观察数据,以实证的方式调查恐怖袭击对该组织支持者数量的影响。通过利用恐怖袭击的外源性时间作为一个自然实验,我们发现IS相关Twitter账户的关注者数量在袭击后显著减少。此外,我们提供了一些启发性的证据来解开两种机制:脱离——支持者信念的改变和威慑——由于恐惧而遣散。由于我们没有找到支持后者的证据,我们得出结论,脱离效应可能解释了我们的主要结果。


18 社交网络中的认知偏差和沟通强度:情景框架的例子

【题目】

Cognitive Biases and Communication Strength in Social Networks: The Case of Episodic Frames

【作者】

Lene Aarøe

Michael Bang Petersen

【摘要】

Abstract Media stories often reach citizens via a two-step process, transmitted to them indirectly via their social networks. Why are some media stories strongly transmitted and impact opinions powerfully in this twostep flow while others quickly perish? Integrating classical research on the two-step flow of political communication and novel theories from cognitive psychology, this article outlines a model for understanding the strength of political frames in the two-step flow. It argues that frames that resonate with cognitive biases (that is, deep-seated psychological decision rules) will be transmitted more and have a stronger influence on opinion when citizens recollect media frames in their social networks. Focusing on the case of episodic and thematic frames, the study tests this model. It introduces a novel research design: implementing the children’s game ‘Telephone’ in consecutive experimental online surveys fielded to nationally representative samples. This design helps gauge the reliability of transmission and the degree of persuasiveness in actual chains of transmission.


媒体故事通常通过两个步骤到达公民手中,通过他们的社交网络间接传播给他们。为什么在这样的两步流动中,有些媒体的故事传播力很强,有些媒体的观点影响很大,而另一些却很快就消失了?本文结合政治传播两步流的经典研究和认知心理学的新理论,提出了一个理解两步流政治框架强度的模型。该研究认为,当公民回想起社交网络中的媒体框架时,与认知偏见(即根深蒂固的心理决策规则)产生共鸣的框架将会被传播得更多,并对意见产生更强的影响。本研究以情景框架和主题框架为例,对该模型进行了检验。它引入了一种新颖的研究设计:在对全国有代表性的样本进行的连续实验性在线调查中,实施儿童式的“电话”游戏。这种设计有助于衡量在实际链的传输中传输的可靠性和说服力的程度。


编  译:王汉林 田舒宁

校  对:王汉林 田舒宁

相关阅读:

顶刊前沿 | 《英国政治科学杂志》2020年第3期

国际前沿 | 《政治学年鉴》2020年刊


编辑:夏小奇

一审:刘博涵

二审:袁    丁


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