核战朝鲜之红色皇帝（上） | 纽约客
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第一篇 疯子理论（上）
第一篇 疯子理论（下）
第二篇 红色皇帝（上）
第二篇 红色皇帝（下）
第三篇 团结一心
第四篇 玉石俱焚
II. A Marxist Emperor
Before Kim’s accession, in 2011, he was almost completely unknown, even inside the country. His name had first appeared in the state press a couple of years earlier. The C.I.A. had little more than a single photo of him—as an eleven-year-old, according to Sue Mi Terry, a former Korea analyst at the agency.
金正恩在2011年登基前，一文不名，甚至在国内也少有人知。此前数年，他的名字头一回出现在国家媒体上。中情局前朝鲜分析师Sue Mi Terry说，中情局只有他11岁时的一张照片。
In 2008, when Kim Jong Il suffered a stroke, Randal Phillips, a senior C.I.A. officer overseeing operations in Asia, met a Chinese counterpart to share analyses, as they sometimes did. But Phillips discovered that Chinese intelligence “didn’t know what was happening,” he told me. Compared with other American adversaries, North Korea is the “hardest target,” Terry said. “There’s no other country that’s like that,” she told me. “It’s just pieced together.”
2008年，金正日中风时，负责亚洲行动的中情局高级官员兰道尔·菲利普斯与中国同行会面，他们不时会交换情报。但菲利普斯发现中国情报部门“也摸不着头脑”。相比其他美国对手，朝鲜是“最困难的目标”，Terry说。“没有哪个国家是那样的，”她告诉我。“只能靠东拼西凑。”
Kim Jong Il suffered a heart attack, and died in December, 2011. At the funeral, Kim Jong Un, the second youngest of his seven children, appeared pale and childlike, weeping as his father lay in an open casket. Afterward, he led the pallbearers, including spy chiefs and Army bosses, decades his senior.
金正日突发心梗于2011年12月去世。在葬礼上，七个子女中排名第六的金正恩面色苍白，一脸稚气，在父亲被置入灵柩中时流泪哭泣。然后，他带领护柩者送葬，棺侧还有间谍头目和军队大佬，均年长他几十岁。
Some prominent analysts predicted that Kim would not be as secure in his power as his grandfather and father had been; his regime could succumb to a coup or could implode for other reasons. Victor Cha, who had been George W. Bush’s lead adviser on Korea, wrote in an Op-Ed in the Times, “North Korea as we know it is over.” Cha told me recently, “I thought he would not last for more than a couple of years.”
有知名分析人士预测，金正恩的权柄不如祖父和父亲那般固若金汤，他的政权可能遭遇政变，或由于其他原因从内里垮掉。乔治·布什的首席朝鲜顾问车维德在《纽约时报》评论版发文指出，“我们所知的朝鲜结束了”。车维德最近还对我说，“我认为他撑不了几年。”
At first, Kim worked under the guidance of three Party elders who served as “regents,” according to Ken Gause, a specialist in North Korean politics at the Center for Naval Analyses, a nonprofit research group in Washington. Kim and his mentors made shrewd choices that helped to establish his authority. Physically, he transformed himself into a near-reincarnation of his grandfather, Kim Il Sung, who was much more popular than Kim Jong Il. He bore a natural likeness to his grandfather, and, to accentuate it, he gained weight, cut his hair in a shorn-sided pompadour, and began wearing horn-rimmed glasses and a panama hat. (When foreign media suggested that he had undergone surgery to enhance the similarity, the state news agency condemned the speculation as “sordid hackwork by rubbish media.”)
华盛顿非盈利研究集团海军分析中心的朝鲜政治专家肯·高斯说，起初，金正恩在三位党内大佬的监护下工作，他们是“摄政者”。金正恩和他的导师精明决断，建立了他的权威。在外形上，他将自己几乎变身为爷爷金日成的化身，金日成比金正日威信高得多。他长得像爷爷，为了强化这一点，他增加体重，剪成两边剃光的蓬巴杜头，并开始戴角质框眼镜和巴拿马草帽。（外国媒体称他做了整形手术以增加相似性时，国家通讯社谴责这种猜测是“垃圾媒体的卑鄙、拙劣的说法”。）
Politically, Kim put himself forward as a more candid and practical leader. His father never permitted discussion of flaws in the socialist paradise, but in April, 2012, Kim acknowledged the failure of a rocket that, upon launch, quickly crumbled into the Yellow Sea. The next month, during a televised inspection of the Mangyongdae amusement park, he made a show of bending down to pull weeds from the sidewalk, and chastising the managers: “How could you not see these? How could you be so negligent and complacent?”
政治上，金正恩让自己成为更为坦率和务实的领导人。他的父亲从不允许谈论社会主义天堂的缺陷，但2012年4月，金正恩承认一枚火箭发射失败，导弹发射后立马解体落入黄海。第二个月，电视播出他视察万景台游乐园时，弯腰拔去人行道上的杂草，并训斥管理人员：“你们怎么连这个都没看到？你们怎么能这么疏忽大意、自以为是呢？”
Kim gradually shed the control of his regents and presented himself as a socialist of the modern age—he was seen in the North Korean media flying on a luxuriously appointed Ilyushin jet, typing on a MacBook, and enjoying an amusement-park ride at the Rungna People’s Pleasure Ground. He appeared in public with his wife, a stylish former cheerleader named Ri Sol Ju, whom he married in 2009. (They are believed to have three children.)
金正恩渐渐脱离摄政者的控制，将自己打造成有现代风范的社会主义者，在朝鲜媒体上，可以看到他驾驶装饰豪华的伊留申喷气机，用苹果电脑打字，在绫罗人民游乐园玩耍。他携夫人亮相，夫人李雪主曾是时髦的拉拉队员，两人于2009年结婚。（据信二人育有三子。）
As always, the propagandists were attentive: foreign analysts who track the use of Photoshop on North Korean state images say that official pictures of Kim are often altered around his ears, possibly to mask some sort of blemish.
宣传部门一如既往地竖起了耳朵：外国分析人士研究了朝鲜官方相片中使用PS的情况，表示金正恩的官方照经常修改双耳，可能为了掩盖某种缺陷。
Kim also sought to convey an ease with brutality, and embarked on North Korea’s most violent Party purge in decades. He executed two of his father’s seven senior pallbearers—his uncle Jang Song Thaek and the Army chief Ri Yong Ho—and expelled three others. His father had also executed senior cadres when he came to power, but killing Jang, an influential family member with deep ties to China, was an act of extraordinary boldness.
金正恩还试图表明自己敢下狠手，他展开朝鲜几十年来最暴力的党内清洗。他处决了父亲七名护柩人中的两名，姨夫张成泽和总参谋长李英浩，并驱逐了另外三位。尽管他父亲掌权时也处决高级干部，但杀死与中国关系密切、且影响力巨大的家里人张成泽，堪称胆大妄为。
The charges against Jang ranged from “treachery” to applauding “halfheartedly” when Kim entered the room. Many of Jang’s children and aides were also put to death, in ways that were intended to capture attention. Some were killed by flamethrowers; others were shot by anti-aircraft guns before outdoor audiences. (Media reports that Jang himself was fed to dogs proved to be false. He was executed by firing squad.)
对张成泽的指控从“叛国”到在金正恩进屋时鼓掌“不认真”。张成泽的许多子女和幕僚也被处死，这旨在震慑人心。有人被火焰喷射器烧死，还有人在观众面前被防空高炮打烂。（有媒体报道张成泽本人喂了狗，这是假新闻，他是被行刑队枪决的。）
Evan Medeiros, who was President Obama’s chief Asia adviser, told me that Kim Jong Il’s “approach to managing élites appeared to be more incentive-based than coercion-based, making sure that they all got goodies and spoils.” He went on, “The son’s approach appears to be ‘If you screw with me, I’m just going to kill you—and I’m going to kill you in a really nasty way.’ ”
奥巴马总统首席亚洲顾问伊文·梅代罗斯告诉我，金正日“管理精英的方式看起来更多采取激励手段而非高压手段，保证他们都能参与分赃。”他继续说，“可儿子的方法看起来是‘你要惹我，我弄死你，而且用不堪的方法弄死你。’”
That principle was expressed most dramatically earlier this year. The target was Kim’s estranged half brother, Kim Jong Nam, who had been living in semi-exile in Macau for more than a decade. In recent years, Kim Jong Nam had given interviews that were critical of the young leader, telling Yoji Gomi, a Japanese journalist, that North Korea was “likely to become weak under the third generation.” In a fateful comment, he called his half brother “just a figurehead.”
今年初，这一原则体现得最为昭彰，其目标是金正恩同父异母的兄弟金正南，两人关系已经疏远了，后者十多年来差不多算是流亡在澳门。最近几年，金正男接受采访，批评年轻的领袖，他对日本记者五味洋治说，朝鲜“可能在第三代治下变得虚弱”。在一次要命的言论中，他说同父异母的兄弟“不过是个傀儡”。
On the morning of February 13th, Kim Jong Nam was at Kuala Lumpur International Airport, in Malaysia. At home in Macau, the Chinese government provided security guards, but he travelled alone. An airport security camera captured his arrival and movements. He wore jeans and a summer blazer, and carried a backpack. As he stood before a check-in kiosk, two young women smeared liquid on his face, and then fled. Agitated, he approached a security guard. He grew dizzy and was taken to an airport clinic, where his condition rapidly deteriorated.
2月13日早上，金正男正在马来西亚吉隆坡国际机场。在澳门家里，由中国政府提供安保，但他独自去旅行就没了保障。机场安防录像拍下了他到港活动，他穿牛仔裤、休闲夏装，背着双肩背包。站在验票亭前时，两名年轻女子将液体抹在他脸上后就逃离。他有点不快，叫来一个安保。由于有点头晕，所以被送往机场诊所，在那里他的身体情况迅速恶化。
In a photograph, he is slumped in a chair, arms splayed, eyes closed. He died in an ambulance, less than twenty minutes after the attack. Based on samples taken from his eyes and skin, Malaysian authorities accused North Korea of its first known assassination by the nerve agent VX, a tasteless, odorless chemical weapon. South Korean and Japanese media reported that he may have enraged his brother by preparing to defect or by aiding foreign intelligence services.
一张照片显示，他瘫坐在一张椅子 40 37587 40 15290 0 0 3123 0 0:00:12 0:00:04 0:00:08 3123上，双臂展开，双眼紧闭。他在救护车上死亡，距遇袭不足二十分钟。根据从眼睛和皮肤中提取的样品，马来西亚当局指控朝鲜首次使用VX神经毒气从事暗杀，那是一种无味、无嗅的化学武器。韩国和日本媒体报道称，他可能准备叛变或为外国情报机构提供帮助，因此惹恼了他的弟弟。
The killing caused a diplomatic crisis: North Korea demanded the return of the body and of several North Korean citizens, who were sought by police for questioning. When those demands were refused, North Korea sealed its borders to departing Malaysians, trapping nine embassy workers and their families. After two weeks, Malaysia released Kim Jong Nam’s body, and North Korea allowed the workers and their families to leave.
杀戮引发一场外交危机：朝鲜要求归还尸体并送返几名被警察叫去问话的朝鲜公民。这些要求遭到拒绝，于是朝鲜封锁边境，不允许马来西亚人离境，并拘禁了九名使馆工作人员和家人。两周后，马来西亚送还了金正男的尸体，朝鲜允许工作人员和家人离开。
The two women involved in the attack, who face first-degree-murder charges, are in custody in Malaysia; they have told investigators that they worked in local night clubs and were paid ninety dollars each for what they thought was a TV-show prank. After the attack, the women washed their hands, suggesting that they may have been given separate, harmless chemical components that became toxic when mixed together. They are scheduled to go on trial in October.
涉案的两名女子被控一级谋杀，现在在马来西亚的监狱中。她们对调查人员说自己在当地夜总会工作，每人拿了九十美元，以为是在电视节目中的恶搞。袭击后，两名女子洗了手，表明她们拿到的可能是分别无害的两种化学成分，混合起来却变成了毒物。二人定于十月出庭受审。
Six years into Kim Jong Un’s reign, some analysts in Seoul argue that senior Party officials can overrule or direct him, but U.S. intelligence believes that Kim is in sole command. The assassination of the half brother could not have happened without Kim’s approval, a U.S. official who works on Korea told me. “He’s the top decider, you might say,” the official said. “He’s the only guy that counts.”
金正恩统治六年了，有韩国分析人士称，高级党内官员能够推翻或操控他，但美国情报部门认为金正恩大权独揽。一位负责朝鲜问题的美国官员对我说，没有金正恩的批准，刺杀同父异母的兄弟不可能实施。“他是最高决策者，你知道的，”这位官员说。“他是唯一说了算的人。”
Many analysts worry that, as Kim moves deeper into confrontation with America, he does not have advisers who speak candidly to him. “We can’t identify an internal or external channel of information flow that’s effective in communicating the risks of the course that he’s on,” Scott Snyder, a Korea specialist at the Council on Foreign Relations, told me. “What general is going to be willing to risk his stars, if not his life, in order to tell Kim Jong Un he’s doing the wrong thing?”
许多分析人士担心，随着金正恩进一步与美国对抗，没有参谋会和他讲真话。“我们找不到某个内部或外部的信息流渠道，有效地传达信息，指出他所走的路存在着诸多风险，”外交关系委员会朝鲜专家斯科特·斯奈德对我说。“哪个将军愿意冒着军衔不保甚至小命不保的风险告诉金正恩他做错了呢？”
The U.S. has investigated the question of Kim Jong Un’s hold on power and has found no evidence of a potential coup or a challenge from disaffected élites. At the moment, Kim’s most visible vulnerability is his health: he is overweight and perhaps diabetic. In North Korea, the leader’s health is closely monitored by an agency called the Longevity Research Institute. Barring the unforeseen, Kim could rule North Korea for decades.
美国一直在调查金正恩对权力的掌控情况，没有发现证据忿忿不平的精英们可能发动政变或提出挑战。此时，金正恩最显而易见的弱点是他的健康状况：他太胖了，可能还有糖尿病。在朝鲜，领袖的健康有长寿研究所密切监控。如无意外，金正恩可以统治朝鲜数十年。
On the way to lunch one afternoon in Pyongyang, I noticed that the latest American threats had already been inscribed on the cityscape. A full-color billboard depicted a barrage of missiles descending on a bombed-out shell of the U.S. Capitol. Across the wreckage of Washington, it said, according to Pak’s translation, “Preëmptive Strike” and “Military Option.”
平壤的某天下午，去吃午饭的路上，我注意到美国人的最新威胁已经写在了城市景观中。一个全彩广告牌上，一排导弹降落在被炸成废墟的美国首都，根据Pak的翻译，华盛顿废墟的另一边写着“先发制人的打击”和“军事选项”。
In the days after the President’s “locked and loaded” remarks, the U.S., following the doctrine of a standoff, was seeking to convey ambiguity—the sense that North Korea should tread carefully, because it doesn’t know what might trigger a violent American response. But the message was getting garbled en route to Pyongyang.
总统说要“装弹上膛”几天后，美国遵循僵持法则，试图传递模棱两可的信息，意思是朝鲜要小心行事，因为它不知道哪一条会促发美国给予暴力回应。但这一信息在递到平壤的途中被断章取义了。
That morning, we had awoken to discover that Mattis and Secretary of State Rex Tillerson had published a joint op-ed in the Wall Street Journal that was clearly an attempt to ratchet down the tension. They wrote, “The U.S. has no interest in regime change or accelerated reunification of Korea.”
那天早上，我醒来发现马蒂斯和国务卿雷克斯·蒂勒森在《华尔街日报》联名发表评论，显然旨在给紧张态势降温。他们写道：“美国无意推动政权更替或加速半岛统一进程”。
Pak, who is one of the government’s seasoned interpreters of American media, had a hard time following it all. In the car, he turned and asked, “How common is this, for the Secretary of State and the Defense Secretary to write a joint editorial?” Not very common, I said. He nodded, and turned back around. He could not understand how the two Cabinet members could so clearly contradict the President.
Pak是政府中资深的美国媒体解读者，他都有点跟不上趟。在汽车中，他转头问：“这种情况常见吗？国务卿和国防部长联名发表社论？”我说，这不常见。他点点头，转过身去。他不明白两个内阁成员怎么会如此明显地呛声总统。
At other points during the week, Pak tried to clear up some confusing details about the American media. “So the Wall Street Journal is conservative?” he asked. The editorial page is conservative, I said, but the news coverage is straight. He took this in and nodded again.
当周还有好几次，Pak试图澄清美国媒体上一些令人困惑的细节。“那么《华尔街日报》是保守派吗？”他问。我说，社论是保守派的，但新闻报道的态度持中。他记下来，再次点点头。
Occasionally, Pak misread something that was hard to discern from far away. He told me, “The United States is a divided country. It has no appetite for war.” On some level, that was true—the United States is a divided country, and it is tired of fighting wars in the Middle East, in South Asia—but he would be wrong to assume that these facts would, with absolute assurance, prevent the Trump Administration from launching a strike on North Korea.
有时，Pak误读了一些东西，这是远在国外很难明白的事。他告诉我，“美国是一个分裂的国家，没有兴趣打仗。”在某种层面上，这是真的，美国是一个分裂的国家，也厌烦了在中东和南亚打仗，但认为这些事实足以保证特朗普政府不会打击朝鲜是错误的。
We pulled up to a large blue-and-white boat that doubles as a restaurant, moored on the banks of the Taedong River. A sign over the entrance memorialized two visits by the Supreme Leader: “General duty ship Moojige received on-the-spot guidance by the esteemed comrade Kim Jong Un.” The restaurant’s distinguishing charm is that you can catch your own lunch in its tanks.
我们上了一艘巨大的蓝白色船，这里被改造成一家饭店，停泊在大同江畔。入口处的标识纪念最高领袖两次到访：“本船接受了敬爱的金正恩同志现场指导”。饭店最吸引人的地方是你可以从燃料箱里领午餐。
On the way to our table, we passed a man standing on a ladder, holding a net, trying to nab a large fish with long whiskers. We reached a dining room where several tables were occupied by families, whose members ranged in age from a grandfather in a Mao-style suit to a couple of kids chasing each other around the table.
走去餐桌，路过有个男人站在梯子上，举着一张网，准备捞起一条长须大鱼。我们进入一间餐厅，几张桌子上都坐着一起吃饭的家人，年纪各异，有穿着毛式礼服的爷爷辈，也有几个在桌旁相互追逐的孩子。
We ordered beef, cold noodles, rice cakes, and sashimi. A television in the corner was tuned to the main state channel. Three other channels, devoted to sports, entertainment, and education, broadcast only occasionally. Pak said that we were watching a classic North Korean drama called “The Lighthouse.”
我们点了牛肉、冷面、米糕和生鱼片。角落里的电视中播送中央电视频道，其他三个频道是体育、娱乐和教育，只偶尔播送。Pak说，我们正在看经典朝鲜剧《灯塔》。
He patiently explained the plot: “A man lived alone on a remote island with a lighthouse. Under the Japanese, he was like a slave, but, when the Great Leader Kim Il Sung came to power, he said this man should be acknowledged, and—”
他耐心地讲述了情节：“一个男人在一个偏远的小岛独自居住，那里有一个灯塔。在日本人占领下，他活得像个奴隶，可当伟大领袖金日成当权后，他说这个男人应该得到认可，然后……”
The movie cut off abruptly and a matronly news anchor appeared on the screen.
“There’s news,” Pak said.
电影突然断了，一个表情庄重的新闻播报员出现在屏幕上。“新闻时间到了，”Pak说。
The broadcast showed photographs of Kim Jong Un in a dark pin-striped suit, surrounded by military men in uniform. The announcer reported that the missile unit had been tasked with preparing to strike the Pacific Ocean near Guam. Another photograph showed Kim beside a screen bearing a satellite image of Andersen Air Force Base, in Guam. The announcer quoted Kim as saying that he “would watch a little more of the foolish and stupid conduct of the Yankees” before making his final decision to launch.
电视里的照片中金正恩身着深色条纹西服，身穿制服的军人簇拥在周围。播报员报道，导弹部队受命准备打击关岛附近的太平洋海域。另一张照片中，金正恩在一个屏幕旁，屏幕上是关岛安德森空军基地。播报员引用金正恩的话说，他“会多看几眼美国佬的愚蠢行为”再做出是否发射的最终决定。
The segment ended with orchestral music over a video montage of missiles shooting from a launch pad, rockets blazing out of their launchers, and soldiers cheering as fighter jets screamed overhead. I glanced around the room and noticed that the other diners were engrossed in lunch.
节目以交响乐结束，配从有发射架发射导弹、火箭脱离发射器喷火腾空而起和士兵欢呼战斗机呼啸而过的剪接画面。我环视屋子，发现其他用餐者都在专心吃午饭。
I was confused. “So is he going to launch them or not?” I asked.
我有点困惑。“这么说他是准备发射还是不准备发射呢？”
“I don’t know,” Pak said. “It depends on whether the United States sends another nuclear asset, like a B-1B, over the Korean Peninsula.”
“我不知道，”Pak说。“这要看美国是否在朝鲜半岛上空派遣其他核设施，如B-1B轰炸机。”
“Does the U.S. know that’s the determining factor?” I asked.
“美国知道那是决定性因素吗？”
“We haven’t told them! But they should know, because we said they should not send any further ‘nuclear provocations.’ ”
“我们没有告诉他们！但他们应该知道，因为我们说他们不要继续进行‘核挑衅’了。”
The mentions of war and weaponry were everywhere: on television, on billboards, in the talk of well-rehearsed schoolchildren. When I attended a show at Pyongyang’s Rungna Dolphinarium, in which dolphins flipped and jumped and performed tricks, the finale featured a video montage that included the image of a missile soaring across the sky. I asked Pak what connected dolphins with missiles. He said, “It’s inspiring to the people. We’re going to have everything we want. A dolphinarium. Nuclear weapons. One by one.”
到处都在提战争和武器：电视上、广告牌上、学生反复排练过的措辞中。我观看了平壤绫罗海豚馆的表演，海豚翻转跳跃，表演绝技，结局是一条剪接过的视频，其中有一个画面是导弹腾空而起。我问Pak海豚和导弹有什么关系。他说，“这鼓舞人心。我们会得到我们想要的一切。海豚馆。核武器。一个一个来。”
At lunch, I asked Pak, “If your country would be destroyed in a nuclear exchange, why are you really entertaining the idea?”
吃午饭时，我问Pak，“如果你的国家在核战中被毁灭，你怎么会真心接受这种想法呢？”
North Korea, he said, is no stranger to devastation: “We’ve been through it twice before. The Korean War and the Arduous March”—the official euphemism for the famine of the mid-nineties. “We can do it a third time.” The argument is embedded in North Koreans’ self-image. They are taught to see themselves as inhabitants of a land shaped by a history of suffering, a sense of hostile encirclement, and a do-or-die insistence on survival.
他说，朝鲜对毁灭并不陌生，“我们挺过两次这种经历了，朝鲜战争和苦难行军”，苦难行军是九十年代中期饥荒的官方委婉说法。“第三次也没问题。”这种论断植入了朝鲜人的自我认知中。他们被灌输，认为自己居住在一片历经苦难的土地，群敌环伺，为了生存，要不就干，要不就死。
But, to state the obvious, I said, risking a premature end to a friendly meal, a nuclear exchange would not be comparable.
可显而易见，我说，相比让一顿友好的午餐提前结束，核大战也算不上什么。
“A few thousand would survive,” Pak said. “And the military would say, ‘Who cares? As long as the United States is destroyed, then we are all starting from the same line again.’ ” He added, “A lot of people would die. But not everyone would die.”
“几千人能活下来，”Pak说。“军队会说，‘这有什么？只要美国被摧毁，我们再次从头来过。’”他还说，“许多人会死，但不是每个人都会死。”
“We must envelop our environment in a dense fog,” Kim Jong Il once said, “to prevent our enemies from learning anything about us.” As a result, interested parties have to be creative. The South Korean intelligence service employs lip-readers to watch what Kim says away from the microphones at political events.
“我们必须藏身迷雾之中，”金正日曾说，“避免我们的敌人了解我们。”结果，相关方必须有所创新。韩国情报部门雇佣读唇者，解读政治活动中金正恩不拿麦克风时说了什么。
To chart who is gaining and losing power, American scholars and analysts, like Cold War Kremlinologists, monitor the choreography of official funerals and dissect photo captions and propaganda reports. Over time, those efforts have started to cut through the fog around North Korea’s first family.
为了弄清谁得势、谁失宠，美国学者和分析人士像冷战时期的克里姆林专家一样，监控官方葬礼的规格，仔细推敲照片配文和宣传报道。随着时间推移，这些努力开始穿透围绕在朝鲜第一家庭周围的迷雾。
……
未完待续
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《核战朝鲜之红色皇帝（下）》