脑洞大开，董事基偶数也能成会计研究话题？

本文转自：会计与资本市场研究平台

本期主要介绍董事基偶数问题研究的最新论文，以及过往与该研究相关的论文介绍，具体如下：

1.Agency problems in firms with an even number of directors: Evidence from China

Journal of Banking & Finance

Volume 93, August 2018

Wen He

University of Queensland

Jin-hui Luo

Xiamen University

Abstract

To avoid a tie in voting, most boards have an odd number of directors. We argue that boards with an even number of directors are more likely to be weak monitors because of inefficient decision making and being captured by controlling shareholders. Consistent with this argument, we find that in China boards with an even number of directors have fewer meetings and are more likely to have board members absent from board meetings. Firms with an even number of directors have more tunnelling through intercorporate loans and related party transactions, lower financial reporting quality and higher incidence of accounting irregularities. This evidence is stronger in firms with weaker external monitoring and for directors with weaker incentives to monitor. Finally, we show that firms with an even number of directors are associated with lower market valuation of equity. Our results suggest that corporate boards with an even number of directors in emerging markets are associated with more agency problems.

链接地址：

https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0378426618301328

2. The Even–Odd Nature of Audit Committees and Corporate Earnings Quality

Journal of Accounting

Auditing & Finance January 28, 2016

Huasheng Gao

Nanyang Technological University

Jun Huang

Shanghai University of Finance and Economics

Abstract

We apply voting theory to the context of audit committees and examine how the even–odd nature of audit committees is related to earnings quality. We hypothesize that an audit committee with an odd number of directors can improve the committee’s voting efficiency by better aggregating directors’ information and thus enhance the quality of committee decisions, as compared with an audit committee with an even number of directors. Supporting this implication, we find that an odd audit committee is associated with lower likelihood of financial restatements than an even audit committee, and that this relation is stronger when the committee members have more heterogeneous opinions, hold less equity ownership, are in a smaller audit committee, and face a more entrenched management.

链接地址：

http://jaf.sagepub.com/content/early/2016/01/25/0148558X15625438.abstract

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