顶刊推送《Journal of Accounting Research》2021年第59卷第4期
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缘起/PREFACE
Journal of Accounting Research
2021年第59卷第4期
https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/toc/1475679x/current
点击阅读原文,进入期刊网站。
01
本期目录
1. Accrual Accounting and Resource Allocation: A General Equilibrium Analysis
JUNG HO CHOI
2. Debiasing the Measurement of Conditional Conservatism
MARC BADIA, MIGUEL DURO, FERNANDO PENALVA, STEPHEN G. RYAN
3. Copycat Skills and Disclosure Costs: Evidence from Peer Companies’ Digital Footprints
SEAN SHUN CAO, KAI DU, BAOZHONG YANG, ALAN L. ZHANG
4. Strategic Director Appointments
GEORGE DRYMIOTES, KONDURU SIVARAMAKRISHNAN
5 .Non-Answers During Conference Calls
IAN D. GOW, DAVID F. LARCKER, ANASTASIA A. ZAKOLYUKINA
6.Do Majority-of-Minority Shareholder Voting Rights Reduce Expropriation? Evidence from Related Party Transactions
NAN LI
7.Analyst Coverage Overlaps and Interfirm Information Spillovers
TIM MARTENS, CHRISTOPH J. SEXTROH
8.Economic Downturns and the Informativeness of Management Earnings Forecasts
DAVID A. MASLAR, MATTHEW SERFLING, SARAH SHAIKH
02
本期摘要及关键词
1.Accrual Accounting and Resource Allocation: A General Equilibrium Analysis
JUNG HO CHOI
Stanford Graduate School of Business
【Abstract】This paper evaluates the role of accrual accounting in improving firms' production decisions and resource allocation across firms. I introduce two imperfect firm-performance measures, cash flows and accounting earnings, into a general equilibrium model with heterogeneous firms under imperfect information. The model demonstrates that improvements in measurement systems lead to more informed decisions on the part of firms and ultimately to allocation of greater resources to high-productivity firms via the product and input markets. Estimated parameter values are consistent with accrual accounting improving managers' information about current productivity by providing a better measure of historical firm performance. Quantitative analysis suggests that introducing accrual-accounting information on top of cash-accounting information leads to a 0.5% increase in aggregate U.S. productivity and a 0.7% increase in aggregate U.S. output via improved resource allocation. The corresponding estimates for China and India, as benchmarks for developing countries, are larger: a 1.5% to 2.3% increase in aggregate productivity and a 2.3% to 3.4% increase in aggregate output. I conclude that accrual accounting plays a significant role in determining aggregate productivity via improved resource allocation.
【Keywords】accrual accounting; resource allocation; productivity; imperfect information; general equilibrium
2.Debiasing the Measurement of Conditional Conservatism
MARC BADIA,MIGUEL DURO,FERNANDO PENALVA,STEPHEN G. RYAN
Leonard N. Stern School of Business, New York University
【Abstract】Basu's [“The Conservatism Principle and the Asymmetric Timeliness of Earnings.” Journal of Accounting and Economics 24 (1997): 3–37] measurement of conditional conservatism as the asymmetric timeliness of earnings underlies hundreds of studies. However, many subsequent studies cast doubt on the extent to which Basu's measure captures conditional conservatism versus statistical biases or alternative constructs (collectively, “biases”), thereby questioning the validity of the inferences that empirical researchers draw from analyses using the measure. We modify Basu's measure in four simple ways to remove these biases. Our key modification is the inclusion of interactive controls for return variance, a volatility proxy that captures Patatoukas and Thomas’ [“More Evidence of Bias in Differential Timeliness Estimates of Conditional Conservatism.” The Accounting Review 86 (2011): 1765–1794] return variance effect and various sources of economic optionality and adjustment costs. This inclusion captures volatility-related effects on both the level of earnings and the sensitivity of earnings to returns, and it allows the magnitudes of these effects to vary with the sign of returns. We conduct validation analyses using placebo-dependent variables, synthetic returns, and nonconditionally conservative earnings components that show our modified Basu measure is largely free of known biases. We further show that our measure is associated with contracting and other economic variables as predicted by theory. Our findings suggest that researchers can rely on our modified Basu measure to identify the determinants and effects of conditional conservatism.
【Keywords】conditional conservatism; asymmetric timeliness
3.Copycat Skills and Disclosure Costs: Evidence from Peer Companies’ Digital Footprints
SEAN SHUN CAO, KAI DU, BAOZHONG YANG, ALAN L. ZHANG
J. Mack Robinson College of Business, Georgia State University
【Abstract】We examine whether firms that imitate peer companies’ strategies (copycats) profit from such behavior and how their success may cause competitive harm to disclosing companies. We identify copycat companies by tracking the digital footprints of investment companies that view disclosures on the SEC EDGAR Web site. We find that copycat companies are able to identify profitable trades that outperform other trades disclosed by the copycatted companies by 5.5% annually. Such stock-screening skills are related to investment sophistication and research intensity. Furthermore, copycats inflict greater damage on the performance of disclosing companies when they possess superior copycat skills, when disclosed trading strategies take longer to complete, and when disclosed stock holdings are characterized by high information asymmetry.
【Keywords】copycat; disclosure; SEC EDGAR; hedge fund; investment company; investment research; proprietary cost; big data
4.Strategic Director Appointments
GEORGE DRYMIOTES, KONDURU SIVARAMAKRISHNAN
Rice University
【Abstract】Recent corporate governance scandals have been attributed to a lack of board independence because of the influence CEOs have over their boards. However, CEOs can also affect board efficacy without compromising its independence by strategically choosing directors. We offer a theoretical framework to examine how CEOs can strategically choose director characteristics (such as expertise and skill set) to influence the inner workings of the board. We examine how director expertise affects the board's equilibrium voting strategies and show that some “passivity” on the part of directors can in fact be desirable equilibrium behavior. More importantly, we show that managers can strategically appoint independent outside directors to influence board voting in their favor. Surprisingly, contrary to what we might expect, we find that opportunistic (principled) managers may not always appoint the least (most) able directors to the board. We also examine whether CEOs would prefer a “captured” board (i.e., an insider-dominated board) and show that the value of director input (i.e., the board's advising role) and the financial markets can discourage CEOs from pursuing such appointments.
【Keywords】board of directors; corporate governance; majority voting; rubberstamping; deferring abstaining; director appointments
5.Non-Answers During Conference Calls
IAN D. GOW, DAVID F. LARCKER, ANASTASIA A. ZAKOLYUKINA
University of Chicago Booth School of Business
【Abstract】We construct a novel measure of disclosure choice by firms. Our measure is computed using linguistic analysis of conference calls to identify whether a manager's response to an analyst question is a “non-answer.” Using our measure, about 11% of analyst questions elicit non-answers from managers, a rate that is stable over time and similar across industries. A useful feature of our measure is that it enables an examination of disclosure choice within a call. Analyst questions with a negative tone, greater uncertainty, greater complexity, or requests for greater detail are more likely to trigger non-answers. We find performance-related questions tend to be associated with non-answers, and this association is weaker when performance news is favorable. We also find analyst questions about proprietary information are associated with non-answers, and this association is stronger when firm competition is more intense.
【Keywords】voluntary disclosure; asymmetric information; conference calls; textual analysis
6.Do Majority-of-Minority Shareholder Voting Rights Reduce Expropriation? Evidence from Related Party Transactions
NAN LI
Carlson School of Management, University of Minnesota
【Abstract】In the presence of business groups, the expropriation through related party transactions (RPTs) is common and costly to minority shareholders. Using the setting of India's RPT voting rule, I find that a majority-of-minority shareholder voting mechanism helps mitigate expropriation. Minority shareholders actively raise their voice against RPT resolutions. A difference-in-differences analysis reveals that shareholder voting has a significant deterrence effect on RPT volume. I also find that stock markets react positively to the voting rule's passage, and that the rule makes Indian firms more attractive to foreign institutional investors.
【Keywords】related party transactions; shareholder voting; corporate governance
7.Analyst Coverage Overlaps and Interfirm Information Spillovers
TIM MARTENS, CHRISTOPH J. SEXTROH
Bayes Business School, City, University of London, 106 Bunhill Row, London, EC1Y 8TZ, Great Britain
Department of Accountancy, Tilburg University, Warandelaan 2, Tilburg, 5037 AB The Netherlands
【Abstract】We offer a novel perspective on the role of sell-side analysts as information intermediaries in capital markets by documenting a flow of information in a new direction, namely, from analysts to the firms they cover. We use analyst coverage overlaps and patent citations to examine analyst-induced information spillovers about technology and industry trends. Consistent with analyst coverage–related information flows, firms are more likely to cite another firm's patent if that firm is covered by the same analyst. The effect varies with analysts' specialization, experience, and level of activity. Firms with more analyst-based connections to peers also show greater corporate innovation. Collectively, our evidence indicates that financial analysts not only reduce information asymmetries between firms and capital market participants but also facilitate the production of business intelligence through feedback and interfirm information spillovers.
【Keywords】analysts; coverage overlap; feedback effect; knowledge flow; information spillover; patent citations; corporate innovation
8.Economic Downturns and the Informativeness of Management Earnings Forecasts
DAVID A. MASLAR, MATTHEW SERFLING, SARAH SHAIKH
【Abstract】Economic downturns create uncertainty about a firm's operations and make it disproportionately harder for outside market participants to assess the firm's prospects. We posit that in this environment, management earnings forecasts will be more informative to investors and analysts. Consistent with this prediction, we find larger stock price reactions and analyst forecast revisions to news in management forecasts during downturns. Holding the amount of news in forecasts constant, stock price reactions to management forecasts are also greater than those to analyst forecasts. We also find that relative to analyst forecasts, management forecast accuracy increases during downturns, suggesting that investors justifiably assess management forecasts as more informative. Overall, we document that macroeconomic conditions create time-series variation in the informativeness of different sources of information to outside market participants.
【Keywords】management forecasts; analysts; reactions; downturns; uncertainty
The journal publishes four regular issues and one conference issue each year. The conference issue contains papers from the annual accounting research conference held at the University of Chicago.
Topics published include:
The impact of financial reporting and disclosure on stock prices; The economics of auditing, enforcement and audit oversight; The use of accounting information in contracting in debt, labor, supply, and other markets; The role of accounting in compensation and in corporate governance; The role of managerial accounting on internal decision making such as budgeting, costing, and transfer pricing; The real effects of financial reporting and disclosure (e.g. on firm behavior); The economics of regulation of financial reporting and disclosure, including bank regulation; International differences in financial reporting and the role of reporting standards in international capital markets; The political economy of standard-setting; The use of accounting information in public finance and macroeconomic statistics; The impact of tax regulation on transaction structuring; The role of transparency in markets and society; Corporate Social Responsibillity
Keywords
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