CER | 张晓衡、于晓华、游良志：产粮大县奖励政策是否会导致对中国粮食生产数据的造假？【转】
（标题有误，应为张晓恒，抱歉）Xiaoheng Zhang,Xiaohua Yu, Liangzhi You.Does the Granary County Subsidy Program Lead to manipulation of grain production data in China? China Economic Review, In Press
摘要简单翻译：
操纵粮食生产数据可能会导致灾难性的社会和经济后果。官方农业统计的准确性长期以来一直受到质疑。本文研究了农业生产数据处理与产粮大县奖励政策（GCSP）之间的联系。自2005年以来，中国政府对1998年至2002年五年平均粮食产量超过20万吨的县提供补贴，鼓励这些地方政府优先发展粮食生产。粮食产量略低于阈值的县可能有动力过度报告粮食产量。根据McCrary（2008）密度测试，本文提供了2005年，2006年和2008年由GCSP引起的过度报告粮食生产的暗示性证据，尽管过高报告率分别仅为3％，2％和1.7 ％ 。政策含义是中央政府的财政分配规则应该避免地方政府的数据操纵激励，特别是应该切断与地方政府自我报告的数据的联系。
Abstract
Manipulation of food production data could lead to catastrophic social and economic consequences. The accuracy of official agricultural statistics has long been questioned in China. This paper studies the linkage between agricultural production data manipulation and the Granary County Subsidy Program (GCSP). Since 2005, Chinese government gave subsidies to those counties with five-year average grain production between 1998 and 2002 more than 200 thousand tons to encourage these local governments to give priority to grain production. The prospective counties with grain production slightly below the threshold may have incentives to over-report their grain production. Based on the McCrary (2008)'s density test, this paper provides suggestive evidence of over-reporting grain production caused by the GCSP in 2005, 2006 and 2008, though the over-reporting rates are only 3%, 2%, and 1.7% respectively. The policy implication would be that fiscal distribution rules of a central government should avoid data manipulation incentives in local governments, particularly should cut the linkage to the data which are self-reported by the local governments.
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.chieco.2019.101347
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