JCC | 村选举中的精英化：中国农村的"选聘分离"计划【转】

摘要简单翻译：

中国的地方政府在农村治理中面临着根本的“民主困境”：尽管当选的乡村干部可能没有能力或无法控制，但地方政府却无法像中国宪法和国家法律所规定的那样改变或废除乡村自治。但是，最近出现了一种解决地方政府困境的新方法：称为“选聘分离”（SEE）。基于对浙江县的深入案例研究，本文认为，SEE是一种典型的制度分层，它在现有的村民民主基础上增加了新的精英型村干部管理体制。这是一种依赖路径的制度变迁，模仿了中国共产党的干部职务名称表制度和编制系统。这项研究对逐渐的制度变革和政治精英管理具有更广泛的意义。

Abstract:

Local governments in China face a fundamental ‘democracy dilemma’ in rural governance: although elected village cadres may not be capable or controllable, local governments cannot change or abolish village self-government, as enshrined in China’s Constitution and the national laws. However, there has recently been a new way of dealing with this dilemma for local governments: called the ‘Separation of Election and Employment’ (xuan pin fenli, SEE) [of village cadres]. Based on an in-depth case study of a Zhejiang county, this article argues that SEE is a typical type of institutional layering, which adds a new meritocratic village cadre management system onto existing village democracy. This is a path-dependent institutional change, emulating the Chinese Communist Party’s nomenklatura and bianzhi systems. This research has broader implications concerning gradual institutional change and political meritocracy.

https://doi.org/10.1080/10670564.2019.1580424

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