股东身份与企业杠杆操纵——基于机构投资者视角的分析

Shareholder Identity and Corporate Leverage Manipulation: An Analysis from the Perspective of Institutional Investors

《财经研究》2023年49卷第2期 页码：138 - 153 online：2023年2月3日

作者

中：卿小权 , 董启琛 , 武瑛

英：Qing Xiaoquan, Dong Qichen, Wu Ying

作者单位：首都经济贸易大学 会计学院，北京 100070

摘要及关键词

摘要：面对杠杆监管要求，企业管理层有可能通过杠杆操纵来降低账面杠杆率，导致报表使用者对其财务状况做出误判。而机构投资者拥有丰富的专业知识和较强的监督能力，很可能识别出企业的杠杆操纵并加以治理。文章基于2007—2020年非金融类A股上市公司数据，发现机构投资者持股能够显著降低企业的杠杆操纵程度。机制分析表明，机构投资者主要通过发挥“注资效应”和“监督效应”，抑制企业杠杆操纵行为。异质性分析发现，在去杠杆政策实施后、拥有稳定型机构投资者以及国有控股样本中，机构投资者对企业杠杆操纵的抑制作用更加显著。拓展性分析发现，机构投资者可能通过派驻董事来约束企业的杠杆操纵；此外，机构投资者持股主要抑制了企业的“名股实债”式操纵行为。文章的研究拓宽了机构投资者参与公司治理的研究视野，对企业杠杆操纵的约束机制进行了有益探索，也为政府部门引导机构投资者发挥监督治理作用并促进经济稳定发展提供了重要启示。

关键词：杠杆操纵；机构投资者；派驻董事；名股实债

Summary: At present, China is emphasizing the strategic goal of stabilizing the economy with high-quality development as the guide. High leverage has become an important factor affecting economic stability and exacerbating systemic risk. For this reason, the central government clearly put forward the task of “deleveraging” at the end of 2015. In the face of the regulatory requirements of internal and external leverage of enterprises, managers may reduce the book leverage ratio by manipulating leverage, which will cause users of the statements to make a misjudgment of the risks such as liabilities of enterprises. However, due to their profit-seeking nature, capital advantage and rich professional knowledge, institutional investors have the motivation and ability to govern corporate leverage manipulation, which is likely to identify and govern corporate leverage manipulation. Based on the data of A-share non-financial listed companies from 2007 to 2020, this paper finds that the shareholdings of institutional investors can significantly reduce the degree of leverage manipulation of enterprises. The mechanism test shows that institutional investors restrain corporate leverage manipulation mainly by exerting the “capital injection effect” and the “supervision effect”. The heterogeneity test shows that after the deleveraging policy is implemented, in the sample group with stable institutional investors and state-owned shareholdings, institutional investors have a more significant inhibitory effect on corporate leverage manipulation. The expansibility test shows that institutional investors may restrict corporate leverage manipulation by appointing directors. At the same time, the shareholdings of institutional investors mainly inhibit the manipulation behavior of “nominal equity but actual debt” of enterprises. This paper not only supplements and improves the definition of leverage manipulation used in the existing literature, but also deepens the cognition of the connotation of leverage manipulation and clarifies its neutral nature. Under the background of the current change from “apparent profit” to “apparent asset liability”, this paper broadens the research field of institutional investors’ participation in corporate governance and improving the quality of balance sheet accounting information, and verifies its mechanism. At the same time, different from the manipulative motivation concerned in the existing literature, this paper mainly explores the constraint mechanism of negative leverage manipulation. This will not only deepen the cognition of the management and investors on leverage manipulation, but also provide enlightenment for the government to guide institutional investors to play the role of supervision and governance, so as to serve the high-quality economic development.

Key words:leverage manipulation; institutional investors; appointment of directors; nominal equity but actual debt

其他信息

DOI：10.16538/j.cnki.jfe.20221014.101

收稿日期：2022-04-25

基金项目：国家社会科学基金项目（20BGL072）

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