金融行政处罚与银行风险——基于“双罚制”和处罚类型视角

Financial Penalty and Bank Risk: Based on Penalizing both Banks and Responsible Persons, and Different Types of Penalty

《财经研究》2023年49卷第2期 页码：154 - 168 online：2023年2月3日

作者

中：赵静1 , 高雅琴2

英：Zhao Jing1, Gao Yaqin2

作者单位：1. 湖南大学 金融与统计学院，湖南 长沙 410006; 2. 长沙银行股份有限公司，湖南 长沙 410205

摘要及关键词

摘要：基于近年来我国加强金融行政处罚的背景，文章运用我国160家银行2008—2020年的面板数据，对比了行政处罚对银行个体风险和系统性风险的差异化影响，并深入探讨不同类型和不同受罚对象行政处罚的异质性作用，进一步探究了相应的作用机制。结果表明：第一，行政处罚总次数、对银行机构和责任人的行政处罚均有助于降低银行个体风险和系统性风险；对责任人的行政处罚对银行个体风险和系统性风险的降低作用大于对银行机构的处罚。第二，警告和罚没均可以降低银行个体风险和系统性风险；禁止从业和取消任职有利于降低银行个体风险，但对银行系统性风险的影响不显著；罚没规模有助于降低系统性风险，但对银行个体风险的影响不显著。第三，行政处罚总次数对资本水平低的银行的风险降低作用更大。第四，理财产品在行政处罚与银行风险关系中发挥部分中介效应。文章对于我国完善金融行政处罚和防范金融风险具有重要的现实意义。

关键词：金融行政处罚；“双罚制”；个体风险；系统性风险

Summary: In order to deal with regulatory arbitrage of banks, prevent financial risks, and promote the high-quality development of the banking industry, China has strengthened financial administrative penalty for illegal businesses in recent years. In September 2015, the former China Banking Regulatory Commission revised and approved the “Measures of the China Banking Regulatory Commission on Administrative Penalty”, which clearly stipulates administrative penalty. It emphasizes “penalizing both banks and responsible persons”, which means that administrative penalty to responsible persons should be strengthened in addition to penalty to institutions, and strengthens the legitimacy and professionalism of administrative penalty. Thereafter, China’s regulatory authorities have put more emphasis on applying administrative penalty to restrain the high-risk behavior of banks since then. However, it is quite controversial whether administrative penalty can restrain bank risk. Based on this background, we gather financial administrative penalty announcements and bank micro-data from 2008 to 2020. This paper analyzes the differential impact of administrative penalty on bank individual risk and bank systemic risk, comprehensively contrasts the heterogeneity of different types and different subjects of penalty, and demonstrates the mechanism of their relationship by using the fixed-effect model. The results show that: First, the total number of administrative penalty, and administrative penalty imposed on institutions and responsible persons all contribute to reducing bank individual risk and bank systemic risk. And administrative penalty imposed on responsible persons has a greater impact on reducing individual risk and systemic risk than punishing institutions. Second, both warnings and forfeitures can decrease bank individual risk and bank systemic risk. Job forbidden and disqualification are conducive to lowering bank individual risk, but their impact on bank systemic risk is not significant. The scale of forfeitures helps to reduce bank systemic risk, but it does not have a significant impact on bank individual risk. Third, the total number of administrative penalty has a greater impact on lowering the risk of banks with a low capital level than that of banks with a high capital level. Fourth, bank wealth management products play a partial intermediary role in the curbing effect of administrative penalty on bank risk. The main extensions of this paper are as follows: First, most studies analyze the impact of administrative penalty on bank risk from a macro perspective, it discusses the role of administrative penalty from a micro perspective of individual bank. Second, it demonstrates the impact of administrative penalty on both bank individual risk and bank systemic risk. Third, as the administrative penalty imposed on responsible persons has been strengthened in China since 2015, it explores the impact of administrative penalty on bank risk for different punishment objects. Fourth, by applying a variety of penalty methods, it discusses in detail the differential impact of different types of administrative penalty on bank risk. Fifth, as banks with different capital regulatory pressures have quite different motivations towards regulatory arbitrage, it further investigates the heterogeneous impact of administrative penalty on banks with different capital levels. Sixth, it identifies the impact mechanism of administrative penalty on bank risk from the perspective of wealth management products.

Key words:financial penalty; penalizing both banks and responsible persons; bank individual risk; bank systemic risk

其他信息

DOI：10.16538/j.cnki.jfe.20220615.202

收稿日期：2021-10-20

基金项目：国家社会科学基金重大项目（21&ZD115）；国家自然科学基金项目（71903053，71903114）；湖南省自然科学基金项目（2020JJ5093）；中央高校基本科研业务费专项资金项目（531118010317）

点

这里“阅读原文”，查看更多