市场势力关联的收入分配效应：关联机理识别与竞争政策优化

Income Distribution Effect of Market Power Association: Correlation Mechanism Identification and Competition Policy Optimization

《财经研究》2023年49卷第7期 页码：63 - 77 online：2023年7月3日

作者

中：赵伟光1 , 李伟2 , 李凯3

英：Zhao Weiguang1, Li Wei2, Li Kai3

作者单位：1. 浙江工商大学 经济学院，浙江 杭州 310018; 2. 中国社会科学院 工业经济研究所，北京 100006; 3. 东北大学 工商管理学院，辽宁 沈阳 110167

摘要及关键词

摘要：如何通过有效的政策设计，在提高居民工资的同时有效缓解薪资差距，是政府部门和学术界亟待解决的一个重要课题。文章将市场势力引入收入分配问题中，基于工企数据和反垄断行政民事诉讼数据和最低工资数据组成的合并样本，构建了“企业—员工”私人议价模型，实证研究了不完全竞争市场情境下的工资决定机制。研究发现，产品与劳动力市场具有“双边市场势力关联”特征，企业可以根据竞争环境的变化，调节双边市场势力的分配。在上述环境中，企业向劳动力市场扩展势力不仅使员工租金分享能力下降，还在一定程度上扩大了技能员工间的工资差距。这种市场势力关联引发的收入分配效应具有很强的隐秘性。具体表现在，产品市场推动的政策改革虽然减弱了企业产品市场势力从而有利于效率提高，但是其引致的企业向劳动力市场扩展势力的行为却会使员工租金分享能力降低并扩大收入差距。据此，文章认为加强《竞争法》与《劳动保障法》的协同可以达到最优的政策效果，竞争政策也需要建立起“收入分配中性”的执法原则。

关键词：双边市场势力关联；租金分享；技能工资差距；竞争政策

Summary: This paper introduces market power into the issue of income distribution. Based on a combined sample consisting of industrial firm data, antitrust administrative and civil litigation data, and minimum wage data, a “firm-employee” private bargaining model is constructed to empirically study the wage determination mechanism under the scenario of imperfect competition. By measuring the market power of both products and labor, it is found that there is a “bilateral market power association” between products and labor, and firms can adjust the allocation of bilateral market power according to changes in the competitive environment. In this scenario, the behavior of firms expanding their power to the labor market not only reduces the rent-sharing ability of employees, but also to some extent widens the wage gap between skilled workers. The conclusions are as follows: (1) From 1998 to 2013, the market power of products showed a trend of first rising and then falling, while the market power of labor showed a trend of first falling and then rising, indicating a statistical substitution relationship between the market power of products and labor. (2) In this scenario, although the decline of the market power of products is beneficial to increasing the rent-sharing ability of employees, the behavior of firms expanding their power to the labor market caused by the decline of the market power of products will widen the income gap between different skilled workers. (3) From the decomposition results of the market power of products and labor market, the improvement of firms’ own production efficiency explains most of the increase in market power, but the income distribution effect generated by firms’ strategic use of their market power requires attention. (4) Counterfactual policy tests show that promoting the elimination of the market power of both products and labor will not only increase the rent-sharing ability of employees by about 10.57%, but also reduce the wage gap by about 12.15%. The marginal contributions are that: (1) This paper constructs a computable partial equilibrium model that reveals the internal influence mechanism of market power on employees’ rent-sharing and wage gap. The framework is based on the “firm- employee” private bargaining model, which better fits the Chinese economic reality. (2) This paper develops a method for quantitatively identifying the market power of products and labor under the private bargaining mechanism. This identification method only requires output data and employee wage data at the firm level, thus having generality, which expands the literature research on identifying market power. (3) The advantage of using a partial equilibrium model is that counterfactual policy simulations can be conducted to evaluate the impact of different policy combinations on employees’ rent-sharing elasticity and skilled wage gaps, providing empirical references for government decision-making.

Key words: bilateral market power association; rent-share; skill wage gap; competition policy

其他信息

DOI：10.16538/j.cnki.jfe.20230316.202

收稿日期：2022-09-13

基金项目：国家自然科学基金青年项目（72103181）；国家自然科学基金青年项目（71903196）

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