观点 | 特朗普无法对中国发起新冷战，即使他希望如此

本文原文刊于《华盛顿邮报》，作者系世界和平论坛秘书长、清华大学国际关系研究院院长阎学通教授。

In his State of the Union speech, U.S. President Donald Trump defined China as the primary rival challenging America. This is consistent with the tone of the new U.S. National Defense Strategy, which declares: “Inter-state strategic competition, not terrorism, is now the primary concern in U.S. national security.”

唐纳德·特朗普在其总统国情咨文中将中国定义为主要竞争对手，这与美国国家安全战略报告论调如出一辙：国际战略竞争，而非恐怖主义，才是美国国家安全的首要关切。

Along with Russia, China was named as the chief strategic rival challenging America’s security, prosperity and values. This rhetoric, backed up by formal doctrine, understandably brings about fears that Sino-U.S. competition may drive the world into a new Cold War. Yet, while America’s new policy toward China will inevitably have a strong impact on international politics, it does not necessarily mean a coming Cold War. There are three fundamental differences between the Sino-U.S. competition today and the U.S.-Soviet rivalry during the Cold War.

与俄罗斯一样，中国此次亦被视为美国主要战略竞争对手，威胁美国国家安全、经济繁荣和文化价值。官方文件似乎言之凿凿，人们担忧中美关系即将滑入新的冷战轨道。尽管美国对华政策不可避免地会对国际政治产生重大影响，但是断言冷战即将到来似乎为时尚早。在此笔者指出，相比冷战美苏争霸，中美竞争存在三点根本差异。

1. Unlike the U.S.-Soviet competition for global leadership during the Cold War, both China and the U.S. today avoid undertaking excessive international responsibility.

第一，与冷战时期美苏争夺全球领导权有所不同，目前中美两国都在避免承担过多的国际责任。

The Trump administration’s “America First” posture regards global leadership as a burden rather than the most important strategic interest of the U.S. It seeks to unload that burden onto its military allies by asking them to pay more for their own defense. Meanwhile, the current Chinese government worries that the huge cost of global leadership would undermine its economic growth.

目前，特朗普政府及其出台的“美国优先”政策将全球领导权视作美国负担而非其最大战略利益。通过要求盟友增加军费、增强自卫能力等方式，美国试图将负担进行转移。与此同时，中国政府也对成为国际领导者多有担忧：其所需代价巨大，经济发展可能会因此受阻。

Instead, Chinese President Xi Jinping has inherited and embraced the concept of a “community of common destiny,” coined by former President Hu Jintao’s administration. As the phrase implies, China wants every member of the international community to share the responsibility of global governance. To avoid excessive international responsibility, the Chinese government avoids stationing troops in Afghanistan, for example, even though instability there presents a direct threat to the security of neighboring Xinjiang, a frontier region in China where separatist sentiment has erupted in the past.

在此情况下，习近平主席继承了胡锦涛主席所提出的“命运共同体”概念，并对其进行全面阐释。顾名思义，中国希望与国际社会成员共同承担全球治理责任，同时中国政府还应避免承担能力之外的国际责任。正因如此，中国才对出兵阿富汗持克制态度，尽管当地动荡局势已经直接威胁中国新疆地区的安全。作为中国边疆省份，当地曾数次爆发分裂主义运动。

As long as both China and the U.S. are reluctant to undertake global leadership, a Cold War of the all-encompassing kind we saw between the U.S. and the Soviet Union in the 20th century is unlikely to occur — even with the possibility that some secondary powers may compete for regional leadership through military confrontation.

只要中美都不愿成为全球领导者，那么像20世纪时我们看到的美苏之间那种全面冷战就不太可能会发生——即使某些中等国家可能通过军事对抗来争夺地区领导权。

2. Both China and the U.S. have so far purposely constrained their competition from spilling over into the ideological domain — the precise opposite of what the U.S. and the Soviets did during the Cold War.

第二，迄今为止，中美两国都有意不使相互之间的竞争扩散到意识形态领域——这与冷战时期美苏争霸截然不同。

Trump has shown no interest in an ideological contest with China. This was reflected in the National Defense Strategy, which contains the statement, “We will not seek to impose our way of life by force.”

特朗普无意与中国作意识形态之争。这一观点在其国防战略报告中也可见一斑：我国无意将自己的生活方式强加于他国。

The Chinese government is similarly alert to the danger of igniting an ideological confrontation with the West and the U.S. in particular. Soon after the international media reported that the recent 19th Communist Party Congress revealed China’s intention to export a governance model that rivals Western democracy, the Chinese government promptly sought to correct this misimpression by announcing that China “will not ask other countries to copy the Chinese practice.” As long as China and the U.S. don’t prioritize advancing their ideologies abroad above all else, their competition will not escalate to the level of the old U.S.-Soviet rivalry.

对于这一点，中国政府始终保持警惕，避免与西方国家，尤其是美国，进行意识形态对抗。在中国共产党第十九次全国代表大会召开之后，有国际媒体声称，中国企图输出自己的政府管理模式，与西方民主体制进行抗衡。中国政府迅速回应这一错误认识，强调中国“不会要求其他国家复制中国实践模式”。所以，只要中美不将输出意识形态当作首要任务，二者竞争就不会升级为过去美苏之间的对抗状态。

3. China’s present strategic preference for peaceful competition with the U.S. differs greatly from that of the Soviet Union or Russia today.

第三，就中国目前的战略偏好而言，中美两国“和平竞赛”不同于美苏或美俄竞争。

Although China is dismayed and disappointed at being viewed as the primary rival to the U.S. after giving Trump emperor-like treatment during his visit to Beijing, it still adheres to the principle of peaceful competition rather than the proxy-war strategy the Soviet Union adopted during the Cold War.

特朗普到访北京时，享受了皇帝般的待遇，但是美国仍将中国视作主要竞争对手，这令中国十分失望，对于未来感到担忧。尽管如此，中国仍然坚持和平竞争，而非采取冷战时期的苏联代理人战争策略。

Economics remains the most powerful element of China’s national strength, and its military might lags far behind America’s. Thus, China will try its best to avoid any form of military clashes with the U.S. China also insists it is not formally allied with Russia, America’s other rival, which has been confronting the U.S. order in Europe mainly through proxy wars since the end of the Cold War. It should not go unrecognized that wars in the Middle East and former Soviet zones have not escalated to the global level, in no small part because China did not join Russia. China’s behavior in these situations shows that China will not join league with Russia against the U.S., as happened with the East-West division during the Cold War.

由于中国的经济优势仍然是中国国家实力的最重要组成因素，并且中国军事实力与美国相去甚远，所以中国会尽量避免与美国发生任何形式的军事冲突。中国也坚持表示从未与美国的另一对手俄罗斯正式结盟，后者在冷战结束后不断通过代理人战争的方式与美国所主导的欧洲秩序相抗衡。十分明显，中东和苏东地区冲突之所以没有升级为全球冲突，其重要原因是中国在此问题上并未与俄罗斯为伍。上述事实表明，中国不会加入俄罗斯反美联盟，冷战时代的东西分裂难以重演。

The uncertainty of Trump’s leadership is also a minor but favorable factor in preventing a new Cold War. The inconsistency of America’s foreign policy in the first year of his presidency has made its allies cautious in supporting America’s confrontation with China.

相比中国的战略选择，特朗普领导能力的不确定性也是防止新冷战发生的重要原因（尽管这一原因相对处于次要地位）。特朗普在其任期第一年中并未延续美国以往对外政策，这使其盟友对于支持美中对抗颇为谨慎。

To be sure, China-U.S. competition will inevitably grow more severe in 2018. At the moment, China appears to have more confidence than the U.S. in this competition because it believes the Trump administration suffers from a crippling lack of credibility both at home and abroad. The most crucial factor in international competition between superpowers is strategic credibility.

可以确定的是， 2018年中美竞争必将更加激烈。在目前来看，中国在这场和平竞争中显得更具信心，因为中国认为，凡作大国之争，战略信誉为重中之重，而特朗普政府正逢信任危机，四面楚歌。

At Davos late last month, Trump delivered a standard and sober political speech that departed from the tone of his previous talks or tweets. Yet it did little, if anything, to improve America’s reputation. This implies that the Trump administration has already — perhaps terminally — undermined its capacity to shape international opinions and regain strategic credibility. If that is the case, how can it initiate a new Cold War even if it wants to?

在上月末的达沃斯论坛上，特朗普一反其以往谈话和推特中的“独特腔调”，发表了一场合乎标准且异常严肃的政治演讲。然而为时已晚，这对挽救美国威望杯水车薪。各国的冷淡反应说明特朗普政府已经——也许是致命地——削弱了美国塑造国际话语、重获战略信誉的能力。果真如此，力不从心的特朗普政府又如何能发动新的冷战呢？

翻译：吉培坤

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