顾宾：如果中国领导世界，中国会是一个霸权吗？
在习近平主席的带领下，中国正前所未有地走向世界舞台中央。而不久前西方国家还一度敦促中国负起大国责任，这不禁令人喟叹。现在有很多人会怀疑：当有朝一日能够引领世界，中国是否会步美国后尘走向霸权？
只要审视过去十年里中国参与的国际倡议，就会发现这一担忧并非空穴来风。在中国所倡导的国际金融机构中，譬如亚洲基础设施投资银行（亚投行），中国拥有一票否决权。另外，在“一带一路”倡议和多边开发融资合作中心里，中国同样居于主导地位，并享有事实上的否决权。
要判断一个国家是否是霸权国家，有两个决定性要素。其一，它必须是公认的强权；其二，它还要独断专权，将其意志强加于他国，而罔顾他国的意愿与利益。
中国是经济大国，以购买力平价计算，国内生产总值早在2014年就超过了美国。中国也迅速成长为军事大国，最为先进的第三艘航母于近日下水。中国不再怯于运用权力以及取得国际合作中的否决权。
与此同时，中国正以一种基于规则的方式，巧妙地运作权力。以亚投行为例，中国在其中的否决权来自独特的持股公式，它将国内生产总值作为唯一变量，并在亚洲国家内部保留了75%的持股比例。即使美国在2015年成为了亚投行的创始成员国，根据这一公式，美国作为域外国家，只能参与分配25%的域外股份，它在亚投行的地位将相形见绌。
然而，拥有否决权是一回事，滥用否决权是另一回事。问题的关键在于，中国是否会奉行霸权，以他国利益为代价，滥用其否决权以实现自身利益。
短期来看，这种可能性为零。作为一个发展中的大国，中国仍处于要在国际社会中树立地位的阶段。无疑，中国一直在采取稳慎的手段来赢得包括老牌大国在内的其他国家的信任与合作。在此期间，中国明显受到了最为严格的审查，甚至是西方有增无减的偏见。
居于这样一个充满竞争、非议甚至是敌意的环境，中国在全球经济治理中，须得展示出一个善意而自我约束的大国形象。换而言之，无论是在“一带一路”倡议、亚投行还是多边开发融资合作中心里，中国都不可能滥用否决权和奉行霸权。
长远来看，中国奉行霸权的可能性即使存在，也是微乎其微。中华文明里没有传教士的基因；它更多地选择去以德服人而非强施于人。诚如孔子曰：“远人不服，则修文德以来之”。霸权主义盛气凌人，中华文化推己及人。
这恰如其分解释了为何中国一直在传统和新型机构中所倡导和践行“共商，共建，共享”的指导方针。例如，在最近的WTO关于放弃新冠疫苗专利权的谈判中，中国就率先垂范，展现出了领导力，为谈判的成功和WTO的复兴做出了重要贡献。
与之形成鲜明对比的是，美国从不曾惮于滥用布雷顿森林机构的否决权，常常阻滞这些机构所亟待的改革进程。比如，国际货币基金组织在经历十多年毫无成果的谈判后，仍未就新的份额公式达成一致；世界银行亦未实施2016年动态公式的结果，其资产负债表在全球危机中愈发收缩。
美国阻挠这些改革，其意图在于遏制中国在其间日益提高的影响力。此外，美国也从不犹豫滥用美元体系来制裁、孤立敌对势力，同时震慑他国。令人遗憾的是，美式霸权致使这些机构的存在意义和合法性受到威胁，严重冲击着国际社会对“美式多边主义”的信任。
更有甚者，美国为了破坏以“一带一路”倡议和亚投行为代表的“中国式多边主义”，长期污蔑这些机构标准低下，并阻挠其盟友的加入。
共同的价值观是可持续世界秩序的先决条件。中国期待的是人类命运与共的世界，文明之间也能美美与共。为此，中国须得吸取美国教训，不从否决权滑向霸权，中国式多边主义才能赢得胜利。
本文由北京外国语大学法学院研究生魏旭东翻译
Can China be a hegemon when it leads the world?
China has been unprecedentedly active on the world stage since Xi’s era. It is historically amazing, given that the West had been urging China to become a “responsible stakeholder” not long before. Many people would now suspect: Can China be a hegemon when it leads the world, as the US has been?
There is no doubt about the legitimacy of the concern, if one looks into the international initiatives that China made during the past decade. For example, in some international financial institutions (IFIs) it initiated, such as Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB), China holds a veto power. In others it initiated, such as Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) and Multilateral Cooperation Center for Development Finance (MCDF), China is also dominant, and has a de facto veto power.
If a country is to be a hegemon, there are two defining elements. One is that it must be a recognized power; the other is that, by utilizing its power, the country imposes what it alone decides or wishes for upon others, heedless of their feelings or interest.
China is an economic power, surpassing the US as early as 2014, if measured in terms of GDP at purchasing power parity (PPP) rates. China has also quickly become a military power, with its third and most advanced aircraft carrier launched recently. China no longer feels shy to maneuver power and earn a veto position in international cooperation.
Meanwhile, China maneuvers power in a rules-based manner, and with prowess. In the case of AIIB, its veto power is derived from a unique shareholding formula, with GDP as the only variable plus 75% of shareholdings being retained within Asia. The US would be belittled in the non-regional group under the formula, if it became a founding member in 2015.
However, holding a veto power is one thing; to abuse it is another. The case about China is whether it would exercise hegemony, i.e., abusing its veto power to pursue its own interest at the expense of others?
In the short term, the possibility is zero. As a growing power generally, China is still in the phase of establishing itself before the international community. No wonder that it has been taking prudent while meticulous steps to win trust and cooperation from others, including from the established powers. All the while, it is clear that the country is under most strict scrutiny, and even unabated western bias.
In such a highly competitive, contentious, and even hostile environment, China has to behave as a benign and self-restrained power in global economic governance. In other words, there is not even the slightest chance for China to abuse veto power and exercise hegemony, either in the BRI, AIIB or MCDF.
In the long run, the possibility for China to exercise hegemony is also very low, if not impossible. In its cultural gene, China is not a missionary society; it chooses to influence others more by inducing respect than by conversion. As Confucius said, “If people from the distant quarters still do not submit themselves, you can attract them by endorsing propriety, righteousness, and music.” (“远人不服，则修文德以来之” in Chinese）. Featuring voluntarism, the Chinese culture contrasts a hegemon’s mentality to impose its will and seek predominance over others.
This well explains the reason why China has been advocating, and practicing, the so-called golden rule of “extensive consultation, joint contribution, and shared benefits” in the traditional institutions, as well as in the new ones where it dominates. For example, China demonstrated leadership while exercising self-restraint during a recent WTO negotiation on waiving COVID-19 vaccine patent rights, contributing to its success and the revival of the WTO at large.
In stark contrast, the US never hesitates to abuse veto power in the Bretton Woods institutions, stopping or delaying the much-needed reforms in them. For example, there has been no agreement on a new quota formula in the IMF, after over a decade of fruitless negotiations, while the result of the 2016 Dynamic Formula is yet to be implemented in the World Bank, causing its balance sheet even strained amid global crises.
The US blocks those reforms only to suppress China’s rising influence in them. It also never hesitates to abuse the dollar system to sanction or decouple anybody it dislikes, while chilling others. Regrettably the US hegemony makes those traditional institutions gradually losing relevance and legitimacy, which in turn backfires on American multilateralism.
The US takes even further steps to sabotage Chinese multilateralism, as represented by the BRI and the AIIB. It has sought to stigmatize those institutions with the rhetoric of low standards, and to coerce its allies from joining them.
Shared values are a prerequisite for a sustainable world order. China aspires to “a world of shared future for mankind”, featuring harmony in diversity across civilizations. To make it happen, China should draw the lesson of the US all the way through. Chinese multilateralism only shines when a veto power does not slip into hegemony.
This op-ed appeared in The Straits Times with the title “China, the US, and what it means to be a hegemon”, July 16, 2022 by Gu Bin, associate law professor at Beijing Foreign Studies University, and author of Chinese Multilateralism in the AIIB