顾宾：中国参与全球治理的七条思路
17年前，美国银行家佐利克发表了一篇很有影响力的文章，督促中国成为“负责任的利益相关者”。这十年，中国在国际社会空前活跃，引起了西方社会不适和焦虑，一些人提出疑问：如果中国领导世界，中国会是一个霸权吗？为了回答这个问题，需要准确把握中国参与全球治理的七条思路。
第一，美式多边主义 v. 中国式多边主义。过去十年，中国在基础设施互联互通领域先后发起三项国际机制倡议，分别是：“一带一路”，亚投行和多边开发融资合作中心（MCDF）。这些机制孕育着中国式多边主义的理念。相比美式多边主义，中国是在重起炉灶吗？换句话说，如果中国倡导中式多边主义，而西方依然信仰美式多边主义，国际社会还能在攸关人类前途命运的重大议题上展开合作吗？
美式多边主义长期指引着人类社会的和平与发展。但是，在美式多边主义之下，发展中国家被忽略了，它们的声音长期得不到倾听。由此造成国际发展合作的结果不尽如人意，甚至事与愿违，反过来损害了美式多边主义的声誉。中国式多边主义吸取美式多边主义的经验教训，在维护基于规则的国际秩序、尊重国际最佳实践的基础上，回应发展中国家的具体关切。中国式多边主义的优势，已经为中国倡议的成功的国际机制所证实。
第二，霸权 v. 自我克制。协商一致是国际社会合作决策的最优解。这既适用于美国主导的布雷顿森林机构，也适用于中国主导的一带一路、亚投行。与此同时，中美在各自主导的国际机制中享有一票否决权。长期以来，美国滥用一票否决权，拖延世界银行和IMF改革，压制新兴市场国家的话语权，受到国际社会批评。有人提出了一个很有意思的问题：“中国持有一票否决权再正常不过了，但是美国捍卫其霸权却被批评为自私，这不也是双标吗？”
霸权的构成有两个要素：一是国家实力强大，这是前提；二是“输出革命”，强迫他国接受自己的意志，这是关键特征。持有一票否决权，不等于滥用一票否决权。中国的文化基因里，没有传教士传统；中国希望以赢得尊重的方式影响其他国家，而不是强迫对方接受自己。孔子讲，“远人不服，则修文德以来之”。中国式多边主义具有基于自愿和谦卑的特质，与强行施加意志、力图控制他人的霸权思维形成鲜明对比。
第三，最佳实践 v. 可行标准。中国式多边主义的一个鲜明特征，是推行高且可行的标准。毋庸置疑，坚守高标准是世界一流机构所必需的。在亚投行筹建之初，国际社会曾经质疑它将实施什么样的标准。这样的质疑后来越来越少，甚至烟消云散了，就是因为亚投行不仅在法律文本里，而且在项目实践中，坚守了最高的环境、社会和治理标准。
与此同时，标准必须是可行的。在亚投行的环境与社会框架中，借款国在项目准备和项目实施过程中发挥主体作用。为了服务借款国利益，亚投行进行了有益的、富有灵活性的探索，例如在符合其核心原则的前提下，允许借款国以国内法替代适用亚投行的环境社会标准。
第四，法治（rule of law） v. 法的工具性（role of law）。国际开发金融领域在反思国际援助的效果时，认为“不仅要关注法治，更要关注法律的工具属性”。判断一个国际机构有无条约授权，不以条约明确授权为准，而是只要有利于实现条约目的和宗旨，且不违反条约明文规定即可。
这种条约解释的方法称为目的解释法（或称暗示授权），有利于国际机构灵活适用其法律，以适应不断变化的世界。有赖于条约的目的解释方法，亚投行能够在第一时间设立旨在帮助成员国打赢新冠疫情防控阻击战的200亿美元“危机恢复基金“，理直气壮投资“一带一路”项目，并为MCDF提供秘书处服务。
第五，对抗式制衡（adversary checks） v. 协商式监督（advisory engagement）。对于一家成功的国际机构来说，良好的公司治理必不可少。亚投行内设监督机制，要求在其非常驻董事会与管理层之间构建起“适当的制衡关系“。关键的问题是如何把握“适当性”边界。
为了适应不断变化的国际环境，亚投行管理层必须果断决策，采取一些新的务实举措，坚定不移推进亚投行的法定宗旨和目的。为此，董事会必须赋予管理层更大的权限。建议在亚投行监督机制的频谱上，向着闪耀东方智慧的“协商式监督”一端靠拢，避免走向西方文化“对抗式制衡”的极端，以此体现亚投行的亚洲基因、维护其目标宗旨。
第六，竞争 v. 合作。对于新机构来说，与老机构形成合作关系至关重要。1997年亚洲金融危机期间，日本曾倡议成立亚洲版的IMF，但是因为美国和IMF的阻挠而胎死腹中。日本倡议失败说明一个道理：老机构倾向于把新机构视为威胁，而不是合作伙伴。
亚投行从倡议之初，即重视发展与传统机构的合作关系。亚投行与世界银行、亚洲开发银行保持形式多样的密切合作，例如知识和信息分享、签订合作备忘录、共同投资项目。MCDF继承亚投行的合作精神，从一开始起即向同类机构主动释放善意和学习意愿。对于新机构来说，展现善意和合作意愿，还能够迅速帮助自身提升能力和国际声誉。
第七，结盟v. 结伴。中国致力于民族复兴伟业，为此需要专注于自身持续发展和进步，避免树立敌人。中国的发展需要和谐的世界环境，这与美国“不是盟友就是敌人”的霸权思维截然不同。中国的使命和处世方式，决定了中国外交呈现“结伴不结盟”的特点。
中国外交的基本立足点是广大发展中国家，并承诺“中国永远是发展中国家大家庭的一员”。中国把欧盟视为坚守多边主义的可信赖的伙伴。中俄在国际事务中密切协调配合，两国关系“上不封顶”，但终究不是盟友，这从中国在俄乌冲突中所持立场看得很清楚。中国是所有人的朋友，但不是任何人的盟友。
Seven Myths About China’s Approach to Global Governance
China has been unprecedentedly active on the world stage since President Xi’s era. It is historically amazing, given that the West had been urging China to become a “responsible stakeholder” not long before. Now many people are curious: What would the world look like if China actually lead the world? Seven misunderstandings regarding this transition must be debunked to understand China’s approach towards global governance.
First, American multilateralism vs. Chinese multilateralism.During the past decade China has initiated a series of public goods in infrastructure connectivity, including the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB), and Multilateral Cooperation Center for Development Finance (MCDF). Does Chinese multilateralism, as so dubbed, require decoupling from American multilateralism? Or alternatively, if China advocates Chinese multilateralism, whereas the West still has faith in American multilateralism, is it really possible for them to cooperate and coordinate on world matters?
American multilateralism contributed to world peace and prosperity, but the developing world has unfortunately been ignored or little heard. Failure to produce the hoped-for results backfires on the reputation of American multilateralism. Chinese multilateralism builds upon American multilateralism, and it is well positioned to correct the latter’s defects by being responsive to the particular needs of developing countries, while maintaining a rules-based, high-standard system, as exhibited by the success of its development initiatives.
Second, hegemony vs. self-restraint. Consensus is a preferred decision-making method in the Bretton Woods institutions, as well as in the AIIB and the BRI. Meanwhile, both the United States and China manifestly hold veto power in those institutions. In the World Bank, the United States has been blocking shareholder realignment reforms in favor of emerging economies, delaying the implementation of the official shareholding formula known as the 2016 Dynamic Formula. For example, China would have held over 12 percent of shares under that formula, instead of merely 6 percent now. Similarly, in the International Monetary Fund (IMF), negotiations over a new quota formula that is supposed to increase the voice of emerging economies, including China and other BRICS countries, have dragged on for over a decade.
A hegemon has two composite elements: it must be powerful (that is a prerequisite) and then based on its power, impose its will on others. Holding a veto power is one thing; to abuse it is another. In its cultural gene, China is not a missionary society and it chooses to influence others more by inducing respect rather than by conversion. Featuring voluntarism and self-restraint, the Chinese approach towards global governance contrasts with a hegemon’s mentality to impose its will and seek predominance over others.
Third, high vs. feasible standards. A major characteristic of Chinese multilateralism is the promotion of high and feasible standards. High standards are integral in the operations of a top-notch development institution. There used to be concerns over what standards the AIIB would apply, which have nevertheless been relieved because the Bank has instituted environmental, social, and governance (ESG) standards both in text and in practice.
On the other hand, the standards must be feasible. While offering a leading role for the Bank’s clients in project preparation and implementation, AIIB standards are open to exploring greater flexibility for the benefit of borrowing countries, for example, by relying on their system for standard compliance while conforming to AIIB’s core principles and standards.
Fourth, rule of law vs. role of law. The development community has been urged to think differently about aid, in particular, to think not only about the rule of law but also about the role of law. For finding that an institution has a power, it is enough that the exercise of the power may further the purpose of the institution, and that it is not inconsistent with explicit law.
This, dubbed as a teleological methodology (or the doctrine of implied powers), enables an international organization to adapt to new environments by liberally interpreting its laws. The methodology empowered the AIIB to combat the Covid-19 pandemic through a US$20 billion crisis recovery facility, as well as to embrace the BRI and administer MCDF.
Fifth, adversary checks vs. advisory engagement. Good corporate governance is integral to the success of an institution. The AIIB has a built-in oversight mechanism “to ensure proper checks and balances” between its non-resident board and management. To find out where the degree of “properness” lies along a spectrum is key.
Facing ever-changing circumstances, the AIIB needs to rely upon a pragmatic executive branch to take any bold but necessary actions to promote the interests of the Bank. It is advisable, therefore, to lean towards the Oriental wisdom of advisory engagement, rather than the Western style of adversary checks, along the spectrum of oversight that best suits the Asian gene of the Bank and its purposes.
Sixth, competition vs. cooperation. Forging a cooperative external relationship, particularly with those established ones, is key to the success of a newcomer. The failure of Japan’s proposal to establish the Asian Monetary Fund, a replica of the IMF in 1997, proves that the established institution tends to view a newcomer as a threat, rather than a partner.
The AIIB has forged a sound collaborative relationship with peer institutions by sharing knowledge, signing MOUs, and co-financing projects. Drawing upon the AIIB, the MCDF took initiative to engage with peer institutions in a benign and cooperative manner. The approach also helps a newcomer to make rapid progress in reputation and capacity- building.
Seventh, alliance vs. partnership. China has persevered with its goal of “rejuvenating the nation.” To make this happen, it tends to concentrate on continuous self-improvement, while avoiding making enemies. The Chinese dream is predestined on a harmonious world environment, contrasting the U.S.-branded hegemony— “either with us or against us.” China’s mentality decides the mantra of its diplomacy as looking for “partnerships rather than alliances.”
Traditionally China considers its bond with developing countries as the bedrock of its diplomacy, and treats the European Union as a trusted partner in upholding multilateralism. While China and Russia coordinate closely in world affairs, attesting to their “no-ceiling” cooperation, they are not allies, as has been proved saliently in the ongoing Ukrainian war. China is with everybody and allying nobody.
This piece was published with The National Interest on July 25, 2022
Gu Bin, associate law professor at Beijing Foreign Studies University, author of Chinese Multilateralism in the AIIB， China Forum expert