The Rise and Fall of Japan’s Electronics Industry 日本电子工业的兴衰
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There is no industry in the world where technological innovation is more intense than the semiconductor industry. The current winner might become a loser in a few days, this reminds me of the “The Tale of the Heike”:
The sound of the Gion Shoja bells echoes the impermanence of all things;
the color of the Sala flowers reveals the truth that the prosperous must decline.
The proud do not endure, they are like a dream on a spring night;
the mighty fall at last, they are as dust before the wind.
世界上没有比半导体行业的技术创新如此激烈的行业。今天的胜利者过几天也会变成一个失败者，这让我想起了《平家物语》中的一首诗：
祗园精舍之钟声，奏诸行无常之响。
娑罗双树之花色，表盛者必衰之兆。
骄者难久，正如春宵一梦。
猛者遂灭，恰似风前之尘。
There is a clear difference between semiconductor and the submissive view of the Heike story. Even if you have changed from a winner to a loser, there will always be the next chance to recover. Transistors and integrated circuits were invented in the United States, and the US established their overwhelming position as world leaders in the 1970s.
半导体和对《平家物语》的顺从观点相比，但有一个明显的区别。即使你曾经从一个胜利者变成了一个失败者，但总会有下一次复苏的机会。美国发明了晶体管和集成电路而一直到20世纪70年代它保持了这行业的世界领先者。
However, it was replaced by Japan in the late 1970s. At the same time, Japan expanded its market share under the support of a huge domestic market in the field of consumption. In addition, Japan's competition in the storage sector of the computer market surpassed that of the United States, and expanded its market share in the 1980s. Japan occupied more than half of the world market share in the late 1980s. 1980s was the time when the sun set in the United States and in Japan it was the time that the sun rose.
然而，自上世纪70年代末以来，被日本替代了。与此同时，日本在消费领域的巨大国内市场的支撑下，扩大了市场份额。此外，日本在计算机市场的存储领域的竞争超过了美国，并在20世纪80年代扩大了市场份额。日本在20世纪80年代末占据了世界市场份额的一半以上。20世纪80年代是美国日落的年代，而对日本是太阳升起的年代。
However, this situation was overturned again in the 1990s. The United States took the strengthening of semiconductors as a national initiative, revived the momentum, and surpassed Japan again in 1993. Since then, the United States has maintained an overwhelming position until today. In the 1990s, the sun rose again in the United States and set in Japan.
然而，在90年代，美国把加强半导体作为一项全国性的举措，在1993年再次超过日本。从此以后美国在这方面一直保持着占有压倒性的领导地位。20世纪90年代，美国的太阳再次升起，日本的太阳落山。
Such severe changes will naturally recur in individual companies. For example, take the top ten companies in the world, Texas Instruments (USA) had been the world leader for about 15 years since 1970. Among the top ten companies in 1981, five were American companies, four were Japanese companies and one was a European company. It was a time of total American victory. Later, however, the Japanese manufacturers' great leap forward began, and NEC finally took the top spot from Texas Instruments in 1985. In 1989, the top ten manufacturers were six Japanese manufacturers, NEC was the first, American companies accounted for three seats, and Europe for one. However, in the 1990s, the relative share of Japanese manufacturers gradually declined. Especially after the great depression in 1996, Japan's decline was particularly prominent.
如此严重的变化自然也会在个别公司中反复出现。例如，世界十大公司，自1970年到1985年，德州仪器（美国）保持着世界领先者的地位。在1981年的十大公司中，有五家是美国公司，四家是日本公司，一家是欧洲公司。那是美国大获全胜的时代。然而，后来，日本制造商的大跃进开始了，最终NEC在1985年从德州仪器（Texas Instruments）手中夺走了榜首的位置。1989年，排名前十有6家日本制造商，其中NEC是首位，来自美国有3家，来自欧洲有1家。然而，在20世纪90年代，日本制造商的相对份额逐渐下降。特别是1996年大萧条后日本的衰落尤为突出。
In 2006’s top ten companies list, there were four companies from the United States, two from Japan, two from South Korea and two from Europe. Compared with 1989, the number of Japanese companies dropped sharply from six to two. What were the factors that led to this significant change? Of course, the answer is not simple, but by examining the historical trends to date, the following factors can be mentioned.
2006年，在世界十大公司中，美国有4家，日本有2家，韩国有2家，欧洲有2家。与1989年相比，日本企业的数量从6家锐减到2家。导致这个变化的原因是什么？当然，答案并不简单，但通过研究迄今为止的历史趋势，可以提到以下情况。
The first factor is the change in the structure of the geographical market. Until early 1980s, the U.S. market was the largest in the world, and American manufacturers used this advantage to take most of the world's share. During this period, Japanese market was much smaller than American market, the market share of Japanese manufacturers was about 30% in the early 1980s.
第一个因素是地理市场结构的变化。直到20世纪80年代初，美国市场一直是世界上最大的市场，美国制造商利用这种情况占据了世界的大部分份额。当时日本市场比美国市场小得多，因此日本制造商的市场份额在80年代初约为30%。
However, in late 1980s, great changes took place. Due to the rapid growth of domestic consumption capacity, Japanese market surpassed that of America and became the world's largest market. Japanese manufacturers made full use of this advantage and achieved leapfrog development, gaining 52% of the world market share. In the 1990s, the market was driven by personal computers, a trend Japanese manufacturer ignored. The share of Japanese manufacturing industry was declining year by year, and has now dropped to less than half of its peak.
在20世纪80年代末，情况发生了巨大变化。由于消费能力的快速增长，日本市场超过了美国市场，成为世界第一大市场。日本制造商充分利用这一优势，实现了跨越式发展，并得到了52%的世界市场份额。在20世纪90年代，市场是由个人电脑驱动的，日本制造商错过了这一潮流。日本制造业所占份额逐年下降，目前已降至峰值的不到一半。
The second factor is the transformation of technology and products. From the late 1970s to the 1980s, DRAM products have been at the center of Japan's rapid export to the United States. In a sense, DRAM is a specialty of Japan. Since the 1990s, however, the product mix has changed significantly. Microprocessors and logic LSIs accounted for more than memory, and the United States was more competitive in these areas.
第二个因素是技术和产品的转变。从70年代末到80年代，存储器产品（DRAM）一直处于日本对美国出口快速增长的主要国家。从某种意义上说，DRAM是日本的一种特产。然而，自1990年代以来，产品组成发生了重大变化。微处理器和逻辑LSI比重超过了存储器，美国在这些领域具有更强的竞争力。
The third factor is the role of the government responsible for industrial policy. In the 1970s, the Japanese government clearly listed semiconductor as an important national strategic field. The "VLSI project" that was started in 1976 is a symbol of this strategy. However, the project faced strong criticism from the United States, which called it a "government and private vassal system" or "System of Japan Inc." Therefore, from the end of this project in 1980 to 1995, Japan did not carry out such a cooperation project between industry and government, this period was called "the blank 15 years".
第三个因素是负责产业政策的政府的作用。20世纪70年代，日本政府明确将半导体列为国家重要战略领域。1976年开始的“超大规模集成电路工程”就是这种情况的象征。然而，该项目将面临来自美国的强烈批评，称之为“政府与私人的附庸制度”或“日本公司制度”。因此，从1980年该项目结束到1995年，日本没有进行这种工业与政府的合作项目，这一段时间被称为“空白的15年”。
At the same time, in the United States, Europe and Asia, semiconductor was positioned as "the most important strategic field of the country". Since the 1980s, with the Japanese project model as a successful example, many countries have launched large-scale public-private cooperation projects. Among them, SEMATECH, founded in 1987, made great achievements.
同时，在美国、欧洲和亚洲，半导体被定位为“国家最重要的战略领域”，20世纪80年代以来，以日本项目模式为成功范例，各国相继启动了大规模的公私合作项目。其中，1987年成立的美国SEMATECH公司取得了重大成就。
The fourth factor is the change of business model. Until the 1980s, Japan was a leader in the industry, and most semiconductor management was vertically integrated within the company. In other words, it is a system that includes almost all business operations, such as design and development, manufacturing, assembly / testing, all the way to sales. However, a great change took place in the 1990s, which is the rise of horizontal business model.
第四个因素是商业模式的变化。直到20世纪80年代，日本在该行业处于领先地位，大多数半导体管理都是在公司内部垂直整合的。换句话说，它是一个系统，几乎包括了所有的业务操作，如设计和开发、制造、组装/测试，一直到销售。然而，90年代发生了一个巨大的变化，那就是横向商业模式的兴起。
It was TSMC that led such a new movement in Taiwan. The company established a new business model (silicon foundry), which only undertakes wafer manufacturing. At the same time, a fabless business model that only designs and develops within the company has begun, in which manufacturing is outsourced. Xilinx, Altera and Qualcomm are all in this category, and these companies have been working with foundry manufacturers. Japan lagged behind in dealing with this horizontal division of labor, which is one of the reasons for its share decline.
正是台积电在台湾领导了这样一场新运动。该公司建立了一个新的商业模式（硅铸造），只承担晶圆制造。与此同时，一种只在公司内部进行设计和开发的无晶圆厂商业模式开始了，在这种模式下制造需外包。锡林克斯、Altera和高通等都属于这一类，这些公司一直在与铸造制造商合作。日本在应对这种横向分工方面落后，这也是其份额下降的原因之一。
The fifth factor is the difference of organizational form. In Japan, in many cases, semiconductor business is managed as a branch business of major electronics manufacturers, while in the United States, most are professional semiconductor manufacturers, such as Intel, Texas Instruments and micron. In Europe, they were major electrical manufacturers, such as Siemens (Germany), Phillips (Netherlands) and Thomson (France), who initially led semiconductors, but now they are all independent semiconductor companies. Similar actions have been taken in Japan, and industrial restructuring is underway. In 1999, NEC and Hitachi established Elpida, an independent DRAM company, as the first large semiconductor company in Japan. In addition, after a great recession in 2001, NEC Electronics separated from NEC, and Hitachi and Mitsubishi's system LSI departments merged to form Renesas technology. Although conditions are being created for rapid decision-making, this goal still requires a long process.
第五个因素是公司组织形式的差异。在日本，在许多情况下，半导体业务被作为主要电子制造商的分部业务进行管理，而在美国，大多数是专业半导体制造商，如英特尔、德州仪器，美光等等。在欧洲，有主要的电气制造商，如西门子（德国），菲利普斯（荷兰），汤姆森（法国）等最初领导半导体，但现在都已转变为独立的半导体专业公司。日本也开始了类似的行动，产业重组也在进行。1999年，NEC和日立的DRAM业务分拆成立了独立的DRAM公司Elpida，成为日本第一家专注半导体的大公司。此外，在2001年的一次大衰退之后，NEC电子从NEC剥离，日立和三菱的系统LSI部门合并，形成了Renesas技术。尽管目前正在为迅速作出决定创造条件，但这一目标仍需要很长的过程。
The sixth factor is the expansion of globalization. Since Japan was the world's largest market in the second half of the 1980s, Japanese semiconductor manufacturers focused on the domestic market. However, the composition of the market has changed a lot, and the shift to Asia is obvious. The challenge for Japanese manufacturers is how to cope with this change in geographical market structure.
第六个因素是全球化的扩大。由于日本在20世纪80年代后半期是世界上最大的市场，日本的半导体制造商把注意力集中在国内市场上。然而，市场构成发生了很大变化，向亚洲的转移是显而易见的。日本制造商面临的挑战是如何应对地理市场结构的这种变化。
The seventh factor is cooperation between academia, such as universities, national laboratories and industry. Because semiconductors are based on cutting-edge technology, universities and research institutions play a significant role. If we take the development history of Silicon Valley as an example, we can clearly understand that the neighboring Stanford University and the University of California / Berkeley have played a very important role. The goal of university is to play the leading role of scientific research and provide human resources. Founded in 1982 in the United States, SRC (semiconductor research Corp.) plays a central role in the cooperation between industry and academia. Since the establishment of SRC, universities in the United States have been actively engaged in semiconductor research, and the number of speeches at major international conferences has exceeded that of universities in other fields. In Japan, the SRC based Semiconductor Technology Academic Research Center (STARC) was founded in 2005, but it lagged behind SRC for more than 20 years. The reason for Japan's decline in semiconductor competitiveness is its failure to adapt to the above changes, including management and technology.
第七个因素是学术界比如大学、国家实验室和工业之间的合作。由于半导体是基于尖端技术的，大学和研究机构所扮演的角色是很重要的。如果我们以硅谷的发展历史为例，我们可以清楚地了解到，邻近的斯坦福大学和加州大学/伯克利分校发挥了非常重要的作用。大学的目标是发挥科研的主导作用，和提供人才资源。SRC（Semiconductor Research Corp.）于1982年在美国成立，在工业与学术界的合作中发挥了核心作用。自SRC成立以来，美国各大学都在积极开展半导体的研究，在各大国际会议上的演讲数量超过了其他领域的大学。在日本，以SRC为基础的半导体技术学术研究中心（STARC）于2005年成立，但当时已落后 20多年。日本半导体竞争力下降的原因是未能成功适应上述形势变化，包括管理和技术。
Conclusion
In Charles Darwin’s evolution theory, the survival of the fittest means “It isn’t the strongest of the species that survive, nor the most intelligent but the ones most responsive to change”. The semiconductor industry in Japan have lacked in the quick response to the changes for many years. The response from the Japanese government up to today also has a big problem. Until the 1970’s, the government regarded the semiconductor as an important strategic field. The change occurred after the “US-Japan Semiconductor Agreement” concluded in 1986. Since it was decided to double the market share of foreign-made semiconductors in Japan from 10% to 20% in this agreement, Japanese government made strong administrative guidance to the semiconductor users in Japan to:
Use foreign made semiconductors as much as possible, instead of Japanese made products.
That DNA embedded at that time still substantially remains unchanged until today. Due to the various factors mentioned above, the sun which rose in Japan in the 1980’s declined in the 1990’s and finally set in the big depression in 2001. Comparing today’s situation of Japanese semiconductor with that at its height, it reminds us of a phrase
The proud do not endure, they are like a dream on a spring night
but this is also a consequence of the intense dynamism of semiconductors. However, its dynamism gives new opportunities to losers, too.
在查尔斯达尔文的进化论中，适者生存意味着“生存的物种不是最强的，也不是最聪明的，而是最能适应变化”。多年来，日本半导体工业一直缺乏对这些变化的快速反应。日本政府至今的反应也有着一个大问题。直到20世纪70年代，政府将半导体视为重要的战略领域。但是到1986年的“美日半导体协议”之后一切都变了。由于在这项协议中答应了将日本国内对外国企业半导体市场份额从10%提高到20%，日本政府对日本的半导体用户作出了强有力的行政指导，
尽可能多地使用外国制造的半导体，而不是日本制造的
到今天为止这个态度基本保持着不变。由于上述各种因素的影响，20世纪80年代在日本升起的太阳在20世纪90年代开始下降，最后在2001年进入大萧条。对比日本半导体的目前和鼎盛时期的情况，它让我们想起了一句话：
骄着难久，正如春宵一梦
但这也是半导体强烈活力的结果。然而，它的活力也给失败者带来了新的机会。
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