Constitutional Political Economy2023年第1期摘要中译

全文转自微信公众号“清湖宪法研习社”

期刊简介

    期刊简介：Constitutional Political Economy《宪法政治经济学》是致力于宪法学分析广泛领域的评论杂志。其基础学科是经济学，但制度的研究要求对经济、政治、法律、哲学动机、规则和效果的多重考察。因此，本刊是包含多种不同观点的跨学科期刊。宪法分析是该期刊的主要重点，但同时也包括对公共政策、法律制度、规范和方法论问题等。该期刊是由Springer Verlag出版社出版的季刊，每期通常包含5或6篇关于宪法政治经济学、公共选择、政治理论以及法与经济学的高质量文章。

期刊网址：https://www.springer.com/journal/10602

Constitutional Political Economy

宪法政治经济学

2023年第1期

Volume 34, issue 1, March 2023

On the structure of the political party system in Indian states, 1957–2018论1957—2018年间印度各邦政党制度的结构Abstract：We develop and test an equilibrium model of party structure to account for the large and ever-changing number of political parties that contest Indian state elections. The analysis finds that the number of parties increases with the voting density of state constituencies, the heterogeneity of the state’s electorate, state per capita income and literacy levels, falls with average age while responding to a set of constitutional and legislative rules designed to affect party and electoral performance. The model is also applied to entry and exit, allowing the empirics to highlight those factors that affect party turnover rather than aggregate party numbers. The model explains better the number of parties than ENP, the effective (vote share weighted) number of parties, implying that the variability in the fringe of smaller parties has not substantially affected the vote shares received by the larger more established parties. Affirmative action, primarily in the form of increases in the proportion of seats reserved for members of special castes is associated with a reduction in both party numbers and ENP consistent with speeding the integration of scheduled castes into broader based political parties.摘要：我们开发并测试了一个政党结构的均衡模型以解释参加印度邦选举的大量且不断变化的政党数量。分析发现，政党数量的增加与邦选区的投票人口密度、邦选民的异质性、邦人均收入和识字水平有关，随着有能力回应一系列旨在影响政党和选举表现的宪法和法律规则的选民的平均年龄而下降。该模型支持经验主义学派重视那些影响政党更替的因素而非政党总人数，因而其也适用于研究（政党的）进入和退出。该模型比ENP（有效（加权投票制）政党数目）更好地解释政党数量，这意味着较小政党边缘的变化并未对较大较成熟的政党获得的投票份额产生实质性影响。肯定性行动，主要表现是增加特殊种姓成员席位的比例，这导致了政党成员数量和ENP的减少，而它们有利于加快在册种姓融入基础更广泛的政党。J. Stephen Ferris，Department of Economics, Carleton University, Ottawa, K1S 5B6, CanadaBharatee Bhusana Dash，School of Economics, XIM University, Bhubaneswar, India

Branching on the bench: quantifying division in the supreme court with trees法庭的分支：最高法院分裂的树形结构评价法Abstract：The popular method of ideal point estimation provides empirical legal scholars with spatial representations of the Supreme Court justices that help elucidate ideological inclinations and voting behavior. This is done primarily in one dimension, where politics dominates, though recent work details a second dimension capturing differing attitudes on the authority of various legal actors. This paper explores a new network-theoretic tree-based method for visualizing the relationships between the justices, based on their voting records, that allows scholars to study the intricate branching structure of the Court. It is shown how this tool can be used to uncover periods in the Court’s history where the balance on the bench fractured in unusual and interesting ways. Moreover, by defining several tree-based measures and charting their evolution over time, a picture emerges that throughout the past fifty years the Court became increasingly linear and bipolar, dividing along political lines.摘要：流行的理想点评估方法为实证法学者提供了最高法院大法官的空间表达图谱，这有助于解释法官的意识形态倾向和投票行为。尽管最近的工作聚焦于捕捉最高法院对各种法律实践者权威不同态度的第二维度，但本研究主要是在政治占主导地位的维度上完成的。本文开发了一种新的树形网络理论的方法，该方法通过呈现大法官之间基于投票记录的直观化关系，使学者能够研究法院错综复杂的分支结构。文章展示了如何运用这个工具呈现以不寻常和有趣的方式打破法庭平衡的最高法院历史。此外，通过确定若干树形度量值并绘制其随时间推移的演变情况，可以看出，过去五十年中，最高法院因为政治路线的差异变得越来越线性化和两极化。Noah Giansiracusa，Department of Mathematical Sciences, Bentley University, Waltham, MA, USA

A master of two servants: lessons from the israeli experience about the effect of separation of powers on public accountability and social welfare一主二仆：来自以色列关于权力分立影响公共问责制和社会福利经验的教训Abstract：History is abundant with authoritarian rulers who reluctantly delegated governance powers to other institutions. Nevertheless, the intriguing question is why would democratic powerful rulers delegate powers voluntarily to (probably) contrarian institutions and tolerate activism that impedes the implementation of their election commitments. I develop a principal-agent model based on Fiorina’s blame-deflection hypothesis that politicians use the separation of powers principle as a shield against public criticism and accountability and addresses Stephenson’s criticism. I show that in subgame-perfect equilibrium, the agent manipulates the principal. The extended model embeds experience and impartial judiciary and shows that the equilibria are preserved, but social welfare is lower.摘要：历史上充斥着威权统治者，他们不情愿地将治理权力委托给其他机构。然而，有趣的是，为什么民主而强大的统治者会自愿将权力委托给（可能）唱反调的团体，并容忍阻碍其选举承诺实施的激进主义者。我根据Fiorina的“问责-回避”假说（《国会：华盛顿建制的基石》，耶鲁大学出版社，英国，1977年;《公共选择》1982年第39期：第33—66页）提出了一个“委托—代理”模式。该假说认为政治家使用权力分立原则作为抵御公众批评和问责的盾牌，并回应了Stephenson的批评（《法律研究杂志》第32期，第59—89页）。我的研究表明，在子博弈完美均衡结构中，代理者操纵主体。嵌入了经验和司法公正的扩展模型表明：权力是平衡的，但社会福利是低下的。Mordechai E. Schwarz，Department of Economics and Management, The Open University of Israel and Open University Institute for Policy Analysis, Ra’anana, Israel

Building inclusive institutions in polarized scenarios在两极分化情景中建立包容性制度Abstract：We study how the polarization of voters and platforms influences political participation and the political inclusion of others in a series of lab-in-the-field experiments run in Colombia. We present a novel experimental methodology to understand the endogenous generation of political institutions in a polarized scenario. Participants in our experiment donate a substantial amount of money to one of two charities in small groups. By bidding for their political rights (freedom of expression, freedom of choice, voting rights) or the rights of others, we elicit the value of political participation and political inclusion in a between-subjects manipulation, using an incentive-compatible mechanism. As individuals endogenously bid for different political rights, the rules governing the choice of charities are endogenously selected. We control participants' political ideology (endogenous polarization), and we manipulate the distance between charities (exogenously imposing high/low party polarization) in a within-subjects’ manipulation. Our experimental results suggest that the polarization of platforms (charities) does not increase willingness to participate in politics or to include others in the political process. However, the endogenous polarization of participants becomes central to understand our results: moderates are willing to pay more for political inclusion than for political participation. In contrast, solid liberals and conservatives (polarized individuals) prioritize political participation over inclusion.摘要：在哥伦比亚进行的一系列田野实验中，我们研究了选民和平台的两极分化如何影响政治参与和其他主体的政治包容。我们提出了一种新的实验方法来理解两极分化境况中政治制度的内源性生成。我们实验的参与者向小组中的两个慈善机构之一捐赠了大量资金。我们利用激励兼容的机制，通过在他们的政治权利（言论自由、选择自由、投票权）或他人权利中的竞价实验，以主体间性控制方法探究政治参与和政治包容的价值。由于个人内生式地争取不同的政治权利，因此控制慈善机构选择的规则也是内生选择的。我们不仅控制参与者内生性极化的政治意识，还以主体内部控制理论操纵慈善机构之间的距离（外源性提高/降低政党两极分化）。我们的实验结果表明，平台（慈善机构）的两极分化并没有增加政治参与或将他人纳入政治进程的意愿。然而，参与者的内生两极分化成为理解我们结果的核心：温和派愿为政治包容比为政治参与付出更多。相比之下，坚定的自由主义者和保守主义者（两极分化下的个人）优先考虑政治参与而非包容。Lina Restrepo-Plaza，Universidad del Valle, Cali, ColombiaEnrique Fatas，Center for Social Norms and Behavioral Dynamics, University of Pennsylvania, Philadelphia, PA, USA；Escuela de Administración, Universidad ICESI, Cali, Colombia

How cooperative is “cooperative federalism”? The political limits to intergovernmental cooperation under a de facto concurrency rule“合作联邦制”有多合作？并行规则下政府间合作的政治限制Abstract: Proponents of “cooperative federalism” claim that intergovernmental behaviour is endogenous to legal rules about legislative competences: a concurrency rule systematically induces intergovernmental cooperation, where an exclusivity rule systematically impedes it. Citing the imperative for greater cooperation, courts in classical, or dualist, federal systems have used legal doctrine to fashion zones of de facto legislative concurrency. We develop a formal model to explore the soundness of this reasoning. Our analysis complicates courts’ simplistic expectation. Under our assumptions, cooperation may be supported in equilibrium, but only under quite restrictive conditions. We show how the impact (if any) of a de facto concurrency rule on government behaviour depends on the paramountcy rule, government policy preferences relative to the status quo, policy development costs, and the risk of costly political backlash. We pair our theoretical analysis with a study of Canadian federalism jurisprudence and its impact on Canadian securities regulation.摘要：“合作联邦制”的支持者声称，政府间行为与有关立法权限的法律规则有内在关联：并行规则系统性地促进政府间合作，而排他性规则则施以全面的障碍。古典或二元联邦制度下的法院以加强合作的必要性为由，利用法律原则来塑造事实上的现代立法并行领域。我们开发了一个规范的模型来探索这种推理的合理性。我们的分析认为法院的简单期望实则不易实现。根据我们的假设，合作只在相当有限的条件下于均衡的情势中得以实现。我们展示了事实上的并行规则对政府行为的影响（如果有的话），而后者往往取决于主权规则、政府关于现状的政策偏好、政策制定成本以及代价高昂的政治反弹的风险。本文将我们的理论分析与对加拿大联邦主义司法判例及其对加拿大证券监管的影响的研究相结合。Christa Scholtz，McGill University, Montreal, CanadaAndrei Munteanu，Université du Québec à Montréal, Montreal, Canada

Book Review书评The decline and rise of democracy, by David Stasavage Princeton: Princeton University Press 2020 pp 406 ISBN 978-0-6971-17746 (hbk)民主的衰落与兴起，普林斯顿大学出版社2020年版Abstract：The book is a thorough analysis of why in ancient times democracy in the sense of government by consent emerged in some places, how it went into retreat, and then re-emerged and transformed into modern representative government in various parts of the world, but failed to launch in other parts. The themes of the book are the origins and causes of democratic governance, the endurance of autocracy in some places, the correlation between democracy and economic development, the significance of state capacity, and a message of optimism about the future of democracy.Over 350 pages divided in twelve chapters, Stasavage, a prominent political scientist, tells a fascinating story and presents a robust analysis emphasizing three causal factors for the establishment of government by consent and democracy. First, geography, especially the morphology of soil used for cultivation. Second, information deficiencies, principally, the inability of rulers to observe and measure the size of activities that can be taxed unless assisted by a network of persons willing to cooperate with the rulers. Third, the time sequence of events when initial conditions and contigencies may demarcate the course of future developments. Stasavage argues that democracy is a human invention, not a specifically European one, but far from being inevitable. However, compared to the rest of the world, in the course of history Europe innovated in two ways, it established assemblies representing large geographical areas and formalized elections, attributes which culminated with the rise of modern democracy.摘要：本书对于古代有些地方出现授权意义上的民主之原因及其衰落以及其在世界多地重新出现并转变为现代代议制政府但在其他地方却未能显现的历程进行了透彻的分析。本书的主题是民主治理的起源和原因、一些地方专制的持久性、民主与经济发展之间的关联、国家能力的重要性以及作者对民主未来的乐观与信心。全书共350多页，分为十二章，作者Stasavage作为一个著名政治学家，讲述了一个引人入胜的故事，并对于基于同意的民主政府得以建立的三个因素进行了有力分析。第一，地理状况，特别是用于耕作的土壤形态。第二，信息劣势。主要是：若统治者无法获得与其有合作意愿人群的协助，其无法观察和衡量可以征税的事项规模。第三，可能形塑未来发展进程的初始条件和偶然事件发生的时间顺序。斯塔萨维奇认为，民主是人类的发明，并非欧洲独有的必然的产物。然而，与世界其他地区相比，欧洲在其历史进程中创造了两条路径，它建立了代表广泛地理区域的议会和正式的选举制度，这些最终推动了现代民主的兴起。George Tridimas，Department of Accounting Finance and Economics, Ulster Business School, York, BT15 1ED, Belfast, UK