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【直播】【QuACT系列报告】伏虎：The Vickrey Auction as a Prior Independent...
本系列报告由中国科学院计算技术研究所主办，于2021年6月17日10:00开始，授权蔻享学术进行网络直播。
直播二维码
The Vickrey Auction as a Prior Independent Auction--Improvements and Generalizations of the Bulow-Klemperer Theorem
报告人
伏虎（上海财经大学）
时间
2021年6月17日 10:00-11:00
Bulow and Klemperer's theorem is a fundamental result in auction theory. It states that, in a single-item auction where the n bidders' values are independently and identically drawn from a regular distribution, the Vickrey auction with one additional bidder (a duplicate) extracts at least as much revenue as the optimal auction without the duplicate. As a consequence of Bulow-Klemperer, the Vickrey auction is an approximately optimal auction for all regular distributions when there are at least two bidders. We show that, interestingly, it is not the optimal such prior-independent auction, and survey recent works that yield further results in this direction. In the second half of the talk we show that, when the bidders' values are not necessarily drawn from an identical distribution, adding a carefully chosen duplicate suffices to help the Vickrey auction keep a constant fraction of the optimal revenue. This improves the number of duplicates needed for such an approximation given in a well-known work by Hartline and Roughgarden (2009).
报告人简介
Hu Fu has been an associate professor at the Institute for Theoretical Computer Science (ITCS) at Shanghai University of Finance and Economics (SHUFE) since 2021. Prior to this, he was an assistant professor at the University of British Columbia from 2016 to 2020. He earned his PhD in computer science at Cornell University, supervised by Bobby Kleinberg. Subsequently, he was a postdoc at Microsoft Research, New England Lab and Caltech. Hu's research interest is mainly in computational questions in economics.
编辑：黄琦
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