【周末荐读】Steve H. Hanke：The Hong Kong Dollar, Rock Solid | 稳定的港币
观点摘要：货币投机者已将目标瞄准了港币。由于中国的经济发展放缓，资本外逃继续，空头圈有说法认为人民币相对美元的价值会降低。有人断言，这将会对港币造成压力，并迫使其编制。这使得7.8港币=1美元的固定利率变成无效的空谈，并把利润注入把注押在港币将贬值的人的口袋里。
但就像像过去对港币的投机性攻击一样，这次的攻击也将失败，空头们将被迫遭受较大损失。许多经验丰富的外汇投机者，都几乎对香港的货币设置机制完全不了解。
香港的固定汇率有许混乱不明的地方。香港汇率制度和他们的特征共有三种类型的制度：浮动汇率，固定汇率和钉住汇率。
在固定和浮动汇率制度下，货币当局在一段时间内只针对一个目标。虽然浮动和固定利率似乎不一样，但他们都属于自由市场。这两种汇率都没有外汇管制，都是为国际收支调整服务的自由市场机制。在固定汇率制度下，一个国家的货币基础是由国际收支平衡决定的，它与外汇储备的变化是一对一的对应关系。浮动和固定利率制度本质上是一个平衡系统，在此之下市场会被迫自动调整金融流动，避免国际收支危机。“固定汇率”钉住汇率制度经常使用外汇管制，并且不以自由市场机制作为国际收支平衡的调整手段。它们本质上是不平衡的系统，也缺乏自动调节机制，需要一个中央银行来管理汇率和货币政策。在钉住汇率制度下，货币基础同时包含国内和国外的组成部分。
与浮动和固定汇率不同，钉住汇率必然导致货币政策与汇率政策的冲突。中国人民币属于钉住汇率制度范畴。人民币的货币基础围绕着外国和国内的组成部分。此外，中国实行资本管制。所以，人民币空头可能会像闻到血的熊一样蠢蠢欲动。
港币通过货币发行机制和挂钩的美元，并不属于这种情况。因此，必须由外汇储备支持货币局货币基础 （储备货币）——100%，或稍微多一些。下表显示所谓货币局的“储备法则”在香港是被严格遵循的。“流动法则”，即储备金的改变必须和货币局的外汇储备变化一一对应，在香港也被严格遵循。
从来没有一个如香港一般遵从了货币发行局制度后被投机攻击打垮的机制，香港也不会是第一个。
全文翻译如下
货币投机者们又开始蠢蠢欲动了。据说他们中类似George Soros和Kyle Bass这样的人已将目标瞄准了港币。由于中国的经济发展放缓，资本外逃继续，空头圈有说法认为人民币相对美元的价值会降低。有人断言，这将会对港币造成压力，并迫使其编制。这使得7.8港币=1美元的固定利率变成无效的空谈，并把利润注入把注押在港币将贬值的人的口袋里。 就像像过去对港币的投机性攻击一样，这次的攻击也将失败，空头们（谐音熊）将被迫回到“冬眠”状态，遭受较大损失。有趣的是许多像George Soros这样经验丰富的外汇投机者，都几乎对香港的货币设置机制完全不了解。这离第一次针对港币的投机性攻击已经过去很久了；最大一次规模的攻击是在1997-1998年的亚洲金融危机时期。我们不可忘记对冲基金专家Bill Ackerman在2011年那针对港币为大家所熟知为“赌一把”攻击的惨败。 不是只有货币投机者不了解香港。金融记者——甚至他们中非常有对于香港市场的经验者——都显然不明白决定港币发行的机制。例如前摩根斯坦利分析师、南中国早报的专栏作家Jake van der Kamp，最近写了一篇挑衅性地题为“从货币发行制度到香蕉共和国操控手段”的专栏文章煽动投机的火焰。香港从1983年开始施行的货币制度的建立者，同时也是香港金融管理局成员的John Greenwood对此作出了回应。Greenwood礼貌地惩罚了van der Kamp，并且说Kamp并不知道自己在说些什么，Kamp也识时务地说他犯了错误。 那么，为什么像香港这样对于汇率——尤其是货币发行局制度里的固定汇率有这么多混乱不明的地方？要回答这个问题，我们必须了解汇率制度和他们特征的分类。如下表所示，共有三种类型的制度：浮动汇率，固定汇率和钉住汇率。 在固定和浮动汇率制度下，货币当局在一段时间内只针对一个目标。虽然浮动和固定利率似乎不一样，但他们都属于自由市场。这两种汇率都没有外汇管制，都是为国际收支调整服务的自由市场机制。在浮动汇率下，中央银行设置了一个货币政策，但是汇率是自动调整的。因此，货币基础是由中央银行决定的。在固定汇率下，有两种可能性：要么货币局规定汇率和货币供应量自动调整，或者国家“美元化”，使用美元或者其他外币作为本币，同时货币供应依然是自动调整。 在固定汇率制度下，一个国家的货币基础是由国际收支平衡决定的，它与外汇储备的变化是一对一的对应关系。无论是浮动还是固定利率，货币政策和汇率政策之间不存在冲突，而国际收支危机也不能兴风作浪。浮动和固定利率制度本质上是一个平衡系统，在此之下市场会被迫自动调整金融流动，避免国际收支危机。 大多数人把“固定汇率”和“钉住汇率”认为是可以互换或几乎可以互换的术语。实际上，他们是非常不同的汇率机制。钉住汇率制度下货币局在一段时间内有多于一个的目标。钉住汇率制度有很多种：爬行钉住汇率制度，可调整的钉住汇率，管理浮动汇率，等等。钉住汇率制度经常使用外汇管制，并且不以自由市场机制作为国际收支平衡的调整手段。它们本质上是不平衡的系统，也缺乏自动调节机制，需要一个中央银行来管理汇率和货币政策。在钉住汇率制度下，货币基础同时包含国内和国外的组成部分。 与浮动和固定汇率不同，钉住汇率必然导致货币政策与汇率政策的冲突。例如，当资本流入在钉住汇率下变得“过量”时，中央银行经常试图通过出售债券，减少基础货币的内币持有来，为随后增持的基础货币的外币部分消毒。而当资金外流“过量”的时候，中央银行往往会通过购买债券，增持基础货币的内部部分来弥补货币基础的外币减持。当中央银行开始弥补越来越多地在内币建立基础货币的同时弥补基础货币外币的减持的时候，国际收支危机就爆发了。当这种情况发生后，货币投机者们发现即期汇率和货币政策之间的矛盾，人民币贬值，利率上升且实施外汇管制就只是时间问题了。 随附的货币组成图清楚地显示，中国人民币属于钉住汇率制度范畴。人民币的货币基础围绕着外国和国内的组成部分。此外，中国实行资本管制。所以，人民币空头可能会像闻到血的熊一样蠢蠢欲动。 港币通过货币发行机制和挂钩的美元，并不属于这种情况。因此，必须由外汇储备支持货币局货币基础 （储备货币）——100%，或稍微多一些。下表显示所谓货币局的“储备法则”在香港是被严格遵循的。“流动法则”，即储备金的改变必须和货币局的外汇储备变化一一对应，在香港也被严格遵循（见附图）。 从来没有一个如香港一般遵从了货币发行局制度后被投机攻击打垮的机制，香港也不会是第一个。事实上，港币的货币发行制度正如期待那样地运作着，这也是它不会被打垮的原因。 那么，会发生什么呢？当美联储采取量化宽松时，美元流入了香港。现在美联储已经开始对美联储的资金利率进行了提高，资金流向已经逆转。因此，货币发行部门自动收紧，私营部门的广义货币和对私人部门的都降低到了低于其趋势水平的程度（见附图）。 这就是应该发生的事情。我们或许期待香港经济放缓。但是，港币仍然稳如磐石。
英文原文如下
The currency speculators are restless, again. Many, like George Soros and Kyle Bass, are reportedly taking aim at the Hong Kong dollar (HKD). HKD bear circles think China’s renmimbi (RMB) will lose value against the U.S. dollar (USD) as China’s economy slows down and capital flight from China continues. This, it is asserted, will put pressure on the HKD, and force its devaluation. Thus rendering the fixed rate of 7.8 HKD/USD null and void, and pumping profits into the pockets of those who bet on a devaluation of the HKD.
Like past speculative attacks against the HKD, this will fail and the bears will be forced back into hibernation, suffering large losses. What is fascinating is how so many experienced currency speculators, like George Soros, can be so ill-informed about Hong Kong’s monetary setup. This is far from the first speculative attack on the HKD; the most massive occurred during the Asian Financial Crisis of 1997-98. We cannot forget hedge fund guru Bill Ackerman’s well-advertised “bet the house” attack against the HKD in 2011. It failed badly.
The currency speculators aren’t the only ones ill-informed about Hong-Kong. Financial journalists — even veterans with Hong Kong market experience — clearly don’t understand the currency board system that governs the course of the HKD. For example, Jake van der Kamp, a columnist at the South China Morning Post and former analyst at Morgan Stanley, recently fanned the speculative flames by penning a provocative column titled “From a Currency Board to a Banana Republic Manipulation.” This brought out a response from John Greenwood, the architect of Hong Kong’s currency board system, installed in 1983, and a member of the Currency Board Committee of the Hong Kong Monetary Authority. Greenwood politely took van der Kamp to the woodshed and told him that he didn’t know what he was talking about, and van der Kamp had the good sense to admit that he had sinned.
So, why is there so much confusion about exchange rates — particularly fixed exchange rates delivered by currency board systems, like Hong Kong’s? To answer that question, we must develop a taxonomy of exchange-rate regimes and their characteristics. As shown in the accompanying table, there are three types of regimes: floating, fixed, and pegged.
In fixed and floating rate regimes the monetary authority aims for only one target at a time. Although floating and fixed rates appear dissimilar, they are members of the same free-market family. Both operate without exchange controls and are free-market mechanisms for balance-of-payments adjustments. With a floating rate, a central bank sets a monetary policy, but the exchange rate is on autopilot. In consequence, the monetary base is determined domestically by a central bank. With a fixed rate, there are two possibilities: either a currency board sets the exchange rate and the money supply is on autopilot, or a country is “dollarized” and uses the U.S. dollar, or another foreign currency, as its own and the money supply is again on autopilot.
Under a fixed-rate regime, a country’s monetary base is determined by the balance of payments, which move in a one-to-one correspondence with changes in its foreign reserves. With either a floating or a fixed rate, there cannot be conflicts between monetary and exchange rate policies, and balance-of-payments crises cannot rear their ugly heads. Floating and fixed-rate regimes are inherently equilibrium systems in which market forces act to automatically rebalance financial flows and avert balance-of- payments crises.
Most people use “fixed” and “pegged” as interchangeable or nearly interchangeable terms for exchange rates. In reality, they are very different exchange-rate arrangements. Pegged-rate systems are those in which the monetary authority aims for more than one target at a time. They come in many varieties: crawling pegs, adjustable pegs, bands, managed floats, and more. Pegged systems often employ exchange controls and are not free-market mechanisms for international balance-of-payments adjustments. They are inherently disequilibrium systems, lacking an automatic adjustment mechanism. They require a central bank to manage both the exchange rate and monetary policy. With a pegged rate, the monetary base contains both domestic and foreign components.
Unlike floating and fixed rates, pegged rates invariably result in conflicts between monetary and exchange rate policies. For example, when capital inflows become “excessive” under a pegged system, a central bank often attempts to sterilize the ensuing increase in the foreign component of the monetary base by selling bonds, reducing the domestic component of the base. And when outflows become “excessive,” a central bank often attempts to offset the decrease in the foreign component of the monetary base by buying bonds, increasing the domestic component of the monetary base. Balance-of-payments crises erupt as a central bank begins to offset more and more of the reduction in the foreign component of the monetary base with domestically created base money. When this occurs, it is only a matter of time before currency speculators spot the contradictions between exchange rate and monetary policies and force a devaluation, interest-rate increases, the imposition of exchange controls, or all three.
As the accompanying monetary composition chart makes clear, China’s RMB falls into the pegged regime category. The RMB’s monetary base has foreign and domestic components that move around. In addition, China imposes capital controls. So, the RMB bears might be smelling blood.
That’s not the case with the HKD, which is linked to the USD via a currency board. As such, the board’s monetary base (reserve money) must be backed by foreign reserves — 100%, or slightly more. The accompanying chart shows that this so-called currency board “backing (or ‘stock’) rule” is strictly followed in Hong Kong. The “flow rule” — that reserve money must change in a one-to-one relationship with changes in the currency board’s foreign exchange reserves — is also strictly followed in Hong Kong (see the accompanying chart).
There has never been a system that followed currency board rules — like Hong Kong’s — that has been broken by a speculative attack. And Hong Kong’s will not be the first. Indeed, its currency board is operating exactly as it should, which is why it can’t be broken.
So, what will happen? When the U.S. Fed embraced quantitative easing, USDs flowed into Hong Kong. Now that the Fed has started to notch up the Fed funds rate, the flows have reversed. In consequence, the currency board is automatically tightening up, and both broad money and credit to the private sector are decelerating and are below their trend rates (see the accompanying chart).
This is just what is supposed to happen. We should expect a slow-down in the Hong Kong economy. But, the HKD will remain rock solid.
👉 【周末荐读】美联储如何避免与中国之间的汇率战？
👉 【周末荐读】资本项目管理与资本项目可兑换
👉 【周末荐读】金融危机之前车殷鉴——2008年金融危机深度分析及启示
👉 【周末荐读】孙鲁军：关于人民币汇率制度改革的几点思考
周一“宏观经济与政策”、周二“商业银行与财富管理”、周三“金融稳定与金融监管”、周四“国际金融与人民币国际化”、周五“互联网金融与资产证券化”、周末“好文荐读与读史”。查看更多学术成果可登录“国际货币网”（www.imi.org.cn）。
欢迎读者朋友多多留言与我们交流互动，推荐好文章可联系：邮箱：imi@ruc.edu.cn；电话：010-62516755