【周末荐读】美联储如何避免与中国之间的汇率战？
观点摘要：在当前多元货币储备体系不完全的构架中，一个关键却被忽视的一点就是中美货币互换链。当下，这两大经济体通过协商达成的联储—央行互换协议正是积极处理两国货币关系的一个重要举措。这一协议旨在为国际金融市场提供美元和人民的流动性。联储－央行（Fed-PBoC）协议主要强调了人民币在针对其主要交易对手时体现的稳定性，这将会给金融市场带来一定的稳定。
联储－央行（Fed-PBoC）记录表明，超过3500亿元（520亿美元）的互换协议在中国和英格兰银行、欧洲银行之间生效。即便超过1000亿的互换协议仍然在会限制性条例下出现，但是从中国官方的储备来看，已经从2014年中期的峰值4万亿美元降低到了3.3万亿。
此协议在美国内引起一系列的质疑，但是联储官方依然坚持此次协议与他国互换条约的相似性。特别的，互换协议在各个中央银行的操作和政策水平之内被决定，并且不需要法律上的支持。
另外一个跟深远的事实是，这样的协议可以有效的避免美国和中国之间由于人民币贬值引起的汇率战。因为这种汇率战会在美国每一个选举年影响到美国投资者。这样的协议可以有效的平静由于当年日元贬值引起的国内紧张。
目前，现有的5种永久性的互换协议覆盖了包括加元、欧元、日元、瑞士法郎等一系列全球化的货币——根据美国金融机构的外汇储备基金的报道。但是人民币始终没有完全在资本交易中得到便捷的转换。但是根据11月份的决定——人民币加入国际货币基金组织SDR之前，中国央行的互换协议在SDR 10月份生效之前促进了这种融合的进程。
因此，相当一部分国际性关注点在于人民币的弱势相对于美元的强势上，却少有关注在两者交易权重的稳定性上。据相关数据显示，人民币在去年名义升值为3.7%左右，实际上升值3.9%，而2014年，名义上升值为6.2%，实际上为6.1% 。
英文原文如下
One key element that is missing in the incomplete architecture of the developing multicurrency reserve system is a swap line between the U.S. and China. It is time that the world’s two largest economies filled this lacuna by negotiating a Federal Reserve-People’s Bank of China swap agreement in each other’s currencies, with the aim of supplying dollar and yuan liquidity on international financial markets.
Most of the more than 30 swap lines agreed between the PBoC and foreign central banks in the last eight years have been designed to help renminbi (yuan) settlement of international trade and investment — though they have also been used in currency support for some emerging-market trading partners.
A Fed-PBoC accord, with the full-scale backing of the U.S. Treasury, would command more headlines. It would emphasize steadying the yuan against its main trading partners, with a major potential effect in calming financial markets.
A Sino-American swap line would also strengthen the U.S. Treasury’s bid to regain ground in international financial diplomacy, following Washington’s less than sure-footed handling of the establishment of the China-backed Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank last year.
In line with these ambitious goals, a Fed-PBoC accord would probably have to exceed the 350 billion yuan ($52 billion) swap lines in force between China and the Bank of England and the European Central Bank. Even a $100 billion swap line might appear of limited relevance, in view of the strains on official Chinese reserves, down to $3.3 trillion from the $4 trillion peak in mid-2014.
But the symbolic effect in shoring up the Chinese authorities’ exchange commitment would be unmistakable.
Questions might be asked in Congress about the possible repercussions for U.S. taxpayers of a contingent credit accord between the U.S. and Chinese central banks. But Fed and Treasury officials would able to argue that such an agreement would be similar to standing arrangements between the Fed and other major foreign central banks. Typically, swap agreements are decided at the operational and policy levels between individual central banks, and do not require legislative approval.
A further factor helping calm the political environment for such an accord is that it would lower the probability that Chinese depreciation would spark further “currency wars” between major trading partners, harming U.S. exporters in a U.S. election year. The accord would help calm nerves in Japan about undue depreciation of the yuan against the yen.
It would pave the way too for more constructive engagement between the U.S. and China extending beyond present dollar strength, preparing for the inevitable time — perhaps in two or three years — when the greenback starts to weaken again.
Under arrangements formalized in 2007 and made permanent in 2013, the Fed maintains swap lines with the Bank of Canada, the Bank of England, the ECB, the Bank of Japan, and the Swiss National Bank. Earlier, the Fed built swap lines with Australia, Brazil, Denmark, Korea, Mexico, New Zealand, Norway, Singapore and Sweden, though these were withdrawn after the acute phase of the trans-Atlantic financial crisis.
The five permanent swap accords cover arrangements with the institutions issuing Canadian dollars, sterling, euros, yen and Swiss francs — currencies used globally, accounting for the bulk of the foreign currency funding of U.S. financial institutions.
The yuan is still not fully convertible for capital transactions. But following November’s decision (backed by the U.S. Treasury) for the yuan to enter the International Monetary Fund’s special drawing right (joining the dollar, euro, sterling and yen), the PBoC’s swap accord absence appears glaring, promoting the need for inclusion before the SDR decision takes effect on Oct. 1.
There has been considerable international focus on the yuan’s weakness against a generally strong dollar, but less so on its relative trade-weighted stability. According to indices from the Bank for International Settlements, the yuan rose by 3.7% last year on a nominal trade-weighted basis, 3.9% in real (inflation adjusted) terms, compared with 6.2% nominally and 6.1% in real terms in 2014.
👉 黄达回忆录：我的家庭 | 忆旧纪年（一）
👉 黄达回忆录：我家的亲戚关系 | 忆旧纪年（二）
👉 黄达回忆录：童年时的天津“城里”（上） | 忆旧纪年（三）
👉 黄达回忆录：童年时的天津“城里”（下） | 忆旧纪年（四）
周一“宏观经济与政策”、周二“商业银行与财富管理”、周三“金融稳定与金融监管”、周四“国际金融与人民币国际化”、周五“互联网金融与资产证券化”、周末“好文荐读与读史”。查看更多学术成果可登录IMI官网“国际货币网”（www.imi.org.cn）。
欢迎读者朋友多多留言与我们交流互动，推荐好文章可联系：邮箱：imi@ruc.edu.cn；电话：010-62516755