【周末荐读】David Marsh: 聚焦英国脱欧公投——首相卡梅伦的两大误判(附英文原文)
本文选自IMI学术委员、货币金融机构官方论坛(OMFIF)常务董事、执行总裁David Marsh为OMFIF“英国脱欧公投”话题撰写的系列评论。
作为英国著名经济学家、华尔街日报专栏作家、评论员,David Marsh用精妙的语言分析了英国对欧盟的政策及影响,指出在“英国脱欧”问题中,英首相卡梅伦的对欧盟策略存在的两大误判。
作者认为,卡梅伦提出英国脱欧并未帮助保守党减少党内分歧,反而加剧了党内矛盾。另一方面,卡梅伦在2013年首次提出“”脱欧公投“时认为欧盟在未来几年将不断加大政治经济一体化的进程,从而英国能更灵活地与欧盟谈判,同时仍保持在经济和安全领域关键决策的控制权。然而目前来看,欧盟在移民、社会安全、就业、投资、教育、经济增长等诸多领域面对诸多严峻挑战,而在如何解决这些问题至今仍没有很好的答案,当前欧盟形势似乎并不如卡梅伦最初预测那般乐观。
直至6月23日英国正式公投,OMFIF将针该话题持续发布100篇社评,本文为该系列中的第77篇。
英文原文如下:
Consequences of a non-settlement
Prime minister's miscalculations in EU strategy
by David Marsh in London
The European Union’s sorry state of paralysis is summed up in a tale of two speeches, three years apart. The chronicle provides ammunition for both sides in the UK’s in-out debate ahead of the 23 June EU referendum.
In a 40-minute address to the Bloomberg media group in January 2013 setting down the framework for a possible plebiscite, David Cameron mentioned no less than seven times hopes for an EU ’settlement’ to improve the bloc’s cohesiveness. In a speech of similar length at the British Museum on 9 May, how many times did the UK prime minister utter the word ’settlement’? Not once.
In his EU strategy, Cameron has made two key miscalculations. The first – less forgivable, in view of prior knowledge of the Conservatives’ predilection for knifing themselves in the back – was his belief that the referendum ploy would heal divisions within his party instead of, as is now apparent, inflaming them.
The other, more excusable, was Cameron’s assumption in 2013 that, by now, Europe would have taken firm steps towards becoming a more integrated political and economic community to meet its longer-term needs, above all in holding together monetary union.
Britain, for its part, he foresaw in 2013, would be able to negotiate flexible arrangements in keeping with UK desire to retain control over key decision-making on security and economics.
The depressing reality is that, in the intervening 36 months, in nearly all important areas, Europe has made practically no progress in preparing a better long-term basis – beyond taking further steps to implement already overdue plans for ’banking union’.
Thoroughgoing treaty change on which the French and Germans can agree is still years away – and may never happen. Brexiteers say the disarray shows the EU is unreformable. Pro-EU campaigners can point out, somewhat half-heartedly, that at least it demonstrates the unrealisablity of a European 'superstate'.
Europe’s stasis is symbolised by the inconclusive 24 May finance ministers’ accord on Greece. This allows Athens sufficient liquidity to make essential repayments this summer, but postpones until the end of the year (and probably until after next year’s French and German elections) key decisions on restructuring debts. Crucially, the International Monetary Fund will not decide until end-2016 whether to take part in the latest bail-out – although this merely postpones vital questions on whether and how Greek creditors will provide longer-term support.
The challenges confronting the EU – over migration, defence, social security, jobs, investment, education, growth and money – have increased in inverse proportion to its ability to resolve them.
Cameron in January 2013 said the EU’s ’main, overriding purpose’ was ’not to win peace, but to secure prosperity’. He foresaw ’a new settlement subject to the democratic legitimacy and accountability of national parliaments where member states combine in flexible co-operation, respecting national differences, not always trying to eliminate them.’
On 9 May, Cameron offered no hint of any forthcoming positive changes, emphasising far more the security, defence and economic risks of upsetting the status quo.
The migration crisis and tensions over Russia and the Middle East have inevitably darkened the backcloth. In January 2013 Cameron mentioned ’security’ twice and ’war’ three times; in his May 2016 address there were 20 references to ’security’ and six to ’war’.
In both speeches, Cameron brought up Commonwealth war cemeteries and the hundreds of thousands of British servicemen who died in two world wars. So Europe in 2016 offers a chance, perhaps, of averting some undefined tragedy, but very little hope of a better future. Hardly surprisingly, the vote is finely poised.
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