海外之声｜放缓金融改革的危害——现在向说客妥协还为时尚早

观点速递

本文作者是系统风险委员会主席保罗·塔克。原文摘自国际货币金融机构官方论坛（OMFIF）评论，OMFIF是一家总部位于伦敦的全球金融智库。

作者提出，目前生产力增长前景不明，债务负担持续增加，宏观经济刺激能力减弱。现在有声音要求降低大型复杂公司的股本标准、放松流动性要求、放弃中央交易对手或新决策制度，政府应该无视这些鼓噪，坚决不妥协。

最后本文作者认为，政府和立法机构不应该松懈下来、阻碍金融系统风险抵御能力进一步提高，而应确保金融机构无论何时都能为家庭和企业提供服务 ，这正是维持社会活力和繁荣的先决条件。

中文译文如下：

放缓金融改革的危害

现在向说客妥协还为时尚早

保罗·塔克

翻译：陈佳鑫

审校：肖柏高

八年前，也就是2008年底发生系统性崩溃的几个月后，各国已着手增强世界银行业和金融系统抵御危机的能力。在20国集团的共同国际计划之下，各国纷纷改革，推出相应的国家计划。

在共同基本点上达成协议反映出各国已认同，鉴于跨境银行、资本市场和保险业相互关联，在某些领域应用国际最低标准和政策符合共同利益。

在世界经济的敏感时刻，美国和欧洲有一些人呼吁撤销部分改革方案。但立法和监管机构应该注意，放缓、暂停或走回头路可能带来危害。

系统风险委员会（Systemic Risk Council）一直在跟踪美国关于“多德－弗兰克监管改革”的讨论。我们担心的是，巴塞尔银行监管委员会、甚至央行官员和负责监管审慎准则制定者的监管负责人，在严峻的行业压力下，也在讨论降低计划中的资本标准。

这些趋势十分危险。危机迟早都会卷土重来，那时有实力的银行有钱借贷，其他的小银行却没有。那些最早采取坚定行动改善金融系统的地区会从稳健的宏观经济复苏中获益良多，而改革更渐进或不坚定的地区则不会。

根据系统风险委员会的共同改革计划“五大支柱”，G20需要更为稳健的金融系统，降低失败的可能性，避免中介机构出现危机时需要财政救援。这五大支柱和以往一样重要。

企业需要拥有更多权益资本，应和他们发生危机时造成的社会和经济后果成比例。要求银行类的中介机构大幅减少流动风险敞口。监管机构有权全面监管整个系统，以确保所有中介机构以及与系统稳健高度相关的所有市场活动能够抵御风险。G20规定在可能的情况下，衍生品交易需要通过风险抵御能力更强的中央交易对手进行集中清算，以便简化中介机构的风险敞口网络。

最关键的是，制度已得到强化，可以处理所有类型、规模或国籍的金融中介机构。这样即使危机到来，这些机构也可以继续为家庭和企业提供基本业务，而不需要纳税人提供偿付支持。

在五大支柱方面的监管改革以外，审慎监管也取得了巨大进展，尤其是会针对关键中介机构和服务提供商进行定期压力测试。

而在全球债务规模持续膨胀的同时，仍有声音要求放缓改革，这些进展可能因此前功尽弃。现在不仅不应放松任一支柱的改革，更审慎的做法应是采取更强硬的措施，并且主要经济体应该补足其在危机来临时可使用的弹药，努力降低债务水平。

目前，生产力增长前景不明，债务负担持续增加，宏观经济刺激能力减弱，而改革计划并没有根据这些变化进行调整。这种情况下，监管政策制定者应该考虑是否要求银行（可能也包括其他机构）比2008年－2009年之后强调“维持稳定”时期持有更多的权益资本。

当下一次衰退到来，央行和财政当局将无法像2009年一样火力全开并维持至今。政府和立法机构不应该松懈下来、阻碍金融系统风险抵御能力进一步提高，而应确保金融机构无论何时都能为家庭和企业提供服务，而这正是维持社会活力和繁荣的先决条件。

现在有声音要求降低大型复杂公司的股本标准、放松流动性要求、放弃中央交易对手或新决策制度，政府应该无视这些鼓噪，坚决不妥协。

以上这些做法会损害民众福利，导致纳税人为受人诟病的救援计划买单。这样做还会使更多处于经济边缘化的行业和地区受到威胁，比实体经济波动带来的风险更大。

距这场危机开始已有十年，现在还不是向金融行业说客或短期的诱惑妥协的时候。过去10年工作以“稳定作为首要任务”，如今政策制定者在回顾时需要仔细鉴别、有所取舍。

英文原文如下：

Hazards of relaxing financial reform

Now is not the time to bow to lobbyists 

by Paul Tucker in Boston

Eight years ago efforts began, only a few months after the systemic collapse of late 2008, to make the global banking and financial system more resilient. Reforms around the world have brought together national initiatives under a shared international programme from the Group of 20 leading economies.

Agreement on shared elements has reflected acceptance that, in certain areas, international minimum standards and policies are in the common interest, in view of the interconnectedness of cross-border banking, capital markets and insurance.

At a sensitive time for the world economy, there are calls in the US and Europe to undo parts of the reform programme. But legislators and regulators should beware of the hazards of relaxing, suspending or back-tracking on past advances.

The Systemic Risk Council has been tracking the debates about the Dodd Frank regulatory reforms in the US. We are concerned by reports that the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, and even central bank governors and heads of supervision who oversee the prudential standard-setters, have been debating softening their plans for capital standards in the face of intense industry pressure.

That would be a perilous course. When bad times come, as sooner or later they will again, strong banks lend, weak banks do not. The jurisdictions that took the earliest, most determined actions to build financial system resilience have benefited from more solid macroeconomic recovery than those of their peers adopting a more gradual or less committed reform strategy.

Under what the SRC calls the ‘five pillars’ of the shared reform programme, the G20 has required a more resilient financial system, so as to reduce the probability of failure and to avoid fiscal bailouts when intermediaries do fail. These five pillars remain as vital as ever.

Individual firms are required to carry more equity capital, in proportion to the social and economic consequences of their failing. Banking-type intermediaries have been required to reduce materially their exposure to liquidity risks. Regulators have been empowered to adopt a system-wide view to ensure the resilience of all intermediaries and market activities materially relevant to the resilience of the system. The G20 has simplified the network of exposures among intermediaries by mandating that, wherever possible, derivatives transactions be centrally cleared by resilient central counterparties.

Crucially, enhanced regimes have been established for resolving financial intermediaries of any kind, size, or nationality so that, even in a crisis, essential services can be maintained to households and businesses without taxpayer solvency support.

These five elements of regulatory reform have been accompanied by some major developments in prudential supervision, notably regular stress testing of key intermediaries and service-providers.

These advances are put at risk by voices calling for dilution at a time when world debt has continued to increase. Far from being a moment to relax any of the five pillars of reform, it may be prudent to adopt tougher policies while leading countries replenish their macroeconomic arsenal and try to lower debt levels.

The reform programme was not calibrated for a world where productivity growth has proven elusive, the debt overhang has increased, and macroeconomic stimulus capacity is stretched. In these circumstances, regulatory policy-makers should consider whether to require banks (and possibly some others) to carry more equity than prescribed for the ‘steady state’ in the years immediately following 2008-09.

When the next recession comes, central banks and fiscal authorities will not have nearly as much firepower as they could deploy in 2009 and maintain until now. Governments and legislators should not impede further efforts to build a resilient financial system that can serve households and businesses through thick and thin – a precondition for sustaining dynamism and prosperity.

The authorities should resist siren voices urging lower equity standards for big and complex firms, slacker liquidity requirements, retreat on central counterparties, or dismantling of the new resolution regimes.

Such action would endanger the welfare of citizens and lead to additional, uniformly unpopular, taxpayer-funded bailouts. It would expose economically marginalised industries and regions to even greater risks than those caused by changes in the real economy.

Almost a decade after the start of the crisis, now is not the time to bow to financial industry lobbyists or to short-term temptations. Policy-makers must be discriminating as they review the work of the past decade – leaving stability as a priority.

Sir Paul Tucker is chair of the Systemic Risk Council, a non-partisan body of former government officials and experts which exists to promote measures to preserve financial stability. This article appeared in OMFIF Commentary. The Official Monetary and Financial Institutions Forum (OMFIF) is a global financial think-tank, headquartered in London.

观点整理  张晨希

图文编辑  张晨希

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