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海外之声 | CEPS研究员：特朗普主义与中欧的贸易政策领导力（中英双语）

Original 2017-12-10 国际货币研究所 IMI财经观察

观点速递

本文作者是欧洲政策研究中心(CEPS)前研究员胡卫年（Weinian Hu）和CEPS高级研究员雅克·佩克曼斯（Jacques Pelkmans），原文摘自欧洲政策研究中心评论（CEPS Commentaries），本文可在CEPS网站上免费下载（www.ceps.eu）。

CEPS的研究员认为，随着特朗普主义掀起了对全球贸易外交的争议，其他贸易大国应当扛起推动经济开放和全球化的大旗。欧盟和中国都不认同特朗普主义，而且如果他们愿意坚定地承担起这个领导责任，他们有能力抵抗。欧盟和中国甚至可能考虑建立中欧自由贸易区（FTA），虽然中国的说法很含糊：中国需要这样的自贸区，希望促进全球化。但中国刚刚进行的改革缓慢而保守，要完成这样的任务绝对需要更大的开放度。

中文译文如下：

中欧在贸易政策的领导力：可行否？满意否？

胡卫年；雅克·佩克曼斯

翻译：李时良

校对：肖柏高

特朗普贸易政策反映出民族主义和公然的保护主义，由此，欧盟的主要关注点不应该是如何回应特朗普的言论。欧盟应当加倍努力，推动内部合理贸易投资自由化进程。此举具有合理性，因为长远看，欧洲将掀起的竞争之风将带来经济效益。此外，此举合乎时宜，因为特朗普在其民族主义和选择性保护主义做法上孤立无援。由（不）平衡的双边货物贸易驱动的预期性双边协定，貌似并没有许多人支持，甚至可能无人支持。

今天欧盟同许多贸易伙伴面临的挑战是制定共同策略并在世界经济建立起其令人信服的领导力量，应共同促进作为世界贸易基础的多边主义的发展，并同时继续发展和WTO相协调的地区间贸易、双边及多边贸易协议。在这些行动中，欧盟应走在前头。

本文将围绕该贸易战略的一个主要元素展开，即中欧领导力。我们将就这一关键性问题讨论三方面内容：共同领导力的理论依据；重申这一战略可靠性；2017年三月的人民代表大会和中国政治协商会（也称为“两会”）下中国的改革能力的简要介绍。

“

理论依据

欧盟和中国都是全球经济中最大的贸易体。中国是一百多个国家的最大贸易伙伴，而欧盟是这其中许多国家的第二大或第三大贸易伙伴。对于其他几十个WTO的合作伙伴，欧盟在与这些国家的双边贸易中位列榜首，而中国则分别居于二、三、四名。中国与欧盟之间的双边商品和服务贸易规模巨大：2016年双边商品贸易总额达5140亿欧元，而服务业（2015年）则达到640亿欧元。对于商品，尚可与跨大西洋贸易相比，但对于服务业，中欧之间的合作潜力巨大，中国的服务业才刚刚开始起步。此外，在商品和服务两个领域，中国在市场准入方面的限制远远大于美国和欧盟。中国对外商直接投资（FDI）的限制也是一样的。2015年欧盟在中国的外国直接投资存量为1680亿欧元，而中国在欧盟这一数据为350亿欧元——这仅为跨大西洋贸易额的一小部分。

美国已经退出了多边的跨地区的贸易协议（典型如TPP），一些政策顾问甚至怀疑美国会不会接受对其不利的WTO上诉机构的裁决。因此，维护多边主义、进一步发展贸易协议的领导作用必须落到中国和欧盟肩上。这两个经济体，同他们的区域合作伙伴和正在谈判的自由贸易区的国家，大有作为。然而，更为战略性的举措就是将中欧贸易投资关系样本化，从而为更多伙伴创造机会。

中国和欧盟也不断深化双边关系，比如中欧间的60多次对话、能力建设活动（如 35 42658 35 15232 0 0 4371 0 0:00:09 0:00:03 0:00:06 4370费品安全、《WTO/SPS协定》等）和正在进行的投资协议谈判（CAI），部分与市场准入有关。中国（通过习主席2014年在布鲁日的倡议）提议推进双边自贸协定。犹豫之后，CAI一通过欧盟就开始积极探讨该提议。然而，这些计划都是在没有特朗普主义在世界经济中进行商榷的。

“

中欧自由贸易协定：实践检验

在佩克曼斯（Pelkmans），弗朗索瓦（François）等合著的著作（2016）中，除了基于现代CGE（Computable General Equilibrium model）和2011年全球贸易分析项目数据库的经济影响评估外，还提供了中欧之间可能的自由贸易协定的详细事实性分析。这本书的主要内容就是分析中欧双方应如何成功达成该自由贸易协定。毕竟，领导不仅仅需要“能言善辩”和“远见卓识”，而是需要在双向市场准入和增进市场参与者的机会方面取得实际具体成果。这项将要谈判的自由贸易协定是“深入而全面的”，欧盟现在也与其他合作伙伴如韩国，越南，新加坡，加拿大，日本（未完成）进行例行谈判，谈判是在跨大西洋贸易及投资伙伴协议（TTIP）下进行（现在暂停）。

在这些贸易伙伴中，只有越南是发展中国家。比起越南这样的中低等收入国家，中国更为发达，但仍然有许多长期的发展的挑战。自由贸易协定的“深入而全面”特点体现在九大领域，均进行深入审查：工业关税、农产品关税、关税配额（TRQs）、技术性贸易壁垒（TBT）、食品和饲料安全壁垒、服务业市场准入、公共采购、知识产权（IPR）和地理标志（GIs），国企（State-Owned Enterprises ，SOEs）和投资（CAI）。我们得出了清晰的整体结论：欧盟的TRQs比中国的问题更多（数量和复杂程度上都是如此），除此之外，中国关于其市场准入制度列出了一系列严峻的问题，清单较长，如下：

技术性贸易壁垒（Technical Barriers to Trade——部分系统性，是是计划经济及其制度的产物）;
《实施动植物卫生检疫措施的协议》（sanitary and phytosanitary，或SPS措施——同上）;
服务（具有高度限制性，与国有企业和（或）外国直接投资相关的更为如此）；
公共采购（中国第六次要求成为政府采购协定的成员，迄今尚未完成）；
知识产权和地理标志（中国知识产权制度达到国际标准，但执行力度不够；地理标志领域的首次谈判取得成功，但中国内部存在有关品牌和创始的争议）；
国有企业（几乎未观察到改革的迹象，存在竞争限制甚至存在国企主导的市场准入）；
投资（2014年，中国的经合组织FDI管制指数最高，涵盖22大领域和58个国家——包括所有金砖国家、其他发展中国家以及所有经合组织成员国）。

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中国的改革和整装待发的领导力

在2013年11月的第三次全体会议上，中国提出了一个瞩目的结构性和全方面改革的愿景。这些改革主要是以市场经济语言起草，大部分都沿正确的方向展开。然而，它们并非直接业务性的，所以观察已完成的业务改革和实施至关重要。一些明确的例子可用于此（例如技术法规、标准、合格评定制度及机构的改革，参见Pelkmans等人2016年专著的第9章），但总体而言，中国和欧洲商界普遍比较失望。2013年底的经验智慧与良好的长期发展和开放型经济体系相适应，但后来似乎已经被另一种思路所取代，后者导致了进展缓慢。

最近，中国总理李克强选择不直接回答以下问题，即中国将采取什么措施来说服国际社会，使国际社会相信中国正在推进更自由的贸易和开放的经济发展模式。相反，李总理说，中国会先解决国内问题，但又立即表示，如果“国门”关闭，这一承诺难以实现。他进一步强调，改革是一个循序渐进的过程，过去几十年来，中国改革取得长足进展。但两会传达的整体信息就是中国改革的雄心正在熄灭。

进一步开放将促进中国经济发展。例如，如果一项双边自由贸易协定将进入谈判阶段（如Pelkmans等人合著书中所言，同上），中国的额外GDP（百分比计）将是欧盟收入增长的2.5倍。请注意，此处影响的模拟必然是被大大低估的，因为未能考虑作为“深入而全面”的FTA的先决条件的中欧全面投资协议（CAI）的经济影响。中欧双边FTA之外的更广泛开放将带来进一步的收入增长，并在中国一带一路战略背景下，稳定中国贸易和投资决心，许多欧洲国家都是通过亚投行（AIIB）参与该战略。

李总理在3月15日的记者招待会上透露，中国呼吁加快CAI谈判，并期待欧盟的积极响应。他强调，即使没有CAI，中国也将继续促进对欧盟企业的市场准入和平等（“国民”）待遇，同中国本土企业一视同仁，这令人振奋。

不过，中国的欧盟商会的情况貌似并不乐观。根据商会2016年度发布的立场文件，2013年第三次全体会议（2013年11月）提出的许多改革措施大多都未进行，或者至多折半完成。在某些领域，据称还有令人担忧的“倒退”迹象。毕竟，根据2015年经合组织FDI管制指数，中国仅下降一名成为限制性方面的第二名，在菲律宾之后。

总体而言，市场准入可能不仅仅是一个欧洲问题。若只有在自由贸易区谈判中才能体现中国的积极性，中国也可能存在该问题。目前，中国正在进行九个自贸协议谈判，其中包括中日韩三边自贸协定谈判和区域综合经济伙伴关系（RCEP），并于3月3日完成了第17轮谈判。中国正在进行六项自由贸易协定研究，另外还将对2014年10月生效的“中加外商投资促进和保护协定”基础上的中加自贸协定进行共同的探索性研究。

审视中国的自由贸易协定战略，鉴于同邻国的自由贸易协定似乎发挥了作用（但并非“深入”），且与发展中国家的自由贸易协定已形成基础，现在是中国接近“大国”的时机，是抓住进一步经济发展的“关键”的时机。不用说，在这种情况发生之前，中国——本身已经是一个大国，在经济开放方面，必须符合其他“大国”的期望。随着TTIP命运的不确定性的出现，欧盟专员马尔姆斯特伦（2017年3月8日，在新加坡）发布了欧盟全的球贸易议程，表现出欧盟在推动与全球合作伙伴的贸易谈判上的决心。。中国是否如三年前习主席说的那样，愿意和欧盟建立更密切的贸易关系呢？

尽管李总理呼吁加快同欧盟进行CAI谈判，欧盟仍然不乐意与中国进行FTA谈判。在存在特朗普斯主义的新世界，先CAI后FTA的谈判顺序可能不是给中国和其他非特朗普世界经济的最佳信号。此外，中国出现了向另一种FTA转变的迹象：毕竟，中日韩三方自由贸易区谈判共同的愿景是“全面，深入和互惠互利”，这也符合欧盟的要求。

现在双方应该采取行动：欧盟应该与中国进行最高级别的磋商，无论是加快CAI谈判，还是给予欧盟投资者更多的“国民待遇”，都能使得CAI和FTA的排序再商榷。而中国也需要加快改革，特别是与市场准入和优化市场功能有关的改革。

国内改革的注意事项或许反映了老子的智慧，即“治大国若烹小鲜”——太多的管理会破坏它。但中国不应该忘记，过去的大胆改革工作加快了成功的经济转型，世界上没有一个其他国家能够实现。欧盟和中国正在朝着同样的根本方向发展，正如习近平总统关于全球化的积极言论和他对世界经济论坛上的承诺那样[9]，通过开放来促进贸易和投资、自由化和便利化，对保护主义坚决说不。

英文原文如下：

EU-China Leadership in Trade Policy: Feasible? Desirable?

By Weinian Hu, Jacques Pelkmans

Monday, 20 March 2017

Given the nationalism and blunt protectionism that characterises President Trump’s trade policy, the primary focus of the EU should not be on how to respond to his rhetoric. The EU should rather double its efforts to pursue its own, sensible trade and investment liberalisation agenda. This is not only rational because of the economic gains that will come in the longer run from competitive winds that will blow in Europe, it is also appropriate because Trump is likely to find himself pretty much alone in his nationalistic and selectively protectionist agenda. The intended ‘bilateral deal’ approach, driven by (im)balances in bilateral goods trade, does not seem to have the backing of many, perhaps of no-one.

The challenge today for the EU and many of its trading partners is to build common strategies and convincing leadership in the world economy, with a view to supporting and bolstering multilateralism as the foundation of world trade, while continuing WTO-compatible (inter)regional, bilateral and plurilateral trade initiatives. The EU should be at the forefront of these initiatives.

This commentary will look at one principal element of such a trade strategy, namely, EU-China leadership. We shall touch upon three aspects in considering this critical option: the rationale for joint leadership; a reminder of what it takes for such a strategy to be credible; and, briefly, China’s reform capability in light of the National People’s Congress and the National Committee of the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference (also known as ‘Two Sessions’) of March 2017.

“

Rationale

The EU and China are the biggest traders in the world economy. For well over one hundred countries, China is the first trading partner and, for many of these countries, the EU ranks second or third in terms of bilateral exchange. For several dozens of other WTO partners, the EU ranks first in their bilateral trade, with China having moved up to second, third or fourth position. Bilateral trade in goods and services between China and the EU is huge: in 2016 two-way goods trade amounted to €514 bn, and for services (2015) another €64 bn. For goods, this compares to trans-Atlantic trade, but for services, where the potential between China and the EU is much greater, services from China are only beginning to develop.Moreover, in both services and goods, the restrictiveness of China in terms of market access is far greater than that in the US and the EU. The same holds for the restrictiveness of China with respect to incoming FDI. The 2015 EU stock of foreign direct investment (FDI) in China was €168 bn, with Chinese FDI in the EU being €35 bn − a fraction of the trans-Atlantic values.

The US has withdrawn from multilateral and interregional (TPP!) trade initiatives, and some policy advisers are even casting doubt on the acceptability of WTO Appellate Body rulings that are adverse to the US. The leadership role to uphold multilateralism and further pursue trade initiatives must therefore fall to China and the EU. These two economies can do a good deal with their regional partners and the countries with which they are negotiating free trade areas (FTAs). A far more strategic move, however, would be to turn the EU-China trade and investment relationship into an example, thereby also creating a bundle of opportunities for many other partners.

China and the EU are continuously deepening their bilateral relationship as well, for example with over 60 dialogues and capacity-building exercises (e.g. in safety of consumer goods; in SPS matters; etc.) and ongoing talks on an investment agreement (CAI), partly linked to market access. China (via President Xi’s call in Bruges in 2014) has suggested exploring a bilateral FTA. After some hesitation, the EU has begun to speak about this idea in positive terms, once the CAI is agreed. These intentions were exchanged in a world economy without Trumpism, however.

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The EU-China FTA

In Pelkmans, François et al. (2016), a detailed factual analysis of a possible FTA between China and the EU has been presented, besides an economic impact assessment based on a modern CGE (Computable General Equilibrium model) and the Global Trade Analysis Project 2011 database. The underlying idea of the book is to better understand what it takes for both partners to conclude such an FTA successfully. After all, leadership is not a matter of ‘convincing by speech’ and ‘vision’ only, but of realising concrete results in terms of mutual market access and acknowledgement of opportunities by market players. The FTA assumed to be negotiated is a ‘deep and comprehensive’ one, as the EU now routinely negotiates with other partners such as South Korea, Vietnam, Singapore, Canada, Japan (unfinished) and (now pending) in TTIP.

Of these trade partners, only Vietnam is a developing country. China is more developed than, say, a low- middle-income country, like Vietnam, but nonetheless has many lingering development challenges. The ‘deep and comprehensive’ nature of the FTA is expressed in nine broad areas, all scrutinised in depth: industrial tariffs, agro-food tariffs and TRQs, technical barriers to trade (TBTs), food and feed safety barriers, market access in services, public procurement, IPRs (Intellectual Property Rights) and GIs (Geographical Indications), SOEs (State-Owned Enterprises) and investment (the CAI). The overall conclusion of our work is clear: with the exception of TRQs, where the EU’s TRQs are more problematic than those of China (both in number and complexity), China presents a wide-ranging set of formidable problems in its market access regimes.

The list is long:

TBTs (Technical Barriers to Trade - partly systemic, as a legacy of planning and its institutions);
SPS (sanitary and phytosanitary, or SPS measures - idem);
services (with high degrees of restrictiveness, even more so when linked to SOEs and/or FDI);
public procurement (where China’s six offers to become a member of the plurilateral GPA have not, so far, sufficed);
IPRs and GIs (the regime of IPRs in China is up to international standards but its enforcement is weak; in GIs some first negotiation successes are accomplished but there are internal quarrels in China about brands and origin);
SOEs (where next to no reform movement has been observed, throttling competition or even entry in a range of SOE-dominated markets); and
investment (in 2014, China has the highest OECD FDI Regulatory Restrictiveness index, covering 22 broad sectors and 58 countries – including all BRICs and some other developing countries, as well as all OECD ones).

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Chinese reforms and readiness for leadership

In the November 2013 Third Plenum, China presented an impressive vision of structural and wide-ranging reforms. These reforms were drafted largely in market-economy language and, for the most part, go in the right direction. However, they are not directly operational, so it is critical to observe what operational reforms and implementation have been accomplished. Some clear examples can be mentioned (e.g. an overhaul of the technical regulation, standards and conformity assessment regimes and institutions, see Pelkmans et al., 2016, ch. 9) but overall there is widespread disappointment inside China and in European business. The wisdom of late 2013, which accords so well with sound long-run development and an open economy, seems to have been replaced by another wisdom that justifies slower progression.

Li Keqiang, China’s Prime Minister, recently chose not to reply directly to the question of what measures China would implement to convince the international community that the country is moving towards freer trade and an open economic development model. Instead, Premier Li said that China would have to sort out its domestic issues first, but conceded immediately that this undertaking would not be possible if “doors” were closed. He further stressed that reform is a gradual process and, looking at past decades, China’s reform has made consistent progress. Yet the overall message conveyed at the Two Sessions was that China is scaling back its ambition of reform.

Further opening-up would benefit the Chinese economy. For example, if a bilateral FTA were to be negotiated (as in Pelkmans et al., op. cit.), the extra GDP for China (in percentages) would be 2½ times the gain for the EU. Note that the impact simulation is necessarily a considerable underestimation as the economic impact of the EU-China comprehensive agreement on investment (CAI), a prerequisite for a ‘deep and comprehensive’ FTA, is not incorporated. Greater openness beyond a bilateral EU-China FTA would bring further gains and should also underpin China’s ambition of trade and investment within the context of the One Belt, One Road (OBOR) initiative, in which many European countries are involved via the AIIB.

Premier Li revealed at the press conference of March 15th that China had called for an acceleration of the CAI negotiations, and was awaiting a positive response from the EU. He then stressed that, even without the CAI, China would continuously enhance market access for, and extend equal (‘national’) treatment to EU businesses as if they were local Chinese enterprises. This would be very welcome news.

Nonetheless, the EU Chamber of Commerce in China looks less optimistic. According to the 2016 annual Position Paper published by the Chamber, many reform measures tabled at the 3rd Plenum (November 2013) have been left unattended, or at best only half done. In some areas, it is alleged that there were even worrying signs of “going back”. After all, based on the OECD FDI Regulatory Restrictiveness index (2015), China moved only one position down to the second most restrictive ranking, after the Philippines.

Overall, market access may not be just a European problem. It could well be a Chinese problem, too, if one only realises China’s activism in FTA negotiations. Presently, China is undertaking nine FTA negotiations, including the China-Japan-Korea trilateral FTA negotiations and the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP) with the 17th round of negotiations concluded on March 3rd. China is conducting six FTA studies, in addition to a joint exploratory study of a Canada-China FTA building on the Canada-China Foreign Investment Promotion and Protection Agreement, which entered into force in October 2014.

Reflecting on China’s FTA strategy, given that the FTAs with neighbouring countries seem to function (but are not ‘deep’) and that a basis has been formed in FTAs with developing countries,[7] it is time for China to approach ‘great powers’ and grasp the ‘key’ to further economic development.[8] Needless to say, before that can happen, China - herself a great power, must live up to the expectations of other ‘great powers’ in terms of economic openness. With uncertainty looming over the fate of the TTIP, EU Commissioner Malmström (in Singapore on 8th March 2017) unveiled the EU’s global trade agenda of doubling down in advancing EU trade talks with partners around the world. Will China be ready to foster a closer trade relationship with the EU, as President Xi himself proposed three years ago?

Despite Premier’s Li’s call for an acceleration of the CAI negotiations with the EU, the EU remains reluctant to enter into FTA talks with China. In the new world of Trumpism, the sequence of first CAI and subsequent FTA talks might not be the best signal to send to China and the rest of the non-Trump world economy. Moreover, China shows signs of a shift towards another type of FTA: after all, the common vision shared by China, Japan and Korea for their trilateral FTA negotiations is ‘comprehensive, deep and mutually beneficial’, which corresponds to what the EU would want as well.

Both sides should now make a move: the EU should discuss with China at the highest level whether acceleration of CAI talks and granting more ‘national treatment’ by China to EU investors can lead it to reconsider the sequencing of CAI and FTA. And China, for its part, needs to accelerate the implementation of its reforms, especially those with relevance to market access and better market functioning.

Caution about domestic reforms may reflect Laozi’s wisdom that governing a great nation is like cooking a small fish – too much handling will spoil it. But China should not forget that its audacious reform undertakings in the past accelerated its successful economic transformation to an extent that no other country in the world has achieved. The EU and China are moving in the same fundamental direction, as became clear from President Xi’s positive words about globalisation and his pledge at the World Economic Reform[9] to promote trade and investment, liberalisation and facilitation through opening up, which was a firm ‘No’ to protectionism.

观点整理田雯

图文编辑田雯

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