海外之声 | 史蒂夫·汉克：私有化助推美国基础设施建设（中英双语）

观点速递

本文作者是史蒂夫· 汉克，IMI国际委员、约翰霍普金斯大学教授。本文原文发表于2017年4月27日福布斯网站（Forbes.com）。《福布斯杂志》是一个可靠的商业新闻和金融信息的主要来源。

亚当·斯密在《国富论》中指出，公有制相较私有制有效率低下的缺点，而这样的特点也被无数事例证明。作者提出，发展美国基础设施建设的有效方法就是通过竞争性的投标制度出让基础设施建设和运营的特许经营权，并通过保证金的方式维持质量水平。数据表示，美国基础设施私有化的比重正在上升。

中文译文如下：

私有化：美国基础设施再创辉煌的现实之路

史蒂夫·汉克

翻译：张晴

审校：肖柏高

谈到基础设施，贝莱德集团首席执行官拉里·芬克（Larry Fink）很在行。作为全世界上规模最大的资产管理公司的负责人，以及特朗普总统策略与政策论坛的成员，拉里·芬克极力支持私有化。芬克最近写道：“对这些[基础设施]项目来说，产生颇有竞争力的回报是必需的，而这只有通过私有制下的高效率才能实现。”在昨天的白宫战略与政策论坛上，芬克要是发表这番言论就好了。

在这一点上，芬克与亚当·斯密《国富论》（1776）中的观点一致。在这部经典著作中，亚当·斯密写道：“从来没有任何两种性格，能像商人性格与君主性格那样互不相容。”亚当·斯密认为，公有制和行政管理疏忽大意、浪费资源，因为公职人员的行为与其所带来的商业结果没有直接的利益关系。事实上，他们总是事不关己。为证明这一观点，亚当·斯密着重提到，欧洲公有土地的产量只有私人土地的25％。

通过对私营与公共企业提供产品及服务的成本进行分析，得出了与亚当·斯密一致的结论。大量证据表明，若提供给定数量及一定质量的产品，公共企业所需成本约为私营企业的两倍。这个结果出现频率如此之高，以致形成了一条经验法则：“成本翻倍的官僚体制。

然而，如何在基础设施领域引进并维持竞争呢？毕竟，对于许多基础设施项目来说，垄断常常出现，因为相比于多家公司，一家公司生产商品、提供服务的价格更低。例如，在同一地点设立多个港口、机场、桥梁等在经济上不可行。

为了维持竞争，使私营部门能够获得运营基础设施的特许经营权，一项竞争性投标制度应运而生。这一制度最早在1859年由埃德温·查德维克（Edwin Chadwick）提出，如今在法国广泛推行。虽然可能不会在市场内部产生竞争，但依然可以通过竞争对市场带来益处。

招标时，只要对基础设施特许经营权的竞争是激烈的，就有望达到双赢局面——既能避免冗余设施，又能获得颇具竞争力的价格。事实上，对私营基础设施来说，赢得特许经营权的关键在于投标书中的条款。投标应当关注特许经营机构所收取费用和该经营权能为公众提供的服务，而非为获得该经营权所交付的费用。特许经营权应当授予承诺向消费者提供最佳价格和最优质量的投标人。

若要实施这一制度，政府只需建立一个买方代理机构，负责进行拍卖，并制定设施建造、维护或运营合同。

一旦获得授权，合同的执行就可以私有化。例如，会计师事务所可以保留、审核特许经营机构的账目，并确保其遵守合同条款。

为给特许经营机构创造额外的激励措施，维持并提高质量水平，合同中可以要求特许经营机构在特许经营期间缴纳保证金。一旦发现特许经营商违反合同，合同执行者可没收该保证金。这就类似住公寓所缴纳的“押金”。

特许经营机构一旦获得权力，将会积极控制成本、采用新技术等，因为每节约一美元的成本，就相当于多赚了一美元的利润。

如果公司经理人不注意成本控制，企业就会面临利润下降，股价下跌，而企业也将成为成熟的收购目标。

如下图所示，过去五十年来，公共基础设施占国内生产总值的比重逐渐下降。特朗普总统试图改变这种趋势，或至少使其趋于稳定。拉里·芬克的想法很对：使基础设施私有化。诀窍就是制定一项“智能”基础设施计划。

英文原文如下：

Privatization: The Real Way to Make American Infrastructure Great Again

by Steve H. Hanke

When it comes to infrastructure, BlackRock’s CEO, Larry Fink, has it right. The head of the world’s largest asset management company, and a member of President Trump’s Strategy and Policy Forum, is beating the privatization drums. As Fink recently put it: "These [infrastructure] projects must deliver competitive returns and that will often require efficiencies that can only be achieved through private ownership.” Hopefully Fink delivered that message at yesterday’s Strategy and Policy Forum at the White House.

It’s as if Fink lifted a page from Adam Smith’s The Wealth of Nations (1776). In that classic, Smith wrote, “No two characters seem more inconsistent than those of trader and sovereign.” Smith argued that public ownership and administration were negligent and wasteful because public employees do not have a direct interest in the commercial outcome of their actions. Indeed, they have no skin in the game. To prove his point, Smith stressed that publicly-owned lands in Europe were only 25% as productive as comparable private lands.

Comparative cost analyses of private versus public provision of goods and services support Smith’s conclusion. Considerable evidence shows that the cost incurred in publicly providing a given quantity and quality of output is about twice as great as in private provision. This result occurs with such frequency that it has given rise to a rule-of-thumb: “The Bureaucratic Rule of Two.”

But, just how does one introduce and maintain competition in the infrastructure field? After all, for many infrastructure projects, a monopoly will often naturally emerge because a single firm can produce goods and services more cheaply than multiple firms. For example, multiple ports, airports, bridges, etc. at the same location are not economically viable.

To ensure that competition prevails, a system of competitive bidding for privately-owned infrastructure franchises, as first articulated by Edwin Chadwick in 1859 and as widely practiced in France today, is the way to go. Though competition within a market may be impossible, the benefits of competition for that market may be attainable.

So long as there is vigorous bidding for an infrastructure franchise, the best of both worlds - avoidance of redundant facilities together with competitive prices - can be had. Indeed, the key to the franchise-bidding approach for private infrastructure is the terms of the bidding. Instead of bidding in terms of a sum to be paid for the franchise, bidding should be in terms of the prices that the franchisee would charge and the services the franchise would provide the public. The franchise should be awarded to whichever bidder promises the best combination of price and quality to consumers.

To implement this system, the government need only create a buyers’ agency with a mandate both to conduct the auction and to devise the contracts for the construction, maintenance, or operation of the facilities.

Once the franchise is granted, enforcement of the contract can itself be privatized. An accounting firm, for example, could be retained to audit the franchisee and confirm that the terms of the contract have been observed.

To create additional incentives for franchisees to maintain and improve quality, contracts could require the franchisee to post a bond for the duration of the franchise. This bond would be forfeited to the contract enforcers if the franchisee is found to be in violation of the contract. It would serve essentially the same function as a “security deposit” on an apartment.

Once in place, the franchisee will have every incentive to aggressively control costs, adopt new technologies, etc., since every dollar of cost saved is an extra dollar of profit earned.

If the firm’s managers are not attentive to cost control, the firms’ profits would fall, share prices would decline, and the firm would become a ripe target for takeover.

As the chart below shows, public infrastructure as a portion of GDP has drifted downward over the past half-century. President Trump wants to change that trend, or at least stabilize it. Larry Fink has the right idea: privatize infrastructure. The trick will be to develop a “smart” infrastructure program.

Steve H. Hanke, Member of IMI International Committee, Professor of Johns Hopkins University.

观点整理  田雯

图文编辑  田雯

监制  魏唯 李欣怡

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