视点 | 在去全球化时代加强全球经济治理
08年金融危机后，G20迅速升级全球经济治理的核心平台，并在短短几次领导人峰会后就促使各国共同推出了有力的经济刺激计划和国际金融体系改革方案，一时风头无二。可以说，G20的成功标志着发展中国家参与全球金融治理的有效性与合理性。然而，08年至今，人们对G20峰会的产出期待变得越来越低，甚至有尖刻的评价认为，G20领导人现在除了能一致强调经济增长的重要性之外，已经不能达成其他共识。
G20的这一困境与美国的单边主义、G20自身缺乏常设秘书处和议程一贯性、G20自身的代表性与合法性依旧有所不足、发展中国家与发达国家的分歧都有关系，但困境不意味着G20不再重要。
作为促进多边主义的国际经济合作平台，G20给各国领导人创造了面对面交流的机会，这对推动重要政策转变、增强互信以避免不必要的冲突是至关重要的。同时，每次G20峰会也是提升公众对全球经济合作的认识的重要机遇。
那么，该如何增强G20这个珍贵而重要的全球经济治理核心平台的作用呢？作者提出了四点建议：第一，G20的决议公报要更加注重可以具体落实的政策措施，而非充满雄心地提出众多大的改革方向，以致空耗G20的信誉，这方面G20可以学习一带一路倡议；第二，要增强治理（Governance），而非政府（Government）在G20议程中的参与。类似国际金融论坛(International Finance Forum, IFF)发挥F20的作用为G20建言献策，追踪政策执行的NGO主体应该被鼓励；第三，会议公报的语言要让大众更容易理解，并列出大众可以跟踪的改革措施，这样就会形成对G20决议执行的公众监督；最后，每次峰会除了邀请相关国际组织参与外，主办国可以邀请三到四位特邀国家元首，让G20变得不那么封闭。
总之，G20是国际经济合作与多边主义最重要的平台，我们要发挥好G20的作用，促进全球共同发展。
作者 | 曹胜熙 IMI副研究员
Group of Twenty (G20) has become the premier forum of international economic cooperation since 2008. It was through G20 that World leaders gathered amid the turmoil that wracked global financial markets. Furthermore, it was through G20 that the advanced economies acknowledged the indispensable roles emerging markets play in tackling global economic problems and maintaining the credibility of international financial institutions. Joint efforts were quickly devoted to reforming global economic governance and rescuing troubled economies. G20 countries adopted a comprehensive, coordinated and calibrated package of stimulus measures to thaw credit markets and to resuscitate economic activity suppressed by uncertainty. Meanwhile, G20 leaders stated clearly that they underscored the critical importance of rejecting protectionism. In conclusion, it was a fantastically shining moment of global economic cooperation.
Unfortunately, this initial spirit of a shared future has eroded soon, so have the effectiveness and efficiency of G20 summits. Results of the recent G20 summits are disappointing, albeit the expectations have already been lower and lower. Nothing significant emerged in the communiqué, which could catch public attention, let alone forming global policy agenda. Ironically speaking, G20 leaders seem unable to agree on much of anything other than the importance of economic growth. In this sense, G20 is becoming nothing more than an expansive talk shop.
There are several reasons behind this failure. First, Trump administration has brought trade tensions and hyper-dimensional uncertainty, which is also called Trump Uncertainty to global society and made G20 a sideshow since US put forward bilateral trade tensions challenging multilateralism. After all, it is difficult to deal with a global problem without U.S. engagement. Second, the rotating presidency of G20 summits brought about flexibility as well as weak policy agenda consistency. The lack of a standing secretary makes almost everything declared not trackable in an official manner. E.g., the 2014 Brisbane summiteers boasted of putting together a list of some 800 measures that would increase GDP in the years to come, while by 2016, the IMF had concluded that the Brisbane goals “seem out of reach.” Even, the capacity of the chairing country’s working group could sometimes be questioned. Third, although G20 countries account for about 85% of global economic output, 75% of global exports, and two-thirds of the world’s population, G20 is a so-called self-appointed steering committee for global economy. In other words, voices from outside G20 get neglected from time and time, which is a standing challenge for G20’s legitimacy and effectiveness. Finally, 20 has been a large number in terms of collective action, especially when G20 gathers economies with different policy agendas.
However, the current disadvantages do not mean G20 is not necessary nor worth the efforts. As Lagarde said, “during the ten years since the first G20 Leaders’ Summit, the G20’s efforts have been crucial in helping the global economy recover”. Her position could be supported with the following points. To start with, G20 Leaders’ Summit actually can result in important policy changes. As the University of Toronto’s G20 Research Group shows, G20 summit averagely generates 194 tangible, measurable commitments with an average compliance rate of 71 percent on their tracked 23 areas. Furthermore, summits are invaluable chances for intensive top-level diplomacy. Subtle changes happen when leaders meet face to face as they signal, charm, bargain, cajole and shame there. Moreover, they offer an opportunity to promote mutual understandings. Many international conflicts are more apparent than real, grounded in misperceptions and apathy. Last but not least, summits can stimulate public awareness, arouse interest and heat debate. In this way, they contribute to an informed global dialogue on common affairs.
Nonetheless, G20 could work much better to avoid the risk of becoming as irrelevant in global economic cooperation as the Group of Seven (G7). Historically speaking, G20, after birth, tended to attract mostly junior officials until the financial crisis. The indifference could return. Andrés Manuel López Obrador, Mexico’s president, skipped the 2019 Osaka summit for no apparent reason, while other leaders appeared to be more willing to appear somewhere else.
First of all, G20 should rescue its credibility from making big promises it cannot keep or alternatively making broad statements which seem empty. Instead, the outlined actions should separately be of a size that can be easily implemented. In this regard, China-proposed BRI could be an example. While based on the broad principles of consultation, contribution and shared benefits, BRI is greatly practical in project level, with a special focus on infrastructure. Secondly, as to the disadvantage of interim secretariat, G20 summits can catalyze international engagement groups to be policy task forces in different areas and this is more governance, less government. For instance, the International Finance Forum (IFF), which was set by global policy makers, professors and professionals announced to be F20 under the chairmanship of Dr. Zhou Xiaochuan this year, trying to contribute policy recommendations to the 2020 G20 summit on financial issues. Similar groups can include business groups (B20), civil society groups (C20), labour unions (L20), think tanks (T20), et cetera. Besides offering professional and practical policy advice, these groups can also be followers in implementation to help generate influencing summit outcomes. Third, the concluding statements should be more easily accessible for the public with a clear message on the future objectives. Thus, there would be public attention and supervision on whether the governments are acting in line with their statements. Finally, although composition is an intractable problem with no correct answer, G20’s legitimacy and efficiency could be earned by the host country inviting two or three countries together with related international organizations.
In brief, it is not G20’s weakness caused those problems, but the intractable nature of the current world causes G20’s disadvantages. Only through multilateralism and international economic cooperation can we reach sustainable and inclusive growth, which is precisely the charm of the G20. With appropriate help, both G20’s legitimacy and effectiveness would be improved.编辑 侯津柠
来源 中国日报
责编 金天、蒋旭
监制 朱霜霜
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