斯坦福哲学百科全书词条：感受质（中英文对照）二
Qualia
感受质
（二）
宋璐瑶 译
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https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/qualia/
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哲学园鸣谢
First published Wed Aug 20, 1997; substantive revision Mon Dec 18, 2017
首发于1997年8月20日星期三；修改于2017年12月18日星期四
接上期：
The hypothesis that there can be philosophical zombies is not normally the hypothesis that such zombies are nomically possible，that their existence is consistent with the actual laws of nature. Rather the suggestion is that zombie replicas of this sort are at least imaginable and hence metaphysically possible.
可能存在哲学怪人的假说通常不是指，这样的怪人是法则上可能的，即，他们的存在与实际的自然规律相一致。相反，意思是说这种怪人复制品至少是可设想的，并因此具有形而上学的可能性。
Philosophical zombies pose a serious threat to any sort of physicalist view of qualia. To begin with, if zombie replicas are metaphysically possible, then there is a simple argument that seems to show that phenomenal states are not identical with internal, objective, physical states. Suppose objective, physical state P can occur without phenomenal state S in some appropriate zombie replica (in the metaphysical sense of ‘can’ noted above). Intuitively S cannot occur without S. Pain, for example, cannot be felt without pain. So, P has a modal property S lacks, namely the property of possibly occurring without S. So, by Leibniz’ Law (the law that for anything x and for anything y, if x is identical with y then x and y share all the same properties), S is not identical with P.
哲学怪人对任何关于感受质的物理主义观点都构成了严重威胁。首先，如果怪人复制品是形而上学可能的，那就会有一个简单的论证表明，现象状态和内在的、客观的物理状态是不一样的。假定在一些合适的怪人复制品身上，客观的物理状态P可以在无现象状态S的情况下出现（在上述的形而上学意义上的“可以”）。就直觉而言， S不可能在没有S时出现。例如，疼痛不可能在没有疼痛时而被感觉到。所以，P具有一种S所缺少的模态属性，即那种在S没有的情况下P仍可能出现的属性。因此，根据莱布尼茨律（对于任意x和任意y，如果x和y相同，那么x和y完全拥有相同的属性），S和P并不相同。
Secondly, if a person microphysically identical with me, located in an identical environment (both present and past), can lack any phenomenal experiences, then facts pertaining to experience and feeling, facts about qualia, are not necessarily fixed or determined by the objective microphysical facts. And this the physicalist cannot allow, even if she concedes that phenomenally conscious states are not strictly identical with internal, objective, physical states. For the physicalist, whatever her stripe, must at least believe that the microphysical facts determine all the facts, that any world that was exactly like ours in all microphysical respects (down to the smallest detail, to the position of every single boson, for example) would have to be like our world in all respects (having identical mountains, lakes, glaciers, trees, rocks, sentient creatures, cities, and so on).
其次，如果一个人在微观物理层面上和我完全一致、处在与我完全相同的环境中（包括现在与过去），却缺乏任何现象经验，那么有关经验和感觉的事实以及有关感受质的事实，就不一定是由客观的微观物理事实来确定或决定的。而且物理主义者也不会同意这一点，即使她承认这些现象意识状态与内在的客观物理状态并不完全相同。对于物理主义者而言，不管她支持哪种物理主义，都至少要相信微观物理事实决定了所有的事实，任何一个在所有微观物理方面（例如从最小的细节到每一个玻色子的位置）与我们完全相像的世界，都必须在所有方面与我们的世界相像（拥有相同的山脉、湖泊、冰川、树木、岩石、有意识的生物、城市等等）。
One well-known physicalist reply to the case of zombies (Loar 1990) is to grant that they are conceptually possible, or at least that there is no obvious contradiction in the idea of a zombie, while denying that zombies are metaphysically possible. Since the anti-physicalist argument requires metaphysical possibility — mere conceptual possibility will not suffice — it now collapses. That conceptual possibility is too weak for the anti-physicalist's purposes (at least without further qualification and argument) is shown by the fact that it is conceptually possible that I am not Michael Tye (that I am an impostor or someone misinformed about his past) even though, given the actual facts, it is metaphysically impossible.
对于怪人的例子，一个为人所熟知的物理主义者的答复（罗耶1990）是承认它们在概念上是可能的，或者至少承认怪人的想法没有明显的矛盾，但否认怪人是形而上学可能的。由于反物理主义论证要求形而上学可能性——仅有概念上的可能性是不够的——所以它现在已经失去效力了。这种概念上的可能性对于反物理主义者的目标来说实在是太弱（至少没有进一步的资格和论据），即便是通过“我不是迈克尔·泰”在概念上是有可能的这一事实来表明（我是一个冒名顶替者或是记错了自己的过去），是以，鉴于实际情况，它在形而上学上是不可能的。
4. Functionalism and Qualia 功能主义和感受质
Functionalism is the view that individual qualia have functional natures, that the phenomenal character of, e.g., pain is one and the same as the property of playing such-and-such a causal or teleofunctional role in mediating between physical inputs (e.g., body damage) and physical outputs (e.g., withdrawal behavior). On this view (Lycan 1987), qualia are multiply physically realizable. Inner states that are physically very different may nonetheless feel the same. What is crucial to what it is like is functional role, not underlying hardware.
功能主义认为个体的感受质具有功能性质，现象特性，如疼痛，无非就是在充当物理输入（如身体损伤）和物理输出（例如撤回行为）之间起如此这般的因果或目的论功能的属性。据此观点（莱肯，1987），感受质在物理层面上是多重可实现的，即便是物理层面差异很大的内在心理状态，也可能会有相同的感觉。所以，关键在于功能作用是什么样子，而非其背后的物理硬件。
There are two famous objections to functionalist theories of qualia: the Inverted Spectrum and the Absent Qualia Hypothesis. The first move in the former objection consists in claiming that you might see red when I see green and vice-versa; likewise for the other colors so that our color experiences are phenomenally inverted. This does not suffice to create trouble for the functionalist yet. For you and I are surely representationally different here: for example, you have a visual experience that represents red when I have one that represents green. And that representational difference brings with it a difference in our patterns of causal interactions with external things (and thereby a functional difference).
对感受质的功能主义理论，存在两个著名的反驳：即颠倒光谱与缺席的感受质假说。前者首先声称当我看到绿色时你可能看到的是红色，反之亦然；其他颜色同样可能如此，以至于我们的颜色体验在现象上会完全颠倒。这当然不足以给功能主义者造成麻烦。因为在此处，你和我在表征上确实是不同的：例如，当我有着表征绿色的视觉经验时，你却有着表征红色的视觉经验。而这种表征上的不同又导致了我们之间在与外部事物的因果作用模式上的差异（从而又造成了功能差异）。
This reply can be handled by the advocate of inverted qualia by switching to a case in which we both have visual experiences with the same representational contents on the same occasions while still differing phenomenally. Whether such cases are really metaphysically possible is open to dispute, however. Certainly, those philosophers who are representationalists about qualia (see Section 7) would deny their possibility. Indeed, it is not even clear that such cases are conceptually possible (Harrison 1973, Hardin 1993, Tye 1995). But leaving this to one side, it is far from obvious that there would not have to be some salient fine-grained functional differences between us, notwithstanding our gross functional identity.
对此，支持颠倒感受质的人可以转换思路来回应，即使是在同一场合，有着相同的表征内容，我们的视觉体验仍可能在现象上有很大的不同。然而，这种情况是否真的具有形而上学的可能性仍有待商榷。当然，那些持感受质的表征理论的哲学家（见第7节）会否认其可能性。事实上，甚至也并不能确定这种情况是概念上可能的（哈里森1973，哈德林，1993，泰1995）。但是，暂且将此置于一旁，因为显而易见的是，即使我们的总体功能是完全同一的，但这并不意味着我们之间一定没有一些显著而细微的功能差异。
Consider a computational example. For any two numerical inputs, M and N, a given computer always produces as outputs the product of M and N. There is a second computer that does exactly the same thing. In this way, they are functionally identical. Does it follow that they are running exactly the same program? Of course, not! There are all sorts of programs that will multiply together two numbers. These programs can differ dramatically. At one gross level the machines are functionally identical, but at lower levels the machines can be functionally different.
设想一个计算机的例子，对于任意两个数字的输入，M和N，给定的计算机总是会有M和N的乘积的输出，而且有第二台计算机也可以实现完全相同的操作，如此，它们在功能上将是同一的。那么，这是否就能得出结论说它们运行着完全相同的程序？ 当然不是！因为有各种各样的程序可以将这两个数字相乘，而且这些程序可能会有很大差异。就整体层次而言，机器在功能上是相同的，但在较低的层次上，机器可以是功能上不同的。
In the case of you and me, then, the opponent of inverted qualia can claim that, even if we are functionally identical at a coarse level — we both call red things ‘red’, we both believe that those things are red on the basis of our experiences, we both are caused to undergo such experiences by viewing red things, etc. — there are necessarily fine-grained differences in our internal functional organization. And that is why our experiences are phenomenally different.
那么，在你和我的那个例子中，反对颠倒感受质的人可以说，即使在较低层次上我们是功能同一的——我们都称红色的东西是“红色的”；我们也基于自己的经验才相信那些东西是红色的；以及我们也都是由此而通过看红色的东西来经历这种经验等——我们的内部功能组织中也必然会有细微的差异。而这就是为什么我们的经验在现象上差异显著的原因。
Some philosophers will no doubt respond that it is still imaginable that you and I are functionally identical in all relevant respects yet phenomenally different. But this claim presents a problem at least for those philosophers who oppose functionalism but who accept physicalism. For it is just as easy to imagine that there are inverted qualia in molecule-by-molecule duplicates (in the same external, physical settings) as it is to imagine inverted qualia in functional duplicates. If the former duplicates are really metaphysically impossible, as the physicalist is committed to claiming, why not the latter? Some further convincing argument needs to be given that the two cases are disanalogous. As yet, to my mind, no such argument has been presented. (Of course, this response does not apply to those philosophers who take the view that qualia are irreducible, non-physical entities. However, these philosophers have other severe problems of their own. In particular, they face the problem of phenomenal causation. Given the causal closure of the physical, how can qualia make any difference? For more here, see Tye 1995, Chalmers 1996).
一些哲学家无疑会回应说，仍然可以设想你和我在所有相关方面的功能上完全一致，而我们的现象特性却不同。但这种说法至少给那些反对功能主义而接受物理主义的哲学家抛出了一个问题。因为设想颠倒的感受质存在于分子对分子的复制品身上（在相同的外部物理环境中），就像设想颠倒的感受质出现在功能复制品身上一样容易。正如物理主义者所承诺的那样，如果前者在形而上学上是不可能的，那为什么后者却是可能的？须要进一步提出一些能令人信服的论据来说明这两种情况并不相同。在我看来，至今还没有人提出过这样的论据。（当然，这个回应并不适用于那些认为感受质是不可还原的非物理实体的哲学家们。但是，这些哲学家亦面临着其他严峻问题，尤其是有关现象因果性的问题。鉴于物理世界是因果封闭的，感受质怎么会产生任何影响？此处的更多内容可参见泰 1995，查尔莫斯 1996）。
The absent qualia hypothesis is the hypothesis that functional duplicates of sentient creatures are possible, duplicates that entirely lack qualia. For example, one writer (Block 1980) asks us to suppose that a billion Chinese people are each given a two-way radio with which to communicate with one another and with an artificial (brainless) body. The movements of the body are controlled by the radio signals, and the signals themselves are made in accordance with instructions the Chinese people receive from a vast display in the sky which is visible to all of them. The instructions are such that the participating Chinese people function like individual neurons, and the radio links like synapses, so that together the Chinese people duplicate the causal organization of a human brain. Whether or not this system, if it were ever actualized, would actually undergo any feelings and experiences, it seems coherent to suppose that it might not. But if this is a real metaphysical possibility, then qualia do not have functional essences.
缺席的感受质的假说认为可能存在有意识的生物的功能复制品，即完全缺乏感受质的复制品。例如，一位作家（布洛克1980）让我们设想，有十亿中国人，每个人都被给了一个用来相互交流的双向收音机和一个人造的（无脑）身体。他们的身体运动由收音机信号所控制，并且信号本身与操作指南相符，中国人从天空中的一个巨大的、对他们所有人都可见的显示屏中接收到这些操作指南。而这些操作指南使得所有参与其中的中国人像单个的神经元一样、收音机链接像神经突触一样发挥功能，以致于这些中国人可以一起复制人脑的因果组织。如果这个系统被实现的话，不管它实际上会不会经历到任何感觉和经验，假设它可能不会（经历到）似乎并不矛盾。但如果这是一种真正的形而上学的可能性，那么感受质就没有功能本质。
One standard functionalist reply to cases like the China-body system is to bite the bullet and to argue that however strange it seems, the China-body system could not fail to undergo qualia. The oddness of this view derives, according to some functionalists (Lycan 1987), from our relative size. We are each so much smaller than the China-body system that we fail to see the forest for the trees. Just as a creature the size of a neuron trapped inside a human head might well be wrongly convinced that there could not be consciousness there, so we too draw the wrong conclusion as we contemplate the China-body system.
对于诸如中国人系统这样的情况，标准的功能主义回应是一口咬定，不管中国人系统看起来多么奇怪，它都不可能不经历感受质。据有的功能主义者所言（莱肯，1987），这个观点的奇怪之处源于我们的相对大小。我们每个人都比中国人系统要小得多，以至于我们见树不见林。正如一个只有神经元大小的生物被困在了人脑中而可能会误以为那里没有意识一样，我们在思考中国人系统时可能也得出了错误的结论。
It has also been argued (e.g., by Shoemaker 1975) that any system that was a full functional duplicate of one of us would have to be subject to all the same beliefs, including beliefs about its own internal states. Thus the China-Body system would have to believe that it experiences pain; and if it had beliefs of this sort, then it could not fail to be the subject of some experiences (and hence some states with phenomenal character). If this reply is successful (for an updated version of this reply and a new related thought experiment, see Tye 2006), what it shows is that the property of having some phenomenal character or other has a functional essence. But it does not show that individual qualia are functional in nature. Thus one could accept that absent qualia are impossible while also holding that inverted spectra are possible (see, e.g., Shoemaker 1975).
还有人争论道（例如，由休梅克在1975年提出），任何一个作为我们全部功能的复制品的系统都必将受所有相同的信念支配，包括关于它自己内部状态的信念。因此，中国人系统必须相信它经验到了痛苦；而且如果有这样的信念，那么它就不可能不是某些经验（且因而是一些具有现象特性的状态）的主体。若此回应成功的话（对于此回应之更新的版本和新的相关思想实验，请参阅泰2006），那它就表明具有某些或其他现象特性的属性具有一个功能本质。但是这并没有表明个人的感受质本质上就是功能性的。因此，人们可以在接受感受质缺席是不可能的同时，认为颠倒光谱是可能的（可参见休梅克 1975）。
5. Qualia and the Explanatory Gap 感受质和解释空缺
Our grasp of what it is like to undergo phenomenal states is supplied to us by introspection. We also have an admittedly incomplete grasp of what goes on objectively in the brain and the body. But there is, it seems, a vast chasm between the two. It is very hard to see how this chasm in our understanding could ever be bridged. For no matter how deeply we probe into the physical structure of neurons and the chemical transactions which occur when they fire, no matter how much objective information we come to acquire, we still seem to be left with something that we cannot explain, namely, why and how such-and-such objective, physical changes, whatever they might be, generate so-and-so subjective feeling, or any subjective feeling at all.
我们对于经历诸现象状态会具有的现象特性的理解，是由内省所提供的。对于大脑和身体之间客观上发生着什么，我们的理解确实还不够全面。但是，问题在于这二者之间似乎还是存在着一个巨大的鸿沟。很难看出我们认识中的这个鸿沟如何才能被弥合。对于神经元的物理结构及其活动时会出现的化学交换过程，无论我们的探究深入到什么程度，无论我们能获得多少客观的信息，我们似乎仍然留下了一些自己无法解释的东西，即这般的客观物理变化（不论它们可能是什么），究竟是为什么以及如何就产生了那般的主观感觉，或者说任何主观感觉。
This is the famous “explanatory gap” for qualia (Levine 1983, 2000). Some say that the explanatory gap is unbridgeable and that the proper conclusion to draw from it is that there is a corresponding gap in the world. Experiences and feelings have irreducibly subjective, non-physical qualities (Jackson 1993; Chalmers 1996, 2005). Others take essentially the same position on the gap while insisting that this does not detract from a purely physicalist view of experiences and feelings. What it shows rather is that some physical qualities or states are irreducibly subjective entities (Searle 1992). Others hold that the explanatory gap may one day be bridged but we currently lack the concepts to bring the subjective and objective perspectives together. On this view, it may turn out that qualia are physical, but we currently have no clear conception as to how they could be (Nagel 1974). Still others adamantly insist that the explanatory gap is, in principle, bridgeable but not by us or by any creatures like us. Experiences and feelings are as much a part of the physical, natural world as life, digestion, DNA, or lightning. It is just that with the concepts we have and the concepts we are capable of forming, we are cognitively closed to a full, bridging explanation by the very structure of our minds (McGinn 1991).
这就是著名的有关感受质的“解释空缺”（莱文1983,2000）。有人认为，解释空缺是不可桥弥合的，所以从中得出的恰当结论只能是，世界上存在着关于感受质的解释空缺。经验和感受具有不可还原地主观的、非物理的特性（杰克逊1993；查尔默斯1996，2005）。对此，还有些人虽在根本上持同一立场，但同时坚持认为这并未有损于关于经验和感受的纯粹物理主义的观点，毋宁说，它所表明的是，一些物理的质性或状态是不可还原的主观的东西（塞尔1992）。还有些人认为解释空缺可能在将来的某一天会被弥合，但是目前我们仍然缺乏将主客观视角结合在一起的概念。在此观点看来，感受质可能会被证明是物理的，但这如何是可能的，我们目前还难窥门径（内格尔，1974）。还有人坚持认为，解释空缺原则上是可弥合的，但这并非是由我们或像我们这样的什么生物来将之实现。就像生命、消化、DNA或闪电一样，经验和感受至多不过是物理的自然世界中的一部分。正是基于我们所拥有的概念和我们能够形成的概念，我们才能通过自己特有的心灵结构在认识上不断向一个全面的、可弥合的解释靠近（麦金，1991）。
Another view that has been gaining adherents of late is that there is a real, unbridgeable gap, but it has no consequences for the nature of consciousness and physicalist or functionalist theories thereof. On this view, there is nothing in the gap that should lead us to any bifurcation in the world between experiences and feelings on the one hand and physical or functional phenomena on the other. There aren't two sorts of natural phenomena: the irreducibly subjective and the objective. The explanatory gap derives from the special character of phenomenal concepts. These concepts mislead us into thinking that the gap is deeper and more troublesome than it really is.
另一种新近得到不少人支持的观点是，存在着真正的、不可弥合的空缺，但它对于意识的本质以及物理主义或功能主义的理论并没有什么影响。据此观点，这种空缺完全不会导致我们在经验、感觉与物理或功能现象之间出现任何分歧。不存在两种类型自然现象：即不可还原的主观现象与客观现象。解释空缺源于现象概念的特征。这些概念使我们误认为空缺比它实际所是的样子要更深、更麻烦。
On one version of this view, phenomenal concepts are just indexical concepts applied to phenomenal states via introspection (see Lycan 1996). On an alternative version of the view, phenomenal concepts are very special, first-person concepts different in kind from all others (see Tye 2003). This response to the explanatory gap obviously bears affinities to the second physicalist response sketched in Section 3 to the Knowledge Argument. Unfortunately, if the appeal to phenomenal concepts by the physicalist is misguided, then it cannot be used to handle the gap.
据此观点的一个版本所言，现象概念只是通过内省而用于现象状态的索引性概念，（见莱肯，1996）。据另一版本所言，现象概念是非常特殊的、与所有其他概念都不同的第一人称概念（见泰 2003）。对解释空缺的这种回应显然与第三节知识论证中所述的第二种物理主义者的回应相似。不幸的是，如果物理主义者对现象概念的诉诸被误导的话，那么它就不能用来处理此空缺了。
There is no general agreement on how the gap is generated and what it shows.
关于解释空缺是如何产生的以及它究竟表明了什么，如今并没有较为一致的意见。
6. Qualia and Introspection 感受质和内省
In the past, philosophers have often appealed directly to introspection on behalf of the view that qualia are intrinsic, non-intentional features of experiences. Recently, a number of philosophers have claimed that introspection reveals no such qualities (Harman 1990, Dretske 1995, Tye 1995, 2000). Suppose you are facing a white wall, on which you see a bright red, round patch of paint. Suppose you are attending closely to the color and shape of the patch as well as the background. Now turn your attention from what you see out there in the world before you to your visual experience.
过去，哲学家往往直接诉诸内省，其代表性的观点就是认为感受质是经验的内在的、非意向性的特征”。但近来，许多哲学家声称内省并没有显示出这种性质（哈曼1990，德雷斯科1995，泰1995，2000）。假设你面对着一堵白色的墙壁，看到上面有一个亮红色的圆形漆块。假设你正仔细观察着那个漆块的颜色、形状以及背景。现在，把你的注意力从在你面前的这个外部世界上所看到的东西转移到你的视觉体验上。
Focus upon your awareness of the patch as opposed to the patch of which you are aware. Do you find yourself suddenly acquainted with new qualities, qualities that are intrinsic to your visual experience in the way that redness and roundness are qualities intrinsic to the patch of paint? According to some philosophers, the answer to this question is a resounding ‘No’. As you look at the patch, you are aware of certain features out there in the world. When you turn your attention inwards to your experience of those features, you are aware that you are having an experience of a certain sort but you aware of the very same features; no new features of your experience are revealed. In this way, your visual experience is transparent or diaphanous. When you try to examine it, you see right through it, as it were, to the qualities you were experiencing all along in being a subject of the experience, qualities your experience is of.
专注于你对那个色块的觉知，而不是你所觉知到的那个色块。你有没有发现自己突然认识到了一些新的特性，这些特性对你的视觉体验而言是内在的，就像红性和圆性是那个油漆色块的内在特性一样。据一些哲学家所言，这问题的答案当然是：没有。当你看到那个色块时，你意识到了外部世界上存在的某些特征。而当你把注意力向内转移至你对那些特征的经验上时，你认识到你正具有某种特定的经验，而不是说你认识到的就是那种特征；你的经验并没表现出什么新的特性。因此，你的视觉经验是透明的或半透明的。当你试着审视这些经验时，你会借由它所是的样子，直观到那些你一直经验着自己作为经验主体的性质、那些你经验之中的性质。
This point holds good, according to the philosophers above, even if you are hallucinating and there is no real patch of paint on the wall before you. Still you have an experience of there being a patch of paint out there with a certain color and shape. It's just that this time your experience is a misrepresentation. And if you turn your attention inwards to your experience, you will ‘see’ right through it again to those very same qualities.
在上述哲学家看来，这种观点是强有力的，即便只是幻觉使然，你面前的墙上并不存在任何真实的漆块。更何况你确实有一种经验，即那儿有着一片有某种颜色和形状的油漆。只不过这次你的经验是一次错误的表征罢了。如果你把注意力转到自己的经验之内，你将再次通过它“看到”那些相同的性质。
These observations suggest that qualia, conceived of as the immediately ‘felt’ qualities of experiences of which we are cognizant when we attend to them introspectively, do not really exist. The qualities of which we are aware are not qualities of experiences at all, but rather qualities that, if they are qualities of anything, are qualities of things in the world (as in the case of perceptual experiences) or of regions of our bodies (as in the case of bodily sensations). This is not to say that experiences do not have qualia. The point is that qualia are not qualities of experiences. ？？This claim, which will be developed further in the next section, is controversial and some philosophers deny outright the thesis of transparency with respect to qualia (see Block 1991, 2000; Stoljar 2004; Nida-Rümelin 2007).
这些观察表明，感受质，如果被理解为，当我们内省地注意我们的经验时我们所认识到的经验的那种被直接感受到的特性，那么它其实并不存在。我们所意识到的特性根本不是经验的特性，而毋宁说这样的特性（如果它们是任何东西的特性的话），是存在于世界之中的事物的（如在感知经验的例子中）或者我们自己身体的特性（如在身体感觉的例子中）。这不是说经验没有感受质，关键在于感受质不是经验的特性。这一说法将在下一节中进一步展开讨论，它争议很大，而且一些哲学家完全否认感受质的透明性这一论点（参见布洛克1991，2000；司图嘉2004；Nida-Rümelin 2007）。
According to Block, for example, qualia are not presented to us in introspection as intrinsic, non-intentional properties of our experiences. Still it does not follow from this that we are not introspectively acquainted with such properties. For we do know on the basis of introspection what it is like to undergo a visual experience of blue, say. So, if what a state is like is a matter of which intrinsic, non-intentional properties it tokens, then obviously we are introspectively aware of properties of this sort (in the de re sense of ‘of’). On this view, whether qualia are properties of experiences (in particular, intrinsic, non-intentional properties) is a theoretical matter. Introspection does not settle the matter one way or the other.
如布洛克所说，感受质并非是在内省中，作为我们经验的内在的、非意向性的属性而被呈现出来的。不过，由此并不能得出结论说，我们不是内省地了解到这些属性的。因为我们确实是在内省的基础上才知道，比方说，经历一种蓝色的视觉经验的现象特性。所以，如果一种状态的现象特性是什么，就是看它具有哪种内在的、非意向性的属性，那么显然，我们是内省地意识到这类的属性（在实在意义上的“的”）。根据此观点，感受质是不是经验的属性（特别是内在的、非意向性的属性）就是一个理论问题。而内省则无论如何都无法解决此问题。
7. Representational Theories of Qualia 感受质的表征理论
Talk of the ways things look and feel is intensional. If I have a red after-image as a result of a flashbulb going off, the spot I ‘see’ in front of the photographer's face looks red, even though there is no such spot. If I live in a world in which all and only things that are purple are poisonous, it is still the case that an object that looks purple to me does not thereby look poisonous (in the phenomenal sense of ‘looks’). If I feel a pain in a leg, I need not even have a leg. My pain might be a pain in a phantom limb. Facts such as these have been taken to provide further support for the contention that some sort of representational account is appropriate for qualia.
关于事物看起来和感觉起来的方式的谈论是涉及内涵的。如果我因为闪光灯熄灭而有了一个红色的后像，那么我在摄影师脸前“看到的”那个点看上去就是红色的，即使这样的点实际上并不存在；假如我生活在一个所有且只有紫色的东西才具有毒性的世界上，那么对我而言，看起来是紫色的物体并不会因此而看起来就是有毒的（在“看起来”的现象学的意义上）；如果我感到腿疼，我甚至不必要真的有一条腿，因为那疼痛可能只是来自于一条幻肢。诸如此类的事实都已被用来支撑如下论点，即“某种表征解释适用于感受质”。
If qualia are not qualities of experiences, as some philosophers maintain on the basis of an appeal to introspection, and the only qualities revealed in introspection are qualities represented by experiences (qualities that, in the perceptual case, if they belong to anything, belong to external things), a natural representational proposal is that qualia are really representational contents of experiences into which the represented qualities enter. This would also explain why we talk of experiences *having* qualia or *having* a phenomenal character. For the representational content of an experience is something the experience has; just as meaning is something a word has. Moreover, just as the meaning of a word is not a quality the word possesses, so the phenomenal character of an experience is not a quality the experience possesses.
如果感受质不是经验的质性——正如一些哲学家以诉诸内省为基础而认为的那样——并且内省中出现的质性完全是经验表征出来的质性（在知觉的例子中，如果那些质性属于任何事物的话，那它们属于外在的事物），那么自然而至的就会是表征论的观点，即感受质实其实是经验的表征内容，而被表征的质性就包含在经验中。这也就解释了为什么我们说经验“具有”感受质或“具有”现象特性。因为一种经验的表征内容其实就是经验所具有的某种东西，就像含义是一个词所具有的某种东西一样；而且，正像一个词的含义不是这个词所具有的一种特性那样，经验的现象特性也不是经验所具有的一种特性。
If qualia are representational contents, just which contents are these? Obviously there can be differences in the representational contents of experiences without any phenomenal difference.If you and I see a telescope from the same viewing angle, for example, then even if I do not recognize it as a telescope and you do (so that our experiences differ representationally at this level), the way the telescope looks to both of us is likely pretty much the same (in the phenomenal sense of ‘looks’). Likewise, if a child is viewing the same item from the same vantage point, her experience will likely be pretty similar to yours and mine too. Phenomenally, our experiences are all very much alike, notwithstanding certain higher-level representational differences. This, according to some representationalists, is because we all have experiences that represent to us the same 3-D surfaces, edges, colors, and surface-shapes plus a myriad of other surface details.
如果感受质是表征内容的话，那么这些内容是什么？ 显然，没有任何现象差异的诸经验的表征内容之中却可能存在差异。例如，如果你和我从相同的角度看到了一个望远镜，那么即使我不认为它是一个望远镜，而你认为它是（在这个层次上，我们的经验在表征方面是不同的），望远镜对我们两个而言看起来的方式，仍然可能是几乎相同的（在现象学意义上的“看起来”）。同样，如果一个孩子从同一个位置看同一个望远镜，她的经验将很可能与你我二人的相似。现象上来说，我们的经验都非常相像，尽管会在某种更高的层次上存在表征差异。根据一些表征论者的观点，这是因为我们都会有相似的经验来表征相同的三维曲面、边缘、颜色和表面形状以及无数其他表面细节。
The representation we share here has a content much like that of the 2 1/2-D sketch posited by David Marr in his famous theory of vision (1982) to which further shape and color information has been appended？？ (for details, see Tye 1995). This content is plausibly viewed as nonconceptual. It forms the output of the early, largely modular sensory processing and the input to one or another system of higher-level cognitive processing. Representationalists sometimes claim that it is here at this level of content that qualia are to be found (see Dretske 1995, Tye 1995, 2000; for an opposing representational view, see McDowell 1994).
此处我们谈论的表征所具有的内容，很像大卫·马尔在他著名的视觉理论（1982）中所提出的附加了更多形状和颜色信息的2.5维图中的（表征）内容（详见泰1995）。这个内容理所当然地被视为非概念的。它构成了早期大部分模块化感觉处理的输出，以及某一更高级的认知处理系统的输入。表征论者有时会声称就是在内容的这个层次上发现了感受质（参见德雷斯克1995，泰1995，2000；反对表征论的观点，见麦克道威尔1994）。
One worry for this view is that if qualia are to be handled in terms of representational content, then there had better be a content that is shared by veridical visual experiences and their hallucinatory counterparts. Disjunctivists have disputed the supposition that there is a common content (see, e.g., Hinton 1973, Martin 1997, Snowdon 1990). Perhaps veridical experiences have only singular contents and hallucinatory experiences have gappy contents or no content at all (for an extended discussion of visual experience and content, see Pautz 2010, Siegel 2011).
这种观点的一个问题在于，如果按表征内容来处理感受质的话，那么最好要存在一种为真实的视觉体验及其相对应的幻觉所共享的内容。析取论对于存在共同内容（参见，例如，韩丁1973，马丁1997，斯诺登1990）的假设持怀疑态度。因为也许真实的经验只有单一的内容，而幻觉经验只有不完整的内容甚或是根本就没有内容（对于视觉体验和内容的延伸讨论，参见Pautz 2010，西格尔2011）。
An alternative possibility is that qualia are properties represented by experiences. On this view, there need be no common content shared by veridical experiences and their hallucinatory counterparts. It suffices that the same properties be represented. Of course, such a view requires that a further account be provided of what it is that makes a property represented by an experience a quale.
另一种可能性是，感受质是经验所表征的属性。依此观点看来，并不需要有被真实的经验及其相对应之幻觉经验所共同分有的内容，只要有相同的属性被表征即可。当然，此观点必须进一步说明是什么使得为经验所表征的属性变成了感受质。
Some philosophers try to ground qualia in modes of representation deployed by experiences within their representational contents. On one version of this view, visual experiences not only represent the external world but also represent themselves (for a recent collection of essays elaboarating this view, see Kriegel and Williford 2006). For example, my current visual experience of a red object not only represents the object as red (this is my focal awareness) but also represents itself as red (this is normally a kind of peripheral awareness I have of my experience). When I introspect, the experience alone provides me with awareness of itself — no higher order thought is necessary. What the experience is like for me is supposedly its redness, where this is a mode of representation my experience uses to represent real world redness.
一些哲学家试图将感受质奠基于表征模式，这种表征模式被经验用于其表征内容。此观点的一个版本认为，视觉经验不仅表征外部世界，而且还表征其自身（近期有关于此的论文集，可参见克里格尔和威利福德2006）。例如，我现在对一个红色物体的视觉体验不仅表征着这个红色的物体（这是我的焦点意识），而且还将自身表征为红色（这通常是我对自己的经验的一种次要认知）。当我内省时，只有经验让我意识到了它自己——高阶思维在此并不必要。之于我，经验的现象特性就是所谓的它的红性，这是一种表征模式，我的经验用这种模式来表征真实世界中的红性。
This view is incompatible with the phenomenon of transparency (see section 6) and it is very close to the classic qualiaphile view, according to which when the subject introspects, she is aware of the token experience and its phenomenal properties. The new twist is that this awareness uses the token experience itself and one of its contents.
这种看法与透明性的现象（见第6节）是不相容的，但它与传统的感受质偏爱者的观点非常接近，根据其观点，当主体内省时，她就会觉察到某种殊型经验及其现象属性。而这种觉知又用了此殊型经验本身以及其中的一种内容。
Representationalists about qualia are often also externalists about representational content (but not always — see, for example, Chalmers 2004). On this view, what a given experience represents is metaphysically determined at least, in part, by factors in the external environment. Thus, it is usually held, microphysical twins can differ with respect to the representational contents of their experiences. If these differences in content are of the right sort then, according to the wide representationalist, microphysical twins cannot fail to differ with respect to the phenomenal character of their experiences. What makes for a difference in representational content in microphysical duplicates is some external difference, some connection between the subjects and items in their respective environments. The generic connection is sometimes called ‘tracking’, though there is no general agreement as to in what exactly tracking consists.
感受质的表征论者往往也是表征内容的外部论者（但并不总是，例如查尔莫斯 2004）。依这种观点，给定的经验表征了什么至少在一定程度上是被外部环境的因素所形而上地决定的。因此，通常认为，微观物理方面完全一致的双胞胎在其经验的表征内容方面却可以不同。如果这些内容中的差异是正确的，那么根据宽表征论者的观点，微观物理双胞胎就不可能在其经验的现象学特征上有所不同。使得微观物理复制品之间的表征内容产生差异的其实是一些外部的差异以及主体与其所处环境种的事物的某些联系。类型联系有时被称为“追踪”，尽管“追踪”究竟包含了什么在内，人们并没有一致的意见。
On wide representationalism, qualia (like meanings) ain't in the head. The classic, Cartesian-based picture of experience and its relation to the world is thus turned upside down. Qualia are not intrinsic qualities of inner ideas of which their subjects are directly aware, qualities that are necessarily shared by internal duplicates however different their environments may be. Rather, they are representational contents certain inner states possess, contents whose nature is fixed at least in part by certain external relations between individuals and their environments (Byrne and Tye 2006; for an opposing but still representationalist view, see Pautz 2006).
按照宽表征论的观点，感受质（像意义一样）并不在人的头脑中。经典的笛卡尔式的经验图景及其与世界的关系因此而被颠倒了。感受质不是其主体直接意识到的内在思想的本质特征，也不是必然要为内在复制品所分享的特征，无论其环境可能多么地不同。相反，它们是某些内在状态所具有的表征内容，是其性质至少部分地由个人与其环境之间的某种外部关系所确定的内容（拜恩和泰2006；反对此但仍属表征论的观点，参见鲍兹2006）。
Representationalism, as presented so far, is an identity thesis with respect to qualia: qualia are supposedly one and the same as certain representational contents. Sometimes it is held instead that qualia are one and the same as certain representational properties of experiences (or properties represented in experiences); and sometimes it is is argued that these representational properties are themselves irreducible (Siewert 1998). There is also a weaker version of representationalism, according to which it is metaphysically necessary that experiences exactly alike with respect to their representational contents are exactly alike with respect to their qualia. Obviously, this supervenience thesis leaves open the further question as to the essential nature of qualia.
至此所提出的表征论，实质上是一个有关感受质的同一性论题：感受质被认为就是某种表征内容。有时感受质也被认为就是经验的某种表征属性（或在经验中被表征的属性）；不过也有人争论道，这些表征属性本身就是不可还原的（西沃特1998）。还有一个较弱版本的表征论认为，如果两个经验在表征内容方面完全相同，那么它们在感受质方面也完全相同，这一点是形而上学必然的。显然，这个随附性论题使感受质的根本性质成为了有待进一步讨论的问题。
For further discussion, see Section 3 of the entry on representational theory of consciousness. Objections to representationalism are covered in the next section.
进一步的讨论，请参见词条“意识的表征理论”的第3节。下一节将介绍对表征论的反驳。
未完待续
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