对话思想者 | 拜登对华政策是“特朗普2.0”吗?
Wang Guan: I want to welcome all of our viewers from around the world to another edition of Global Thinkers. I’m Wang Guan in Beijing. And today, it is our great pleasure to have with us, political scientist, scholar, and author, Professor John Mearsheimer, he is currently with the Department of Political Science at the University of Chicago. Sir, welcome to CGTN again.
王冠:欢迎来自世界各地的观众收看最新一期的《对话思想者》节目。我是主持人王冠,目前在北京。今天,我们有幸邀请到一位政治学家、学者、作家,芝加哥大学政治学系教授约翰·米尔斯海默先生。米尔斯海默先生,欢迎您再次来到CGTN。
China eradicated poverty last year according to official data, and also it is launching the 14th Five-Year Plan - a roadmap guiding China's economy and social political development. How do you look at those domestic Chinese programs?
2020年,中国消除了绝对贫困,也启动了中国的“十四五”规划,一个指导国民经济和社会发展的目标纲要。您如何看待中国国内的规划?
John Mearsheimer: I think that they have been largely successful. I think there's no question that huge numbers of people have been lifted out of poverty in China over the past four or five decades. And from a Chinese perspective, this is a wonderful thing. I would imagine that the Chinese government will go to great lengths to sustain those gains, and to bring those people who are left in poverty, out of poverty. This is a great accomplishment.
约翰·米尔斯海:我认为中国这些规划取得了很大的成功。毋庸置疑,在过去四五十年里,中国庞大数量的人口摆脱了贫困。从一个中国人的角度来看,这是令人赞叹的事。我可以想象,中国政府会不遗余力地巩固脱贫成果,解决后续帮扶问题,防止返贫。这的确是一项伟大的成就。
In terms of running the economy, few countries in the history of the world have done a better job of growing their economy than Chinese leaders have done. They have been wildly successful. That's why, in my opinion, we now have this strategic competition. I think, to be honest, the biggest problem the Chinese face moving forward in terms of domestic politics is population decline. I think this is a worldwide problem. It's not limited to China by any means. In fact, I think South Korea has the lowest birth rate in the world. Japan has a remarkably low birth rate. The United States is beginning to experience a downward movement in its birth rate, and there's no sign that's going to slow up.
在经济发展方面,历史上很少有国家做得比中国领导人更好。他们已经取得了很大的成功。我想这也是中美之间存在战略竞争的原因。事实上,我认为中国国内今后面临的最大问题是人口出生率下降问题。当然,这是一个世界性的问题,绝不局限于中国。事实上,韩国是世界上出生率最低的国家,日本的出生率也非常低。美国也开始面临出生率下跌的趋势,而且没有迹象表明这种趋势会缓解。
Wang Guan: We can regard the whole international community as this one global village under this economic globalization. If you think about the COVID, I mean, no country is safe until all are safe. You think about climate change, we’re all in this together. Can’t you look at it that way?
王冠:我们可以把整个国际社会看作是经济全球化浪潮下的一个地球村。疫情之下,只有当每个国家都安全了,所有国家才能安全。气候变化问题也同样是一个国际问题。您对此是否认同?
John Mearsheimer: I think there's no question that there are certain areas in which China and the United States will cooperate. I think proliferation is one of those issues, for example. I think that the Chinese and the Americans and the Russians will all cooperate to limit nuclear proliferation. I think with regard to climate change and pandemics, you're likely to get significant cooperation on those fronts as well. But the key point is that the overall relationship between the United States and China will be one of competition, strategic competition, and it'll be a dangerous competition because there will always be the possibility that that competition will turn into a war. So you'll have some cooperation, but it will be part and parcel of an intense security competition.
约翰·米尔斯海默:中国和美国无疑将在某些领域进行合作。比如,防止核武器扩散问题就是其中之一。我认为中国、美国和俄罗斯将会就防止核扩散问题进行合作。在应对气候变化和疫情防控等方面也可能会开展重要合作。但关键在于,中美关系的主基调仍将是竞争、战略竞争。这将是一场危险的竞争,因为有演变成战争的可能性。所以,的确会存在部分领域的合作,但那也仅是激烈安全竞争的一部分而已。
Now you say, “isn't this an outdated way of thinking about international politics? Hasn't the world changed?” The answer is no.
你可能会说,“这种国际政治思维方式难道没有过时吗?难道世界没有变化吗?”答案是没有。
Wang Guan: How would you rate Joe Biden’s policy towards China? Is it “Trump 2.0”?
王冠:您如何评价拜登的对华政策?是“特朗普2.0”吗?
John Mearsheimer: It's almost “Trump 2.0”. It's very interesting. But a lot of people thought that when Biden took office that he would go back to the China policy of the Clinton administration, the Bush administration and the Obama administration where he had been vice president. That's another way of saying a lot of people thought we would go back to pursuing a policy of engagement instead of the containment policy that Trump pursued. But what's happened is that Biden has largely followed in the footsteps of his predecessor Donald Trump. There's no evidence that there's any significant difference between Biden and Trump, except for one thing, and that is Biden is much better at working with allies than Trump was.
约翰·米尔斯海默:拜登对华政策基本上是“特朗普2.0”。这很有意思。很多人认为拜登上台后,他将一改前任总统的对华政策,转而采取类似于克林顿政府、布什政府和奥巴马政府(彼时拜登任副总统)时期的对华政策。换句话说,很多人认为美国会重新采取对华接触政策,而非特朗普采取的遏制政策。但现在的情况是,拜登在很大程度上延续了特朗普政府的对华政策。没有证据表明拜登和特朗普之间有任何根本区别,只是拜登要比特朗普更擅长与盟友合作。
Trump was at heart a unilateralist, and Trump really had little use for our allies, and this includes countries like the South Koreans and the Japanese, who we have historically had very close relations with. Trump just didn't see much need to cooperate with them to contain China. Biden is different on this very important dimension, and Biden will go to great lengths to put together an alliance structure in East Asia that is designed to contain China. But other than how Biden deals with allies, I don't think there's much difference between him and Trump.
特朗普本质上是一个单边主义者,而且特朗普领导下的美国对其盟友如韩国、日本来说作用不大,而美国曾经与这些国家有着非常密切的关系。特朗普认为不需要与这些国家合作来共同遏制中国。拜登与特朗普在这一问题上各执己见。拜登将不遗余力地在东亚建立一个遏制中国的联盟。但除了拜登处理盟友的方式之外,我认为他与特朗普之间没什么区别。
Wang Guan: Professor, many in the Biden administration and many liberals in America say that there is a necessity to contain China's rise because of values or because of different ideologies, and they point out the so-called “fact” that there is this human rights concern in Xinjiang, over Hong Kong. Is that really the case? Is that really why? I mean, is it really over “ideologies” and “different values” that America is afraid of China's rise?
王冠:教授,拜登政府中的许多人以及美国的自由党派人士都认为有必要遏制中国的崛起,因为中美之间存在价值观、意识形态差异。他们认为新疆和香港存在所谓“人权”问题,真实的原因是这样吗?是意识形态和价值观的差异让美国害怕中国的崛起吗?
John Mearsheimer: I think there's no question that rhetorically, American policymakers and American elites, in general, will emphasize that the competition between the United States and China is about ideology. It's about two different political systems competing with each other. And this is analogous to what happened in the Cold War when we talked about the Soviet Union as a communist state and the United States as a capitalist democracy. Ideology was very important rhetorically in the Cold War, as it will be in the U.S.-China competition.
约翰·米尔斯海默:我认为,在说辞上,美国的政要和精英们无疑会强调中国和美国之间的竞争是意识形态的竞争,是两个不同政治体系的竞争。这与冷战时期的情况相似,当时我们说苏联是一个共产主义国家,美国是一个资本主义国家。意识形态竞争是冷战时期的主要说辞,那么中美竞争也是如此。
Is this really a competition that's ideological at its core? The answer is no. The United States has had wonderful relations with China for a long period of time - for many decades. The United States in 1985, 1995, 2005, and 2015 had no difficulty dealing with this state. There's been no change in the political system in China. So, what's going on here is that to mobilize political support in the west against China - and even in East Asia against China. But that's not what's driving the train here. What’s driving the train is power politics. So it's that power competition, not ideological competition that is the root cause of the situation that we see today.
中美竞争真的是一场以意识形态为核心的竞争吗?答案是否定的。其实,在很长的一段时期里,中美关系都很不错。美国在1985年、1995年、2005年和2015年与中国打交道时没有问题。中国的政治体制未曾发生变化。美国这么做真正的目的是为了动员西方国家的政治支持来共同对付中国,甚至在动员东亚国家来共同对付中国。但这不是根本原因,根本原因是权力政治。这种权力的竞争,而非意识形态竞争,才是造成中美如今局面的根本原因。