【CF40国际交流】听美国副财长谈中国去杠杆（附演讲实录及PPT）

12月5日晚，中国金融四十人论坛（CF40）举办晚餐交流会。美国财政部国际事务副部长Nathan Sheets及CF40学术委员、北京大学国家发展研究院副院长黄益平等，就“中国经济再平衡与中美关系展望”这一话题展开交流讨论。

晚餐会交流现场

2008全球金融危机后，中国等经济体开始了经济再平衡的过程。随后，投资拉动中国经济增长的作用在减弱，消费的贡献在上升。2016年是中国经济转型的关键期。多方认为，中国需要降低对信贷的依赖程度，也都在关注中国的去杠杆过程。中国能否完成这项任务，成功实现转型，对美国及全球都将带来重要影响。中国经济的再平衡、去杠杆等过程，将会面对什么挑战？将会对国际社会带来什么影响？

就上述问题，Nathan Sheets发表了题为《中国经济再平衡与去杠杆》的主旨演讲。心急的小伙伴可以直接拉到最后看演讲全文（英文版）！

美国财政部国际事务副部长Nathan Sheets

Nathan Sheets 认为，经济再平衡和去杠杆是相互影响和促进的过程，也是中国实现经济可持续发展的关键。企业债务的上升显示中国的经济再平衡还未完成，因此中国必须加速市场化改革来推动这一进程。中国经济的再平衡体现在五个相互联系的方面：从高度依赖外部需求到更多依靠国内需求；从投资驱动到消费驱动；从工业驱动到服务业驱动；从大量资源消耗的粗放型增长到更为环保的增长方式；从国有企业为主的市场到私营部门为主。

从2005年起，人民币实际有效汇率已经升值超过40%，中国的经常项目顺差也显著缩小，显示对外部需求的依赖有所降低。私人部门的消费增长很快，但固定资产投资在GDP中的占比仍然很高，而依赖投资驱动的增长模式直接关系到快速上升的企业债务水平。中国的服务业在GDP中的比重已经超过工业，为劳动力市场提供了大量的就业。重工业占比的下降也推动了中国从资源消耗型的增长转向更为环保和可持续的增长方式。私营部门虽然增长很快，但国有企业在中国经济的总资产中仍占将近40%，国有企业贷款总量占企业贷款总量的近一半，但利润仅占企业总利润的18%。总而言之，国有企业的生产率低于私营企业，但国企仍然拥有获得更多银行信贷，并且有很多信贷资源流向了僵尸企业，扭曲了资源分配。

Nathan Sheets提出了几点政策建议：

首先，中国应当加速实现经济再平衡。其中非常重要的一点是提高居民消费。在这方面财政政策可以发挥更大的作用，包括完善社会保障体系，为农民工和下岗工人提供更多福利等措施。

其次，促进服务业的发展，放松对国内私营部门和国外企业在行业准入的限制。“中美双边投资协定”（BIT）将是推动服务业发展的重要步骤。外国企业的参与将带来更多竞争，有利于提高服务业的生产率。

再次，国有企业改革是解决资源错配，纠正市场扭曲的关键。同时，应当有合适的激励机制使得金融机构为生产率高的企业提供更多贷款，并且允许僵尸企业退出。长期来看，资本市场的健康发展有利于金融资源的合理配置。

最后，政策的透明度是非常重要的。例如，在经济数据、金融系统评估方面的透明度，对于增强政策可信度，最终实行经济去杠杆的目标至关重要。

CF40学术委员、北京大学国家发展研究院副院长黄益平

晚餐会由CF40秘书长王海明主持，黄益平就Nathan Sheets演讲做出点评。出席晚餐会的专家学者有——

CF40嘉宾：

黄益平   CF40学术委员、北京大学国家发展研究院副院长

王海明   CF40秘书长

Danny Alexander    亚洲基础设施投资银行副行长

高善文   CF40成员、安信证券首席经济学家

李伏安   CF40成员、渤海银行股份有限公司董事长

梁惠江   国家开发银行国际金融局局长

刘    燕   中民金服科技投资控股有限公司首席投资官

罗    扬   丝路基金董事总经理

万泰雷   中国银行间市场交易商协会国际部主任

王    君   中欧国际工商学院金融学兼职教授

査道炯   北京大学国际关系学院教授

张    斌   CF40高级研究员

赵志宏   渤海银行股份有限公司董事会秘书、战略发展总裁

（中方名单按议程及姓名音序排列）

美方嘉宾：

Nathan Sheets         美国财政部国际事务副部长

Robert Kaproth        美国财政部国际部亚洲事务副助理部长

Christopher Adams  美国财政部中国事务及战略与经济对话高级协调员

Fabio Natalucci        美国财政部全球金融稳定与监管副助理部长

Kent Hiteshew          美国财政部州与地方财政办公室主任

Leslie Hull                 美国财政部东亚办公室联合主任

Brendan Kelly           美国财政部驻华代表

Joseph Dickson       美国财政部国际银行和证券市场办公室副主任

Matthew Sullivan     美国财政部国际银行和证券市场办公室全球经济学家

Paige Fetzer             美国财政部中国事务及战略与经济对话政策顾问

Maryann Hunter       美国联邦储备局银行业及监管部门副总监

Jasper Hoek             美国联邦储备局国际金融部高级经济学家

Paul Leder                美国证券交易管理委员会国际事务办公室主任

Alberto Arevalo         美国证券交易监督委员会国际事务办公室副主任

Eric Pan                    美国商品期货交易委员会国际事务办公室主任

附：Nathan Sheets演讲实录

美国财政部国际事务副部长Nathan Sheets

Thank you for that introduction.  Let me also thank the China Finance 40 for hosting this event.  

I will speak today on two topics that are closely related:  first, China’s economic rebalancing, which is a familiar theme in discussions of China’s role in the global economy; and second, rising debt levels in China’s corporate sector, a phenomenon that is increasingly a focus for China’s policymakers as well as for global markets.  China’s total debt has risen to 220 percent of GDP, according to the IMF, having increased by roughly one-third in the past five years alone.  Debt of China’s non-financial corporate sector, at about 145 percent of GDP, is among the highest for major economies.

My central point today is that rising corporate leverage reflects the still incomplete nature of China’s economic rebalancing, and underscores the urgency of China accelerating its market-oriented reforms.  Rebalancing and deleveraging are in fact mutually reinforcing efforts, and both are necessary to help ensure China’s sustainable growth into the future.  

When I refer to rebalancing, I am highlighting five inter-related and necessary transitions that are underway in China's economy:

* First, the transition from a growth model largely driven by external demand to one reliant on domestic demand;

* Second, within domestic demand, a transition from reliance on fixed asset investment toward household consumption;

* Third, a transition from an economy driven by manufacturing to one driven by services;

* Fourth, a transition from growth that is energy- and resource-intensive toward more environmentally-friendly growth;

* And finally, the continued transition from a state-dominated economy to a true level-playing field for private sector participants both domestic and foreign.

China’s rebalancing from exports to domestic demand has been notable.  Whereas net exports added well over one percentage point to China’s GDP growth in the years leading up to the Global Financial Crisis, that pattern reversed in a big way from 2008 through 2011.  Since then, net exports have made little contribution to growth on average.  

At the same time, China’s current account surplus has narrowed significantly, from a record 10 percent of GDP just ahead of the global financial crisis to roughly 2 to 3 percent of GDP at present.  The majority of that adjustment came in the form of lower goods surpluses, with some recent widening in the services deficit as well.  It is worth noting the role of RMB appreciation in narrowing what had been excessive Chinese current account surpluses, with China’s real effective exchange rate having appreciated over 40 percent since 2005.  

While the reduced reliance on exports is encouraging, domestic demand remains overly dependent on fixed asset investment.  Investment is much higher in China as a share of GDP than in other major economies; China is also the only economy where investment accounted for a larger share of GDP than private consumption.  

The good news is that in recent years, private consumption has been growing more quickly than overall GDP, but the prevailing imbalance means that it will take many years of consumption-led growth to achieve a more balanced economy.  Notably, if China’s investment slows without consumption growth rising sufficiently to take its place, China risks a marked weakening in its growth rates, with external surpluses again rising as domestic imbalances unwind.

This has in fact been the case with other Asian economies, which have typically seen their current accounts widen as investment rates have declined from their peaks. The crucial difference, however, is that China is now the second largest economy in the world, leaving little scope for global demand—which already faces a number of headwinds in the medium term—to accommodate a large and sudden rise in China’s current account balance.

Reducing the over-reliance on fixed investment is particularly important when we consider that it has been driving the rise in corporate debt.  Most fixed investment is funded through bank credit; however, each unit of new investment has become less efficient in producing additional economic output.  As a result, a greater amount of both investment and credit have been necessary to sustain China’s high rates of GDP growth.

Turning to production—the third rebalancing—China’s services sector has overtaken manufacturing in terms of GDP and is vastly outpacing the industrial and agricultural sectors in creating new jobs.  This has helped support China’s labor market even as heavy industry has significantly declined and overall growth has slowed.  Even so, there is room for substantial further expansion of China’s services sector, which remains smaller as a share of GDP than other economies of China’s income level.  

Although the decline in heavy industry poses challenges, particularly in certain regions in China, it has the positive aspect of reducing China’s reliance on energy-intensive and highly polluting sectors, the fourth rebalancing.  China’s energy intensity, or the amount of energy required to produce a unit of GDP, has declined significantly over the past years, but is still higher than that of the United States and major emerging markets. 

A truly level playing field for the private sector—the fifth and final transition—is essential for China to improve its allocation of credit and other resources, and to sustain its economic dynamism.  SOEs tend to be less profitable and more highly leveraged than their private peers.  

While China has shifted away from a majority state-owned economy, state-controlled enterprises still account for nearly 40 percent of the economy’s total assets.  Urban SOEs account for more than 30 percent of annual fixed asset investment and nearly 20 percent of urban employment.  Remarkably, SOEs still receive nearly half of total corporate credit, while generating only 21 percent of revenues and 18 percent of profits.  This fact speaks to policies that inefficiently encourage lending to SOEs at the expense of private sector firms.  The IMF estimates that SOEs benefit from indirect subsidies on the scale of 3 percent of GDP, of which about half is subsidized support from the financial sector.   According to S&P, the median leverage of SOEs is twice that of private firms.

Drawing on the discussion above, I see four critical interlinkages between China’s rising corporate leverage and the need for economic rebalancing: 

* First, the reliance on investment-led growth, much of it funded through bank loans, is fueling a continued build-up of debt in the corporate sector.

* Second, SOEs, which retain preferential access to the financial sector, receive a disproportionate amount of credit and are more highly leveraged despite being less efficient and profitable than private firms.  

* Third, highly leveraged SOEs are concentrated in energy-intensive and polluting manufacturing industries such as steel, which suffer from excess capacity. 

* Fourth, some evidence suggests that a significant and rising share of new credit is going to roll over loans to loss-making firms in these sectors—so-called “zombie companies.”  This imposes an unsustainable drag on the financial system and impedes the flow of capital to high-growth sectors.

While high and rising leverage underscores the need for prompt action, I believe that China has the capacity to address this challenge.  Government and household debt levels are manageable, the banking sector has sizable buffers, and overall growth remains stable and relatively strong.  However, the authorities must implement announced reforms.  

They would be well served to vigorously address the level of indebtedness in the economy and chart a course toward less credit-intensive growth.  Let me discuss some specific priorities.

First and foremost, China should accelerate its domestic rebalancing efforts.  With an economy led by services, household consumption, and the private sector, China would be able to grow in a less capital- and credit-intensive manner—with the added benefits of using less energy and reducing pollution.  This begins with intensifying efforts to make household consumption the main engine of the economy.  The authorities have shown some willingness to accept a larger fiscal deficit this year to support domestic demand, but further fiscal measures that target household consumption are needed.   These include strengthening the social safety net, extending social benefits to more migrant workers, and covering re-employment costs for laid-off workers in excess-capacity industries.

Next, to further expand the role of services in China’s economy, it is important to remove the pervasive barriers that restrict private firms, both domestic and foreign, from participating in China’s services sector.  A successful conclusion of a high standard bilateral investment treaty or “BIT”, currently under negotiation, would represent a major step toward reducing the state’s dominant role in services.  Foreign investment can be an important catalyst for services, promoting more competition and ultimately greater productivity, both of which are essential to vibrant economic performance.  

Domestic rebalancing may entail slower growth in the short term, particularly as structural reforms are put into place, but will contribute to more sustainable growth in the longer term.  This highlights a related point:  The authorities would be well-advised to phase out GDP growth targets.  The existing targets perpetuate a “growth at all costs” mentality, encouraging bank loans and local government expenditure on unproductive investments.  

At the same time, by making full use of their macroeconomic toolkit, the authorities can support overall economic growth through the deleveraging process.  In China’s case, fiscal policy can play an important role, in two respects: first, by expanding targeted assistance, such as the 100 billion RMB fund established for workers laid off from excess-capacity industries; and second, through fiscal stimulus that offsets the contractionary effects of deleveraging as firms reduce their debt burdens.  

Adopting policies to remove distortions, particularly in the state sector, will be critical. Given their disproportionate share of credit, reforming state-owned enterprises is also a necessary—indeed, an indispensable—feature of China’s deleveraging and corporate restructuring.  The elements of such reform must include removing the state guarantees and financial sector support that SOEs receive at the expense of private sector firms.  

In recent months, we have seen a number of SOEs default on bonds.  This development, if properly managed, sends an important signal to investors and creditors that they must evaluate firms on the basis of fundamentals, rather than on expectations of state support.

In this context, the authorities’ intention to improve bankruptcy laws and take other steps to allow for the orderly exit of “zombie companies” from the market is important.  This initiative is central to resolving not only high leverage but also excess capacity in sectors such as steel and aluminum, an issue that is important to the United States and the global economy.  

At their bilateral meeting in Hangzhou, on the margins of the G-20 Summit, President Obama and President Xi committed to work cooperatively in this area, with the United States sharing technical expertise on the role bankruptcy plays in our corporate restructurings.  And at their most recent meeting in Lima, Peru, President Obama underscored the urgency of addressing excess capacity in industrial sectors, including by launching without delay the Global Forum on Steel Excess Capacity.

More fundamentally, further reforms to China’s financial sector are necessary to reduce financial sector risks and driving broader economic rebalancing.  Such efforts should include incentivizing banks to lend to the most productive investments, not those that have traditionally enjoyed an implicit state guarantee.  As the transition from manufacturing to services proceeds, the efficiency of credit should increase as modern services and other new industries will likely require less credit to sustain their growth.

Because an increasing amount of credit is extended through China’s shadow banking system, getting a firm grasp on shadow banking activity and its attendant risks is also a necessary component of addressing debt and deleveraging.

Continued development of China’s capital markets will provide long-term financing to China’s corporate sector and reduce reliance on the banking system.  To function effectively, capital markets must exist within a supportive ecosystem, which includes independent credit rating agencies, clear and well-established rights for shareholders and creditors, and strong corporate governance practices.  As a closely related matter, further efforts to foster conditions to allow an orderly transition to a market-determined exchange rate are also central to China’s economic rebalancing.

Finally, let me say a word about the importance of transparency.  Being transparent about actions—particularly in the financial sector—is critical to the credibility and ultimate success of deleveraging efforts.  In the United States, our robust stress tests provided a credible and transparent assessment of the weaknesses in our financial system.  These stress tests have paved the way for banks to raise capital and resume credit growth.

The need for such transparency also applies to China’s economic data.  It is hard to judge China’s progress toward increased household consumption when key data are only released once a year.  Similarly, growth in services is admittedly difficult to measure, due to the relatively small average size of service sector firms and a tendency toward operating informally.  Even so, improved data on the performance of the services sector would help shed light on China’s progress toward rebalancing.  

Recognizing these issues, at this year’s S&ED, China committed to publish a more comprehensive monthly indicator of growth in services, and to continue to improve its quarterly GDP expenditure data. 

CONCLUSION 

In early October, China’s State Council announced “Guidelines on Corporate Deleveraging,” the most comprehensive policy document to date to discuss how the Chinese authorities plan to address high corporate leverage.  Later that month, the State Council set up an inter-ministerial joint conference to implement these guidelines.  Such steps toward a comprehensive approach to debt and the banking sector are very encouraging. 

We must not underestimate the size of the task at hand for China, but we also should not discount the resources that China has to address these challenges.  As China undertakes these efforts, enhanced data transparency and policy communication will help both domestic and international stakeholders measure China’s progress toward these goals and foster confidence in China’s reform trajectory.  The United States should continue to engage constructively with China to support the reform agenda.  China’s success matters tremendously for its own economy, as well as for our economy in the United States and for others around the world. 

Thank you.

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CF40国际交流精选：

中国金融四十人论坛

　　“中国金融四十人论坛”（CF40）是一家非官方、非营利性的专业智库，专注于经济金融领域的政策研究。论坛成立于2008年4月12日，由40位40岁上下的金融精锐组成，即“40×40俱乐部”。

       CF40定位为“平台+实体”新型智库，专注于经济金融领域的政策研究。在四十人论坛平台型智库基础上，逐步形成了四十人和新金融两大实体型智库系列，分别包括四十人金融教育发展基金会、四十人金融研究院、丝路规划研究中心和上海新金融研究院、北方新金融研究院、北大互联网金融研究中心、浦山新金融基金会等机构。

       CF40平台集聚了来自政府机关、研究机构和商业机构的300余位金融领域精英人才；同时，CF40研究院专职研究员队伍也渐趋充实。CF40每年召开双周圆桌会议、金融四十人年会、国际学术交流研讨会等百余场闭门研讨会，开展课题研究近30项，出版周报、月报、要报、《新金融评论》期刊以及金融类书籍共计100余册，受到决策层领导重视和经济金融界人士高度评价。

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