美国前副财长Nathan Sheets深剖美通胀压力，预判美联储缩减购债路线图
财政扩张+货币宽松的双重刺激下，5月美国CPI同比大涨5%，超出市场预期。美联储6月议息会议虽将利率维持在近零水平，并继续每月1200亿美元购债计划，但官员们也调整了对于加息时点的预测，点阵图意外释放鹰派信号。
随着近日美联储官员就何时以及如何缩减购债、退出宽松展开激烈辩论，市场对于通胀形势与美国货币政策转向问题的关注再达高点。
通胀压力引发市场焦虑，美联储究竟如何看待？怎样平衡仍然存在的就业缺口与不容忽视的通胀冲击？如何看待美联储推进Taper、宣布加息的节奏与路径？这一过程中其应如何引导市场预期？未来还有哪些问题值得持续关注？
近日，美国财政部前副部长、PGIM Fixed Income首席经济学家、全球宏观经济研究主管Nathan Sheets接受CF40研究部采访，聚焦上述焦点问题分享见解。Nathan Sheets此前为美国财政部负责国际事务的副部长，并曾在美联储任职18年，担任国际金融部主管以及美国联邦公开市场委员会经济学家。
在Nathan Sheets看来，美联储之所以认为目前通胀上涨虽然超出预期但仍是暂时的，是基于三个观察：
首先，美国就业市场仍然较为疲软，就业人数与疫情前相比存有700万的差距；
其次，长期通胀预期仍处于合理区间，“five-year, five-year forward breakeven rate”（正常国债收益率与通胀保值债券收益率的差值）在2.2%左右，与2018年的数值差别不大，说明不存在过高的通胀压力；
第三，价格上涨较为集中，虽然5月CPI报告显示核心CPI上升了74个百分点，但新车、二手车、租赁车、飞机票价格的上涨贡献了这一涨幅的近三分之二。
他分析认为，目前美国经济中存在两种通胀：一是在商品领域，受财政刺激、财富效应、被压抑的储蓄和疫苗接种活动影响，供给的增长赶不上需求的增长；二是疫情期间大幅下降的服务价格正回归常态。而这两方面因素都可能只是暂时的——随着时间的推移，需求端会有所缓和，生产端问题也会得到解决，且服务价格不太可能出现长期通胀。
“总的来看，在美国经济复苏态势强劲、通胀意外走高、市场风险情绪较为积极的情况下，美联储没必要再实施大规模的资产购买。”Nathan Sheets表示，虽然就业市场距离完全复苏还有很长的路要走，但目前的低迷源自供给短缺，而非需求不足。
基于以上分析，他认为更多的消息会在夏末放出，要重点关注Jackson Hole全球央行年会，正式实施可能在10月1日至明年的1月1日之间。“我预计美联储每次会议会宣布将购债规模下调150亿美元，这样的话，缩减至零购债大概需要耗时一年。”
“避免让市场措手不及是美联储从2013年的缩减恐慌中学到的重要一课。”Nathan Sheets表示，这次在向市场传达信息时，美联储也强调，即便开始缩减购债，加息时点也不会很快到来，至少要到2022年末或者2023年。考虑到这些因素，缩减购债给全球市场带来的影响应该也是有限的。
Nathan Sheets预期，全球疫苗接种进度的不断推进和更广泛的经济复苏将为投资者带来信心。如果美联储和其他发达国家央行继续对通胀压力按兵不动，再通胀预期将继续升温，对风险资产产生利好。
他强调，虽然下半年全球市场回弹，但投资者将要面对以下几大问题：一是美联储的暂时性通胀判断是否准确？二是美国2022年经济增长预期如何？财政刺激一旦减弱，经济重启动力消退，总需求能否继续保持强劲态势？三是更高的债务水平（包括公共和私营部门）会对中期的经济活动产生怎样的影响？
“这些问题的答案基本决定了未来几年经济和市场的走势，还有待进一步的观察。”Nathan Sheets对CF40研究部表示。
Q1. 拜登总统在今年五月末的时候向国会提交了2022财年的预算方案，总值6万亿美元。您对这一大规模的支出计划有何看法，在您看来，这是否预示着美国的财政政策正变得更为激进？
之后，拜登又快速转向了他的2.25万亿美元基建计划和1.8万亿美元“美国家庭计划”，而且值得注意的是，两大计划均包含了针对企业和高收入家庭的大幅增税措施。尽管执行周期长达8-10年，这两项计划代表了美国财政政策取向的重大转变，拜登政府正试图通过财政政策推动美国经济朝着更为公平、绿色、高效的方向发展。
2022年的6万亿预算囊括了上述计划，也充分体现了这些计划所带来的财政压力。估算显示，如果这两项计划（包括其中的增税计划）得以完全实施，美国2022年的预算赤字将达1.8万亿美元，约占GDP的8%，虽然和2021年的赤字率（14-15%）相比有大幅下降，或者说财政刺激与2021年相比实际上是下降的，但也说明拜登在任期间的财政赤字至少会高于特朗普在任期间的数额。但拜登的支出计划全部获批的可能性不大，同样的，预算方案中提出的增税幅度也不太可能完全实现。
特朗普政府的赤字率在4-5%之间，疫情完全结束后，拜登政府的赤字率看来会在5-6%左右，如果拥有多数席位的民主党进步派有其他优先支出项目，这一赤字率可能会进一步扩大。
Q2. 宽松的货币政策是大规模经济刺激的基础，但美国财政部长耶伦近期多次提到，利率上升对社会和美联储来说都是一件好事，请问该如何理解这一说法？
其次，特别对于货币政策来说，全球金融危机后，美国长期处于低利率环境，利率有所回调可以给美联储更多的政策空间，同时为可能的经济下行预留更多的降息空间。最近的几轮经济周期中，美联储就受到了零利率下限的限制。“非常规”的货币政策虽然有效，但其有效性显然没法与常规的降息相比。
但值得注意的是，首先，上述论点是否成立与利率上涨的根本原因密切相关，如果利率的上涨并非由再通胀导致，而来源于对滞胀的担忧或风险溢价的上升，那么上述论点的有效性会大打折扣。其次，由于未来几年美国经济很有可能面临人口老龄化、企业部门去杠杆、反通胀压力等结构性问题，本轮经济周期下，利率要想上涨到远高于疫情前的水平恐怕很难。
Q3. 近日美联储逆回购规模再创新高，FOMC声明上调超额准备金利率（IOER）和隔夜逆回购利率（ONRRP）各5bp，是否表明市场流动性目前处于过剩状态？是否预示着缩减和加息的必要性有所上升？
Nathan Sheets：目前美国的金融系统的确存在流动性过剩的现象，主要是因为美联储每月保持着1200亿美元的资产购买，今年财政部存放在美联储的资金下降了约1万亿美元，也加剧了这一问题。
美联储主要使用两种工具调节流动性，一是面向银行的准备金利率，二是主要面向政府支持型企业和非银行金融机构的逆回购。截至六月中旬，银行准备金规模已经达到了将近4万亿美元，而逆回购的规模达到了7500亿美元。
美联储完全有能力运用以上工具组合来控制流动性的增长，但正如6月的议息会决议显示，美联储偶尔也会调整这些工具以维持其有效性。
美联储有信心可以成功控制住目前金融系统中的流动性，并将联邦基金利率维持在目标区间。至少目前为止，流动性调节还没有实质性地影响到美联储的政策，似乎也没有纳入到关于缩减和加息时机问题的讨论中。不管怎么说，美联储一贯谨慎，无疑正在密切关注货币市场的情况。
随着资产负债表不断扩大，美联储面临着前所未有的挑战，伴随而来的风险也越来越难以评估和预测。如果流动性继续泛滥，上述工具的有效性很有可能会达到上限。在此情况下，美联储或者尝试新的工具，或者考虑调整其货币政策，但就目前情势来看，还远不到这一地步。
Q4. 请问您如何理解美联储目前对通胀的态度？
首先，就业市场仍较为疲软，就业人数与疫情前相比仍有700万的差距。
其次，长期通胀预期仍处于合理区间，比如“five-year, five-year forward breakeven rate”（正常国债收益率与通胀保值债券收益率的差值）在2.2%左右，与2018年的数值差别不大，说明不存在过高的通胀压力。
第三，价格上涨较为集中，5月的CPI报告显示，核心CPI上升了74个百分点，但新车、二手车、租赁车、飞机票价格的上涨贡献了这一涨幅的近三分之二。
更宽泛来看，目前美国经济中存在两种通胀。
在商品领域，供给量的增长赶不上需求的增长。受财政刺激、财富效应、被压抑的储蓄和疫苗接种活动影响，总需求异常旺盛，但企业需要时间作出反应，包括调整生产计划、解决供应链问题以及重新雇用工人。这一过程中不可避免会出现短缺和瓶颈，导致某些商品的价格快速上涨，比如芯片短缺影响了汽车生产。美联储认为随着时间的推移，需求会有所缓和，生产端的问题也会得到解决，从而推动供需恢复平衡，商品的通胀势头得到抑制。
与此同时，在疫情期间大幅下降的服务价格正回归常态，但这有可能只是暂时的。经济的正常化带来了服务需求的恢复，但回升程度有限。疫情期间，大量服务消费被商品消费所替代，虽然这一趋势在接下来的几个月里会出现大幅逆转，但与疫情前相比，部分替代现象会固着在经济中。例如，人们更多使用IT产品，降低了国际旅行和酒店的需求。这就导致了服务价格不太可能出现长期通胀。
Q5. 美联储预计何时开始缩减购债？这一过程中如何引导市场预期？市场，特别是新兴经济体市场，是否会经历一场类似于2013年的缩减恐慌？
Nathan Sheets：在美国经济复苏态势强劲、通胀意外走高、市场风险情绪较为积极的情况下，美联储没必要再实施大规模的资产购买。虽然就业市场距离完全复苏还有很长的路要走，但目前的低迷源自供给短缺，而非需求不足。美联储主席鲍威尔在新闻发布会上表示，随着增加的失业救济金停止发放、疫情持续好转，人们会重返工作岗位。
基于这些现实情况，美联储在6月的议息会上已经开始讨论缩减购债问题，更多的消息我认为会在夏末，可能在Jackson Hole全球央行年会的时候放出，正式实施可能在10月1日至明年的1月1日之间。我预计美联储每次会议会宣布将购债规模下调150亿美元，这样的话，缩减至零购债大概需要耗时一年。
目前为止，市场对美联储释放的缩减信号处之泰然，一方面可能认识到量化宽松已经不再必要，另一方面也说明市场相信这一过程会是逐渐的。
避免让市场措手不及是美联储从2013年的缩减恐慌中学到的重要的一课。这次在向市场传达信息时，美联储也强调，即便开始缩减购债，加息时点不会很快到来，至少要到2022年末或者2023年。
考虑到这些因素，缩减购债给全球市场带来的影响应该也是有限的。
Q6. 今年下半年全球市场的风险偏好走势如何？哪些风险需要持续关注？
虽然下半年市场回弹，投资者将要面对以下几大问题。一是美联储的暂时性通胀判断是否准确？二是2022年经济增长预期如何？财政刺激一旦减弱，经济重启的动力消退，总需求能否继续保持强劲态势？三是更高的债务水平（包括公共和私营部门）会对中期的经济活动产生什么样的影响？
这些问题的答案基本决定了未来几年经济和市场的走势。
以下为英文实录：
Q1. President Joe Biden submitted a $6-trillion budget request for fiscal year 2022 to the Congress in late May. How do you assess the scale of this budget? Is the US fiscal policy becoming increasingly aggressive in your view?
Biden then quickly pivoted to his $2.25 trillion infrastructure program and the $1.8 trillion “Families Act.” Notably, both packages include sizable tax increases, mainly targeted at corporations and high-earning households. While this spending would be spread over 8-10 years, it nevertheless represents a watershed effort to use fiscal policy to make the US economy fairer, greener, and more efficient.
The Administration’s proposed $6 trillion budget for 2022 embeds these ambitious proposals—and highlights the price tag. Early estimates suggest that, if fully implemented (including the proposed tax hikes), it would leave the budget deficit for the year at roughly $1.8 trillion, about 8% of GDP. While the deficit would be down sharply from the 2021 deficit of 14-15% of GDP, thus signaling a strongly negative fiscal impulse, it also suggests that deficits during the Biden years are likely to be, if anything, larger than those posted under Donald Trump. While it’s unlikely that all of Biden’s spending proposals will be approved, it’s similarly doubtful that taxes will be hiked to the extent proposed in the budget.
A rough rule of thumb is that Trump’s deficits hovered in the 4-5% of GDP range. Once the pandemic is fully behind us, Biden’s deficits seem poised to land around 5-6% of GDP. But to the extent that his progressive majority identifies other spending priorities, these deficits could be even larger.
Q2. Loose monetary policy is a basis for massive fiscal stimulus. But Treasury Secretary Yellen said on many occasions recently that higher interest rates would be a “plus” for the US society and the Fed. How do you interpret this stance?
Second, specifically for monetary policy, a somewhat higher rate environment than prevailed after the global financial crisis would give the Federal Reserve more room for maneuver and, in particular, more scope to cut rates in the event of a downturn. In recent cycles, the Fed has been constrained by the zero lower bound. The unconventional policies that the Fed has relied on have been effective, but they are clearly not as effective as conventional rate cuts.
But these thoughts require two important caveats. First, the arguments above hinge critically on the underlying question of why interest rates are rising. If rather than being driven by reflation, the higher rates reflect stagflation concerns, or rising risk premiums, the arguments above are blunted. Second, with the economy likely to face a number of structural headwinds in the years ahead—including aging demographics, corporate sector deleveraging, and entrenched disinflationary pressures—it may yet prove difficult for rates in this cycle to move sustainably higher than in the years before the pandemic.
Q3. Reverse repo by the Fed reached a record scale recently. Does it indicate there is too much liquidity in the market and the Fed needs to take action? Does it mean that taper and rate hikes are becoming more necessary?
Nathan Sheets：There is a veritable glut of liquidity in the US financial system at present. It reflects the Fed’s ongoing asset purchases of $120 billion per month. But, in addition, the Treasury has added to the flood this year by drawing down its deposits at the Federal Reserve by roughly $1 trillion.
The Fed’s principal tools for managing this liquidity are, first, its interest on reserves facility (to which only banks have access) and, second, the reverse repo facility (which caters mainly to the GSEs and nonbank financial institutions). As of mid-June, bank reserves were approaching $4 trillion, with another $750 billion in the reverse repo facility.
Taken together, these tools have given the Fed ample capacity to manage rising liquidity levels. Even so, as highlighted by the Fed’s action at the June FOMC meeting, the rates on these facilities need to occasionally be recalibrated to ensure their continued effectiveness.
Bottom line, the Fed remains confident that it will be able to successfully manage the massive liquidity in the system and hit its target for the funds rate. And, at least to date, liquidity-management issues have not been a meaningful constraint on policy, and such issues do not seem to be factoring appreciably into the debate regarding the timing of tapering and rate hikes. Nevertheless, the Fed is always prudent and, no doubt, is watching conditions in the money markets closely.
Moreover, as the balance sheet continues to expand, the Fed increasingly moves into uncharted territory, and the associated risks become harder to assess and predict. There is a clear possibility that, as liquidity levels continue to rise, limitations on these tools could become evident. If so, the Fed will either need to design additional facilities to meet the challenges at hand, or re-think its monetary policy strategy. But the balance of the evidence suggests that we are still a goodly distance from that point.
Q4. How do you understand the Fed’s attitude toward inflation at this point?
First, there is still significant slack in the labor market, with employment down by over 7 million workers relative to before the pandemic.
Second, longer-term inflation expectations remain well behaved. For example, the five-year, five-year forward breakeven currently trades at around 2.2%, broadly similar to its readings in 2018 and not indicative of uncomfortably high inflation.
Third, the observed price increases have been remarkably concentrated. The May CPI report showed a 74 basis point increase in core prices, but nearly two-thirds of the rise came from new and used vehicles, rental cars, and airline fares.
More broadly, there are two inflationary dynamics at work in the US economy. In the goods sectors, demand is simply outpacing the supply response. Lifted by fiscal stimulus, wealth effects, pent-up saving, and the vaccination campaign, aggregate demand is exceptionally strong. But it’s taking time for firms to respond. They must adjust production schedules, figure out supply chains, and rehire workers. In the process of making these adjustments, shortages and bottlenecks have arisen, which have driven the prices of some goods rapidly higher. Semiconductors used in the production of autos are “Exhibit 1” in this regard. Over time, however, the Fed sees demand moderating and the production-side of the economy working through (or around) the glitches. This will allow the supply-demand balance to normalize, and goods inflation to cool.
In parallel, prices of services—which softened appreciably through the pandemic—are normalizing. But this also is likely to be a temporary process. Demand for services is rebounding as the economy gets back to normal, but there are limits to the bounce. During the pandemic, the economy has heavily substituted toward goods and away from services. While a large portion of this shift is likely to reverse in the months ahead, the economy may remain somewhat more goods intensive and less services intensive than before the pandemic. For example, increased deployment of IT products may imply a notch less international travel and reduced demand for hotel rooms. In such circumstances, a long-lived surge in services inflation seems unlikely.
Q5. When do you expect the Fed to start tapering? How will the Fed guide market expectations during this process? Do you expect to see taper tantrum again like the one in 2013, especially in emerging market economies? What are the regional risks that deserve attention?
Recognizing these realities, the Fed at its June meeting confessed that it had discussed the timing of tapering. I expect that we will hear more about tapering toward the end of the summer, perhaps at Jackson Hole, and that tapering will commence sometime between October 1 and January 1. My expectation is that the Fed will cut its purchases by $15 billion per meeting, indicating that the move to zero will take roughly a year.
To date, the markets have absorbed the “taper talk” with little apparent concern. Perhaps this sanguine response flows from a recognition that the asset purchases are no longer necessary. It probably also reflects confidence that the Fed will fully telegraph its intentions and that tapering will be gradual. The Fed has learned important lessons from the 2013 “taper tantrum” and will be careful to avoid surprising the markets. Further, the Fed’s communication has underscored that, even once tapering commences, rate hikes will still be well into the future, likely not before the end of 2022 or sometime in 2023. Consistent with these observations, the global spillovers from tapering are likely to be limited as well.
Q6. How do you expect the risk preference in global markets to change in the second half of the year? Specifically, do you think the $6-trillion budget plan could add to the debt risks facing the US? As the US asset bubble spreads, when do you think the risk of asset repricing will occur?
That said, even as investors enjoy this second-half bounce, they will increasingly turn to several key questions. First, is the Fed correct that the recent outbreak of inflation is only transitory? Second, what will growth look like in 2022? Once fiscal stimulus abates and the boost from re-opening passes, how strong will aggregate demand ultimately be? And, third, to what extent will higher levels of indebtedness (in both the private and public sectors) constrain the pace of activity over the medium term? The answers to these questions will largely chart the course for the economy and markets in the years ahead.
监制：卜海森 李俊虎