精译求精系列之三：科技公司的生命周期被压缩—投资者的一大挑战（下）

编者按：中国投资者对巴菲特以及其经典的投资心得耳熟能详。但实际上，这个世界仍然有大量可以与巴菲特比肩的投资大师精心撰写的投资心得，但多以英文或者其他语言撰写，国内几乎没有介绍。格隆汇特意组织力量开始制作《精译求精系列》，力求将这些含金量十足的大师心得，呈现在广大会员眼前，体现他们的价值，为大家的投资，保驾护航。

本文的作者是纽约大学金融系教授Aswath Damodaran在其博客上发布的投资心得。文章主要讨论了科技公司的生命周期！

Muchof what we learn and practice as investors represent models and methodsdeveloped in a different age, one where the market was composed of consumerproduct, infrastructure and manufacturing companies. While those lessons mayhave been good ones for old economy markets, I will argue in this post thatthey can provide misleading signals with short corporate life-cycles, anaffliction common among, but not unique to, tech companies. Lest this beconstrued as an attack on a specific group of investors, I will spread mycritique across investor classes, starting with value investors, then moving onto growth investors and market timers and then turning it on (which is where I count myself).

过去，市场是由消费产品和制造型公司组成的，作为投资者，我们大部分所学和实践都源于那一时期出现的模型和方法。在旧经济市场中这些模型和方法是有效的，但在本文中我想说的是，它们很有可能对生命周期较短的企业提供误导信息。受难的不是只有科技公司，但是它们往往是最常见的一类受害者。为了不被认为是针对某一特定的投资群体，我会对不同类别的投资者逐一分析，首先是价值型投资者，然后是成长型投资者和市场投机者，最后是内在价值投资者（我视自己为其中一员）。

TheTech Challenge for Value Investors

价值投资者面临的科技挑战

Ifyou are a value investor, you may have been told that everything you need toknow about valuation is in Ben Graham's Security Analysis. I will make aconfession.  I love Ben Graham for his philosophy and intellect, but Ithink that using the techniques suggested in it to value tech companies is akinto using a hammer to do surgery. It is not Graham's fault, since he wrote thebook at a time when the corporate world was populated with railroads, utilitiesand manufacturing companies and much of his advice was directed at coaxinginvestors who were more interested in buying bonds, to consider stocks as analternative. In fact, in the Graham world, a good stock looks like a perpetualbond, with ever-growing coupons. So, at the risk of arousing the ire of valuepurists, here is my list of old value investing chestnuts that need to beroasted on the tech fire.

如果你是一位价值投资者，那么你很可能会被告知：对于价值你只需要知道一件事就是够了，那就是Ben Graham的《证券分析》。坦白说，我十分佩服Ben Graham的理念和智慧，但是用他提倡的方法去对科技公司进行估价，就如同用铁锤去做手术。这并非Graham的错，他写这本书的时候，整个企业界都是铁路公司、公共设施公司和制造业公司，而他的大部分建议都是为了迎合那些视股票为替代品，但对债券更感兴趣的投资者。实际上，在Graham看来，一支好的股票像一支永久债券一样也有日益增长的息票。所以即便是冒着激怒纯粹价值者的风险，我仍列举出了一些在研究科技公司时需再回炉重造的旧投资策略。

1. Don'ttrust earnings multiples: There are some pricing metrics that aresingularly inappropriate for use with tech companies, and at the top of thelist is price earnings (PE) ratios. Early in the life cycle, when growth isexplosively high and R&D expenses are rising, the PE ratios for techcompanies will be high, as markets price in future earnings, and tech companieswill almost always look expensive, even if they are fairly priced. Later in thelife cycle, when growth is not just low but often negative and R&D expensesare falling, the PE ratios for tech companies will be low, and tech companieswill look cheap, even when they are not.

别相信市盈率：某些定价标准用在科技公司上是极其不合适的，我想说的第一个就是市盈率。在生命周期早期，科技公司呈爆炸性成长，研发经费攀升，此时市盈率很高，动态市盈率也很高。此时，即便定价公正，科技公司的股价也总是看上去很贵。在公司生命周期后期，科技公司增长缓慢，研发经费降低，市盈率也会很低，科技公司的股价此时看上去就很便宜，虽然事实完全相反。

To illustrate this dynamic, I created two companies, both with 20-year windowsand similar risk, but made one a tech company, with intense growth (50%) forthe first 5 years, a short mature period of 5 years (10%) and speedy declinethereafter and the other one a non-tech company, with less intense growth (25%)for the first 5 years, a longer mature period of 10 years and a more stableafterlife. The graph below shows the fair PE ratios for these firms, as theymove through their lifetimes. The bottom line is that tech companies lookexpensive on a PE ratio, when they are young, and cheap on a PE ratio basis,when they age, even if they are fairly valued. This problem is exacerbated bythe accounting mistreatment of R&D, which makes young tech companies lookless profitable than they truly are and old tech companies more profitable. and book value are also affected, but not tothe same degree. 

为了更好地呈现这一动态过程，我假定有两家风险相似、且都发展了20年的公司，其中一家为科技公司。在前五年里，科技公司迅速成长（50%增长速率），随之是五年的短暂成熟期（10%增长速率），然后是快速衰落阶段。其它非科技公司在头五年增长并不如科技公司那样急剧（25%增长速率），成熟期长达十年，衰落期也更为平缓。下图清楚地展示了这两家公司整个生命周期的市盈率。总得来说就是即便估值公正，从市盈率上看，科技公司的股价在成长期显得更贵，而在衰老期看上去更便宜。这一问题因研究发展经费的会计记账误区而恶化。这样一来，年轻的科技公司看上去并不如实际上那么盈利，而老的科技公司看上去好像更有利可图。市销率和市净率也会受到影响，只是程度上没那么严重而已。

Spreadsheet for PE ratio comparison

Ican offer some evidence for this from , where I classified all companies based ontheir age and compare old tech companies (older than 35 years) with oldnon-tech companies. In the graph below, I compare the earnings multiples at which old tech companies(>35 years) trade, relative to old non-tech companies:

在之前一篇关于旧科技公司的文章里，我们能发现一些支持上述言论的论据。在文中，我根据发展年限将公司分类，然后将旧科技公司（35年以上）和旧的非科技公司进行了对比。如下图所示，我将年老的科技公司的市净率与年老的非科技公司的市净率也进行了对比：

Old companies =  Age greater than 35 years (since founding)

Notethat old tech companies look cheap on every earnings metric, relative to oldnon-tech companies. There may be a reason why companies like IBM and Microsoftkeep showing up on the lists of cheapest stocks, when you run value screens.

值得注意的是，从每一个收益指标上看，年老的科技公司都比年老的非科技公司看上去更便宜。这可能就是为什么IBM和微软这类公司经常出现在低价股票名单上的原因。

2.Don't buy and hold "good" companies:Not all value investors subscribe to this notion, but quite a few seem toaccept the idea that if you find a good company (well managed, with strongcompetitive advantages), you should buy the company for your portfolio and holdfor the long term (perhaps forever). That is not good advice with techcompanies, where today's tech superstar can become tomorrow's dog. If you buy atech company, you should be revaluing it at frequent intervals, selling it, ifthe price exceeds the value significantly.

不要因为一家公司看上去“好”就买入并一直持有：并不是所有的价值投资者都对这一观点买账，很多人认为如果发掘了一家优秀的公司（管理优良，竞争力强），就应该在投资组合中加入该公司的股票并长期持有（甚至永久持有）。然而，对于科技公司而言，这并不是一个好建议。一个新兴的科技公司明天就有可能沦为落水狗。如果你买入了一家科技公司，那么你就应该时不时对它进行反复评估，当股票价格高出股票价值太多时就可以卖出了。

3.Don't prize dividends over stock buybacks:I have always believed that fixed dividends are a ill-suited way of returningcash on a residual claim (equity), especially because investors who receivethem seem to view them as constants that should not be changed. With technologycompanies, I would argue that stock buybacks are not only more suited to theirlife cycle needs, but are also more reflective of what they can afford to payout, than large dividends. Again, I can offer partial backing for thisstatement by comparing cash returned by old tech companies versus old non-techcompanies.

不要觉得分发股利就一定比回购股票好：我一直相信固定的股利不是一个向剩余索取权返回现金的好方法，其中很重要的原因就是接收股利的投资者们似乎将股利看成了一个不可改变的常数。对于科技公司而言，回购股票不仅比分发股利更适合其自身的生命周期，也更能反应公司的偿付能力。同样的，通过将年老科技公司和年老的非科技公司的返现能力进行对比，这一论断也能得到部分证实。

至少从整体而言，年老的科技公司比年老的非科技公司能返回更多的现金给股东，公司回购股票也更为频繁，它们手头拥有的现金量也更少。总的来说，处于生命周期加速中的公司，其衰落更为急剧，回购股票对它们而言可能更为适合。

TheTech Challenge for Growth Investors

成长型投资者

Whilegrowth investors don't have the long traditions that value investors do, theyhave their own share of dos and don'ts accumulated through time. One is, ofcourse, the idea of buying growth at a reasonable price (GARP), a notion madepopular by Peter Lynch's work at Magellan and his resultant writings. Inputting that  common sense notion into practice with tech companies, growth investors draw on they own share of practices based on thepremises that growth is good, that it is sustainable and if bought at areasonable price, is a winning strategy. 

尽管成长型投资者的发展史没有价值投资者那么长，但在这段时间里他们形成了一套自己的可为和不可为准则。准则之一当然是以合理的价格购入增值型资产，它的盛行得益于彼得·林奇在麦哲伦工作时在自己著作中的推行。在对科技公司进行投资时，增长型投资者认为只要基于以下前设就可将这一宽泛的准则付诸实践，并达成双赢局面：增长是好事，增长是可持续的，并且购入价格是合理的。

1.   Growth is notalways good: I have long argued against the lazynotion that growth is good and that a company should therefore go for growth,at any cost. While that notion is dangerous at any company, it is particularlyso at tech companies, where once the ,growth is a value destroyer, not a value adder. 

1，增长不总是好事：增长总是好的，企业要不惜一切代价追求增长——对这种懒人信条我一直都持不赞成态度。这种观点对很多公司来说都是危险的，对科技公司尤为如此，因为科技公司的生命周期一旦经历转折，增长就变成了价值损坏者而并非价值增长者。

2.   Growth may notbe sustainable: Growth in the past has never been a greatindicator of future growth across companies, but it is a particularly misplacednotion with tech companies where growth rates can change over night.

2，增长不总是持续的：公司在过去增长绝不意味着将来也会增长。这一说法对科技公司更是如此，因为科技公司的增长速率可能一夜之间发生转变。

3.   PEG Ratios aremisleading: If value investors put their trust in PEratios, growth investors put their in PEG ratios, the ratio of PE to growthrate. A low PEG ratio is considered to be a signal that a company is undervalued; this is even more when a PEGratio below one becomes a magical indicator of cheapness. Using the tech lifecycle rubric, I would argue that the PEG ratio approach will lead to too manytech companies looking cheap during their high growth phase and too few intheir decline, the mirror image of the problem faced by value investors. Hereagain, I can use the two companies from my example to illustrate my point:

3，PEG指标有误导性：价值投资者相信的是市盈率，增长型投资者相信的是PEG指标，即市盈率对盈率增长的比率。较低的PEG通常被认为是暗示公司价值被低估：当PEG指数低于1时，大家就认为这个暗示更加强烈，此时PEG好像有了某种神奇魔力。但是就科技公司而言，PEG指标会使太多科技公司的股价在增长期看上去很便宜，而在衰落期看上去便宜的却是少之又少。价值投资者面临的就是这种镜像问题。我想用之前例举的两家公司进一步阐明我的观点：

PEG  = Trailing PE/ Expected Growth rate in EPS in next 5 years

Note that early in the life cycle, techcompanies have lower PEG ratios than non-tech companies and later in the lifecycle, they.

值得注意的是在生命周期初期，科技公司比非科技公司的PEG指标更低，但在生命周期末尾，科技公司看上去更有利可图。

TheTech Challenge for Market Timers

市场投机者面临的科技挑战

This is not a post on market timing, but there are lessons here for markettimers as well. The composition of the S&P 500 has changed over time, withtech companies increasing as a proportion of the index from 6% of the index in1990 to 20% of the index in 2015.

这篇文章的主题并不是市场投机，但是市场投机者也可以从中汲取一些经验。在过去的十几年里，标准普尔500指数的构成已经发生了变化，科技公司在该指数中所占比例从1990年的6%上涨到2015的20％。

index PE will depend inlarge part on where these companies are in their life cycles; if they are stillin their growth phases, their presence will push up the index PE, but if theyare in decline, they can depress the index PE.

虽然只有最成功的科技公司才能进入这一指数，但是它们确实将科技公司特定的生命周期特征带入了其中。科技公司对PE指数的影响很大程度上取决于公司处于生命周期的什么阶段。如果公司尚在成长阶段，那么PE指数就会升高，但是如果科技公司处于衰落期，那么PE指数就会被拉低。

The Tech Challenge in Valuation

评估所面临的科技挑战

作为一个内在价值投资者，在对科技公司进行估价时，我一直都在与公司缩短的生命周期搏斗。在现金流量贴现法里，对公司估价的一个典型框架就是先估计现金流量的增长，假设增长呈永久性，然后估计终值。

The defense that is offered, when someone notes that nothing lasts forever, isthat if a company lasts decades, you might as well use the assumption of"forever", since your value will be approximately the same number.That argument loses its power with technology firms, raising the question ofwhether we are over valuing mature technology companies by using this standardmythology. There are three simple fixes, if the perpetual growth assumptiontroubles you with a technology company:

如果有人说没什么是能永久的，你可以这样反驳他：如果一家公司的寿命是几十年，我们也可以假设它是“永久的”，因为这跟你的估值几乎没什么差别。但是如果是科技公司，这个论据就失效了。一个问题随之而来——我们是否用统一的标准高估了成熟的科技公司。如果对科技公司进行这样的永久性增长假设让你很困扰，那么你可以参考以下三种简单的解决方法：

1.Usea liquidation value, assuming that you disband the company andsell its assets. Since the assets of technology companies are not physical,this will yield a conservative estimate of value.  

1，使用清算价值。假定你解散了公司并出售了其资产。由于科技公司的资产并非有形资产，产生的价值估计将是保守的。

2. Usea growing annuity equation, i.e., assume that your cash flows willcontinue after your terminal year but only for a finite period (10-15 years)and with limited growth.

2，使用年金方程，例如：假设你的现金流在终止年份之后的一段有限时间内（10-15年）仍在继续，并且增长是有限的。

3. Usea growing perpetuity equation, with a negative growth rate inperpetuity, a practice that you don't see used often, but is well in line withwhat the model allows. Intuitively, you are assuming that the company willshrink over time and effectively disappear.

3，使用永续增长方程。假定永久年金的增长率为负，虽然这一假设不常被使用，但它恰在模型允许的范围之内。直观地看，你在假设公司随着时间逐渐缩水, 直至快速地消失

Asa final point, in intrinsic value, you have to make judgments about managers incompanies, and when valuing declining tech companies, where managers are indenial about the decline, you have to value the consequences (bad investments,value destroying growth etc.).

最后一点, 在进行内在价值投资时, 你必须对公司的管理层进行评估。在对衰落的科技公司进行评估时,如果管理层否认衰落这一过程,你就必须对结果进行评估(不良投资,价值破坏增长等)。

TheBottom Line

总结

As the market's axis tilts towards technology, it may be time for us to revisitthe metrics and models that we have been using, almost on auto pilot, for manydecades. The shorter lives and the higher failure rates of technology companiescan make them look cheap, when they are expensive, if you are a value investor,and their high growth rates can draw in growth investors, who may not factor inthe fact that this growth is not sustainable.

如果市场的轴心向科技倾斜，我们就应当重新审视常年使用的指标和模型了。如果你是一位价值投资者，当科技公司的寿命较短而失败的风险较高时，公司股价就会看似很便宜，然而事实是其股票偏高。而科技公司较高的增长率会蒙蔽增长型投资者的双眼，即便公司的增长并非持续的，他也无法认清这一现实。

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