Vol.608 域外法学 | Legal Theory，Volume 25，Issue 3

   Legal Theory 

《法律理论》

Volume 25, Issue 3 | September 2019

01

The Authority of Moral Oversight: On the Legitimacy of Criminal Law

道德监督的权威性：论刑事法律的合法性

Christopher Bennett

    An influential view in recent philosophy of punishment is that the apparatus of criminal justice should be geared at least in part to state censure of wrongdoing. I argue that if it were to be so geared, such an apparatus would make ambitious claims to authority, and that the legitimacy of the relevant state would then depend on whether those claims can be vindicated. This paper looks first at what kind of authority is being claimed by this apparatus. The criminal law, I argue, cannot merely be thought of as claiming a right to rule and to be obeyed. Rather, its authority is better understood as the authority of moral oversight: a power to alter, at will (though within certain limits), citizens’ liability to answer for their compliance with—and to be officially censured for their failure to comply with—a designated set of pre-existing moral 7reasons. The paper then looks at whether a state could realistically be expected to possess such authority—that is, whether a state that claims to have such a power could ever be legitimate.

摘要：在近期的惩罚哲学中，一种有影响力的观点是，刑事司法程序应当至少部分地适合于国家对不法行为（wrongdoing）的谴责。我主张，如果照此做法，这样一种程序将雄心勃勃地主张其权威性，并且相关国家的合法性将依赖于这些主张能否得到辩护。本文首先观察这些程序所主张的是何种权威。我认为，刑事法律不能仅仅被认为是在主张统治与被服从的权利。相反地，它的权威性更应当被理解为道德监督的权威性：一种任意地（尽管在特定限度内）改变公民服从于一套指定的预先存在的道德理由、并在未能服从之时受到官方谴责之责任的权力。此后，本文关注一个国家可否现实地被期待为拥有这种权威，也即是，一个主张拥有这种权力的国家可否被合法化。

02

Sensitivity, Safety, And the Law: A Reply to Pardo

敏感性、安定性与法律：答帕多教授

David Enoch and Levi Spectre

    In a recent paper, Michael Pardo argues that the epistemic property that is legally relevant is the one called Safety, rather than Sensitivity. In the process, he argues against our Sensitivity-related account of statistical evidence. Here we revisit these issues, partly in order to respond to Pardo, and partly in order to make general claims about legal epistemology. We clarify our account, we show how it adequately deals with counterexamples and other worries, we raise suspicions about Safety's value here, and we revisit our general skepticism about the role that epistemological considerations should play in determining legal policy.

摘要：最近，迈克尔·帕多（Michael Pardo）在其发表的文章中认为，与法律相关的认识论属性是指安定性，而非敏感性。在论述中，他反对我们有关敏感性的统计证据。在本文中，我们回顾这些问题，一方面是为了回应帕多，另一方面是致力于对法认识论提出一般性主张。在此我们表明了自己的观点，向读者展示如何充分应对反例及其他担忧，并且提出了对安定性价值的怀疑，此外我们也重新审视了对认识论因素在确定法政策时所发挥之作用的普遍怀疑论。

译者补充：A belief or judgment is sensitive if and only if, roughly, had it been false, the relevant person would not have believed it. A belief or judgment is safe if and only if, roughly, the relevant person would not have held it without it being true. Both conditions—Sensitivity and Safety—seem to capture something important, at least epistemically and perhaps also legally.

03

Contractualist Justification and The Direction of A Duty

契约主义的辩护与义务的指向

Julian Jonker

    To whom is a duty owed? Contractualism answers with an interest theory of direction. As such, it faces three challenges. The Conceptual Challenge requires acknowledgment that a duty is conceptually distinct from an interest. The Extensional Challenge requires an account of cases in which one who is owed a duty does not take an interest in the duty, or does not take as much of an interest as someone who is not owed the duty. The Positivist Challenge requires explanation of the great flexibility of law and other social practices in positing duties that do not reflect the landscape of moral interests. Contractualism can be shown to meet these challenges once we acknowledge the centrality of the idea of a generic interest. Focusing on generic interests also illuminates the distinctive form of respect involved in directedness.

摘要：对谁负有义务？契约主义用利益理论来回答。因此，它面临三个挑战。（1）概念上的挑战（The Conceptual Challenge）要求承认义务在概念上与利益是不同的。（2）外延上的挑战（The Extensional Challenge）要求说明以下情况：定向义务之指向者并不总对义务之实现享有利益；即便他/她享有了这份利益，可能相较而言，第三方享受了更大的利益。当我向A承诺，我会帮他/她搬家的时候，A可能并不关心我会不会实际这么做；他/她甚至可能希望我不要帮他/她。即便A关心我是否会这么做，A的姐姐可能更为关心我的动向，因为我的帮助会减轻她帮A搬家的负担。（3）实证主义的挑战（The Positivist Challenge）要求解释法律和其他社会实践在承担不反映道德利益的义务时的巨大灵活性，因为定向义务（directed duty）在道德领域以外还广泛存在于法律、礼仪、体育规则之中。一旦我们承认一般利益（generic interest）这一观念的中心地位，契约主义就可以应付这些挑战。关注一般利益也阐明了指向性（directedness，即当我向A承诺，我所负之义务是指向A而不是指向其他人的）中尊重（respect）的独特形式。

译者补充：Generic Interest Theory——a directed duty is owed to the person whose generic interest grounds the duty; where S has a generic interest in x if it is reasonably foreseeable and reasonable that a representative person in S’s position take an interest in x. The idea is that a generic interest demarcates that part of the world in which it is reasonable for a person to take an interest, given that ordinarily a person would take an interest in it, and could be expected to do so.