前沿｜American Political Science Review（美国政治科学评论）2019.02
本期政治学人国际化部推介《美国政治科学评论》（American Political Science）2019年第2期部分文章编译，以飨读者。欢迎关注与评论！注意：
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期刊简介
American Political Science Review（美国政治科学评论）创刊于1906年，是政治学最早的学术研究期刊。提供同行评审的文章和评论整个学科子领域的论文。
涉及的领域包括政治学理论、美国政治、公共政策、公共行政、比较政治和国际关系。
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论文索引
“Judge Lynch” in the Court of Public Opinion: Publicity and the De-legitimation of Lynching
在舆论法庭中“审判私刑”：传播与私刑的非法化
Misdemeanor Disenfranchisement? The Demobilizing Effects of Brief Jail Spells on Potential Voters
轻罪不投票？短期监禁对潜在投票者的抑制效应
Through the Grapevine: Informational Consequences of Interpersonal Political Communication
道听途说：人际政治传播的信息后果
Is Position-Taking Contagious? Evidence of Cue-Taking from Two Field Experiments in a State Legislature
采取立场会传染吗？从州立法机构的两个实验看检验暗示的证据
Using a Probabilistic Model to Assist Merging of Large-Scale Administrative Records
用一个概率模型协助合并大规模行政记录
Local News and National Politics
地方新闻及国家政治
Democratization and the Conditional Dynamics of Income Distribution
民主化与有条件的收入分配动态
How Do Immigrants Respond to Discrimination? The Case of Germans in the US During World War I
移民如何应对歧视？——以一战期间在美德裔为例
Diversity, Institutions, and Economic Outcomes: Post-WWII Displacement in Poland
多样性、制度与经济结果：二战后波兰人口的流离失所
Does Exposure to the Refugee Crisis Make Natives More Hostile?
难民危机的曝光会让当地人更有敌意吗？
Cosmopolitan Immigration Attitudes in Large European Cities: Contextual or Compositional Effects?
欧洲大城市的国际移民态度：情景效应还是组成效应？
Information Provision, Voter Coordination, and Electoral Accountability: Evidence from Mexican Social Networks
信息提供，选民协调和选举回应：来自墨西哥社会网络的证据
When Do Citizens Respond Politically to the Local Economy? Evidence from Registry Data on Local Housing Markets
公民何时会在政治表现上对地方经济做出相应的反应？——基于地方房屋市场登记数据的分析
Demand Effects in Survey Experiments: An Empirical Assessment
调查实验中的需求效应：一种实证评估
Participation, Government Legitimacy, and Regulatory Compliance in Emerging Economies: A Firm-Level Field Experiment in Vietnam
新兴经济体中的参与、政府合法性与法规性服从：一项来自越南的基于公司的田野实验
Elite Defection under Autocracy: Evidence from Russia
专制主义下政治精英的叛逃：来自俄罗斯的证据
Mass Repression and Political Loyalty: Evidence from Stalin’s‘Terror by Hunger’
大规模镇压与政治忠诚:来自斯大林“饥饿恐怖”的证据
Legitimacy in Criminal Governance: Managing a Drug Empire from Behind Bars
刑事治理的合法性：在狱中管理毒品帝国
03
原文&译文（标题及摘要）
01 在舆论法庭中“审判私刑”：传播与私刑的非法化
题目：
“Judge Lynch” in the Court of Public Opinion: Publicity and the De-legitimation of Lynching
作者：
MICHAEL WEAVER， University of British Columbia
摘要：
暴力如何成为公众所无法接受的? 我在美国私刑的背景下提出这个问题。1880年到1930年之间，在美国关于私刑的公共讨论从公开或被默许转向了广泛的谴责。我认为这是因为在当时，关于私刑的传播越来越多。当本地人为附近的私刑辩护时，私刑的传播却将私刑暴露给那些遥远的、不支持私刑的观众，让非裔美国人能够安全地表达反对意见和（对私刑的）谴责。我运用了私刑、铁路网和成千上万期报道私刑的报刊上的数据来验证这一论点。我发现，在那些有更多机会(通过铁路网)进行传播的县，关于私刑的传播更多，且在地理上更广泛。同时，远距离的传播（在这样的地区）也更为关键，媒体曝光风险的增加可能降低了私刑的发生率。（另外，）我讨论了在其他背景下，传播如何能够成为加强或削弱暴力正当性的一种机制。
How does violence become publicly unacceptable? I address this question in the context of lynching in the United States. Between 1880 and the 1930s, public discourse about lynching moved from open or tacit endorsement to widespread condemnation. I argue this occurred because of increasing publicity for lynchings. While locals justified nearby lynchings, publicity exposed lynching to distant, un-supportive audiences and allowed African Americans to safely articulate counternarratives and condemnations. I test this argument using data on lynchings, rail networks, and newspaper coverage of lynchings in millions of issues across thousands of newspapers. I find that lynchings in counties with greater access to publicity (via rail networks) saw more and geographically dispersed coverage, that distant coverage was more critical, and that increased risk of media exposure may have reduced the incidence of lynching. I discuss how publicity could be a mechanism for strengthening or weakening justifications of violence in other contexts.
编 译：王悦霖
审 校：郑 亮
02 轻罪不投票？短期监禁对潜在投票者的抑制效应
题目：
Misdemeanor Disenfranchisement? The Demobilizing Effects of Brief Jail Spells on Potential Voters
作者：
ARIEL WHITE，Assistant Professor of Political Science, MIT
摘要：
本文利用犯罪判决和投票率的政府数据，提出了新的关于牢狱经历和投票行为关系的因果估计。我使用县级司法系统中随机分布的案件分配程序，将其作为影响轻罪案件判决的外生方差来源。聚焦于轻罪的罪犯可以使本研究具有更广泛的意义（即他们可以代表很多的人），因此这种轻罪是非常常见的。对于第一次犯轻罪的人，证据显示：短暂的牢狱经历会把他们在下一次选举中进行投票的几率降低几个百分点。这种结果在不同种族之间有显著的差异：白人轻罪者不会出现下次不积极投票的现象；但是黑人被告由于牢狱经历会出现较显著的投票率下降。参考被告们被捕前的投票历史，证据显示种族差异在被告被逮捕时就存在了。本文的研究成果展示了一个大规模的，跨人种的，由轻微犯罪导致投票率降低的现象。
This paper presents new causal estimates of incarceration’s effect on voting, using administrative data on criminal sentencing and voter turnout. I use the random case assignment process of a major county court system as a source of exogenous variation in the sentencing of misdemeanor cases. Focusing on misdemeanor defendants allows for generalization to a large population, as such cases are very common. Among first-time misdemeanor defendants, I find evidence that receiving a short jail sentence decreases voting in the next election by several percentage points. Results differ starkly by race. White defendants show no demobilization, while Black defendants show substantial turnout decreases due to jail time. Evidence from pre-arrest voter histories suggest that this difference could be due to racial differences in exposure to arrest. These results paint a picture of large-scale, racially-disparate voter demobilization in the wake of incarceration.
编 译：王子谦
审 校：王志浩
03 道听途说：人际政治传播的信息后果
题目：
Through the Grapevine: Informational Consequences of Interpersonal Political Communication
作者：
TAYLOR N. CARLSON， University of California, San Diego
摘要：
许多美国公众在社交媒体上获取政治类信息。但是，从其他渠道而不是媒体获取信息的后果未得到充分研究。我设计了一个名为“电话游戏”的实验，以检验信息在从官方报告流向新闻媒体再到其他渠道的过程中如何发生变化，我发现一般来说社会上获得的信息与新闻文章不同。在第二个实验（样本具有全国代表性）中，我随机指派参与者阅读关于研究1中生成的文章的新闻文章或社交信息。阅读社交信息的参与者比阅读新闻文章的参与者掌握的内容要少得多。然而，从见多识广的人那里得到信息的人与从媒体获得信息的人掌握到了同样的客观事实。虽然参与者从见多识广的人那里获得的信息和从媒体那里获得信息相同，但是这些参与者会有不同的主观评价。
Much of the US public acquires political information socially. However, the consequences of acquiring information from others instead of the media are under-explored. I conduct a “telephone-game” experiment to examine how information changes as it flows from official reports to news outlets to other people, finding that social information is empirically different from news articles. In a second experiment on a nationally representative sample, I randomly assign participants to read a news article or a social message about that article generated in Study 1. Participants exposed to social information learned significantly less than participants who were exposed to the news article. However, individuals exposed to information from someone who is like-minded and knowledgeable learned the same objective facts as those who received information from the media. Although participants learned the same factual information from these ideal informants as they did from the media, they had different subjective evaluations.
编 译：徐垚晟
04 采取立场会传染吗？从州立法机构的两个实验看检验暗示的证据
题目：
Is Position-Taking Contagious? Evidence of Cue-Taking from Two Field Experiments in a State Legislature
作者：
ADAM ZELIZER， The University of Chicago
摘要：
暗示被认为是具有影响力的，因为立法者大都从志同道合、值得信任的政策专家那里获取信息。不幸的是，对于研究人员来说，这一自我选择的过程使得区分暗示的因果效应和立法者与类似同行交流的倾向变得更加复杂。根据先前的以因果为导向的研究估计，暗示是在外源网络中发生作用而非立法者自己选择形成的自然存在的通信网络之中。本项研究依据两个立法现场实验中共计2000多个观察结果来检验暗示的获取，模拟了一个内生立法网络中随机分配的信息处理的扩散机制。实验结果进一步强化了Matthews和Stimson（1975年）和Kingdon（1973年）基于访谈的经典研究中对自我选择的通信网络的发现：暗示影响了相当一部分的政策立场，并且主要发生在决策过程的后期。另外我还发现，一般来说，暗示是对立法机构内其他专业知识来源的政策信息的补充，而非替代品。
Cue-taking is thought to be influential because legislators seek information from like-minded, trusted policy experts. Unfortunately for researchers, this self-selection process complicates efforts to separate the causal effects of cues from the tendency of legislators to communicate with similar peers. Prior causally-oriented research has estimated cues’ effects in exogenous networks, but not in the naturally-occurring communication networks that legislators themselves choose to form. This study examines cue-taking with two legislative field experiments, with over 2,000 observations in total, that model the diffusion of a randomly-assigned information treatment across an endogenous legislative network. Experimental results reinforce findings from classic interview-based studies of self-selected communication networks byMatthews and Stimson (1975) and Kingdon (1973): cue-taking influences a large percentage of policy positions and occurs late in the policymaking process. I also contribute to the literature by showing that on average cues complement, rather than substitute for, policy information from other sources of expertise within the legislature.
编 译：徐红洪
05 用一个概率模型协助合并大规模行政记录
题目：
Using a Probabilistic Model to Assist Merging of Large-Scale Administrative Records
作者：
TED ENAMORADO， Princeton University
BENJAMIN FIFIELD， Princeton University
KOSUKE IMAI， Harvard University
摘要：
由于大多数社会科学研究依赖于多个数据源，合并数据集是研究人员工作流程的重要组成部分。不幸的是，明确链接数据记录的唯一标识符通常不可用，并且数据可能包含缺失的和不准确的信息。这些问题非常严重，尤其是在合并大规模行政记录时。我们开发了一种快速且可扩展的算法来实现概率记录链接的典型模型，它同社会科学家经常使用的确定性方法相比有很多优点。该方法有效地处理了数百万的观测值，同时考虑了缺失值和测量误差，合并了辅助信息以及调整了合并后分析中合并的不确定性。我们进行了全面的模拟研究，以评估我们的算法在现实场景中的性能。我们还将此方法应用于合并竞选捐款记录、调查数据和全国选民档案。我们提供了实现该方法的开源软件包。
Since most social science research relies on multiple data sources, merging data sets is an essential part of researchers’ workflow. Unfortunately, a unique identifier that unambiguously links records is often unavailable, and data may contain missing and inaccurate information. These problems are severe especially when merging large-scale administrative records.We develop a fast and scalable algorithm to implement a canonical model of probabilistic record linkage that has many advantages over deterministic methods frequently used by social scientists. The proposed methodology efficiently handles millions of observations while accounting for missing data and measurement error, incorporating auxiliary information, and adjusting for uncertainty about merging in post-merge analyses. We conduct comprehensive simulation studies to evaluate the performance of our algorithm in realistic scenarios.We also apply ourmethodology tomerging campaign contribution records, survey data, and nationwide voter files. An open-source software package is available for implementing the proposed methodology.
编 译：王志浩
06 地方新闻及国家政治
题目：
Local News and National Politics
作者：
GREGORY J. MARTIN， Stanford Graduate School of Business
JOSHUA McCRAIN， Emory University
主要内容：
在美国的新闻媒体，致力于报道地方政治的新闻媒体正处于长期的衰退中，读者群体逐渐转向国家级的媒体。利用最近一波的企业集团收购地方电视台的例子，我们调查了这一现象到底是由供给侧还是需求侧驱动的。根据大量地方新闻频道节目和收视率的数据，我们发现该所有权的变化导致了：（1）大幅增加对国家政治的报道，代价是牺牲了对地方政治的报道（2）报道的意识形态倾向显著右倾（3）收视率小幅下降，这些变化都是相对于其他面向同一群体和市场的新闻节目来说的。以上结果表明，在政治新闻的国有化和两极化趋势中，供给侧发挥了重要作用，同时对地方官员的问责和群众的两极化具有消极意义。
The level of journalistic resources dedicated to coverage of local politics is in a long-term decline in the US news media, with readership shifting to national outlets. We investigate whether this trend is demand- or supply-driven, exploiting a recent wave of local television station acquisitions by a conglomerate owner. Using extensive data on local news programming and viewership, we find that the ownership change led to (1) substantial increases in coverage of national politics at the expense of local politics, (2) a significant rightward shift in the ideological slant of coverage, and (3) a small decrease in viewership, all relative to the changes at other news programs airing in the same media markets. These results suggest a substantial supply-side role in the trends toward nationalization and polarization of politics news, with negative implications for accountability of local elected officials and mass polarization.
编 译：林俊斯
07 民主化与有条件的收入分配动态
题目：
Democratization and the Conditional Dynamics of Income Distribution
作者：
MICHAEL T. DORSCH， Central European University
PAUL MAAREK， Universit´e Panth´eon-Assas (Paris 2)
摘要：
尽管理论上上有理由认为民主化会使收入分配更加均等，但现有的实证研究并未发现民主化对调整收入不平等存在显著影响。本文开始于一个简单的观察，即专制政体的形式是复杂多样的，并且统治着较为极端的收入分配现状（即平等主义）。而民主化可能会将这种极端的收入分配推向“中间地带”。因此，我们检验了初始的收入分配状况在何种程度上决定了民主化以后收入分配的动态变化。采用固定效应（fixed effects）与工具变量回归（instrumental variable regressions），我们证明尽管民主化进程具有推动高度收入不平等的专制政体向收入分配更加平等转化的效果，但是在收入分配上具有平等主义特征的专制政体可能会在民主化进程后出现贫富分化更加悬殊的结果。这种影响似乎是由总体（市场）不平等的变化所驱动的，这表明民主化，总的来说，是导致了市场机会的重新分配，而不是直接的财政再分配。我们还研究了哪些类型的改革能够在民主化之后起作用，这些改革可能使我们的研究结果合理化。
Despite strong theoretical reasons to expect that democratization equalizes income distributions, existing empirical studies do not find a statistically significant effect of democratization on measures of income inequality. This paper starts from the simple observation that autocracies are heterogeneous and govern quite extreme distributional outcomes (also egalitarian). Democratization may drive extreme income distributions to a “middle ground.” We thus examine the extent to which initial inequality levels determine the path of distributional dynamics following democratization. Using fixedeffects and instrumental variable regressions, we demonstrate that egalitarian autocracies become more unequal following democratization, whereas democratization has an equalizing effect in highly unequal autocracies. The effect appears to be driven by changes in gross (market) inequality, suggesting that democratization has led, on average, to redistribution of market opportunities, rather than to direct fiscal redistribution. We then investigate which kinds of (heterogeneous) reforms are at work following democratizations that may rationalize our findings.
编 译：陈立夫
审 校：阿尔法
08 移民如何应对歧视？——以一战期间在美德裔为例
题目：
How Do Immigrants Respond to Discrimination? The Case of Germans in the US During World War I
作者：
VASILIKI FOUKA， Stanford University
摘要：
我研究了歧视对少数移民群体作出融入社会的决定的影响。受到歧视的少数移民群体会更加努力地融入社会以避免歧视和来自社会的骚扰呢？还是会变得更加孤立并躲在自己的社群里？我利用对第一次世界大战期间美国本土态度的外来冲击——反德国主义——来实证地识别德国移民对本地敌意的反应。我用了两个衡量融入社会的努力的标准：命名模式和归化申请。在面对愈演愈烈的歧视时，德国人更努力地融入美国社会，给自己的孩子取美国人的名字，更多地申请美国公民身份。这些反应在反德情绪更高涨的州中更加显著，这种情绪反映在投票模式和真对德裔的暴力事件上。
I study the effect of taste-based discrimination on the assimilation decisions of immigrant minorities. Do discriminated minority groups increase their assimilation efforts in order to avoid discrimination and public harassment or do they become alienated and retreat in their own communities? I exploit an exogenous shock to native attitudes, anti-Germanism in the United States during World War I, to empirically identify the reactions of German immigrants to increased native hostility. I use two measures of assimilation efforts: naming patterns and petitions for naturalization. In the face of increased discrimination, Germans increase their assimilation investments by Americanizing their own and their children’s names and filing more petitions for US citizenship. These responses are stronger in states that registered higher levels of anti-German hostility, as measured by voting patterns and incidents of violence against Germans.
译 者：徐红洪
09 多样性、制度与经济结果：二战后波兰人口的流离失所
题目：
Diversity, Institutions, and Economic Outcomes:
Post-WWII Displacement in Poland
作者：
VOLHA CHARNYSH， Massachusetts Institute of Technology
摘要：
文化多样性的扩张是如何影响国家与社会的互动呢？异质性社区与同质性社区的制度差异是否会影响经济活动呢？我认为异质性的存在不仅会阻碍（社区内部或社区之间的）非正式的合作，同时也会增加国家提供的第三方干预。随着时间的推移，异质性社区乐意与国家机构接触的行为，将加强国家能力的积累、提升共同利益、促进私人经济活动。在此，我使用波兰在第二次世界大战后人口转移的原始数据来检测这个观点。经过研究，我发现：在初始阶段，同质性的移民社区通过非正式行政来提供地方公共产品方面更为成功；而异质性社区（移民社区）则依靠国家提供公共产品。在国家社会主义经济相似的条件下，异质性社区上缴了更高的税收收入，并在市场化后获得了更高的收入和创业率。而这些发现挑战了之前有关多样性的主要观点—多样性对于经济发展有害。
How does an increase in cultural diversity affect state–society interactions? Do institutional differences between heterogeneous and homogeneous communities influence economic activity? I argue that heterogeneity not only impedes informal cooperation but also increases demand for third-party enforcement provided by the state. Over time, the greater willingness of heterogeneous communities to engage with state institutions facilitates the accumulation of state capacity and, in common-interest states, promotes private economic activity. I test this argument using original data on post-WWII population transfers in Poland. I find that homogeneous migrant communities were initially more successful in providing local public goods through informal enforcement, while heterogeneous migrant communities relied on the state for the provision of public goods. Economically similar during state socialism, heterogeneous communities collected higher tax revenues and registered higher incomes and entrepreneurship rates following the transition to the market. These findings challenge the predominant view of diversity as harmful to economic development.
编 译：郑 亮
审 校：王悦霖
10 难民危机的曝光会让当地人更有敌意吗？
题目：
Does Exposure to the Refugee Crisis Make Natives More Hostile?
作者：
Dominik Hangartner：苏黎世联邦理工学院公共政策助理教授、伦敦政治经济学院政治系副教授，他利用实地调查和统计数据来研究移民政策和政治机构的影响。他有多篇成果发表在《美国政治学杂志》和《美国政治科学评论》等政治学顶尖期刊上，并获得包括菲利普·莱弗休姆奖等多个奖项。
Elias Dinas: 欧洲大学研究院罗伯特·舒曼高级研究中心和社会政治科学系瑞士联邦主义、民主和国际治理主席，牛津大学政治和国际关系系助理教授。
Moritz Marbach: 苏黎世理工大学比较与国际研究中心博士后，斯坦福大学和苏黎世联邦理工学院移民政策实验室成员。
Konstantinos Matakos: 伦敦国王学院政治经济系助理教授。
Dimitrios Xefteris: 塞浦路斯大学经济系助理教授。
摘要：
近年来，欧洲虽经历前所未有的大批量难民涌入，但并无证据表明难民危机与当地人态度、政策偏好和政治参与之间存在因果关联。我们在爱琴海开展了一项自然实验，在那里，靠近土耳其海岸线的希腊岛屿出现急剧增加的难民潮，而距离较远的岛屿却并未出现此状况。通过对2070位岛屿居民的定向调查，以距土耳其距离作为衡量指标，我们发现，直接接触难民潮会引起当地人对难民、移民和穆斯林少数民族较大和较持久的敌意，并促使其支持限制性庇护和移民政策，以及参与实施这种排他性政策。因难民仅经过这些岛屿，所以我们的发现挑战了有关反移民情绪的标准性经济与文化解释，本研究同时也表明，仅接触便足以导致敌意的持续增加。
Although Europe has experienced unprecedented numbers of refugee arrivals in recent years, there exists almost no causal evidence regarding the impact of the refugee crisis on natives’ attitudes, policy preferences, and political engagement. We exploit a natural experiment in the Aegean Sea, where Greek islands close to the Turkish coast experienced a sudden and massive increase in refugee arrivals, while similar islands slightly farther away did not. Leveraging a targeted survey of 2,070 island residents and distance to Turkey as an instrument, we find that direct exposure to refugee arrivals induces sizable and lasting increases in natives’ hostility toward refugees, immigrants, and Muslim minorities; support for restrictive asylum and immigration policies; and political engagement to effect such exclusionary policies. Since refugees only passed through these islands, our findings challenge both standard economic and cultural explanations of anti-immigrant sentiment and show that mere exposure suffices in generating lasting increases in hostility.
编 译：郑 静
审 校：夏静姝
11 欧洲大城市的国际移民态度：情景效应还是组成效应？
题目：
Cosmopolitan Immigration Attitudes in Large European Cities: Contextual or Compositional Effects?
作者：
Rahsaan Maxwell，University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill
摘要：
不同的欧洲地区对移民问题的看法是不尽相同的。大城市是国际化欧洲（Cosmopolitan Europe）的家园，对移民持有积极的态度。但是大城市以外——尤其是在农村地区——则是民族主义的欧洲（Nationalist Europe），在那里，移民是一种威胁。这种分野在先前有过很好的证明并且经过了许多的讨论，但是关于为什么大城市的人们更加可能对移民持有积极态度的研究却很少。关于这种对移民态度地理上的差异通常有两个解释：情境效应（contextual effects）或者组成效应（compositional effects）. 为了评估这两个因素的 解释力，我采用了欧洲社会调查，瑞士家庭研究小组和德国社会-经济研究小组的数据。研究结果支持了组成效应的解释力并且强调了（人口和社会）机制对促成“亲移民“的人们选择进入大城市的重要性。这对我们理解欧洲社会分化有一些启发，其中最值得注意的一点就是人口极化（geographic polarization）是更深层次（人口和地理）分化的后续体现。
Europe is geographically divided on the issue of immigration. Large cities are the home of Cosmopolitan Europe, where immigration is viewed positively. Outside the large cities—and especially in the countryside—is Nationalist Europe, where immigration is a threat. This divide is well documented and much discussed, but there has been scant research on why people in large cities are more likely to have favorable opinions about immigration. Debates about geographic differences generally highlight two explanations: contextual or compositional effects. I evaluate the two with data from the European Social Survey, the Swiss Household Panel, and the German Socio-Economic Panel. Results support compositional effects and highlight the importance of (demographic and cultural) mechanisms that sort pro-immigration people into large cities. This has several implications for our understanding of societal divisions in Europe; most notably that geographic polarization is a second-order manifestation of deeper (demographic and cultural) divides.
编 译：王子谦，王志浩
12 信息提供、选民协调和选举回应：来自墨西哥社会网络的证据
题目：
Information Provision, Voter Coordination, and Electoral Accountability: Evidence from Mexican Social Networks
作者：
ERIC ARIAS,威廉玛丽学院政府学系助理教授。
PABLO BALÁN,哈佛大学政府学系研究生。
HORACIO LARREGUY,哈佛大学政治学系助理教授。
JOHN MARSHALL,哥伦比亚大学政治科学系助理教授。
PABLO QUERUB´IN,纽约大学政治系助理教授。
主要内容：
社会网络如何调节政治信息影响选举回应的方式？我们提出了一个简易模型，即在高度互联的选民网络中，即使选民仍支持渎职的执政党，揭露现任执政党渎职行为也可促使其协调与渎职较轻的挑战者政党之间的关系。我们通过特定语境下的田野调查，提供了这一机制在墨西哥的证据，在这一语境中，选民虽仍然认为挑战者较执政者渎职较轻，但现任者渎职信息会增加选民对执政党支持。将此试验与具体家庭网络数据相结合，我们发现与模型相一致的是，在网络联系较紧密地区，现任政党由信息提供而获得的得票率增加与较少渎职的挑战者在更具关联性网络中的协调相抵消。个体层次的数据进一步证明，网络促进了投票者之间明确的默许性合作。这些发现表明，网络可以帮助投票者协调信息，淘汰表现欠佳的政客。
How do social networks moderate the way political information influences electoral accountability? We propose a simple model in which incumbent malfeasance revelations can facilitate coordination around less malfeasant challenger parties in highly connected voter networks, even when voters update favorably about incumbent party malfeasance. We provide evidence from Mexico of this mechanism by leveraging a field experiment in a context where the provision of incumbent malfeasance information increased support for incumbent parties, despite voters continuing to believe that challengers were less malfeasant than incumbents. Combining this experiment with detailed family network data, we show that—consistent with the model—the increase in incumbent party vote share due to information provision was counteracted by coordination around less malfeasant challengers in precincts with greater network connectedness. Individual-level data further demonstrate that networks facilitated explicit and tacit coordination among voters. These findings suggest that networks can help voters coordinate around information to help remove poorly performing politicians.
编 译：郑静，夏静姝
13 公民何时会在政治表现上对地方经济做出相应的反应？——基于地方房屋市场登记数据的分析
题目：
When Do Citizens Respond Politically to the Local Economy? Evidence from Registry Data on Local Housing Markets
作者：
MARTIN VINÆS LARSEN， Aarhus University
FREDERIK HJORTH， University of Copenhagen
PETER THISTED DINESEN， University of Copenhagen
KIM MANNEMAR SØNDERSKOV， Aarhus University
摘要：
最近关于经济事务投票的研究关注于当地经济的角色，但其结果并不确定。我们认为，虽然通常来说当地经济状况会影响到现任政府的支持度，但是当地经济状况的重要性随着公民与政府之间的互动程度而变化。更加近期且频繁地与当地经济各方面产生交集会使得这些方面更加突出，相应的，在对现任政府的评估中会显得更突出。我们将这一过程称为“语境开启”。我们通过研究当地住房市场为这些主张提供证据。将丹麦公共登记处的房屋价格详细数据与选区一级的选举结果和一项单独的小组调查联系起来，我们发现，当个人参与到住房市场交易时，他们对现任政府的支持会更多地依据于当地房价的变化。因此，该研究提供了一个框架，用于了解公民何时在政治上对当地经济作出反应。
Recent studies of economic voting have focused on the role of the local economy, but with inconclusive results. We argue that while local economic conditions affect incumbent support on average, the importance of the local economy varies by citizens’ interactions with it. More recent and frequent encounters with aspects of the local economy make those aspects more salient and, in turn, feature more prominently in evaluations of the incumbent government. We label this process “context priming.” We provide evidence for these propositions by studying local housing markets. Linking granularly detailed data on housing prices from Danish public registries to both precinct-level election returns and an individual-level panel survey, we find that when individuals interact with the housing market, their support for the incumbent government is more responsive to changes in local housing prices. The study thus provides a framework for understanding when citizens respond politically to the local economy.
编 译：徐垚晟
14 调查实验中的需求效应：一种实证评估
题目：
Demand Effects in Survey Experiments: An Empirical Assessment
作者：
JONATHAN MUMMOLO， Princeton University
ERIK PETERSON ，Texas A&M University
摘要：
调查实验在社会科学中普遍存在。对此一个常见的批评是，这些研究的积极结果源于实验者需求效应（EDES）——即当参与者推断实验目的并且作出回应以帮助验证研究者的假设时，这其中会出现偏差。我们认为在线调查实验的几个特征使其在EDES方面具有稳健性，并对其在涉及12000多名参与者的众多研究中的情况进行测试，复制了所有实证政治科学子领域的五个实验设计。我们将关于实验者意图的信息随机分配给参与者，并表明提供这些信息不会改变实验中的处理效果。我们发现，即使是符合研究者预期的财政激励措施也无法持续地诱导需求效应。在调整自己的行为以符合研究者的期望方面，研究对象表现出有限的能力，这一发现对设计和解释调查实验具有重要意义。
Survey experiments are ubiquitous in social science. A frequent critique is that positive results in these studies stem from experimenter demand effects(EDEs)—bias that occurs when participants infer the purpose of an experiment and respond so as to help confirm a researcher’s hypothesis. We argue that online survey experiments have several features that make them robust to EDEs, and test for their presence in studies that involve over 12,000 participants and replicate five experimental designs touching on all empirical political science subfields. We randomly assign participants information about experimenter intent and show that providing this information does not alter the treatment effects in these experiments. Even financial incentives to respond in line with researcher expectations fail to consistently induce demand effects. Research participants exhibit a limited ability to adjust their behavior to align with researcher expectations, a finding with important implications for the design and interpretation of survey experiments.
编 译：徐红洪
15 新兴经济体中的参与、政府合法性与法规性服从：一项来自越南的基于公司的田野实验
题目：
Participation, Government Legitimacy, and Regulatory Compliance in Emerging Economies: A Firm-Level Field Experiment in Vietnam
作者：
EDMUND MALESKY， Duke University
MARKUS TAUSSIG， Rutgers Business School
摘要：
本文在一党统治的越南进行了一项田野实验，以此检验其命题：给予公司（样本具有广泛的代表性）对法规草案进行评论的机会，是否能够加强公司之后对法规的遵守。我们发现了干预的三个主要结果。首先，受到干预的公司对政府监管机构的看法有了更大的改善。其次，这些公司更有可能允许附属于政府的审计人员检查他们的工厂。第三，受到干预的公司表现出更高的合规性。收到有关法规要求的预先信息无法解释公司对审计人员的开放和工厂的合规性。这三项结果都不需要公司提供实质性的评论。
This paper employs a field experiment in single-party–ruled Vietnam to test whether providing a broad-based representative sample of firms the opportunity to comment on draft regulations increases their subsequent compliance. We find three main outcomes of this treatment. First, treated firms exhibited greater improvement in their views of government’s regulatory authority. Second, these firms were more likely to allow government-affiliated auditors to examine their factories. Third, treated firms demonstrated greater compliance on the factory floor. Access and compliance were not explained by the receipt of advance information about the regulation’s requirements, and none of the three outcomes required that firms offer substantive comments.
编 译：王志浩，王子谦
16 专制主义下政治精英的叛逃：来自俄罗斯的证据
题目：
Elite Defection under Autocracy: Evidence from Russia
作者：
Ora John， 威斯康星大学密尔沃基分校政治科学系副教授，俄罗斯高等经济研究学院制度与发展研究中心高级研究员；
David Szakonyi， 乔治·华盛顿大学政治科学系副教授，俄罗斯高等经济研究学院制度与发展研究中心研究员。
摘要：
政治精英的凝聚力是专制政体稳定的基本支柱。高级别精英的叛逃可能表明政体存在弱点并使得反对派的力量更加壮大，有时甚至会导致政权崩溃。运用俄罗斯4,291名执政党候选人的数据资料集，本文设定并检验了关于专制政权统治之下精英联盟稳固性的假设。我们的理论预测，当政权“分赃”的意愿存在更大的不确定性时，统治精英就会出现问题。我们的理论推测，当专制政权无法稳定地提供“赃物”时，统治地位的政治精英就会出现叛逃现象。而与反对派分享权力、限制“分赃”和缺乏正式制度的专制政权会出现更多精英的背叛。虽说拉拢反对派可以缓解政权外部的威胁，但是却使得政权内部的人员心怀不满，因而更易发生叛逃问题。其中，那些有自己追求和有商业联系的人最有可能发生叛逃，因为他们可以在政权之外继续追求自己的政治目标。总而言之，我们的研究成果强调了专制政体生存的权衡战略。专制独裁者采取的许多策略可以击退各方挑战，但却增加了叛逃的风险。
Elite cohesion is a fundamental pillar of authoritarian stability. High-level defections can signal weakness, embolden the opposition, and sometimes, lead to regime collapse. Using a dataset of 4,291 ruling party candidates in Russia, this paper develops and tests hypotheses about the integrity of elite coalitions under autocracy. Our theory predicts that ruling elites defect when there is greater uncertainty about the regime’s willingness to provide spoils. Regimes that share power with the opposition, limit access to spoils, and lack formal institutions see more defections. Coopting the opposition assuages outside threats but leaves regime insiders disgruntled and prone to defection. Those with personal followings and business connections are the most likely to defect, since they can pursue their political goals independently of the regime. Taken together, our results highlight important tradeoffs among authoritarian survival strategies. Many of the steps autocrats take to repel challenges simultaneously heighten the risk of defections.
编 译：郑 亮
审 校：王悦霖
17 大规模镇压与政治忠诚:来自斯大林“饥饿恐怖”的证据
题目：
Mass Repression and Political Loyalty: Evidence from Stalin’s‘Terror by Hunger’
作者：
Arturas Rozenas， New York University
Yuri M.Zhukov， University of Michigan
摘要：
国家通过镇压可以强制人们服从，但这种压制并不总是有效，特别是那些暴力地镇压、大规模范围的镇压或者不分青红皂白的镇压——往往会激起更强烈的反抗。为什么镇压会造成不同的影响？为了给出合理解释，我们研究了因斯大林在乌克兰施行的强制性农业政策和集体惩罚运动而带来的后续政治遗留问题，如直接导致1932年至1934年三百多万人因饥饿而死亡。通过八十年来当地政治行为的丰富的微观数据，我们发现那些暴露于斯大林“饥饿恐怖”的社区对莫斯科的忠诚度更高，因为该政权可以在应对反抗时进行必要地威胁报复。当这种报复威胁减弱的时候，饥荒肆虐的社区对莫斯科表现出了更多的反对，无论是短期的还是长期的。因此，镇压之于反对派既可以威慑，也可以煽动，这取决于后镇压行为所展现的政治机会结构。
States use repression to enforce obedience, but repression—especially if it is violent, massive, and indiscriminate—often incites opposition. Why does repression have such disparate effects? We address this question by studying the political legacy of Stalin’s coercive agricultural policy and collective punishment campaign in Ukraine, which led to the death by starvation of over three million people in 1932–34. Using rich micro-level data on eight decades of local political behavior, we find that communities exposed to Stalin’s “terror by hunger” behaved more loyally toward Moscow when the regime could credibly threaten retribution in response to opposition. In times when this threat of retribution abated, the famine-ridden communities showed more opposition to Moscow, both short- and long-term. Thus, repression can both deter and inflame opposition, depending on the political opportunity structure in which post-repression behavior unfolds.
编 译：阿尔法
18 刑事治理的合法性：在狱中管理毒品帝国
题目：
Legitimacy in Criminal Governance: Managing a Drug Empire from Behind Bars
作者：
Benjamin Lessing, 芝加哥大学助理教授
Graham Denyer Willis, 剑桥大学高级讲师
主要内容：
国家、叛乱分子与黑手党都会将其管理范围扩大到其核心成员资格以外的地方，即使是监狱中的黑帮组织也逐渐表现出了这一特征。美国的帮会就曾经通过对监狱生活的控制从而管理毒品街头市场的交易。但是位于巴西圣保罗的帮会“首都第一司令部”（简称PPC）很明显走的更远，他们策划会造成城市目标瘫痪的攻击，同时对贫民窟施加某种社会秩序，从而大幅度的降低了凶杀案的发生。我们通过对上百名被捕获的PCC成员的档案和文件中挖掘到了有关PPC毒品交易与内部纪律体系的细节。
我们能够从中发现大量以寄售为基础的贩运活动，其利润能为成员家庭提供集体利益，在这些信息中能够发现精心制作的官僚运行程序和记录保存；还包括了大量非暴力的对欠债与违法行为的惩罚。我们认为这些特征，反映了在刑事治理中创造“理性官僚”的合法性是一种广泛使用的策略。PCC所塑造的的集体主义规范，相对公平的程序和细致的“犯罪者的犯罪记录”有助于推动共同体对违规者采取轻度制裁的惩罚措施，从而在没有过度强制的情况下促使成员内部自发自愿的遵守。这也很好的解释了PCC何以在巴西快速扩张。
States, rebels, and mafias all provide governance beyond their core membership; increasingly, so do prison gangs. US gangs leverage control over prison life to govern street-level drug markets. Brazil’s Primeiro Comando da Capital (PCC) gang goes further, orchestrating paralyzing attacks on urban targets, while imposing a social order throughout slums that sharply reduces homicides. We analyze hundreds of seized PCC documents detailing its drug business and internal disciplinary system.
Descriptively, we find vast, consignment-based trafficking operations whose profits fund collective benefits for members’ families; elaborate bureaucratic procedures and recordkeeping; and overwhelmingly nonviolent punishments for debt-nonpayment and misconduct. These features, we argue, reflect a deliberate strategy of creating rational-bureaucratic legitimacy in criminal governance. The PCC’s collectivist norms, fair procedures, and meticulous “criminal criminal records” facilitate community stigmatization of infractors, giving mild sanctions punitive heft and inducing widespread voluntary compliance without excessive coercion. This has aided the PCC’s rapid expansion across Brazil.
编 译：陈立夫，阿尔法
编辑：欧阳星
一审：夏静姝
二审：宋 婷
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