前沿 | American Political Science Review（美国政治科学评论）2019.01
政治学人国际化部为大家带来了American Political Science Review（美国政治科学评论）2019年第1期中的研究论文（Research Paper）的部分编译，以飨读者。
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期刊简介
American Political Science Review（美国政治科学评论）创刊于1906年，是政治学最早的学术研究期刊。提供同行评审的文章和评论整个学科子领域的论文。
涉及的领域包括政治学理论、美国政治、公共政策、公共行政、比较政治和国际关系。
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最新目录（Research Paper）
Legislative Staff and Representation in Congress
国会职员与国会的代表性
Does Private Regulation Preempt Public Regulation?
公司管制：孰先孰后？
Does Party Trump Ideology? Disentangling Party and Ideology in America
政党胜过意识形态吗？理清美国的政党和意识形态
The Informational Theory of Legislative Committees: An Experimental Analysis
立法委员会的信息理论：一个实验性的分析
Preventive Repression: Two Types of Moral Hazard
预防性镇压：道德风险的两种类型
The Countervailing Effects of Competition on Public Goods Provision: When Bargaining Inefficiencies Lead to Bad Outcomes
公共物品供给竞争的抵消效应：谈判低效何时引发恶果？
Enhancing Electoral Equality: Can Education Compensate for Family Background Differences in Voting Participation?
增强选举公平：教育是否可以弥补投票参与中家庭背景的差异？
(Under What Conditions) Do Politicians Reward Their Supporters? Evidence from Kenya’s Constituencies Development Fund
（在什么情况下）政客会奖励他们的支持者？来自肯尼亚选举发展基金会的证据
The Psychology of State Repression: Fear and Dissent Decisions in Zimbabwe
国家压迫的心理：津巴布韦公民的恐惧和异议决策
The Credibility of Public and Private Signals: A Document-Based Approach
公共和私人信号的可信度：一种文本分析方法
From Isolation to Radicalization: Anti-Muslim Hostility and Support for ISIS in the West
从孤立到激进：西方反穆斯林的敌意核对ISIS的支持
A Theopolitics Contra Political Theology: Martin Buber’s Biblical Critique of Carl Schmitt
神学政治的对立：政治神学——马丁·布伯对卡尔·斯密特的圣经批判
Candidate Entry and Political Polarization: An Experimental Study
候选人的产生和政治极化：一项实验研究
The Endurance of Politicians’ Values Over Four Decades: A Panel Study
四十年来政客价值观的耐性分析：一项定群追踪研究
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原文&译文（标题及摘要）
01 国会职员与国会的代表性
题目：
Legislative Staff and Representation in Congress
作者：
ALEXANDER HERTEL-FERNANDEZ Columbia University
MATTO MILDENBERGER University of California, Santa Barbara
LEAH C. STOKES University of California, Santa Barbara
摘要：
国会职员联系着国会议员与选民，理论上讲，这促进了民主的代表性。然而，关于国会职员是否真正地认识到议员的选民的偏好，学术界却研究较少。通过分析美国国会高级职员的原始调查数据，本文发现，国会职员对选民意见存在系统性的错误估计。然后，本文利用观察分析和两个调查实验考察了这种误解的来源。如果国会职员的政策信息更加依赖保守派和商业利益集团，那么他们就对选民意见有着更扭曲的看法。自我中心偏误也塑造着国会职员的观念。我们的调查结果呈现出了“国会代表选民意见”这一假设的复杂性，同时也有助于解释为什么国会经常不回应普通公民的诉求。总之，无论是研究美国还是其他发达民主国家，学者们都应该更加关注国会的立法助理们，他们是政策制定过程的关键参与者。
Legislative staff link Members Of Congress And Their constituents，theoretically facilitating democratic representation. Yet，little research has examined whether Congressional staff actually recognize the preferences of their Members’ constituents. Using an original survey of senior US Congressional staffers, we show that staff systematically mis-estimate constituent opinions. We then evaluate the sources of these misperceptions, using observational analyses and two survey experiments. Staffers who rely more heavily on conservative and business interest groups for policy information have more skewed perceptions of constituent opinion. Egocentric biases also shape staff perceptions. Our findings complicate assumptions that Congress represents constituent opinion, and help to explain why Congress often appears so unresponsive to ordinary citizens. We conclude that scholars should focus more closely on legislative aides as key actors in the policymaking process, both in the United States and across other advanced democracies.
02 公司管制：孰先孰后？
题目：
Does Private Regulation Preempt Public Regulation?
作者：
Neil Malhotra et al.
摘要：
以往的研究将公司游说作为企业影响政府政策的主要方式。本文对私人管制这一较少研究的影响方式展开研究，将其界定为公司实行自主行为约束的自发性努力。我们认为，在选择政治策略上，相比于较为严厉的公共法规，公司可优先采用适度的私人法规。为检验这一假设，我们就选民、游说人员和政府官员三个需受环境管制的群体进行了测试。试验表明了各群体如何响应公司所实施的自主性环境项目。三个群体都倾向于相对适度的自主性环境项目，而非较为严苛的政府法规，这一发现对于社会福利研究有重要意义。我们发现当一个行业的所有公司都加入自愿行动中时，影响力最大。研究证明，公司权力还存在私人管制这一替代性来源，同时也指出，将私人管制作为影响政府政策的策略存在局限性。
Previous research has emphasized corporate lobbying as a pathway through which businesses influence government policy. This article examines a less-studied mode of influence: private regulation, defined as voluntary efforts by firms to restrain their own behavior. We argue that firms can use modest private regulations as a political strategy to preempt more stringent public regulations. To test this hypothesis, we administered experiments to three groups that demand environmental regulations:voters, activists, and government officials. Our experiments revealed how each group responded to voluntary environmental programs (VEPs) by firms. Relatively modest VEPs dissuaded all three groups from seeking more draconian government regulations, a finding with important implications for social welfare. We observed these effects most strongly when all companies within an industry joined the voluntary effort. Our study documents an understudied source of corporate power, while also exposing the limits of private regulation as a strategy for influencing government policy.
03 政党胜过意识形态吗？理清美国的政党和意识形态
题目：
Does Party Trump Ideology? Disentangling Party and Ideology in America
作者：
MICHAEL BARBER Brigham Young University
JEREMY C. POPE Brigham Young University
摘要：
人们保守(自由)是因为他们是共和党人(民主党人)吗? 或者正好相反:人们之所以是共和党人(民主党人)，是因为他们是保守派(自由派)?虽然关于这个由来已久的问题已经有许多人回答，但验证答案却是困难的。因为这些概念在当下的美国几乎不可能被理清。意识形态和党派之争是高度相关的，而且随着时间的推移这对关系只会越来越紧密。然而，特朗普当选提供了一个难得的机会，让我们得以把政党依附和意识形态承诺两者区分开。通过一个研究设计——测试人们对特朗普总统的实际“保守”和“自由”政策声明的看法。我们发现知识水平低的受访者、强势的共和党人、支持特朗普的民众、以及自称是保守派的人，在接受特朗普的暗示时，最有可能表现得像党内忠诚分子一样——无论是自由派还是保守派。结果表明，在美国有大量忠诚于党的人，那些所谓的自我定义的保守主义者的说法是可疑的。群体忠诚要比任何意识形态原则都更能影响他们的看法。
Are people conservative (liberal) because they are Republicans (Democrats)? Or is it the reverse: people are Republicans (Democrats) because they are conservatives (liberals)? Though much has been said about this long-standing question, it is difficult to test because the concepts are nearly impossible to disentangle in modern America. Ideology and partisanship are highly correlated, only growing more so over time. However, the election of President Trump presents a unique opportunity to disentangle party attachment from ideological commitment. Using a research design that employs actual “conservative” and “liberal” policy statements from President Trump, we find that low-knowledge respondents, strong Republicans, Trump- approving respondents, and self-described conservatives are the most likely to behave like party loyalists by accepting the Trump cue—in either a liberal or conservative direction. These results suggest that there are a large number of party loyalists in the United States , that their claims to being a self-defined conservative are suspect, and that group loyalty is the stronger motivator of opinion than are any ideological principles.
04 立法委员会的信息理论：一个实验性的分析
题目：
The Informational Theory of Legislative Committees: An Experimental Analysis
作者：
MARCO BATTAGLINI Cornell University and EIEF
ERNEST K. LAI Lehigh University
WOOYOUNG LIM The Hong Kong University of Science and Technology
JOSEPH TAO-YI WANG National Taiwan University
摘要：
我们实验性地调查了立法委员会的信息理论（Gilligan and Krehbiel, 1989）。两个立法委员会的成员在替代性的立法规则下，提供了与某一立法决定的与政策相关的信息。在开放的规则下，立法机构可以自由做出任何决定，但是在有限制的规则下，立法机构必须在一个成员的提案和现实之间做出选择。我们发现即使存在偏差，委员会成员也会通过提供有用的信息改进立法机构的决定。我们获得的证据可以支撑以下两条附加的预测：外部人原则，根据更极端的偏差减少信息传播；另一个是分布原则，基于开放原则比基于有限的规则更具有分配的有效性。当偏差没有那么极端的时候，基于有限制的规则在信息上更加有效这一点，我们发现分布原则主导了限制规则（restrictive-rule）原则。总的来说，我们提供了实验性的证据支持Gilligan和Krehbiel的信息理论。
We experimentally investigate the informational theory of legislative committees (Gilligan and Krehbiel 1989). Two committee members provide policy-relevant information to a legislature under alternative legislative rules. Under the open rule, the legislature is free to make any decision; under the closed rule, the legislature chooses between a member’s proposal and a status quo. We find that even in the presence of biases, the committee members improve the legislature’s decision by providing useful information. We obtain evidence for two additional predictions: the outlier principle, according to which more extreme biases reduce the extent of information trans- mission; and the distributional principle, according to which the open rule is more distributionally efficient than the closed rule. When biases are less extreme, we find that the distributional principle dominates the restrictive-rule principle, according to which the closed rule is more informationally efficient. Overall, our findings provide experimental support for Gilligan and Krehbiel’s informational theory.
05 预防性镇压：道德风险的两种类型
题目：
Preventive Repression: Two Types of Moral Hazard
作者：
TIBERIU DRAGU New York University
ADAM PRZEWORSKI New York University
摘要：
威权主义领导人主要通过预防性镇压来保持他们对权力的控制，这种预防性镇压按例是由专门的安全机构执行，目的是阻止任何反对者组织和威胁他们的权力。我们构建了一个模型来分析道德风险问题，这个问题固有化地存在于统治者与其负责预防性镇压的安全机构之间的委托——代理关系中。该模型区分了两种类型的道德风险：第一种是“政治”，通过降低统治者的权力租金，安全机构可以施加政治影响，从而增加他们的收益；第二种是“腐败”，通过开展不会降低统治者权力租金的寻租活动，安全机构可以增加收益。令人惊讶的是，当唯一的道德风险问题是政治而不是安全机构可以在政治与腐败之间进行选择时，统治者和安全机构都会变得更好。我们认为，当政治是安全机构唯一可用的道德风险时，统治者在权力中生存的均衡概率更高。这些发现导向了我们的核心结论，即腐败机会会削弱威权主义者的统治，原因在于腐败会扭曲安全机构（负责遏止威权统治者掌握权力的潜在威胁）的激励机制。
Authoritarian leaders maintain their grip on power primarily through preventive repression, routinely exercised by specialized security agencies with the aim of preventing any opponents from organizing and threatening their power. We develop a formal model to analyze the moral hazard problems inherent in the principal-agent relationship between rulers and their security agents in charge of preventive repression. The model distinguishes two types of moral hazard: “politics,” through which the security agents can exert political influence to increase their payoff by decreasing the ruler’s rents from power, and “corruption,” through which the agents can increase their payoff by engaging in rent-seeking activities that do not decrease the ruler’s rents from power. The surprising conclusion is that both the ruler and the security agent are better off when the only moral hazard problem available is politics rather than when the agent can choose between politics and corruption. We also show that the equilibrium probability of ruler’s survival in power is higher when politics is the only moral hazard available to the agent. These findings lead to our central conclusion that opportunities for corruption undermine authoritarian rule by distorting the incentives of the security agencies tasked with preventing potential threats to an authoritarian ruler’s grip on power.
06 公共物品供给竞争的抵消效应：谈判低效何时引发恶果？
题目：
The Countervailing Effects of Competition on Public Goods Provision:When Bargaining Inefficiencies Lead to Bad Outcomes
作者：
Jessica Gottlieb and Katrina Kosec
摘要：
政治竞争通常被视为公共物品供给的中介，有助于鼓励在职者参加竞选。此外，我们认为政治竞争还会通过公共物品供给降低立法谈判效率。这些抵消效应可能会在政党较弱和透明度较低，特别是许多新确立民主制度的国家，产生绝对的负面影响。我们使用取自马里共和国的面板数据证明了政治竞争与地方性公共物品之间存在强负相关关系。机制检测证实，我们将该关系解释为立法谈判低效的证据。为探究这些发现的可推广性，我们对跨国面板数据进行了分析，结果发现高（低）水平政党体制制度化下，政治竞争会导致更好（更坏）的公共物品供给。本文阐明，为何政治竞争仅为选择性有益，同时强调，在政治竞争中，同时考虑选举与立法领域的重要意义。
Political competition is widely recognized as amediator of public goods provision through its salutary effect on incumbents’ electoral incentives. We argue that political competition additionally mediates public goods provision by reducing the efficiency of legislative bargaining. These countervailing forces may produce a net negative effect in places with weak parties and low transparency—typical of many young democracies. We provide evidence of a robust negative relationship between political competition and local public goods using panel data from Mali. Tests of mechanisms corroborate our interpretation of this relationship as evidence of legislative bargaining inefficiencies. To explore the generalizability of these findings, we analyze cross-country panel data and show that political competition leads to better (worse) public goods provision under high (low) levels of party system institutionalization. The paper sheds light on why political competition is only selectively beneficial, and underscores the importance of considering both the electoral and legislative arenas.
追求简洁排版也得保证文字易读性
07 增强选举公平：教育是否可以弥补投票参与中家庭背景的差异？
题目：
Enhancing Electoral Equality: Can Education Compensate for Family Background Differences in Voting Participation?
作者：
KARL-OSKAR LINDGREN Uppsala University
SVEN OSKARSSON Uppsala University
MIKAEL PERSSON University of Gothenburg
摘要：
文献记录表明，相较于来自于高社会地位的家庭，源自低社会地位家庭的个人其投票率更低。本文检验了教育改革是否可以帮助减小这个差距。我们通过研究瑞典在1990年代改革高中教育的试验为基础，基于居住在不同城市或者出声在不同年份的个人在教育所得（educational attainment）这个外生变量上有了提升，建立了因果关系。和近期研究中运用置信度识别（credible identification）的策略一样，我们无法发现一个在统计上显著地教育对政治参与度的平均影响。尽管如此，我们在基于前人研究的基础上，发现了教育改革可以减小来自不同社会背景的个体的投票率水平，尤其是提升那些来自低社会阶层的居民。这个结果与近期的论证教育在部分程度上可以从政治角度提升边缘群体的情况相匹配。
It is well documented that voter turnout is lower among persons who grow up in families from a low socioeconomic status compared with persons from high-status families. This paper examines whether reforms in education can help reduce this gap. We establish causality by exploiting a pilot scheme preceding a large reform of Swedish upper secondary education in the early 1990s, which gave rise to exogenous variation in educational attainment between individuals living in different municipalities or born in different years. Similar to recent studies employing credible identification strategies, we fail to find a statistically significant average effect of education on political participation. We move past previous studies, however, and show that the reform nevertheless contributed to narrowing the voting gap between indi- viduals of different social backgrounds by raising turnout among those from low socioeconomic status households. The results thus square well with other recent studies arguing that education is particularly important for uplifting politically marginalized groups.
08 （在什么情况下）政客会奖励他们的支持者？来自肯尼亚选举发展基金会的证据
题目：
(Under What Conditions) Do Politicians Reward Their Supporters? Evidence from Kenya’s Constituencies Development Fund
作者：
J. Andrew. Harris Daniel N. Posner
摘要：
我们利用创新的空间建模技术和超过32000个肯尼亚选区发展基金会项目的精准地理定位数据来检验国会议员是否会奖励他们的支持者。极少数证据表明，一旦控制影响项目安置地的其他因素，如人口密度、贫困率、少数民族人口和到马路的距离，国会议员将项目不成比例地输送到其盟友的地盘。尽管结果是这样，我们仍然发现了一些关于政治目标跨选区变化的证据，这很大程度上是因为议员们的支持者和反对者的空间隔离。这一发现挑战了非洲裙带关系转移的向心性这一传统观点，强调了当地条件是如何促生特定的激励措施和政治商品战略性分配的机会。我们也强调了分析项目层面分配的利益和挑战，而不是聚焦于行政单元。
We leverage innovative spatial modeling techniques and data on the precise geo-locations of more than 32,000 Constituency Development Fund (CDF) projects in Kenya to test whether Members of Parliament (MPs) reward their supporters. We find only weak evidence that MPs channel projects disproportionately to areas inhabited by their political allies, once we control for other factors that affect where projects are placed, such as population density, poverty rates, ethnic demographics, and distance to paved roads. Notwithstanding this result, we find evidence for cross-constituency variation in political targeting, driven in large part by the spatial segregation of the MP’s supporters and opponents. Our findings challenge the conventional wisdom about the centrality of clientelistic transfers in Africa and underscore how local conditions generate particular incentives and opportunities for the strategic allocation of political goods. We also highlight the benefits and challenges of analyzing allocations at the project level rather than aggregated to the administrative unit.
09 国家压迫的心理：津巴布韦公民的恐惧和异议决策
题目：
The Psychology of State Repression: Fear and Dissent Decisions in Zimbabwe
作者：
Davis，LAUREN E. YOUNG University of California
摘要：
许多独裁政权都通过残酷的镇压行动来压制异议。心理学理论认为，情绪会影响公民如何认知和处理有关压迫风险的信息，并最终决定其是否会表达异议。我在津巴布韦对671名反对派支持者进行了一项实地实验，测试情绪对独裁统治下异见人士的影响。实验随机安排一些参与者参加一项能引发温和恐惧状态的练习，而其他人则完成一项中性的练习（以作为对照）。结果上来看，恐惧使得对异议的假设和行为测量显著减少。恐惧还增加了公民对作出异议决策的悲观情绪，以及对风险的厌恶情绪。实验表明，情绪与策略选择之间存在很大的关联性。一个不受欢迎的独裁者何以防止多数民众推翻其政权，人们的恐惧心理可能是一个重要因素。
Many authoritarian regimes use frightening acts of repression to suppress dissent. Theory from psychology suggests that emotions should affect how citizens perceive and process information about repression risk and ultimately whether or not they dissent. I test the effects of emotions on dissent in autocracy by running a lab-in-the-field experiment with 671 opposition supporters in Zimbabwe that randomly assigns some participants to an exercise that induces a mild state of fear, whereas others complete a neutral placebo. The fear treatment significantly reduces hypothetical and behavioral measures of dissent by substantively large amounts. It also increases pessimism about parameters that enter into the dissent decision as well as risk aversion. These results show that emotions interact in important ways with strategic considerations. Fear may be a powerful component of how unpopular autocrats exclude large portions of their populations from mobilizing for regime change.
10 公共和私人信号的可信度：一种文本分析方法
题目：
The Credibility of Public and Private Signals: A Document-Based Approach
作者：
Azusa Katagiri；Eric Min
摘要：
危机谈判文献主要使用正规的定性方法来讨论行动、公共话语和私人话语的相对效力。这些方法忽视了决策者被信息轰炸并努力从无休止的噪音中发出真实信号的现实。实质行动因此比任何外交沟通都能更为有效地塑造精英认知。另外，即使它表面上是“无需付出代价的”，但私人信息却提供了一个比公共的和“高代价的”声明更加精确的交流渠道。超过18000份在1958-1963年柏林危机期间反映私人话语、公共话语和白宫对苏联决心的解密文件被我们数字化并使用统计学习技术处理来进行评估。结果表明实质行动对白宫的影响大于公共或私人话语的影响；而公共话语则比私人话语传递出的信息更为嘈杂；私人话语比公共话语对决心的评估有更大的影响。
Crisis bargaining literature has predominantly used formal and qualitative methods to debate the relative efficacy of actions, public words, and private words. These approaches have overlooked the reality that policymakers are bombarded with information and struggle to adduce actual signals from endless noise. Material actions are therefore more effective than any diplomatic communication in shaping elites’ perceptions. Moreover, while ostensibly “costless,” private messages provide a more precise communication channel than public and “costly” pronouncements. Over 18,000 declassified documents from the Berlin Crisis of 1958–63 reflecting private statements, public statements, and White House evaluations of Soviet resolve are digitized and processed using statistical learning techniques to assess these claims. The results indicate that material actions have greater influence on the White House than either public or private statements; that public statements are noisier than private statements; and that private statements have a larger effect on evaluations of resolve than public statements.
11 从孤立到激进：西方反穆斯林的敌意核对ISIS的支持
题目：
(Under What Conditions) Do Politicians Reward Their Supporters? Evidence from Kenya’s Constituencies Development Fund
作者：
J. Andrew. Harris Daniel N. Posner
摘要：
我们利用创新的空间建模技术和超过32000个肯尼亚选区发展基金会项目的精准地理定位数据来检验国会议员是否会奖励他们的支持者。极少数证据表明，一旦控制影响项目安置地的其他因素，如人口密度、贫困率、少数民族人口和到马路的距离，国会议员将项目不成比例地输送到其盟友的地盘。尽管结果是这样，我们仍然发现了一些关于政治目标跨选区变化的证据，这很大程度上是因为议员们的支持者和反对者的空间隔离。这一发现挑战了非洲裙带关系转移的向心性这一传统观点，强调了当地条件是如何促生特定的激励措施和政治商品战略性分配的机会。我们也强调了分析项目层面分配的利益和挑战，而不是聚焦于行政单元。
We leverage innovative spatial modeling techniques and data on the precise geo-locations of more than 32,000 Constituency Development Fund (CDF) projects in Kenya to test whether Members of Parliament (MPs) reward their supporters. We find only weak evidence that MPs channel projects disproportionately to areas inhabited by their political allies, once we control for other factors that affect where projects are placed, such as population density, poverty rates, ethnic demographics, and distance to paved roads. Notwithstanding this result, we find evidence for cross-constituency variation in political targeting, driven in large part by the spatial segregation of the MP’s supporters and opponents. Our findings challenge the conventional wisdom about the centrality of clientelistic transfers in Africa and underscore how local conditions generate particular incentives and opportunities for the strategic allocation of political goods. We also highlight the benefits and challenges of analyzing allocations at the project level rather than aggregated to the administrative unit.
12 神学政治的对立：政治神学——马丁·布伯对卡尔·斯密特的圣经批判
题目：
A Theopolitics Contra Political Theology: Martin Buber’s Biblical Critique of Carl Schmitt
作者：
CHARLES H. T. LESCH Vanderbilt University
摘要：
文章回顾了马丁·布伯对卡尔·施密特被忽视的政治神学。由于犹太教伦理学家和学者的特殊身份，布伯对卡尔·施密特的批判因而长期被置于漠视的位置。然而，正如我在仔细阅读了他所注解的《圣经》后所发现的那样，布伯在长达十几年的工作中，把自己的努力投入到了政治神学谱系的危机研究中。布伯认为，上帝主权是绝对的并且不能被世俗仿造；任何世俗世界的统治者都不能宣称自己合法地拥有保留了上帝的权力。布伯的观点其实阐述了他所了解的犹太教早期的政治神学理论：神学政治，一种基于屈从上帝权力的无统治状态。但是，布伯并不希求恢复这样的宗教愿景，而是希望将以色列先知所应验的精神融入到现代社会。而他这种理论结果却形成了对自由民主与政治神学的新发展。
This article recovers Martin Buber’s important but neglected critique of Carl Schmitt’s political theology. Because Buber is known primarily as an ethicist and scholar of Judaism, his attack on Schmitt has been largely overlooked. Yet as I reveal through a close reading of his Biblical commentaries, a concern about the dangers of political theology threads through decades of his work. Divine sovereignty, Buber argues, is absolute and inimitable; no human ruler can claim the legitimate power reserved to God. Buber’s response is to uncover what he sees as Judaism’s earliest political theory: a “theopolitics,” where human beings, mutually subject to divine kingship, practice non-domination. But Buber, I show, did not seek to directly revive this religious vision. Instead, he sought to incorporate the spirit of theopolitics, as embodied by Israel’s prophets, into modern society. The result is a new and significant perspective on liberal democracy and political theology.
13 候选人的产生和政治极化：一项实验研究
题目：
Candidate Entry and Political Polarization: An Experimental Study
作者：
JENS GROßER Florida State University
THOMAS R. PALFREY California Institute of Technology
摘要：
本文报告了一项实验结果，该实验基于公民候选人模型（citizen–candidate model），其中被试者拥有有关理想化观点的独有信息。在所有的干预组，作者都观察到了低效的政治极化；也就是说，持有极端理想观点的公民与那些中庸公民相比，成为候选人的频率更高。其次，当选民利用意识形态党派标签获得关于候选人理想观点的方向性信息时，那些极端化的公民成为候选人的频率就更少了。尽管如此，这种方向性信息是福利增强的，因为更低的进入成本和更充分的选民信息超过了政治极化带来的低效率。第三，进入率随着团体规模扩大和进入成本上升而下降。进入博弈中独特的对称贝叶斯均衡的切点对的特性揭示了这些发现。从数量上看，当理论进入率高（低）时，我们观察到的进入太少（太多）。logit随机最优反应均衡则揭示了进入率中这一观察性偏差的一般模式。
We report the results of a laboratory experiment based on a citizen–candidate model with private information about ideal points. Inefficient political polarization is observed in all treatments; that is, citizens with extreme ideal points enter as candidates more often than moderate citizens. Second, less entry occurs, with even greater polarization, when voters have directional information about candidates’ ideal points, using ideological party labels. Nonetheless, this directional information is welfare enhancing because the inefficiency from greater polarization is outweighed by lower entry expenses and better voter information. Third, entry rates are decreasing in group size and the entry cost. These findings are all implied by properties of the unique symmetric Bayesian equilibrium cut point pair of the entry game. Quantitatively, we observe too little (too much) entry when the theoretical entry rates are high (low). This general pattern of observed biases in entry rates is implied by logit quantal response equilibrium.
14 四十年来政客价值观的耐性分析：一项定群追踪研究
题目： The Endurance of Politicians’ Values Over Four Decades: A Panel Study
作者：
DONALD D. SEARING University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill
WILLIAM G. JACOBY Michigan State University
ANDREW H. TYNER Princeton University
摘要：
政客的价值观在他的职业生涯中是一成不变的吗？我们该如何解释这种一成不变的价值观耐性呢？基于这种目的，这篇文章运用独特的纵向数据集来分析、讨论国家政客政治价值观的耐性；具体而言，笔者收集了英国众议院议员在1971年至1973年、2012年至2016年通过Rokeach评级工具所评测的结果，并以此为依据来检验文章的假设。文章结果表示：政客们价值观具备显著的稳定度；政客在三十岁左右就已经形成了趋于稳定的价值观，并会在很大程度上一直维持直至退休。同时，文章的假设也证明：党派意识形态的变化更多地与新招募成员中的新观点有关系，而不是新观点在老党员之间传递。
How much do the political values of politicians endure throughout their careers? And how might the endurance be explained? This paper uses a unique longitudinal data set to examine the persistence of political values among national politicians: members of the British House of Commons, who completed Rokeach-type value ranking instruments during 1971–73 and again 40 years later in 2012–16. The findings show remarkable stability and provide strong support for the persistence hypothesis which predicts that politicians develop crystallised value systems by their early thirties and largely maintain those values into retirement. This is consistent with the view that rapid changes in aggregate party ideologies have more to do with new views among new waves of recruits than with conversions among old members.
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