前沿 | Journal of Politics（政治学杂志）Number 4 - October 2019
让每一个人自由地理解政治
让世界各地的学人成果互联互通
让政治学人的核心关切得到传播
让每位闪烁的政治学人共享这片充满思考和情怀的天空
政治学人始终在路上
本期国际化部为大家带来了《政治学杂志》2019年第4期文章编译（上）。
编译属国际化部译者志愿提供，如有不妥欢迎指正；如对我们的工作有什么建议，欢迎到后台留言；如有转载请注明出处。学术公益是一条很长的路，我们诚邀您同行，欢迎留言您希望编译的政治学期刊，感谢您的支持。
PART
一
期刊简介
Journal of Politics（政治学杂志）是美国南方政治科学协会（SPSA）旗下学术期刊，目前由芝加哥大学出版社代为出版。期刊创刊于1939年，出版周期为每年4期，期刊收录范围涵盖政治科学相关的所有细分学科。
期刊研究领域和收录范围包：美国政治、比较政治学、国际关系、政治学理论、政治学方法论。
PART
二
期刊目录
Empowering Women? Gender Quotas and Women’s Political Careers
赋予女性权力？性别配额和女性的政治事业
Mutual Optimism and Costly Conflict: The Case of Naval Battles in the Age of Sail
相互乐观和代价高昂的冲突：以大航海时代的海战为例
Getting Rich Too Fast? Voters’ Reactions to Politicians’ Wealth Accumulation
致富过快？选民对政客财富积累的反应
Emigration and Collective Action
移民与集体行动
One-Party States and Legislator Extremism in the US House, 1876–2012
1876到2012年间一党独大的州和美国众议员的极化
Issue Competition without Electoral Incentives? A Study of Issue Emphasis in the European Parliament
没有选举激励的议题竞争？对于欧洲议会如何重视事务的研究
Nostalgic Enlightenment: Rousseau on Memory and Moral Freedom in Émile and “Lettres morales”
怀旧的启蒙：卢梭在《爱弥尔》和“道德信”中关于记忆和道德自由的论述
The Constraining Power of the Purse: Executive Discretion and Legislative Appropriations
钱包产生的约束力：行政自由裁量权与立法拨款
Do Local Party Chairs Think Women and Minority Candidates Can Win? Evidence from a Conjoint Experiment
地方的政党主席会认为女性和少数族裔候选人能够获胜吗？来自联合实验的证据
1Climate Justice and Historical Responsibility
气候正义与历史责任
PART
三
精选译文
01 赋予女性权力？性别配额和女性的政治事业
【题目】
Empowering Women? Gender Quotas and Women’s Political Careers
【作者】
Yann Kerevel，Louisiana State University
【摘要】
女性在行政岗位的任职一直落后于在立法机关的任职，且一些研究发现，妇女在行政领域面临“玻璃天花板”。打破这个天花板的一个方法是采用立法机关的性别配额。但是，学者们对立法配额如何影响女性进入行政岗位知之甚少。先前的研究还无法决定一旦通过配额选举，女性是否会以和男性相似的比例晋升到行政岗位。通过分析近2000名墨西哥议员未来职业道路的数据，我发现女性在获得行政位提名时会碰到玻璃天花板。通过分析配额实施前后的职业数据，并利用实行混合选举制度的地区对政策比较宽松的实施，我发现尽管配额增加了女性担任其他立法职位的机会，但对促进女性晋升至行政办公室几乎毫无作用。
Women’s representation in executive office continues to lag behind that of their female peers in legislatures, and several studies find women face an executive glass ceiling. One way to shatter this executive glass ceiling is through the adoption of legislative gender quotas. However, scholars know little about how legislative quotas affect women’s access to executive office. Previous research has been unable to determine whether once elected through quotas, women advance to executive office at similar rates to men. Using data on the future career paths of nearly 2,000 Mexican legislators, I find women face a glass ceiling in winning nomination to executive office. Using career data before and after quota implementation, and exploiting lax enforcement in the district component of the mixed electoral system, I find quotas have done little to increase the advancement of women into executive office, although they have increased opportunities for women in other legislative positions.
02 相互乐观和代价高昂的冲突：以大航海时代的海战为例
【题目】
Mutual Optimism and Costly Conflict: The Case of Naval Battles in the Age of Sail
【作者】
David Lindsey，Baruch College, City University of New York
【摘要】
相互乐观理论认为，双方对结果的乐观信念往往导致国际冲突。由于信念无法观测，因此这个理论很难系统检验。在这里，我利用大航海时代海战与众不同的特征，提出了一个可以完全依靠可观测变量的对理论的纯净检验，其中最显著的特征就是海军上将直接将船开走就能够避免战争。通过一个正式的模型，我说明了如果一场海战里的双方都可以将船开走以避免战争的话，战争结果就无法通过可观测的能力指标来预测。而在单边战争中，即如果只有一方可以通过开走船只来避免战争，结果就可以通过这些相同的指标来预测。我用1650到1833年英国所有中队级别的海战测试了这些预测。我证明了可观测的力量指标在双边战争中的预测性要差很多，从而确认了核心的关键理论预测。
Mutual optimism theory holds that mutually optimistic beliefs about outcomes cause international conflict. Because beliefs are unobservable, this theory is difficult to test systematically. Here, I present a clean test of theory that relies exclusively on observable variables by exploiting novel features of naval battles in the age of sail, most notably an admiral’s ability to avoid battle by simply sailing away. Using a formal model, I show that the outcome of mutual naval battles, where either side could avoid battle by sailing away, should not be predictable from observable capability indicators. The outcome of unilateral battles, where only one side could sail away to avoid fighting, should be predictable from these same indicators. I test these predictions against all squadron-level British naval battles from 1650 to 1833. I show that observable strength indicators are substantially less predictive in mutual battles, confirming the core key theoretical prediction.
03 致富过快？选民对政客财富积累的反应
【题目】
Getting Rich Too Fast? Voters’ Reactions to Politicians’ Wealth Accumulation
【作者】
Simon Chauchard，Leiden University
Marko Klašnja，Georgetown University
S.P. Harish，College of William & Mary
【摘要】
要求政客公开其财务信息的资产申报在世界范围内变得越来越普遍。这些披露中的信息常常反映出，政客在就职期间迅速积累了财富，而这一事实可能在选民中间引发怀疑。但是，我们对于这样的信息将怎样影响选民的行为知之甚少。为了解决这个问题，我们使用了来自印度的原始实验和调查数据来探索选民对有关政客财富和财富积累的信息的反应。结果显示，选民强烈反对政客在就职期间积累财富，并且会把它跟腐败和政治暴力联系在一起。进一步的研究提出了几个机制，可能可以部分解释为什么尽管有这些负面反应，印度许多“积累财富者”还是可以赢得选举。选民往往缺乏有关披露的信息，且许多人对财富积累的重视程度往往低于其他一些关注点，比如当政期间的表现和基于种姓的呼吁。
Asset declarations requiring politicians to disclose their financial information are becoming increasingly common across the world. The information contained in these disclosures frequently reveals that politicians rapidly accumulate wealth while in office, a fact that may raise suspicion among voters. However, little is known about the ways in which such information may affect voter behavior. To address this gap, we use original experimental and survey data from India to explore voters’ reactions to information about wealth and wealth accumulation. Results suggest that voters strongly disapprove of wealth accumulation in office and associate it with corruption and political violence. Further analyses suggest several mechanisms that may partly explain why many “wealth accumulators” win elections in India despite these negative reactions. Voters generally lack information about disclosures and many weigh wealth accumulation less than some other prominent concerns, such as performance in office or caste-based appeals.
04 移民与集体行动
【题目】
Emigration and Collective Action
【作者】
Emily A. Sellars，Yale University
【摘要】
我建立了一个关于移民和集体行动的模型，来说明退出机会的存在会破坏政治动员。在一个集体行动有风险并且成功需要大量公民参与的背景下，退出的选项会从两个方面来降低动员能力。第一，有利可图的移民机会增加了集体行动的机会成本，抑制了那些可移民者的政治参与。第二，得知一些人拥有有利可图的退出机会会降低每一个人对于集体行动最终成功的信心。因此，所有人在退出选项变得更能有利可图或者更普遍的时候，无论他们个人能不能移民，都会变得难以被动员，从而损害了集体行动并且降低了成功动员的可能性。我使用了墨西哥和日本的历史证据来检验这两点，并且讨论了这对于理解移民的政治经济学以及移民政策的意义。
I develop a model of emigration and collective action to illustrate that the presence of exit opportunities can undermine political mobilization. In a setting where collective action is risky and where success requires the participation of a large number of citizens, exit options reduce mobilization through two mechanisms. First, profitable migration opportunities raise the opportunity cost of collective action, dampening political participation among those who could migrate. In addition, the knowledge that some individuals have profitable exit options lowers everyone’s confidence that collective action can be successful. Because of this, all people—regardless of whether they personally could migrate—become less likely to mobilize as exit options become more profitable or more prevalent, undermining collective action and making successful mobilization less likely. I examine the mechanisms suggested by the model using historical evidence from Mexico and Japan and discuss the implications for understanding the political economy of emigration and of emigration policy.
05 1876到2012年间一党独大的州和美国众议员的极化
【题目】
One-Party States and Legislator Extremism in the US House, 1876–2012
【作者】
Neil A. O’Brian，University of California, Berkeley
【摘要】
单一政党占据主导地位的现象会不会加剧党派极端主义呢？通过分析超过140年的选举数据和唱名表决，我发现，平均而言，与在更具有竞争性的环境中当选的议员相比，那些在其所在政党压倒性主导的州当选的议员更有可能采取比其政党的意识形态主张更为温和的理念。我认为，一党占据州的强势地位的现象往往是由对于地方主要事务的广泛共识、群体喜好以及不平衡的政党组织所导致的，而不是由于选民一致认同一个国家政党。因此，代表们有动机贴着主导政党的标签竞选，但也必须应对两个国家政党都会面对的各种选举压力。尽管学者们主要在由民主党主导的南方观察到一党主义，但我观察到在平原和西部农村，尤其是在1896到1932年间，也存在共和党的一党主义。从历史的角度看，我们也许会对1990年代以来国家政党实力的平衡感到惊讶。
Do party strongholds exacerbate partisan extremism? Using over 140 years of election data and roll call votes I find that, on average, members of Congress elected in states where their party overwhelmingly dominates tend to moderate from their national party’s ideology when compared to members elected in more competitive settings. I argue that heavily one-party states have often been engendered by widespread agreement over locally salient issues, group affect, or imbalanced party organization, not because the electorate consistently agrees with one national party. Consequently, representatives have incentive to run under the dominant party label but must respond to diverse electoral pressures that align to both national parties. While scholars prominently observe one-partyism in the Democratic South, I observe that the plains and rural west, particularly between 1896 and 1932, can be characterized as one-party Republican, too. Perhaps surprisingly, state party strength since the 1990s, in a historical perspective, is quite balanced.
06 没有选举激励的议题竞争？对于欧洲议会如何重视事务的研究
【题目】
Issue Competition without Electoral Incentives? A Study of Issue Emphasis in the European Parliament
【作者】
Maurits J. Meijers，Radboud University
Harmen van der Veer，Leiden University
【摘要】
利基党对主流政党政策议程的影响是事务竞争文献中的一个主要话题。文献强调，利基党针对事务进行的动员往往带来选举威胁，从而使主流政党对这些利基党进行回应。但是如果在不是主要受对选举的考虑影响的制度背景下，政党如何对事务动员作出回应呢？我们认为欧洲议会就是这样的例子，并基于移民这一极右派的核心议题对议题竞争进行了研究。为了确定欧洲议会内极右派成员的影响，我们使用了2004到2016年间议会议题和动议的一套原始数据。通过时间序列回归分析，我们发现主流政党并没有为了回应欧洲议会极右派成员对移民问题的强调而更重视这个问题。这些发现表明，制度背景以及感知到的选举威胁对于事务竞争的动力至关重要。
Niche party leverage over mainstream party policy agendas is a central theme in the issue competition literature. The literature has underlined that the electoral threat associated with niche party issue mobilization guides mainstream party responses to such niche parties. Yet how do political parties react to issue mobilization in an institutional setting not primarily steered by electoral considerations? We argue that the European Parliament constitutes such a case and study issue competition on the radical right’s core issue: immigration. To establish the leverage of radical right members of the European Parliament (MEPs), we use an original data set of parliamentary questions and motions between 2004 and 2016. Using time-series regression analysis, we find that mainstream party groups do not increase their emphasis of immigration issues in response to radical right MEPs’ issue emphasis. These findings indicate that the institutional context and the perceived electoral threat are crucial for issue competition dynamics.
07 钱包产生的约束力：行政自由裁量权与立法拨款
【题目】
The Constraining Power of the Purse: Executive Discretion and Legislative Appropriations
【作者】
Alexander Bolton，Emory University
Sharece Thrower，Vanderbilt University
【摘要】
自由裁量权是理解美国三权分立制度下部门间互动关系的基础。然而，衡量自由裁量权很困难。少数现有的方法无法随着时间推移以一致的方式同时对授权和限制进行测量。本文中，我们基于所有部门得到的立法拨款提出了一种新的测量方法，并通过国会在拨款委员会的报告中施加的支出限制进行了调节。我们提供了证据以证明这一测量方法的有效性，包括一个对盟友原则的测试来证明构想的有效性。最后，在自由裁量的语境下，通过使用该方法对官僚体制所受的政治控制如何影响国会政策的假设进行评估，我们证明了这个测量方法更广泛的效力。我们证明了机构设计和总统控制都是影响国会决策的重要因素。总之，我们提供了一个具有广泛用途的测量自由裁量权的方法来帮助研究人员探究美国政治中的一系列问题。
Discretion is fundamental to understanding interbranch interactions in the US separation-of-powers system. Yet, measuring discretion is challenging. The few existing measures have difficulty capturing both delegation and constraint in a consistent way over time. In this article, we propose a novel measure of executive discretion based on legislative appropriations to all agencies, weighted by spending limitations imposed by Congress in appropriations committee reports. We provide evidence for the validity of the measure, including a test of the ally principle to establish construct validity. Finally, we demonstrate the wider utility of the measure by employing it to evaluate hypotheses about how political control over the bureaucracy influences congressional policy making in the context of discretion. We show that agency design and presidential control are important factors in congressional decisions. Overall, we present a versatile measure of discretion that researchers can use to explore a variety of questions in American politics.
08 地方的政党主席会认为女性和少数族裔候选人能够获胜吗？来自联合实验的证据
【题目】
Do Local Party Chairs Think Women and Minority Candidates Can Win? Evidence from a Conjoint Experiment
【作者】
David Doherty，Loyola University Chicago
Conor M. Dowling，University of Mississippi
Michael G. Miller，Barnard College, Columbia University
【摘要】
我们对地方政党主席进行了一次全国性调查，其中包括一项联合实验，来评估候选人的种族和性别会如何影响主席对于他们在其选区赢得地方州议会初选可能性的判断。两党的地方主席们都认为女性候选人赢得所在选区基本盘支持的可能性和男性相同，但认为拉丁裔和黑人候选人胜选的可能性要小得多。共和党主席们认为少数族裔候选人所面临的劣势并不随其所在县人口结构的变化而改变，而对于民主党主席而言，如果他们所在的县拥有更多的少数族裔人口，那么他会认为少数族裔候选人面临的劣势变小了。我们的发现表明，两党的地方主席都认为少数族裔候选人面临着一场和他们所在选区主要支持者的艰难斗争。这种观念可能会影响地方主席对于应该招什么样的候选人以及应该最大力支持什么样的候选人的决定。
We conducted a national survey of local party chairs that included a conjoint experiment to assess the effects of candidates’ race and gender on chairs’ assessments of their likelihood of winning a state legislative primary election in their area. Chairs from both parties viewed women candidates as just as likely as men to win the support of their base but viewed Latinx and black candidates as substantially less likely to win. The disadvantage chairs believe minority candidates face is insensitive to variation in county demographics among Republican chairs but is attenuated among Democratic chairs serving counties with larger minority populations. Our findings suggest that officials from both parties believe that minority candidates face an uphill battle with their base. This perception may color chairs’ decisions about which candidates to recruit and most vigorously support.
09 气候正义与历史责任
【题目】
Climate Justice and Historical Responsibility
【作者】
Paul Bou-Habib，University of Essex
【摘要】
许多人认为，与发展中国家相比，发达国家在应对气候变化上必须承担更大的责任。这主要有两点原因，分别是它们对全球变暖有更重的历史责任以及它们有更多的财富。然而，人们在这两个原因的相对重要程度上有分歧。本文提出了一种解决这个问题的“制度性观点”，其中包含两个主张。第一，在全球气候治理的合法机构建立之前排放的大量温室气体不会带来与气候相关的职责。第二，更普遍地讲，合法的、制度化的全球治理的缺失，会削弱发达国家对财富的高度所有权，从而消解了对于它们必须承担更多责任以应对气候变化挑战的一个反对理由。结果是，目前应当主要依据财富而不是历史在国家之间分配气候的责任。
Many agree that developed states must bear greater burdens in tacking climate change than developing states for two reasons: their greater historical responsibility for global warming and their greater wealth. People disagree, however, about the relative importance of these two reasons. This article develops an “institutional view” to address this issue, which consists of two claims. First, many emissions of greenhouse gases that took place before the establishment of legitimate institutions of global climate governance do not give rise to climate-related duties. Second, the absence of legitimate institutional global governance, more generally, undermines full rights to wealth on the part of developed states and thus removes an objection to their having to contribute more to tackling the challenges of climate change. The upshot is that, at present, climate duties should be allocated between states mainly on the basis of wealth rather than history.
编 译：吴佳蔚，袁丁
校 对：吴佳蔚，袁丁
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编辑：欧阳星
一审：郑 静
二审：宋 婷
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