前沿 | 比较政治学顶级期刊：Comparative Political Studies, 2020年第3-4期
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本期国际化部为大家带来了《比较政治研究》2020年第3-4期文章编译。
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PART
一
期刊简介
Comparative Political Studies（比较政治研究）是美国SAGE出版社旗下学术期刊，创刊于1968年，期刊每月出版一次，主要探讨比较政治学相关内容，期刊现任主编为明尼苏达大学教授David Samuels。过去五年的影响因子为4.262，在176个政治科学类期刊中排名第12.
期刊研究领域和收录范围包括：比较政治学理论研究、全球比较政治学研究、国内比较政治学研究等。
PART
二
期刊目录
Is Bigger Always Better? How Targeting Aid Windfalls Affects Capture and Social Cohesion
越大就一定越好吗？指定援助的意外收获如何影响捕获和社会凝聚力
Democracy and Retribution: Transitional Justice and Regime Support in Postwar West Germany
民主与报应：战后西德的转型正义和政权支持
Leader Succession and Civil War
领导人的继任与内战
Backing the Incumbent in Difficult Times: The Electoral Impact of Wildfires
在困难时期支持现任者：野火对选举的影响
To Reform or to Retain? Politicians’ Incentives to Clean Up Corrupt Courts in Hybrid Regimes
要改革还是要保持？在混合政权中政客清算腐败法庭的动机
Testing the “China Model” of Meritocratic Promotions: Do Democracies Reward Less Competent Ministers Than Autocracies?
检验精英主义晋升的“中国模式”：民主政体比专制政体对部长的奖励更少吗？
Testing the “China Model” of Meritocratic Promotions: Do Democracies Reward Less Competent Ministers Than Autocracies?
检验精英主义晋升的“中国模式”：民主政体比专制政体对部长的奖励更少吗？
Vote Secrecy With Diverse Voters
多样化选民与投票保密
The Origins of Persistent Current Account Imbalances in the Post-Bretton Woods Era
后布雷顿森林时代持续性经常账户失衡的根源
PART
三
精选译文
01 越大就一定越好吗？指定援助的意外收获如何影响捕获和社会凝聚力
【题目】
Is Bigger Always Better? How Targeting Aid Windfalls Affects Capture and Social Cohesion
【作者】
Laura Paler, University of Pittsburg
Camille Strauss-Kahn, Columbia University
Korhan Kocak, Princeton University
【摘要】
发展中的一项主要挑战来自确保援助物资送给最需要的人。援助机构通常通过指定接受援助的弱势团体或个人来实现这一目标。尽管指定援助很普遍，但我们对其对目标受益的社区的分配结果和社会凝聚力的影响知之甚少。我们通过将确定指定收益群体演化为讨价还价博弈来对此进行调查，该讨价还价博弈由三名参与者组成，即指定群体，精英群体和被排除群体。我们的方法得出了与人们直觉相反的看法，实际上，在精英和被排斥群体争夺援助的社区中，指定群体受益更多。为了给预测提供支持，我们使用回归不连续性设计和印度尼西亚亚齐实施的援助计划提供的原始调查数据。本文证明，理解社区动态在影响指定目标援助计划的经济和社会成果中的作用的重要性。
A central challenge in development involves ensuring that aid reaches those in greatest need. Aid agencies typically try to achieve this by targeting aid to vulnerable individuals or groups. Despite the prevalence of targeting, we know little about its effects on distributional outcomes and social cohesion in communities where some are intended to benefit, and others are excluded. We investigate this by formalizing targeting as a bargaining game with coalition formation involving three players—the target group, the elite, and an excluded group. Our approach yields the counter-intuitive insight that the target group will actually benefit more in communities where elites and the excluded group compete to capture aid. We provide support for predictions using a regression discontinuity design and original survey data from an aid program implemented in Aceh, Indonesia. This article demonstrates the importance of understanding the role of community dynamics in shaping the economic and social outcomes of targeted aid programs.
02 民主与报应：战后西德的过渡性司法和政权支持
【题目】
Democracy and Retribution: Transitional Justice and Regime Support in Postwar West Germany
【作者】
Giovanni Capoccia, University of Oxford
Grigore Pop-Eleches, Princeton University
【摘要】
过去施暴者应被如何严厉惩处才能加强新的民主的合法性？根据社会心理学理论，我们假设，支持民主的群众态度更青睐于过渡民主审判中的被告受到惩罚的方式与他们的罪行在道德上成正比的想法。这种想法是由被告的社会分类和在大众中占主导地位的关于其有罪确定性的观点所形成的。当被告在很大程度上被视为同类，并且他们的有罪性遭到质疑时（例如在西德案件中），较轻的惩罚可能会加强支持民主的态度，而较严厉的制裁则可能削弱支持民主的态度。战后西德刑罚模式的地方性差异分析证实了这一假设，并表明这些有关态度的作用持续至中期。我们的发现对过渡时期司法和民主化的研究具有启示意义。
How harshly should perpetrators of past abuses be punished, to reinforce the legitimacy of a new democracy? Drawing on sociopsychological theories, we hypothesize that prodemocratic mass attitudes are favored by the perception that defendants in transitional justice trials have been punished in a way that is morally proportional to their offenses. This perception is shaped by the social categorization of defendants and the opinions about the certainty of their guilt that predominate in the mass public. When defendants are largely seen as co-ethnics and their guilt is contested, like in the West German case, prodemocratic attitudes are likely to be strengthened by lighter punishments and undermined by harsher sanctions. The analysis of subnational variation in patterns of punishment in postwar West Germany confirms this hypothesis and shows that these attitudinal effects persist in the medium term. Our findings have implications for research on transitional justice and democratization.
03 领导人的继任与内战
【题目】
Leader Succession and Civil War
【作者】
Andrej Kokkonen, University of Gothenburg
Anders Sundell, University of Gothenburg
【摘要】
领导人的继任是专制制度中一个长期的不稳定根源。尽管如此，它仍然是政治学中一个被人们忽视的现象。在本文中，我们整理了一个关于欧洲内战的新而全面的数据集，并将其与800多年来28个州君主命运的数据相结合，用于研究专制制度下的继承如何影响内战的风险。我们利用君主的自然死亡来找出继承中的外来变化，发现了继承大大增加了内战的风险。但是，可以通过世袭继承（比如嫡长子继承制）来减轻继承战争的风险。当世袭君主制取代欧洲的选举君主制以后，继任战争骤然减少。我们的结果表明，继承及其管理机构对于专制政权的政治稳定至关重要。
Leadership succession is a perennial source of instability in autocratic regimes. Despite this, it has remained a curiously understudied phenomenon in political science. In this article, we compile a novel and comprehensive dataset on civil war in Europe and combine it with data on the fate of monarchs in 28 states over 800 years to investigate how autocratic succession affected the risk of civil war. Exploiting the natural deaths of monarchs to identify exogenous variation in successions, we find that successions substantially increased the risk of civil war. The risk of succession wars could, however, be mitigated by hereditary succession arrangements (i.e., primogeniture—the principle of letting the oldest son inherit the throne). When hereditary monarchies replaced elective monarchies in Europe, succession wars declined drastically. Our results point to the importance of the succession, and the institutions governing it, for political stability in autocratic regimes.
04 在困难时期支持现任者：野火对选举的影响
【题目】
Backing the Incumbent in Difficult Times: The Electoral Impact of Wildfires
【作者】
Roberto Ramos, Banco de España
Carlos Sanz, Banco de España
【摘要】
选民如何应对超出政客控制的冲击？我们通过研究1983-2014年西班牙山火对选举的影响来解决回答问题。我们借此可以研究（a）与某个特定灾难不同，可以研究不同地点和时间的火灾影响；（b）相对于选举日的时间异质性影响；（c）对各级政府选举的影响。我们使用倍差法策略，发现在市政选举前9个月内发生意外大火会使在任政党的选票数提高多达8个百分点，而在任期早起发生的大火不会影响选举结果。此外，大火对区域或全国选举没有影响。我们根据选举问责制的主要理论讨论了这个结果背后的可能机制。
How do voters react to shocks that are outside the control of politicians? We address this question by studying the electoral impact of wildfires in Spain in the period 1983-2014. This context allows us to study (a) the effects of fires at different locations and times, as opposed to a specific disaster; (b) the heterogeneous effects by time relative to election day; and (c) the effects on elections for all levels of government. Using a difference-in-difference strategy, we find that an accidental fire up to 9 months ahead of a municipal election increases the incumbent party’s vote share by up to 8 percentage points, whereas a fire earlier in the term does not affect the election results. In addition, fires have no effect on regional or national elections. We discuss the possible mechanisms behind the results in light of the main theories on electoral accountability.
05 要改革还是要保持？在混合政权中政客清算腐败法庭的动机
【题目】
To Reform or to Retain? Politicians’ Incentives to Clean Up Corrupt Courts in Hybrid Regimes
【作者】
Ketevan Bolkvadze, Lund University
【摘要】
本文对非民主国家的司法独立问题提出了新的看法。一些学者认为，政治分裂导致司法更加独立。其他人则认为，这导致非民主国家的司法独立性降低。这些研究集中于司法政治化，忽视了司法腐败。通过对格鲁吉亚和摩尔多瓦的改革进行过程追踪控制比较，我研究了政治分裂对司法腐败的影响。我认为，在如格鲁吉亚那样较为不分裂的政权中，政客们更有动力改革腐败的法院，并利用反腐败措施建立长期的政治控制。在更加分裂的政权中，例如在摩尔多瓦，政客有更强的动机抵制反腐败措施，并利用腐败的法院谋取短期私人利益。这些发现表明，混合政权中的政治分裂可以促使政治家既不向法院授予更多权力，也不向其授予更少的权力，而是使用不同的途径或“进入点”来影响司法结果。
This article offers a novel take on the problem of judicial independence in nondemocracies. Some scholars hold that political fragmentation leads to more judicial independence; others argue that it leads to less independence in nondemocracies. These studies have focused on judicial politicization and neglected judicial corruption. Using a process-tracing controlled comparison of reforms in Georgia and Moldova, I investigate the impact of political fragmentation on judicial corruption. I argue that politicians in less fragmented regimes, as in Georgia, have stronger incentives to reform corrupt courts, and utilize anticorruption measures for establishing long-term political control. In more fragmented regimes, as in Moldova, politicians have stronger incentives to resist anticorruption measures and instead utilize corrupt courts for short-term private gains. These findings suggest that political fragmentation in hybrid regimes can propel politicians to delegate neither more, nor less power to courts, but instead to use distinct avenues, or “entry-points,” to influence judicial outcomes.
06 检验精英主义晋升的“中国模式”：民主政体比专制政体对部长的奖励更少吗？
【题目】
Testing the “China Model” of Meritocratic Promotions: Do Democracies Reward Less Competent Ministers Than Autocracies?
【作者】
Don S. Lee, University of Nottingham
Paul Schuler, University of Arizona
【摘要】
“中国模式”的支持者认为，专制国家，尤其是东亚，对才能的奖励要比民主国家更高。然而，有持相左意见的文献认为，专制政体不大可能奖励才能，因为独裁者担心有才能的官员会挑战其权力。我们认为，独裁者不惧怕技术上的才能，他们担心的是政治能力。因此，独裁政权会晋升具有技术能力的部长，惩罚具有政治能力的人。相比之下，民主国家在决定晋升人选时更重视政治能力。我们是首个对如何奖励部长级行为的理论进行检验的研究，在研究中使用了有关东亚九个国家政绩和晋升的独有的数据集。我们的发现表明，只要保证部长们自我限制其政治行为，独裁者就会晋升这些技术官员。在民主国家，议会民主制和总统民主制导致那些表现出政治能力的人受到晋升。
Proponents of the “China Model” suggest that autocracies, particularly in East Asia, reward competence more than democracies. However, a competing literature argues that autocracies are less likely to reward competence because autocrats fear that competent officials could challenge for power. We argue that autocracies do not fear technical competence; they fear political competence. As such, autocracies may promote ministers with technical competence but punish the politically competent. Democracies, by contrast, place a premium on political competence when deciding whom to promote. We provide the first test of this theory on how ministerial behavior is rewarded using a unique data set of political performance and promotions in nine East Asian countries. Our findings show that autocracies promote officials with technical competence as long as the ministers limit their political behavior. In democracies, parliamentary and presidential democracies promote those displaying political competence.
07 多样化选民与投票保密
【题目】
Vote Secrecy With Diverse Voters
【作者】
Daniel W. Gingerich, University of Virginia
Danilo Medeiros, University of Virginia
【摘要】
为什么现任政客采明知会用削弱现任优势却还要采用无记名投票？为什么在某些情况下无记名投票被视为民主化改革，而在另一些情况下又将其与民主倒退联系在一起？我们的理论和经验能够回答这些问题。我们的出发点是观察到无记名投票有两个结果。它降低了监督投票所需的人力，从而削弱了庇护主义的效用。但是，根据识字率和选举规则的不同，这也可能会缩小政治参与范围。认识到这一点，我们内化了政客对无记名投票的偏好，着眼于他们个人特点和选区特征的作用。我们用来自巴西第二共和国（1945-1964）的立法唱名表决数据来测试的我们的框架。与期望相符的是，立法者支持者的识字率及其与当地的联系极大地影响了无记名投票的选择。
Why would incumbent politicians adopt the secret ballot when doing so weakens the advantages of incumbency? Why is the secret ballot considered a democratizing reform in some settings, whereas in others it is associated with democratic backsliding? We provide theory and empirics to address these questions. Our starting point is the observation that the secret ballot had two consequences. It reduced the capacity to monitor the vote, thereby dampening the efficacy of clientelism. Yet, depending on literacy and electoral rules, it could also narrow political participation. Recognizing this, we endogenize politicians’ preferences over the secret ballot, concentrating on the role of their personal and constituency characteristics. Legislative roll call voting data from Brazil’s Second Republic (1945-1964) is used to test our framework. Consistent with expectations, the level of literacy of legislators’ supporters and the strength of their local ties strongly influenced the choice to adopt the secret ballot.
08 选民是如何歧视女参选者的？来自马拉维的实验性和定性证据
【题目】
(How) Do Voters Discriminate Against Women Candidates? Experimental and Qualitative Evidence From Malawi
【作者】
Amanda Clayton, Vanderbilt University
Amanda Lea Robinson, The Ohio State University
Martha C. Johnson, Mills College
Ragnhild Muriaas, University of Bergen
【摘要】
在传统性别规范强势的地方，选民是如何评估女候选人的？我们在马拉维进行了一项调查实验，以评估公民是否歧视女性候选人，以及候选人的其他特征（政治经验，家庭状况，政策重点和性别亲属关系做法）是如何与候选人的性别互相作用，以影响公民的支持的。与我们的预期相反，我们发现公民更喜欢女性候选人，对于具有相同特征的男性和女性，评价是相似的。然而，我们发现两种出乎意料的方式使女性候选人在选举过程中处于不利地位。首先，我们发现公民更喜欢已婚并育有年幼子女的候选人，在现实中，这种情况对男性比女性候选人更为普遍。其次，我们发现了普遍存在的关于负面竞选活动的定性报告，这些报告可能会影响公民对实际女性候选人的评估，而不会影响对假设候选人的评估。我们讨论了我们的结果如何说明性别偏见在不同政治背景下的实现方式。
How do voters evaluate women candidates in places where traditional gender norms are strong? We conduct a survey experiment in Malawi to assess both whether citizens discriminate against women candidates and how other salient candidate characteristics—political experience, family status, policy focus, and gendered kinship practices—interact with candidate gender to affect citizen support. Contrary to our expectations, we find citizens prefer women candidates ceteris paribus, and women and men with the same traits are evaluated similarly. Yet, we find two unexpected ways women candidates are disadvantaged in the electoral process. First, we find that citizens prefer candidates who are married with young children, a profile much more common among men than women candidates in practice. Second, we find pervasive qualitative reports of negative campaigning that likely affected citizens’ evaluations of actual women candidates, while not affecting evaluations of hypothetical candidates. We discuss how our results speak to the ways gender biases operate in practice across political contexts.
09 后布雷顿森林时代持续性经常账户失衡的根源
【题目】
The Origins of Persistent Current Account Imbalances in the Post-Bretton Woods Era
【作者】
Mark S. Manger, University of Toronto
Thomas Sattler, Université de Genève
【摘要】
为什么有些国家的经常账户经常有盈余？为什么其他国家经常出现数十年的赤字，进而导致持久的全球失衡？这种持续的不平衡是许多金融危机的根源，也是国际经济冲突的主要原因。我们提出，工资谈判机构的差异及其通过对贸易平衡的影响能够很大程度上解释比例的失衡。统一工资谈判协调的国家可以限制出口行业的工资增长以确保竞争力，从而造成持续的贸易顺差。我们估计了自1977年以来经济合作与发展组织（OECD）成员国中这些机构对贸易收支的贡献，并为我们的假设提供了充分的支持。与许多文献相反，固定汇率或浮动汇率制度的选择对贸易或经常账户余额的影响很小。换句话说，盈余国家通过工资谈判机制进行的内部调整胜过赤字国家进行的外部调整。
Why do some countries run persistent current account surpluses? Why do others run deficits, often over decades, leading to enduring global imbalances? Such persistent imbalances are the root cause of many financial crises and a major source of international economic conflict. We propose that differences in wage-bargaining institutions explain a large share of imbalances through their effect on the trade balance. In countries with coordinated wage bargaining, wage growth in export industries can be restrained to ensure competitiveness, leading to persistent trade surpluses. We estimate the contribution of these institutions to trade balances in Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) member countries since 1977 and find ample support for our hypothesis. Contrary to much of the literature, the choice of fixed or floating exchange rate regimes has only a small effect on trade or current account balances. In other words, internal adjustment in surplus countries via wage-bargaining institutions trumps external adjustment by deficit countries.
编 译：王悦霖
校 对：林俊斯
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