顶刊前沿 | Journal of Politics（政治学杂志）Number 1 - January 2020
让每一个人自由地理解政治
让世界各地的学人成果互联互通
让政治学人的核心关切得到传播
让闪烁的政治学人共享这片充满思考和情怀的天空
政治学人始终在路上
本期国际化部为大家带来了《政治学杂志》2020年第1期文章编译。
编译属国际化部译者志愿提供，如有不妥欢迎指正；如对我们的工作有什么建议，欢迎到后台留言；如有转载请注明出处。学术公益是一条很长的路，我们诚邀您同行，欢迎留言您希望编译的政治学期刊，感谢您的支持。
PART 1
期刊简介
Journal of Politics（政治学杂志）是美国南方政治科学协会（SPSA）旗下学术期刊，目前由芝加哥大学出版社代为出版。期刊创刊于1939年，出版周期为每年4期，期刊收录范围涵盖政治科学相关的所有细分学科。
期刊研究领域和收录范围包：美国政治、比较政治学、国际关系、政治学理论、政治学方法论。
PART 2
期刊目录
Shifting Standards: How Voters Evaluate the Qualifications of Female and Male Candidates
变化的标准：选民如何评估女性和男性候选人的资格
Countering Capture: Elite Networks and Government Responsiveness in China’s Land Market Reform
对抗俘获：中国土地市场改革中的精英网络和政府回应
The Politics of Industrial Displacement: Evidence from Special Economic Zones
工业转移的政治：来自经济特区的证据
How Divisive Primaries Hurt Parties: Evidence from Near-Runoffs in US Legislatures
分裂性初选如何伤害政党：来自美国立法机构中决胜选举的证据
Strategic Entry and Strategic Voting in Majoritarian Systems
多数决制下的策略性当选与策略性投票
Boycotting, Buycotting, and the Psychology of Political Consumerism
抵制，有意购买和政治消费主义的心理学
Disputed Elections in Presidential Democracies: Contexts of Electoral “Blackmail”
总统民主制中有争议的选举：选举“敲诈”的背景
Reputation and Organizational Politics: Inside the EU Commission
声誉和组织政治：欧盟委员会的内部
The Perils of Peace: Civil War Peace Agreements and Military Coups
和平的危险：内战和平协议和军事政变
Targeted: The Mobilizing Effect of Perceptions of Unfair Policing Practices
被针对：对不公正警务工作的感知的动员作用
Inequality in the Social Mind: Social Comparison and Support for Redistribution
社会观念中的不平等：社会比较和对再分配的支持
Territorial Conflict over Endogenous Rent
有关内生租金的领土冲突
Human Rights and Public Support for War
人权与公众对战争的支持
How Mayors Hurt Their Presidential Ticket: Party Brands and Incumbency Spillovers in Brazil
市长如何伤害同党的总统候选人：巴西的政党品牌和在职溢出效应
Cosmopolitanism and International Economic Institutions
世界主义与国际经济组织
Prioritized Interests: Diverse Lobbying Coalitions and Congressional Committee Agenda Setting
被优先考虑的利益：多元的游说联盟与国会委员会的议程设定
Who Is Democracy Good For? Elections, Rural Bias, and Health and Education Outcomes in Sub-Saharan Africa
民主对谁有好处？撒哈拉以南非洲的选举、农村偏向以及健康和教育成果
An Economic Theory of War
关于战争的经济理论
Expertise, Networks, and Interpersonal Influence in Congress
国会中的专业知识、网络和人际关系
Electoral Protests and Political Attitudes under Electoral Authoritarianism
选举式威权下的选举抗议和政治态度
Government Privatization and Political Participation: The Case of Charter Schools
政府私有化和政治参与：特许学校的例子
Partisan Conflict and Citizens’ Democratic Attitudes: How Partisanship Shapes Reactions to Legislative Brawls
党派冲突和公民的民主态度：党派如何塑造对立法斗殴的反应
Public Commitments as Signals of Responsiveness in the European Union
公共承诺作为欧盟中的回应信号
Historical Ownership and Territorial Disputes
历史上的所有权和领土纠纷
“And Why Is That a Partisan Issue?” Source Cues, Persuasion, and School Lunches
“为什么这是一个党派问题？”资源、说服和学校午餐
Conservative Larks, Liberal Owls: The Relationship between Chronotype and Political Ideology
保守的百灵鸟，自由的猫头鹰：时型和政治意识形态之间的关系
Personalization of Power and Repression in Dictatorships
权力的个人化以及独裁统治下的压迫
The Shadow of the Future and Bargaining Delay: An Experimental Approach
未来投射的阴影和拖延谈判：一种实验方法
How Fair Is It? An Experimental Study of Perceived Fairness of Distributive Policies
究竟有多公平？关于人们对分配政策公平性的感知的实验研究
Man Bites Blue Dog: Are Moderates Really More Electable than Ideologues?
人咬蓝狗：温和派真的比意识形态追随者更容易当选吗？
How Do Electoral Quotas Influence Political Competition? Evidence from Municipal, State, and National Elections in India
选举配额如何影响政治竞争？来自印度市政、州和国家选举的证据
Turn and Face the Strange Ch-Ch-Changes: How an Evolving America Activates Identity Politics
扭转并应对奇怪的变化：不断发展的美国如何激活身份政治
Euroscepticism in the Populism Era
民粹主义时代中的欧盟怀疑主义
Power and Politics in America’s Private Governments
美国私人政府中的权力与政治
PART 3
精选译文
01 变化的标准：选民如何评估女性和男性候选人的资格
【题目】
Shifting Standards: How Voters Evaluate the Qualifications of Female and Male Candidates
【作者】
NICHOLE M. BAUER Louisiana State University
【摘要】
现有的经验研究发现，与男性候选人相比，女性候选人拥有更高的担任政治职务的资格。这一发现背后未经检验的假设是，女性候选人必须具备更强的资质，才能克服将女性界定为不适合担任领导职务的女性刻板印象。我通过心理学研究来检验这一假设，并发展出一种理论，以解释候选人的性别如何影响选民对政治候选人资格的评估。通过创新的调查实验，结果表明，在多个实验中，相较于男性候选人，选民对女性候选人适用了更严格的资格标准，而这些更高的标准限制了女性候选人获取选举支持的能力。这些发现揭示了女性候选人所面临偏见的一个不易察觉却有害无益的来源。这表明候选人的性别是如何影响选民的决策以及民主机构选择最佳领导人的能力的。
Existing empirical research finds that female candidates have higher levels of qualifications for political office compared to male candidates. An untested assumption behind this finding is that female candidates must have stronger qualifications to overcome feminine stereotypes that characterize women as ill qualified for leadership positions. I test this assumption by drawing on psychology research to develop a theory that explains how a candidate’s sex affects the way voters evaluate the qualifications of political candidates. Using innovative survey experiments, the results show that, across multiple experiments, voters hold female candidates, relative to male candidates, to more stringent qualification standards, and these higher standards limit the ability of female candidates to secure electoral support. These findings uncover a subtle but pernicious source of bias facing female candidates. The implications speak to how candidate sex affects voter decision-making and the ability of democratic institutions to select the best candidates for leadership.
02 对抗俘获：中国土地市场改革中的精英网络和政府回应
【题目】
Countering Capture: Elite Networks and Government Responsiveness in China’s Land Market Reform
【作者】
JUNYAN JIANG Chinese University of Hong Kong
YU ZENG Peking University
【摘要】
政府的回应性通常被视为公众施加政治压力的结果，但是为什么面临类似压力的政治家时常呈现出不同的回应水平？本文将精英网络的结构视为关键的中介变量。我们认为，外部支持网络的存在有助于减少官员对既得利益的依赖，从而提升官员对普通公民的回应能力，并以中国的土地市场改革为例检验这种主张。利用新颖的方式测量城市一级的群众申诉和政治网络，我们证明与土地相关的申诉的强度基本上与改革的出现呈正相关，但这种关联仅在那些与更高级别的领导权威有着非正式联系的一部分城市领导人中显著。我们同样表明，与上级有所联系的领导人倾向于实施与地方官僚和企业利益不太一致的政策。这些发现强调了精英内部的动态在塑造大众与精英的互动中的重要性。
Government responsiveness is often viewed as a result of political pressure from the public, but why do politicians facing similar pressure sometimes differ in their responsiveness? This article considers the configurations of elite networks as a key mediating factor. We argue that access to external support networks helps improve politicians’ responsiveness to ordinary citizens by reducing their dependence on vested interests, and we test this claim using China’s land market reform as a case. Leveraging novel city-level measures of mass grievances and political networks, we demonstrate that the intensity of land-related grievances is on average positively associated with reform occurrence, but this association is only salient among a subset of city leaders who enjoy informal connections to the higher-level authority. We also show that connected leaders tend to implement policies less congruent with local bureaucratic and business interests. These findings underscore the importance of intra-elite dynamics in shaping mass-elite interactions.
03 工业转移的政治：来自经济特区的证据
【题目】
The Politics of Industrial Displacement: Evidence from Special Economic Zones
【作者】
ALAN POTTER New York, New York
【摘要】
政治家如何为经济特区和工业乡镇这类具有高度地区性的成本（人口迁移）和收益（工作和基础设施）的工业项目选定地址？我认为，规避风险的政客会将工业项目搬迁到他们目前几乎无法获得支持的地区，从而将工业项目转移的成本降至最低。为了使项目的收益最大化，政客们还会将项目选定在远离州或国家边界的地方，以确保项目未来的收益仅仅流向潜在的选民。为了检验这一论点，我对印度公共和民营经济特区的位置进行了地理编码，并将私有特区作为公共特区的控制组。分析发现，这一论点得到了支持，即公共特区显然更有可能位于政府在先前选举中表现不佳的选区，并且远离州和国家的边界。
How do politicians locate industrial projects, such as special economic zones and industrial townships, that have highly localized costs (population displacement) and benefits (jobs and infrastructure)? I argue that risk-averse politicians minimize the costs of displacement for industrial projects by locating the projects in areas where they have little existing support. In order to maximize the benefits of the projects, politicians also locate the projects far from state or national borders to ensure that the future benefits of the projects accrue only to potential voters. To test this argument, I geocode the locations of public and private special economic zones in India and use private zones as a control group for public zones. The analysis finds support for the argument in that public zones are significantly more likely to be located in constituencies where the government performed badly in prior elections and far from state and national borders.
04 多数决制下的策略性当选与策略性投票
【题目】
Strategic Entry and Strategic Voting in Majoritarian Systems
【作者】
BRIAN F. CRISP Washington University
BETUL DEMIRKAYA University of Kentucky
【摘要】
选举规则会影响选民围绕一个或多个候选人进行协调的需求和能力。在本文中，我们研究了两种常用的多数决制选举制度——不可让渡的多重投票（MNTV）和由多数票决定的单一席位选区（SMDP）。我们考察了精英的策略性当选和公民的策略性投票。任何一个阶段协调上的失败都会使原本可能当选的候选人团队无法上任，并阻止选民选出最能代表他们的候选人担任公共职务。为了确定因果关系，我们利用了巴西参议院的制度安排，其中两种选举制度被交替使用。通过使用双重差分方法，我们发现精英无法很好地在SMDP下协调，但在MNTV下表现得相对较好，而选民在两种选举制度下均能较好地协调。
Electoral rules impact the need for and ability of voters to coordinate around a candidate or candidates. In this paper, we examine two commonly used majoritarian electoral systems—the multiple nontransferable votes (MNTV) and single-member districts decided by plurality (SMDP). We look at strategic entry by elites and strategic voting by citizens. Coordination failures at either stage could keep teams of candidates out of office who might have otherwise been chosen to govern and could prevent voters from putting in office the candidates who would best represent them. For causal identification, we leverage the design of Brazil’s senate, where both systems are alternately used. Using a difference-in-differences approach, we find that elites do not coordinate well under SMDP but do relatively better under MNTV while voters coordinate equally (well) across both systems.
05 抵制，有意购买和政治消费主义的心理学
【题目】
Boycotting, Buycotting, and the Psychology of Political Consumerism
【作者】
CINDY D. KAM Vanderbilt University
MAGGIE DEICHERT Dallas Housing Authority
【摘要】
政治消费主义是指出于政治、社会或道德层面的考虑而有意避免或购买某产品。对产品的刻意回避（boycotting）和有意购买（buycotting）构成了政治行为的一种新兴形式。在本文中，我们分别基于避免和接近的心理框架，提供了一个概念框架，用于理解和区分抵制和有意购买。我们进行了三个原创的调查实验，以确定负面和正面信息在刺激抵制和有意购买行为中的不同作用。在所有三项研究中，我们发现，负面信息在诱发抵制行为方面比正面信息在诱发有意购买行为方面更加强大。
Political consumerism refers to the intentional avoidance or purchase of products because of political, social, or ethical concerns. The intentional avoidance (boycotting) and the intentional purchase (buycotting) of products constitute a growing form of political behavior. In this article, we offer a conceptual framework for understanding and disentangling boycotting and buycotting, based on a psychological framework of avoidance and approach, respectively. We conduct three original survey experiments to identify the differential effects of negative and positive information in stimulating boycotting and buycotting behaviors. In all three studies, we find that negative information is far more powerful in inducing boycotting than positive information is in inducing buycotting.
06 总统民主制中有争议的选举：选举“敲诈”的背景
【题目】
Disputed Elections in Presidential Democracies: Contexts of Electoral “Blackmail”
【作者】
VÍCTOR A. HERNÁNDEZ-HUERTA Centro de Investigación y Docencia Económicas
【摘要】
这项研究考察了总统民主制中选举后纠纷这一全球性的现象。通过使用涵盖1974年至2012年横跨美洲、非洲和亚洲的31个民主国家举行的164次总统选举的原始数据集，本文进行了两阶段的回归建模。来自印度尼西亚和委内瑞拉的比较案例研究能够解释失败者为何以及如何挑战选举结果。结果表明，在选举质量和选举管理机构的自治程度不同的情况下，挑战都会发生。然而，宪法规则和制度化裁决机制的存在会对他们制度化或非制度化的挑战方式造成影响。重要的是，选举后的纠纷并不一定是由欺诈引起的。当选举中屈居第二的政党在国会中占有不利的谈判地位，进而借助对新政府的敲诈勒索，以政治稳定为筹码，获取短期的权力并提升选举舞台之外的收益时，争议会更容易发生。
This study examines the global phenomenon of postelection disputes within presidential democracies. By using an original data set of 164 presidential elections held from 1974 to 2012 in 31 democracies spanning the Americas, Africa, and Asia, two-stage regression modeling was conducted. Comparative case studies from Indonesia and Venezuela were used to explain why and how losers challenged election outcomes. The results showed that challenges occurred equally under conditions of low and high election quality and varying autonomy of election management bodies. However, the presence of constitutional rules and institutional adjudication mechanisms influenced their institutional or noninstitutional routes. Importantly, postelection disputes were not necessarily instigated by fraud. They were more likely to occur when runner-up parties had unfavorable negotiating positions within Congress and therefore resorted to blackmail of the new government to acquire short-term power enhancing benefits beyond the electoral arena in exchange for political stability.
07 和平的危险：内战和平协议和军事政变
【题目】
The Perils of Peace: Civil War Peace Agreements and Military Coups
【作者】
PETER B. WHITE Auburn University
【摘要】
军队如何在内战之后应对和平？现有文献使我们很好地了解了和平协议如何影响内战复发的机会。但是，它缺少了战后冲突的另一个方面：军事政变。我认为，当军方预料其利益受到了威胁时，内战和平协议会增加军事政变的风险。军队一体化的规定构成了特别严峻的挑战。这些规定可能导致军队的解散和重组，且军队将必须同意与先前的敌人一道工作。面对这一点，军方可能会发动政变。我使用有关内战和平协议和政变企图的数据检验了这一理论，并提出了两个主要发现：在覆盖全球的国家样本中，那些最近签署了和平协议的国家更有可能经历政变，且包含军队一体化条款的协议尤为可能导致政变。
How do militaries respond to peace after civil war? The literature gives us a good understanding of how peace agreements affect the chances of civil war recurrence. However, it misses another aspect of postwar conflict: military coups. I argue that civil war peace agreements increase the risk of a coup, as the military anticipates threats to its interests. Military integration provisions pose a particularly strong challenge. These provisions may entail the dissolution and reconstitution of the military, and the military will have to agree to work alongside former enemies. Facing this, the military may attempt a coup. I test this theory using data on civil war peace agreements and coup attempts and present two main findings: in a global sample of states, those that have recently signed peace agreements are much more likely to see coups, and agreements with integration provisions are particularly likely to lead to coups.
08 声誉和组织政治：欧盟委员会的内部
【题目】
Reputation and Organizational Politics: Inside the EU Commission
【作者】
JENS BLOM-HANSEN and DANIEL FINKE Aarhus University, Denmark
【摘要】
本文使用声誉理论来解决一个世纪难题：是什么指导了大型政治行政系统中对协调工作的选择？现代官僚制理论的创始人马克斯·韦伯（Max Weber）认为，等级制优于其他组织模型，这一论断非常著名。然而，现代政府的组织并不是一个大的等级体系，而是一系列平行的等级体系，通常由15至20个部委组成。这造成了一项协调上的困难，它被实际证明很难加以克服。基于声誉理论，我们认为在确定协调的层级时，对受众管理的关注可能是一个重要的因素。我们在欧盟中央执行机构即欧盟委员会中对这一论点进行考察。基于欧盟委员会的内部数字协调系统中的7000多个案例，我们分析了受众敏感度和受众参与度对协调工作的影响。我们的研究结果表明，对受众的关注是机构部门间协调的重要驱动力。
This article uses reputation theory to address a century-old puzzle: what guides the choice of coordination efforts in large politico-administrative systems? Max Weber, founder of the modern study of bureaucracy, famously considered a hierarchy superior to other organizational models. However, modern governments are not organized as one big hierarchy but as a set of parallel hierarchies, typically 15–20 ministries. This raises a coordination challenge, which in practice has proven surprisingly difficult to meet. Based on reputation theory, we argue that concerns of audience management are likely to be an important factor when deciding on the level of coordination. We investigate this argument in the European Union’s central executive institution, the EU Commission. Based on more than 7,000 cases from the EU Commission’s internal digital coordination system we analyze the impact of audience sensitivity and audience involvement on coordination efforts. Our findings suggest that audience concerns are important drivers of agencies’ interdepartmental coordination.
09 社会观念中的不平等：社会比较和对再分配的支持
【题目】
Inequality in the Social Mind: Social Comparison and Support for Redistribution
【作者】
MEGHAN CONDON Loyola University Chicago
AMBER WICHOWSKY Marquette University
【摘要】
收入不平等从本质上说是关系性的，但是关于美国公众对收入不平等的反应的研究倾向于孤立地考察个人，断定对再分配的支持水平与不平等程度无关。相反，我们关注人们对相对社会经济地位的感知，通过想象中与地位高或低的他人之间的社会互动，在实验中操纵这些相对的社会经济地位。我们发现，即使我们没有提供有关实验对象收入的事实信息，他们在与具有社会经济优势的人进行社会比较时，会认为自己的地位更低，更准确地评估自己的社会经济地位，并且更加支持社会福利支出。我们的发现表明，当条件助长向上的社会比较时，美国人会支持再分配。我们主张将学术研究的注意力转移至结构性因素上，这些因素使日趋扩大的右尾（upper-tail）不平等现象在社会层面隐形了。
Income inequality is fundamentally relational in nature, but research on the American public’s response to it tends to examine individuals in isolation, concluding that support for redistribution is unresponsive to inequality. We focus instead on perceptions of relative socioeconomic position, which we manipulate experimentally through imagined social interactions with high- or low-status others. We find that subjects who make social comparisons between themselves and someone who is socioeconomically advantaged perceive their own status as lower, assess their own socioeconomic status more accurately, and become more supportive of social welfare spending, even though we provide no factual information about the income distribution to subjects in the experiment. Our findings demonstrate that Americans respond with support for redistribution when conditions facilitate upward social comparison. We argue for a shift in scholarly attention to the structural factors that keep rising upper-tail inequality socially invisible.
10 人权与公众对战争的支持
【题目】
Human Rights and Public Support for War
【作者】
MICHAEL R. TOMZ Stanford University
JESSICA L. P. WEEKS University of Wisconsin–lMadison
【摘要】
国际关系中最重要的主题之一是国内政治与国家间冲突之间的关系。在本文中，我们通过实验研究敌对国家的人权实践如何影响国内公众对战争的支持。基于对美国和英国进行的调查，我们的实验揭示了一些重要的发现。首先，即使在争端涉及军事安全而非人道主义干预的情况下，相较于侵犯人权的国家，公民更不愿意攻击一个尊重人权的国家。第二，人权主要通过改变有关威胁和道德的观念，影响公众对战争的支持。公民更有可能将人权的侵犯者视作威胁，并且对与这些国家作战有着更少的良心上的谴责。我们的发现为民主国家的战争政治提供了新的启示，并可能为尊重人权的国家之间的和平提供行为模式上的基础。
One of the most important themes in international relations is the relationship between domestic politics and interstate conflict. In this article, we use experiments to study how the human rights practices of foreign adversaries affect domestic public support for war. Our experiments, embedded in surveys in the United States and the United Kingdom, reveal several important findings. First, citizens are much less willing to attack a country that respects human rights than a country that violates them, even when the dispute concerns military security rather than humanitarian intervention. Second, human rights affect support for war primarily by changing perceptions about threat and morality. Citizens are more likely to view human rights violators as threatening and have fewer moral qualms about fighting such countries. Our findings shed new light on the politics of war in democracies and may provide behavioral foundations for peace among human-rights-respecting states.
11 市长如何伤害同党的总统候选人：巴西的政党品牌和在职溢出效应
【题目】
How Mayors Hurt Their Presidential Ticket: Party Brands and Incumbency Spillovers in Brazil
【作者】
GERMÁN FEIERHERD Universidad de San Andrés
【摘要】
分配政治学中的许多文献表明，当政党掌控着地方一级的职位时，他们会在国家层面享有优势。但这总是正确的吗？不管对本地赞助机构的控制能提供什么优势，在某些情况下，地方政府都可能玷污其政党的标签，从而连累总统选举的候选人。通过在巴西市长竞选中使用断点回归方法，借助财政资源的外生变量以及一项调查实验，我的分析证明了党派标签在联系全国和地方选举中所起的关键作用。我证明，在由同一党派领导的市镇中，来自拥有强大品牌的政党的总统候选人会在选举中面临劣势，特别是当选民对地方政府不满意时。政党标签薄弱、组织松散的政党则不会遭受类似的不利影响。因此，这项研究表明，对于拥有强大政党品牌的纲领性政党而言，市长有时可能是一种负担而非一项资产。
Much of the literature in distributive politics suggests that parties are advantaged nationally when they control office at the local level. But is this invariably true? Whatever advantage control over the local patronage machinery may offer, local governments might under some conditions tarnish their parties’ labels and thus hurt up-ticket candidates. Using a regression discontinuity design in mayoral races in Brazil, exogenous variation in fiscal resources, and a survey experiment, my analysis demonstrates the critical role that party labels play in linking national and local elections. I show that the presidential tickets of parties with strong brands suffer an electoral penalty in municipalities governed by copartisans, especially when voters are dissatisfied with the local government. Loosely organized parties with weak party labels do not suffer a similar disadvantage. Hence, this study shows that for programmatic parties with strong party brands, mayors can sometimes be a burden rather than an asset.
12 被优先考虑的利益：多元的游说联盟与国会委员会的议程设定
【题目】
Prioritized Interests: Diverse Lobbying Coalitions and Congressional Committee Agenda Setting
【作者】
GEOFFREY MILES LORENZ University of Nebraska–Lincoln
【摘要】
对于大多数的国会立法，委员会的考虑是首要和最为严厉的筛选机制。有组织的利益集团试图影响这一筛选过程。许多人认为这种影响来自组织资源。基于受政策驱动的委员会议程制定者在考虑法案之前评估其可行性的需要，我提出了另一种观点。这种需要激励议程制定者偏爱受到代表不同行业、事业和其他利益的组织支持的立法。分析了有关组织对待2005至2014年间颁布的4700多个法案的态度立场的新数据后，我发现委员会的考虑偏向于“利益多元化”的联盟，而不是规模很大但同质化或提供了大量竞选捐款的联盟。当有关可行性的信息更有价值时，对于多数党和分裂政府期间提出的法案，这种关联会更强。这表明游说可以帮助议程制定者确定和推动可能获得广泛和多样化支持的立法。
For most congressional legislation, committee consideration is the first and most drastic winnowing point. Organized interest groups try to influence this winnowing. Many have suggested such influence arises from organizational resources. I offer an alternative view based on the need of policy-motivated committee agenda setters to assess the viability of bills before granting them consideration. Such needs incentivize agenda setters to favor legislation supported by organizations representing diverse industries, causes, and other interests. Analyzing new data on organizations’ positions on over 4,700 bills introduced between 2005 and 2014, I show that committee consideration favors such “interest diverse” coalitions, not coalitions that are large but homogeneous or that give high levels of campaign contributions. These associations are stronger when viability information is more valuable, for majority-party bills and bills introduced during divided government. This suggests that lobbying helps agenda setters identify, and promote, legislation likely to garner widespread and diverse support.
13 民主对谁有好处？撒哈拉以南非洲的选举、农村偏向以及健康和教育成果
【题目】
Who Is Democracy Good For? Elections, Rural Bias, and Health and Education Outcomes in Sub-Saharan Africa
【作者】
ROBIN HARDING University of Oxford
【摘要】
非洲各国政府如何应对民主选举竞争？尽管通常的看法是非洲政府试图通过结合各种类型的选举欺诈、庇护主义和种族动员来赢得选举，但我认为，非洲的民主选举同样能引导政府通过提供基本服务来争取选票。民主对基本健康和教育质量的影响所带有的农村偏向暗示了这一点。我使用了来自27个非洲国家的的个体层面的数据，对这一理论主张进行了考察，即竞争性选举激励了非洲政府实施偏向农村的政策以使农村中的大多数人满意。结果表明，民主选举显著增加了儿童接受初等教育的机会，并降低了婴儿死亡率，但这仅仅适用于乡村地区的儿童。正如论点所预期的那样，这些影响取决于城市化的水平。
How do African governments respond to democratic electoral competition? Although the common perception is that African governments have sought to win elections by combining various types of electoral fraud, clientelism, and ethnic mobilization, I argue that democratic elections in Africa have also induced governments to compete for votes by providing basic services. One implication of this is a rural bias in the impact of democracy on basic health and education outcomes. Using individual-level data from 27 African countries, I investigate the theoretical claim that competitive elections create incentives for African governments to implement prorural policies in order to satisfy the rural majority. The results demonstrate that democratic elections significantly increase access to primary education and reduce infant mortality rates, but only for children in rural areas. As the argument expects, these effects are conditional on the level of urbanization.
14 关于战争的经济理论
【题目】
An Economic Theory of War
【作者】
NUNO P. MONTEIRO and ALEXANDRE DEBS Yale University
【摘要】
战争什么时候会因为经济原因爆发呢？在无政府状态中，较为强大的国家可能会害怕弱国的经济崛起威胁他们的安全，并因此努力限制它。较弱的国家即使正在崛起，也可能倾向于发动战争。对强国的制度性约束越弱，且弱国的影响范围越小，战争的风险则越大。我们通过分析第二次世界大战的经济根源来说明我们的理论，并反思我们的主张所得出的一般教训。
When does war occur for economic reasons? In an anarchic environment, stronger states may fear that their security will be undermined by the economic growth of weaker states and may attempt to constrain it. Weaker states, even if they are rising, may prefer to declare war. The weaker institutional constraints on stronger states are, and the smaller the spheres of influence of weaker states are, the greater are the risks of war. We illustrate our theory by analyzing the economic roots of the Second World War, and we reflect on the general lessons of our argument.
15 国会中的专业知识、网络和人脉影响
【题目】
Expertise, Networks, and Interpersonal Influence in Congress
【作者】
CHRISTIAN FONG University of Michigan
【摘要】
立法者通常必须对它他们并不完全理解的复杂问题进行表决。我展示了立法者通过从具有自己所缺乏的专业知识、可信赖的同行那里听取建议，来应对不完整的信息。通过采用经匹配的双重差分方法，会议中委员会的任务被视作增加专业知识的活动，我判定这种行为解释了所有议会投票决定中很大一部分。这些线索跨越了党派界限，在党派两极分化日益加剧的情况下仍然具有现实意义。我的发现强调了专业知识对立法者的重要性，以及立法者之间的关系在让国会做出充分知情的集体决定中扮演的角色。
Legislators often must vote on complex issues that they do not fully understand. I show that legislators cope with incomplete information by taking cues from trusted peers who possess expertise that they themselves lack. With a matched differences-in-differences design that exploits midsession committee assignments as expertise-increasing events, I estimate that this behavior accounts for a substantial proportion of all congressional voting decisions. These cues cross party lines and remain relevant in the face of mounting partisan polarization. My findings highlight the salience of expertise to legislators and the role that ties between legislators play in allowing Congress to reach informed collective decisions.
16 选举式威权下的选举抗议和政治态度
【题目】
Electoral Protests and Political Attitudes under Electoral Authoritarianism
【作者】
KATERINA TERTYTCHNAYA University College London
TOMILA LANKINA London School of Economics and Political Science
【摘要】
选举式专制政体中，反对派的抗议会影响公民在选举式专制中的态度吗？尽管现有研究预期，随着抗议活动在非自由主义的政权下展开，对抗议者的支持会增加，但是针对这一假说的实证研究很少。我们将由作者收集的有关抗议活动的原始数据库和在2011至2012年俄罗斯选举抗议期间实地进行的两次具有全国代表性的民意调查相结合，研究了抗议是否以及如何影响政治态度。我们发现，在抗议浪潮的前几周，反对派集会吸引了公众对抗议运动诉求的支持。然而，证据同样表明，抗议活动对态度的影响并不始终如一。国家媒体对抗议的报道，以及政权对抗议者的镇压，削弱了对抗议运动及其诉求的支持。我们的发现对有关威权政体应对街头不满时表现的脆弱性和韧性的学术研究作出了原创性贡献。
Do opposition protests affect citizens’ attitudes in electoral autocracies? While existing research expects that as protests unfold in illiberal regimes support for the protesters will increase, there are only a few empirical tests of this hypothesis. Combining an original author-assembled protest event data set with two nationally representative public opinion surveys that were in the field during the 2011–12 electoral protests in Russia, we examine whether and how protests affect political attitudes. We find that, in the early weeks of the protest wave, opposition rallies generated support for the demands of the protest movement. Nevertheless, evidence also suggests that the effects of protests on attitudes are not uniform. The coverage of protests in national media, and the use of regime-led repression against protesters, dampen support for the protest movement and its demands. Our findings make an original contribution to scholarship on authoritarian vulnerability and resilience to street discontent.
17 政府私有化和政治参与：特许学校的例子
【题目】
Government Privatization and Political Participation: The Case of Charter Schools
【作者】
JASON B. COOK University of Pittsburgh
VLADIMIR KOGAN and STÉPHANE LAVERTU Ohio State University
ZACHARY PESKOWITZ Emory University
【摘要】
世界各地的政府都以效率和公民赋权为名将公共服务私有化，但是一些人认为，私有化同样会影响民主统治下的公民参与。我们通过估测特许学校（获得公共资金支持但是由私人运营）对学区选举的影响来探索这种可能性。分析表明，特许学校对该地区学生的招收减少了在该地区学校董事会竞争中投票的数量，并相应减少了这些竞争所在的奇数年选举中的投票率。这种影响主要集中在为成就较低、贫困和来自少数族裔的学生提供服务的地区，导致那些地区中的黑人和有孩子的人在选民中的比例略有下降。几乎没有证据表明特许学校的扩张会影响校董会选举的结果或其他选举的投票率。
Governments around the world have privatized public services in the name of efficiency and citizen empowerment, but some argue that privatization could also affect citizen participation in democratic governance. We explore this possibility by estimating the impact of charter schools (which are publicly funded but privately operated) on school district elections. The analysis indicates that the enrollment of district students in charter schools reduced the number of votes cast in district school board contests and, correspondingly, reduced turnout in the odd-year elections in which those contests are held. This impact is concentrated in districts that serve low-achieving, impoverished, and minority students, leading to a modest decline in the share of voters in those districts who are black and who have children. There is little evidence that charter school expansion affected the outcomes of school board elections or turnout in other elections.
18 党派冲突和公民的民主态度：党派如何塑造对议会斗殴的反应
【题目】
Partisan Conflict and Citizens’ Democratic Attitudes: How Partisanship Shapes Reactions to Legislative Brawls
【作者】
NATHAN F. BATTO Academia Sinica and National Chengchi University
EMILY BEAULIEU University of Kentucky
【摘要】
为什么即使大多数公民不喜欢立法斗殴现象，它还是一直存在？立法机关中打斗展现了民主进程中极端不和谐和激烈冲突的形象。来自台湾——一个有着很长立法斗殴历史的地方——的原始调查数据显示，台湾公民对斗殴行为和参与斗殴的立法者持负面态度。我们认为，尽管斗殴现象普遍不受欢迎，它仍会一直存在，因为反对派议员可以策略性地向有影响力的行动者传递信号，如在台湾的例子中，后者意味着强有力的政党支持者。在一场立法斗殴发生前后分别进行的原始固定样本调查显示出了与该论点相一致的证据，并表明斗殴降低了公众对立法机关和民主进程的普遍评价。因此，这一持续不断的、不受欢迎的党派冲突的例子有助于我们更广泛地理解政治家为什么会故意违反民主规范，并揭示了这种违反规定的行为对民主代议制及其合法性更深远的影响。
Why do legislative brawls persist even though most citizens do not like them? Physical fights in the legislature present an image of extreme discord and bitter conflict in the democratic process. Original survey data from Taiwan, with its extensive history of legislative brawling, find that Taiwanese citizens view brawls and brawling legislators negatively. We argue that brawls persist despite general unpopularity because opposition legislators can strategically send signals to influential actors, such as strong party supporters in the case of Taiwan. An original panel survey conducted before and after a legislative brawl shows evidence consistent with this argument and demonstrates that brawling causes average evaluations of the legislature and of the democratic process to worsen. Thus, this example of persistent, unpopular partisan conflict helps us understand more generally why politicians might deliberately violate democratic norms and reveals some of the broader consequences of such violations for democratic representation and legitimacy.
19 公共承诺作为欧盟中的回应信号
【题目】
Public Commitments as Signals of Responsiveness in the European Union
【作者】
CHRISTINA J. SCHNEIDER University of California, San Diego
【摘要】
政府间组织在民主国家中发挥着至关重要的作用。观察者们已经开始关注这些组织中的政府行为对本国国民的回应程度，但是他们发现很难在这种复杂且不透明的环境中确定政府的回应性。本文分析了欧洲各国政府在欧盟内进行合作时，它们如何在理事会谈判中利用公共承诺来表达他们对选民的回应。我使用了27个国家在欧盟立法谈判中的公共承诺数据以及联合调查实验中的原始数据来检验这个理论。结果表明，政府在面临全国大选时会坚守有利于其国内选民的立场。对德国公民进行的实验结果证明，政府之所以这样做，是因为只要公共承诺符合受访者在政策问题上的立场，选民就会积极地回应这些承诺。
Intergovernmental organizations play a vital role in democracies. Observers have become concerned about the extent to which government behavior in these organizations is responsive to their national constituents, but they find it difficult to identify responsiveness in these complex and nontransparent environments. This article analyzes how European governments use public commitments in Council negotiations to signal responsiveness to their electorates when they cooperate in the European Union. I test the theory using data on public commitments of 27 governments in European legislative negotiations and original data from a conjoint survey experiment. The findings suggest that governments defend positions that favor their domestic constituents when they face national elections. The results of an experiment with German citizens provides evidence that governments do so because voters respond favorably to public commitments, as long as these commitments are responsive to the respondent’s own position on the policy issue.
20 历史上的所有权和领土纠纷
【题目】
Historical Ownership and Territorial Disputes
【作者】
SONGYING FANG Rice University
XIAOJUN LI University of British Columbia
【摘要】
一些最为持久和危险的领土争议常常包含了至少来自争议一方所声称的历史上的所有权。相比于其他形式的领土纠纷，为什么历史上的所有权会带来更强硬的谈判态度呢？这种不妥协的立场会导致更多的军事冲突吗？我们在研究中考察了这些问题。在提出了一个理论解释历史上的领土权如何可能导致领土不不可分割之后，我们通过一个在中国开展的调查实验测试验证了理论中的一些猜想。我们发现，在实验组中，历史上的所有权会使更多的受访者认为在一个假想的争端中，领土不可分割是唯一可接受的结果。此外，那些认为领土不可分割的人更支持针对争端采取经济制裁和军事手段，而更不支持开展双边协商或者由国际组织进行仲裁。
Some of the most enduring and dangerous territorial disputes often involve claims of historical ownership by at least one side of a dispute. Why does historical ownership lead to more hardened bargaining stances than in other territorial disputes? Do such uncompromising positions lead to more military conflict? We investigate these questions in this study. After developing a theoretical argument for how historical ownership may lead to a perception of territorial indivisibility, we test the hypotheses derived from the theory with a survey experiment implemented in China. We find that a historical ownership treatment increases the number of respondents who view the indivisible outcome of a hypothetical dispute as the only acceptable outcome. Furthermore, those who perceive a territory to be indivisible are more likely to favor economic sanctions and military solutions to the dispute and are much less likely to support bilateral negotiation or arbitration by an international organization.
21 保守的百灵鸟，自由的猫头鹰：时型和政治意识形态之间的关系
【题目】
Conservative Larks, Liberal Owls: The Relationship between Chronotype and Political Ideology
【作者】
ALEKSANDER KSIAZKIEWICZ University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign
【摘要】
尽管睡眠对人类生活、健康和幸福至关重要，但它从未成为政治学家关注的中心话题。本文认为，时型（一个人的睡眠时间倾向）是一个过去没有被辨识出来的跟政治意识形态相关的心理因素。时型可能会通过积极的社会认知过程导致政治意识形态，意识形态有可能会通过顺从社会规范的意愿来塑造睡眠特征，或者意识形态和时型可能都由基因遗传、社会化或者社区影响等共同的前因塑造。来自七个美国样本和一个英国样本的分析表明，晨间活动与保守主义之间存在联系。这种关系对于控制开放性、尽责性和人口统计（包括年龄、性别、收入和教育水平）很重要。文章最后呼吁将睡眠和时型的研究纳入政治科学，涉及多个主题和子领域，包括政治心理学、社会网络、政治地理学、政治传播、政治机构和调查设计。
Despite its centrality to human life, health, and happiness, sleep has never been a central topic of concern to political scientists. This article proposes that chronotype (a person’s time-of-sleep preference) is a previously unidentified psychological correlate of political ideology. Chronotype may lead to political ideology through a motivated social cognitive process, ideology may shape sleep patterns through a desire to align with social norms, or ideology and chronotype may arise from common antecedents, such as genetics, socialization, or community influences. Analyses demonstrate a link between a morningness and conservatism in seven American samples and one British sample. This relationship is robust to controls for openness, conscientiousness, and demographics, including age, sex, income, and education. The article concludes with a call to incorporate sleep and chronotype research into political science across a range of topics and subfields, including political psychology, social networks, political geography, political communication, political institutions, and survey design.
22 权力的个人化与独裁统治下的压迫
【题目】
Personalization of Power and Repression in Dictatorships
【作者】
ERICA FRANTZ Michigan State University
ANDREA KENDALL-TAYLOR Center for New American Security
JOSEPH WRIGHT and XU XU Pennsylvania State University
【摘要】
本文使用了新的数据来衡量威权主义政体中个人化的程度，以评估集权和压制模式的关联。文章表明，独裁政体中的权力个人化会导致压制的增加，从而减少对人权的尊重。鉴于我们正在全球范围内目睹个人化的兴起，这项研究的结果表明，独裁政权中的压制现象可能因此变得更加普遍。
This article uses new data measuring gradations of personalism in authoritarian regimes to evaluate the relationship between concentration of power and patterns of repression. It shows that the personalization of power in dictatorships leads to an increase in repression and, thus, a decrease in respect for human rights. Given the rise in personalism we are witnessing globally, the findings of this study imply that repression is likely to become more prevalent in dictatorships as a consequence.
23 究竟有多公平？关于人们对分配政策公平性的感知的实验研究
【题目】
How Fair Is It? An Experimental Study of Perceived Fairness of Distributive Policies
【作者】
TONI RODON Universitat Pompeu Fabra
MARC SANJAUME-ALVET Universitat Pompeu Fabra and Institute for Self-Government Studies
【摘要】
当再分配被视为多维度的，人们如何评估再分配政策的公平性呢？我们估算了分配政策对收入最高和收入最低的人群的影响，以及一般财富、社会流动性和财富来源对于人们认知政策公平性的影响。研究结果表明，鼓励社会向上流动、增加一般财富、奖励努力和向上流动的政策被认为是公平的。但是，对于不同的政党成员和收入阶层而言，对什么样是公平或不公平的看法有所不同。提高最富有者地位的政策，以及不改变甚至恶化最贫穷者地位的政策，会产生不同的公平观念。但这里仍然存在达成共识的空间，因为无论是民主党人还是共和党人，高收入者还是低收入者，都认为在保持最富有者地位的同时，使最贫穷的人变得更富裕的政策是公平的。
How do people evaluate fairness of redistributive policies when redistribution is considered multidimensional? We estimate the effect of distributive policies on the top- and bottom-income groups, as well as the effects of general wealth, social mobility, and origin of wealth on people’s perceived fairness of the policies. Findings reveal that policies that encourage upward social mobility and an increase in general wealth and reward effort and upward mobility are seen as fair. Yet, what is seen as fair or unfair differs substantially across party and income groups. Policies that promote an increase of the status of the wealthiest, and policies that do not change or deteriorate the status of the poorest, generate different fairness perceptions. But there is room for agreement, as policies that make the poorest wealthier, while keeping the status of the wealthiest, are seen as fair by both Democrats and Republicans and among high- and low-income individuals.
24 选举配额如何影响政治竞争？来自印度市政、州和国家选举的证据
【题目】
How Do Electoral Quotas Influence Political Competition? Evidence from Municipal, State, and National Elections in India
【作者】
ADAM MICHAEL AUERBACH American University
ADAM ZIEGFELD Temple University
【摘要】
世界各国采用各种各样的方式来确保代表性不足的群体获得立法代表权，其中包括保留席位和政党名单配额。尽管事实上这些措施是政治干预，大部分文献都忽略了它们对选举竞争的影响。我们认为，保留席位的措施会减少有效候选人的数量，并加剧了选举竞争围绕主要政党展开的激烈程度。此外，这种影响在层级较低的选举中最为明显，因为在层级较低的选举中，候选人更容易在主要政党的标签之外竞选。在从印度收集的有关选举的大量数据中，我们发现，在有保留席位的选区中，有效候选人的人数更少，独立候选人的得票比例更低，而主要政党的得票比例更高。这种影响在地方选举中最为明显，而在全国选举中最不显著。
Countries around the world use various means to ensure that underrepresented groups gain legislative representation, including reserved seats and quotas for political party lists. Despite the fact that such measures are political interventions, the literature has mostly ignored their impact on electoral competition. We argue that reserved seats reduce the number of viable candidates and increase the extent to which competition revolves around major parties. Moreover, these effects should be most pronounced in lower-level elections, where candidates can more easily run outside major-party labels. Drawing on a rich collection of electoral data from India, we find that the effective number of candidates is lower in electoral districts with reservations, while vote shares for independent candidates are lower and vote shares for major parties are higher. These effects are largest in local elections and smallest in national elections.
编 译：吴佳蔚 袁丁
审 校：吴佳蔚 袁丁
相关阅读：
名人与政治专栏 | Perspectives on Politics（政治透视）Issue 1 - 2020
顶刊前沿 | American Political Science Review（美国政治科学评论）Issue 1, 2020
编辑：周佳银
一审：陈佳林
二审：袁 丁
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