顶刊前沿 | 《政治学杂志》2020年第2期（Journal of Politics）
让每一个人自由地理解政治
让世界各地的学人成果互联互通
让政治学人的核心关切得到传播
让闪烁的政治学人共享这片充满思考和情怀的天空
政治学人始终在路上
本期国际化部为大家带来了《政治学杂志》2020年第2期文章编译。
编译属国际化部译者志愿提供，如有不妥欢迎指正；如对我们的工作有什么建议，欢迎到后台留言；如有转载请注明出处。学术公益是一条很长的路，我们诚邀您同行，欢迎留言您希望编译的政治学期刊，感谢您的支持。
PART 1
期刊简介
Journal of Politics（政治学杂志）是美国南方政治科学协会（SPSA）旗下学术期刊，目前由芝加哥大学出版社代为出版。期刊创刊于1939年，出版周期为每年4期，期刊收录范围涵盖政治科学相关的所有细分学科。
期刊研究领域和收录范围包：美国政治、比较政治学、国际关系、政治学理论、政治学方法论。
PART 2
期刊目录
Cities in the Statehouse: How Local Governments Use Lobbyists to Secure State Funding
议会大厦内的城市：地方政府如何利用游说者保障国家拨款
When Time Is of the Essence: A Natural Experiment on How Time Constraints Influence Elections
当时间至关重要：一个关于时间限制如何影响选举的自然实验
More Donors, More Democracy
捐赠者越多，民主越多
Disruption: What Is It Good For?
破坏：有什么好处？
Politics in Forgotten Governments: The Partisan Composition of County Legislatures and County Fiscal Policies
被遗忘的政府中的政治：县立法机关的党派组成与县财政政策
Networks of Violence: Predicting Conflict in Nigeria
暴力网络：预测尼日利亚的冲突
Policy and Performance in the New Deal Realignment: Evidence from Old Data and New Methods
“新政重组”中的政策和绩效：以旧数据和新方法为证
Left-Right Ideology and the Debate over International Bailouts: The Case of Grexit
左右意识形态与关于国际救助的论辩：基于希腊退欧案例的分析
Past Place, Present Prejudice: The Impact of Adolescent Racial Context on White Racial Attitudes
以往的地方，当前的偏见：青少年种族背景对白人种族态度的影响
Government Formation as Logrolling in High-Dimensional Issue Spaces
高维议题空间中循环权衡的政府组阁过程
What’s Missing? A Typology of Political Absence
什么不见了？政治缺席的类型学
Legislative Term Limits and Polarization
任期限制与极化现象
The Ethics of Delegating Monetary Policy
委托货币政策中的伦理道德
Do People Really Become More Conservative as They Age?
人们真的会随着年龄增长变得更加保守吗？
Can Political Alignment Be Costly?
政治联盟会代价高昂吗？
What Is Regular Order Worth? Partisan Lawmaking and Congressional Processes
什么是常规秩序价值？党派立法和国会程序
Strategic Proposals, Endogenous Comments, and Bias in Rulemaking
规则制定中的战略建议、内生性评论和偏见
The Strategic Foundations of Political Sovereignty
政治主权的战略基础
The Welfare State with Private Alternatives: The Transformation of Popular Support for Social Insurance
具有私营福利作为替代选项的福利国家:公众对社会保险支持的转变
Self-Enforcing Legal Limits: Bureaucratic Constraints on Repression under Emergency Powers
自我执行的法律限制:紧急状态下镇压的官僚限制
Power for the Powerless: Martin Luther King, Jr.’s Late Theory of Civil Disobedience
给无权者的权力:马丁•路德•金的后期非暴力反抗理论
Do Nonpartisan Programmatic Policies Have Partisan Electoral Effects? Evidence from Two Large-Scale Experiments
无党派的规划政策是否会对党派选举产生影响？来自两个大型实验的证据
Hierarchy and the Provision of Order in International Politics
国际政治中的等级制度和秩序的规定
Reducing Bias in Citizens’ Perception of Crime Rates: Evidence from a Field Experiment on Burglary Prevalence
减少公民对犯罪率的偏见:来自盗窃盛行率田野实验的证据
Against Detaching the Duty to Vote
反对分离投票的义务
What Explains Taxation by Resource-Rich Rebels? Evidence from the Islamic State in Syria
如何解释资源丰富的叛乱者的征税行为？来自叙利亚伊斯兰国的证据
Inequality Growth and Economic Policy Liberalism: An Updated Test of a Classic Theory
不平等增长与经济政策自由主义：经典理论的最新检验
One Run Leads to Another: Minority Incumbents and the Emergence of Lower Ticket Minority Candidates
一场选举接一场:少数族裔的现任者和得票率较低的少数族裔候选人的出现
Democratization as a Continuous Choice: A Comment on Acemoglu and Robinson’s Correction to “Why Did the West Extend the Franchise?”
民主化作为一个持续的选择:对Acemoglu和Robinson关于“为什么西方国家要扩展特许经营权？”的修正观点的评论
Unequal Returns to Education: How Female Teachers Narrow the Gender Gap in Political Knowledge
教育接收不平等:女教师如何缩小政治知识方面的性别差距
PART 3
精选译文
01 议会大厦内的城市：地方政府如何利用游说者保障国家拨款
【题目】
Cities in the Statehouse: How Local Governments Use Lobbyists to Secure State Funding
【作者】
Julia A. Payson New York University
【摘要】
当地方政府雇用说客时会发生什么？尽管政府间游说在美国和其他联邦系统中都很常见，但我们对其后果知之甚少。利用关于全美州级游说的最新数据，我构建了城市游说与州资金之间的正相关关系。而后，我介绍了十多年来加州地方政府游说的面板数据，基于此采用差异设计估算城市的游说收益。结果显示，游说使州向城市的转移增加了大约8％。但是，政府间游说的利益并没有得到平均分配。我发现，尽管已具有当地收入的优势，人均自有收入水平较高的城市在雇用说客时仍能获得更多的国家资金。这些结果第一次提供了一些实证证据，证明了城市官员可以通过游说影响政府支出——但这种行为也可能使地方经济不平等永久化。
What happens when local governments hire lobbyists? Although intergovernmental lobbying is common in the United States and other federal systems, we know little about its consequences. Using newly compiled data on state-level lobbying across the country, I establish a positive correlation between city lobbying and state funding. I then introduce over a decade of panel data on municipal lobbying in California to estimate the returns to lobbying for cities with a difference-in-differences design. I show that lobbying increases state transfers to cities by around 8%. But the benefits of intergovernmental lobbying are not equally distributed. I find that cities with higher levels of own-source revenue per capita net more state money when they hire lobbyists, despite enjoying a local revenue advantage. These results offer some of the first empirical evidence that city officials can influence state spending by lobbying—but this behavior may also perpetuate local economic inequality.
02 当时间至关重要：一个关于时间限制如何影响选举的自然实验
【题目】
When Time Is of the Essence: A Natural Experiment on How Time Constraints Influence Elections
【作者】
Jerome Schafer Ludwig Maximilian University of Munich
John B. Holbein University of Virginia
【摘要】
选民投票率的基础理论表明，时间是影响投票决定的关键因素，但我们几乎没有证明时间这种资源如何影响选举行为的因果性证据。在本文中，我们使用了超过二十年的选举数据，并利用美国时区边界进行了一个新的地理回归不连续性设计。我们的结果表明，时间分配的外生变化具有重大的政治影响，即我们发现，如果居民居住在时区边界的东侧，他们投票的可能性就会降低。时区还会加剧参与的不平等，并导致选举结果偏向共和党。通过探索可能的机制，我们发现了一些暗示性证据证明这些影响是睡眠不足的结果，而且可以通过投票的便利性得到缓解。不管确切的机制究竟是什么，我们的结果表明，不同地区日常规划的差异影响选民投票的困难程度，并塑造了选民的构成。
Foundational theories of voter turnout suggest that time is a key input in the voting decision, but we possess little causal evidence about how this resource affects electoral behavior. In this article, we use over two decades of elections data and a novel geographic regression discontinuity design that leverages US time zone boundaries. Our results show that exogenous shifts in time allocations have significant political consequences. Namely, we find that citizens are less likely to vote if they live on the eastern side of a time zone border. Time zones also exacerbate participatory inequality and push election results toward Republicans. Exploring potential mechanisms, we find suggestive evidence that these effects are the consequence of insufficient sleep and moderated by the convenience of voting. Regardless of the exact mechanisms, our results indicate that local differences in daily schedules affect how difficult it is to vote and shape the composition of the electorate.
03 捐赠者越多，民主越多
【题目】
More Donors, More Democracy
【作者】
Sebastian Ziaja German Development Institute
Deutsches Institut für Entwicklungspolitik (DIE)
【摘要】
当一国从更多的捐助国那里获得民主援助时，其民主会改善。从发展的角度来看，这一发现似乎令人惊讶，因为大量捐助者或更普遍的“零散援助”的存在已被证明对受援国产生了负面影响。但是零散的援助可能是有益的：捐助者的多样性为参与民主化进程的地方参与者提供了选择。因此，它创建了一个“创意支持市场”，从而提高了由其产生的机构的生存能力。相反，高度集中的捐助者团体可能会导致一个事先设计、却并不适应受援国社会需要的体制蓝图被强加给受援国。基于1994年至2013年期间130个国家面板数据的工具变量分析、因果机制的外显测验以及来自加纳的轶闻证据为多元化民主援助的好处提供了强有力的支持。
A country’s democracy improves when it receives democracy aid from more donor countries. This finding appears surprising from a development perspective, as the presence of a large number of donors, or more generally “fragmented aid,” has been shown to negatively affect the recipient country. But fragmented aid can be beneficial: diversity among donors provides choice to the local actors involved in the process of democratization. It thus creates a “marketplace for idea support,” which increases the viability of the resulting institutions. In contrast, a highly concentrated donor community can lead to the imposition of an institutional blueprint, designed in advance and not adapted to the needs of the recipient society. An instrumental variable analysis with panel data for 130 countries from 1994 to 2013, explicit tests of the causal mechanism, and anecdotal evidence from Ghana provide strong support for the benefits of diverse democracy aid.
04 破坏：有什么好处？
【题目】
Disruption: What Is It Good For?
【作者】
Clarissa Rile Hayward Washington University in St. Louis
【摘要】
本文挑战了对政治破坏在促进大规模变革中所扮演的角色的共识。文章认为，破坏行动所进行的最基本的政治工作并非赢得公众的同情，而是破坏特权人民有动机的无知。从民权运动和黑人生活问题运动的例子出发，文章说明成功的政治破坏行动包括三个步骤。其一，一群政治行为者进行协调，以从导致了一种有动机的无知的认知权力合作关系中撤出；其二，这种认知破坏的行为使潜在的冲突浮出水面，并迫使占统治地位的成员表达自身的立场；其三，由此产生的政治议程变化使下属行为者得以与政治势力强大者进行谈判。本文解释了为什么破坏行为可以在政治上有效的原因，即使它并不能赢得广泛的公众的同情。
Clarissa Rile Hayward Washington University in St. Louis
This article challenges a common understanding of the role that political disruption plays in promoting large-scale change. It argues that the most basic political work disruption performs is not to win public sympathy but instead to interrupt privileged people’s motivated ignorance. Drawing on examples from the Civil Rights and Black Lives Matter Movements, it makes the case that successful political disruption involves three steps. First, a group of political actors coordinate to withdraw cooperation from an epistemic power relationship, which enables motivated ignorance. Second, this act of epistemic disruption brings latent conflicts to the surface and forces members of dominant groups to take sides. Third, the resulting change in the political agenda enables subordinated actors to negotiate with the politically powerful. The article explains why disruption can be politically effective, even when it fails to win widespread public sympathy.
05 被遗忘的政府中的政治：县立法机关的党派组成与县财政政策
【题目】
Politics in Forgotten Governments: The Partisan Composition of County Legislatures and County Fiscal Policies
【作者】
Justin de Benedictis-Kessner Boston University
Christopher Warshaw George Washington University
【摘要】
县政府是美国民主体系中的重要组成部分。然而，已有的研究中几乎没有关于县政府党派组成对县政策影响的研究。美国的大多数县都设有小型立法机构，它们通常被称为委员会或理事会，用以设定预算与其他政策。在本项研究中，我们探究了具有民主党立法者的县是否比具有共和党立法者的县花费更多的问题。我们收集了过去的25年中约298个大、中县的10708次选举的原始数据。根据一项回归不连续性设计，我们发现，选举民主党议员而不是共和党议员会使普通县的支出增加约5％。总体而言，我们的发现对有关党派控制州和地方政府的政策后果的文献进行了补充，其结果表明，县议员的党派选择在县政府中具有重要的政策效应。
County governments are a crucial component of the fabric of American democracy. Yet there has been almost no previous research on the policy effects of the partisan composition of county governments. Most counties in the United States have small legislatures, usually called commissions or councils, that set their budgets and other policies. In this study, we examine whether counties with Democratic legislators spend more than counties with Republican ones. We assemble an original data set of 10,708 elections in approximately 298 medium and large counties over the past 25 years. Based on a regression discontinuity design, we find that electing a Democratic legislator rather than a Republican one leads the average county to increase spending by about 5%. Overall, our findings contribute to a growing literature on the policy consequences of partisan control of state and local government. They show that the partisan selection of county legislators has important policy effects in county governments.
06 暴力网络：预测尼日利亚的冲突
【题目】
Networks of Violence: Predicting Conflict in Nigeria
【作者】
Cassy Dorff Vanderbilt University
Max Gallop University of Strathclyde
Shahryar Minhas Michigan State University
【摘要】
内战是复杂的：多个交战方争夺彼此和政府的领土控制权。这些过程通常是动态的，随时间和空间而变化。在本项研究中，我们通过一种基于网络的方法来应对这些复杂性。通过考虑诸如互惠和及物性之类的重要关系模式，并将他们与冲突过程文献中现有的理论发展联系起来，我们回答了内战期间“谁在何时与谁打架”的问题。此外，以尼日利亚为例，我们提供了一种关于新的、攻击性的行为者加入战争后，如何能够决定性地改变冲突轨迹的新的理论见解。同时，我们的研究表明，与现有的方法相比，我们采用的方法在样本外的背景下更能预测“谁在何时与谁打架”。
Civil conflicts are complex: multiple warring parties compete for control of territory both against each other and the government. These processes are often dynamic, changing over time and space. In this study, we embrace these complexities through a network-based approach. By considering important relational patterns, such as reciprocity and transitivity, and tying them together with existing theoretical developments in the conflict processes literature, we answer the question of “who fights whom and when” during civil conflict. Furthermore, by using the case of Nigeria, we offer novel theoretical insights about how the entrance of a new, aggressive actor can decisively alter the trajectory of conflict. In addition, we show that our approach is better at predicting “who fights whom and when” in an out-of-sample context than extant approaches.
07 “新政重组”（the New Deal realignment）中的政策和绩效：以旧数据和新方法为证
【题目】
Policy and Performance in the New Deal Realignment: Evidence from Old Data and New Methods
【作者】
Devin Caughey Massachusetts Institute of Technology
Michael C. Dougal Netflix
Eric Schickler University of California, Berkeley
【摘要】
近期的研究对“新政重组”的政策基础提出了挑战，认为“新政重组”实际上是由对经济的回顾性评估推动的。通过对1936-1952年进行的民意测验数据进行全面分析，我们认为政策偏好绝非无关紧要。在个人层面上，改入民主党的共和党总统竞选者比那些保持党派忠诚的总统竞选者对新政政策的支持要大得多（反之亦然）。在州一级，公众对新政的支持（这一变量通过组级项目响应模型进行测量）和收入增长都可以预测总统选举中支持民主党人的转变。简而言之，“新政重组”根植于政策偏好和经济回溯。而且，与党派认同不同，大众对新政的支持是长期选举趋势的一个首要指标，预测了未来几十年的总统选举结果，甚至比对同时期的选举结果的预测效果更好。
Recent research has challenged the policy bases of the New Deal realignment, arguing that it was instead driven by retrospective evaluations of the economy. Using a comprehensive analysis of opinion polls conducted in 1936–52, we argue that policy preferences were far from irrelevant. At the individual level, presidential Republicans who became Democrats were much more supportive of New Deal policies than those who remained loyal (vice versa for Democrats). At the state level, both public support for the New Deal—as measured by a group-level item response model—and income growth predict pro-Democratic shifts in presidential elections. In short, the realignment was rooted in both policy preferences and economic retrospection. Moreover, mass support for the New Deal, unlike partisan identification, was a leading indicator of long-term electoral trends, predicting presidential elections decades in the future even better than it does contemporaneous elections.
08 左右意识形态与关于国际救助的论辩：基于希腊退欧案例的分析
【题目】
Left-Right Ideology and the Debate over International Bailouts: The Case of Grexit
【作者】
Kirk Bansak University of California, San Diego
Michael M. Bechtel Washington University in St. Louis
Jens Hainmueller Stanford University
Yotam Margalit Tel Aviv University
【摘要】
什么可以用来解释欧洲公众对希腊退欧态度的尖锐分歧？我们使用来自四个欧洲最大经济体的原始调查来探讨这个问题。我们认为，自身经济利益的差异、以及经常提到的主流政党和极端主义政党支持者之间的分歧，并不能很好地解释公众关于希腊退欧的分歧。我们的研究表明，（公众态度的分歧）形成的关键因素是左右派的分歧。而后，我们针对这种分歧的显著性发展并测试了一系列的理论解释。我们发现，对希腊退欧的左右派态度分歧并不是由对再分配的态度、共情程度或对欧盟的总体支持上的分歧造成的，而是由于左右派选民似乎对货币联盟成员的违约和退出将如何影响欧洲经济抱有不同的期望。这些期望可能反映了人们关于自由市场手段的后果的核心信念的差异。
What explains the sharp divide in European public attitudes toward Grexit? We explore this question using original surveys from four of the largest European economies. We contend that differences in economic self-interest, and the often-mentioned chasm between supporters of mainstream and extremist parties, provide little insight into the public divide over Grexit. Instead, we show that the key factor is the split between the left and the right. We then develop and test a set of theoretical explanations for the prominence of this cleavage. We find that the left-right divide over Grexit is not driven by differences in attitudes on redistribution, levels of empathy, or general European Union support. Instead, left and right voters seem to have different expectations about how a default and exit of a currency-union member would affect the European economy. These expectations likely reflect differences in core beliefs about the consequences of a free-market approach.
09 以往的地方，当前的偏见：青少年种族背景对白人种族态度的影响
【题目】
Past Place, Present Prejudice: The Impact of Adolescent Racial Context on White Racial Attitudes
【作者】
Seth K. Goldman University of Massachusetts, Amherst
Daniel J. Hopkins University of Pennsylvania
【摘要】
对种族背景的广泛研究表明，住在黑人附近的白人美国人持更消极的种族态度。从理论上讲，局部群体间接触已被概念化为通过各种机制同时行动。然而，政治社会化的另一项研究表明，个人的青少年经历通常尤其具有影响力。我们假设白人在青春期的种族背景会使其产生偏见。然后，我们使用两个互补的数据集，即2007-13年进行的基于人口的追踪调查数据和1965-97年进行的青少年-父母社会化追踪调查数据，对这一假设进行了检验。我们的分析证明了在更大的聚合水平下青少年背景的持续性影响：尽管白人的现居县的种族构成并不是预测种族偏见的连续因子，但高中时期所居县的种族构成却是。一个白人在成型期中与黑人的临近会增加其在多年后的种族偏见，这一发现提供了对本地背景影响和种族偏见根源的新见解。
Extensive research on racial contexts suggests that white Americans living near black Americans adopt more negative racial attitudes. Theoretically, local intergroup exposure has been conceptualized as acting contemporaneously through various mechanisms. However, a separate body of research on political socialization indicates that adolescent experiences are often especially influential. We hypothesize that whites’ racial contexts during adolescence produce prejudiced responses. We then test this hypothesis using two complementary data sets, a population-based panel conducted 2007–13 and the Youth-Parent Socialization Panel Survey (1965–97). Our analyses demonstrate the enduring influence of adolescent contexts at larger levels of aggregation: while the racial composition of whites’ current counties is not a consistent predictor of racial prejudice, the racial composition of their county during high school is. Proximity during one’s formative years increases racial prejudice years later, providing new insights about local contextual effects and the roots of racial prejudice.
10 高维议题空间中循环权衡的政府组阁过程
【题目】
Government Formation as Logrolling in High-Dimensional Issue Spaces
【作者】
Scott de Marchi Duke University
Michael Laver New York University
【摘要】
对政府组阁的分析模型通常假定低维的实际政策空间。然而，从行为上讲，政治家们会在高维离散议题空间中谈判以组建政府。我们模拟这些谈判，利用这样一个事实，即不同的政治家通常对同一问题的重视程度不同，这就使得他们能够在就一揽子重大问题谈判商定立场时从贸易中得利。商定一揽子方案中的一系列议题是内生的；政治家们在一起进入政府并“提交”（tabling）他们对问题的不同意见之前，无需就每一个问题达成一致。我们以计算方式执行模型，将模型校准为91个实际的政府组成设置，并绘制出在不同设置中孔多塞组阁胜者的相对概率。这种概率被用以衡量谈判者在巨大的高维状态空间中找到孔多塞组阁胜者的困难程度。我们以选举后谈判持续时间的统计模型实证检验了这一主张。
Analytical models of government formation typically assume low-dimensional real policy spaces. Behaviorally, however, politicians negotiate to form governments in high-dimensional discrete issue spaces. We model these negotiations, leveraging the fact that different politicians typically attach different importance to the same issue, allowing gains from trade when they negotiate agreed positions on large packages of issues. The set of issues in an agreed package is endogenous; politicians need not agree on every issue before they go into government together, “tabling” issues on which they agree to disagree. We exercise our model computationally, calibrating it to 91 real-world government formation settings, and mapping out the relative probability of Condorcet winning cabinets in different settings. This probability measures how hard it is for negotiators to find Condorcet winning cabinets in a giant high-dimensional state space. We test this claim empirically with a statistical model of the duration of negotiations after an election.
11 什么不见了？政治缺席的类型学
【题目】
What’s Missing? A Typology of Political Absence
【作者】
Suzanne Dovi University of Arizona
【摘要】
大多数研究“代表性”的政治科学家都部分采用了汉娜•皮特金（Hanna Pitkin）对“代表性”的定义，即“使缺席者都在场”。他们的重点是“使在场”（“making present”），即代表是如何获得访问权，发言权和决策权的。尽管在场是代表性的基本组成部分，但是理解并正确评估代表性不仅需要关注代表性如何使组（groups）在场，而且还需要关注其如何使组不在场，尤其重要的是要区分代表性构成中的各种缺席状态。为此，本文提供了政治缺席的类型学理论，其定义了缺席（与在场）中的三个相关子类，并区分了战略性缺席和非自愿性缺席。此种理论上的区分是所有代表性的一般理论的核心，这种理论可以充分说明代表是如何通过在代表程序中选择缺席来提出、并进一步主张其要求，并说明这种缺席的民主的代价和好处。
Most political scientists studying representation adopt some version of Hanna Pitkin’s definition of representation as “making present what is absent.” Their emphasis is on the “making present”—that is, on how representatives gain access, voice, and decision-making authority. Although presence is an essential component of representation, understanding and properly evaluating representation requires attending not only to how representation makes groups present but also to how it makes groups absent. In particular, it is important to differentiate the various kinds of absences that constitute representation. To that end, this paper offers a typology of political absence. It identifies three relevant divisions within absence (and presence) and distinguishes strategic absences from involuntary ones. Such theoretical distinctions are central to any general theory of representation that can adequately account for how representatives make and further claims by choosing to be absent from representative processes, and explicate the democratic costs and benefits of such absences.
12 任期限制与极化现象
【题目】
Legislative Term Limits and Polarization
【作者】
Michael P. Olson and Jon C. Rogowski Harvard University
【摘要】
立法期限限制如何影响代表？理论支持者提出任期限制将减少党派之间的冲突并提高代表性的论点，此论点却令人惊讶地很少得到实证检验。我们认为，任期限制通过改变立法者的选举和职业激励机制而加剧了政党两极化，进而提升了政党在立法过程中的作用。我们使用了1993年至2016年点名表决模式的面板数据，结果显示，任职期限限制通过增加共和党和民主党人的投票记录之间的意识形态鸿沟，在州立法投票模式中产生了系统性地更高的政治极化水平。与理论一致，文章进一步表明，任期限制在更专业的立法机构中具有更大的影响，并且增加了政党委员会对选举候选人的影响。与任期限制理论的支持者的目标相反，任职期限限制加剧了当代党派之争对立法后果的影响，并对理解选举激励和职业激励如何影响立法结果产生了影响。
How do legislative term limits affect representation? Proponents’ arguments that term limits would reduce partisan conflict and improve the quality of representation have received surprisingly little empirical scrutiny. We argue that term limits increase party polarization by changing legislators’ electoral and career incentives, in turn increasing the role of parties in legislative processes. Using panel data on roll call voting patterns from 1993 to 2016, we show that term limits produced systematically higher levels of polarization in state legislative voting patterns by increasing the ideological gap between Republicans’ and Democrats’ voting records. Consistent with our theoretical account, we further show that term limits had larger effects in more professional legislatures and increased contributions from party committees to legislative candidates. Contrary to the goals of their proponents, terms limits exacerbated the legislative consequences of contemporary partisanship and have implications for understanding how electoral and career incentives affect legislative outcomes.
13 委托货币政策中的伦理道德
【题目】
The Ethics of Delegating Monetary Policy
【作者】
Jens van ’t Klooster European University Institute
【摘要】
2007年和2008年的全球金融危机改变了货币政策，迫使中央银行行长们使用一些远不同于危机前的工具、目标和专业知识。本文中，我从规范民主理论的角度研究了这些发展。区别于那些完全反对中央银行独立性的作者，我认为，原则上应该允许政府将政治选择委托给未经选举的专家。从民主的角度来看，重要的是授权代理的行为是否服务于政府的最终经济政策目标。尽管中央银行的独立性限制了政府对货币政策的控制，但它也可以改善其货币政策，从而帮助政府推行更广泛的经济政策。我概述了一个平衡这些互相冲突的考虑因素的道德框架；聚焦于欧洲央行的案例，我主张对现有机构进行民主改革。
The global financial crisis of 2007 and 2008 transformed monetary policy, forcing central bankers to move far beyond their pre-crisis instruments, goals, and expertise. In this article, I investigate these developments from a perspective of normative democratic theory. Against authors who reject central bank independence entirely, I argue that it should in principle be permissible for governments to delegate political choices to unelected experts. From a democratic perspective, what matters is whether the act of delegation serves the government’s ultimate economic policy aims. Although central bank independence limits the government’s control over monetary policy, it can also improve monetary policy and thereby help the government pursue its larger economic policies. I outline a moral framework for balancing these competing considerations; focusing on the case of the European Central Bank, I then argue for democratic reform of existing institutions.
14 人们真的会随着年龄增长变得更加保守吗？
【题目】
Do People Really Become More Conservative as They Age?
【作者】
Johnathan C. Peterson Palo Alto College
Kevin B. Smith and John R. Hibbing University of Nebraska–Lincoln
【摘要】
长期以来，民间一直认为，随着年龄的增长，人们在政治上会变得更加保守，尽管有实证研究表明，政治态度具有跨时间的稳定性。我们使用了密歇根州青年-父母社会化追踪数据，分析了成年人在寿命中大部分时间里的态度变化。我们记录了这段时间内政党身份、自我陈述的意识形态和对特定问题立场的变化，并通过将这些变化与同期全国平均水平进行比较，将这些变化置于特定背景之中。与先前的研究相同，但与民间观点相反，我们的结果表明，政治态度长期来看非常稳定。但是，与之前的研究相反，我们亦发现了对民间观点的支持：对于那些一生中确实发生政治态度的转变的人，自由派更有可能成为保守派，而不是保守派成为自由派，这表明民间智慧有一定的经验基础，即使它夸大了这种变化的程度。
Folk wisdom has long held that people become more politically conservative as they grow older, although several empirical studies suggest political attitudes are stable across time. Using data from the Michigan Youth-Parent Socialization Panel Study, we analyze attitudinal change over a major portion of the adult life span. We document changes in party identification, self-reported ideology, and selected issue positions over this time period and place these changes in context by comparing them with contemporaneous national averages. Consistent with previous research but contrary to folk wisdom, our results indicate that political attitudes are remarkably stable over the long term. In contrast to previous research, however, we also find support for folk wisdom: on those occasions when political attitudes do shift across the life span, liberals are more likely to become conservatives than conservatives are to become liberals, suggesting that folk wisdom has some empirical basis even as it overstates the degree of change.
15 政治联盟会代价高昂吗？
【题目】
Can Political Alignment Be Costly?
【作者】
Michael Callen University of California, San Diego
Saad Gulzar Stanford University
Arman Rezaee University of California, Davis
【摘要】
对政治联盟的好处的研究表明，选择执政党政客的选民比选举其他政客的选民获益更大。我们使用回归不连续性设计检验了这一说法，该设计将选民选择执政党政客对巴基斯坦“健康”这一重要的公共服务的影响抽离出来。与现有研究一致，选择执政党的选民将获得更多的服务；更多的医生被分配到执政党地区工作。然而，尽管分派了更多的医生，执政党地区中医生的出勤率并没有增加。这些发现与关于政治联盟的文献形成鲜明对比，表明与执政党联盟会模糊地影响选民的福利：更多的潜在的服务数量可能会以降低服务质量为代价。
Research on the benefits of political alignment suggests that voters who elect governing party politicians are better off than those who elect other politicians. We examine this claim with regression discontinuity designs that isolate the effect of electing a governing party politician on an important publicly provided service in Pakistan: health. Consistent with existing research, governing party constituents receive a higher quantity of services; more doctors are assigned to work in governing party areas. However, despite many more assigned doctors, there is no increase in doctor attendance. These findings contrast with the literature on political alignment by showing that alignment to the governing party affects voters’ welfare ambiguously: higher potential quantity of services may come at the cost of lower quality.
16 什么是常规秩序价值？党派立法和国会程序
【题目】
What Is Regular Order Worth? Partisan Lawmaking and Congressional Processes
【作者】
James M. Curry University of Utah
Frances E. Lee Princeton University
【摘要】
学者和其他国会观察员认为，所谓的常规秩序立法程序的侵蚀加剧了国会中的党派冲突。在这篇文章中，我们研究那些经由更加非正统的和领导主导的立法程序所确立的法律，所得到的两党支持，是否会比经由常规立法流程下通过的法律更少一些。根据国会从1987年至2016年（第100至114届国会）通过的重要法律的原始数据集，我们发现，是否违反常规秩序，与该法案在最初及最终投票中的党派偏见几乎没有联系。对资深国会议员和高级国会工作人员进行的深度访谈显示，集权和非正统的程序常常不是被用来通过党派法案，而是因为这些方法可有效解决立法僵局。非正统程序允许的灵活性和保密性可以帮助谈判取得一致性，以颁布两党都高度赞同的立法。
Scholars and other congressional observers argue that the erosion of so-called regular order legislative processes exacerbates partisan conflict in Congress. In this article, we investigate whether laws passed via more unorthodox and leadership-led legislative processes garner less bipartisan support than those passed under regular order processes. Drawing on an original data set of important laws passed by Congress from 1987 to 2016 (the 100th–114th Congresses), we find little connection between violations of regular order and the amount of partisanship observed on either initial or final passage votes. In-depth interviews with long-time members of Congress and high-level congressional staffers reveal that centralized and unorthodox processes are frequently used not to pass partisan bills but because these methods are efficient in resolving legislative impasses. The flexibility and secrecy permitted by unorthodox processes can assist in negotiating agreements to enact even highly bipartisan legislation.
17 规则制定中的战略建议、内生性评论和偏见
【题目】
Strategic Proposals, Endogenous Comments, and Bias in Rulemaking
【作者】
Brian D. Libgober Yale University
【摘要】
行政机关利用“通知——评论”的规则制定来发布无数涉及重大经济利益的法规。有关规则制定的经验文献产生了一系列复杂的描述性发现，但一直与有关选择性偏见的非正式担忧相左。本文将“通知——评论”描述为监管机构与外部利益之间的说服博弈。对这种利益相关者平衡模型的分析产生了三个关键的理论收益：为监管机构制定更高私人和社会成本的规则提供了信息基础，对监管机构在没有监管的情况下进行战略定位的解释，说明不良经验是比不良政策更强大的动员力量。该模型的双向选择动态表明，完善的经验规律与极端的公共利益狂热和强捕获并不一致，但适合一系列中间结果。为了更深入地了解规则制定中的偏误，该模型建议关注规则修订的成本，弃权后规则的移动以及利益相关者偏好的变化。
Agencies use notice-and-comment rulemaking to issue countless regulations with substantial economic stakes. The empirical literature on rulemaking has produced a complex set of descriptive findings yet has struggled with informal concerns about selection bias. This article characterizes notice and comment as a persuasion game played between regulators and outside interests. Analysis of this stakeholder-balancing model yields three key theoretical payoffs: an informational rationale for regulators to write rules with higher private and social costs, an explanation for strategic positioning by regulators even without oversight, and clarification that adverse priors are a more powerful mobilizing force than adverse policies. The model’s two-sided selection dynamics reveal that well-established empirical regularities are inconsistent with extreme public-interest zealotry and strong capture but fit a range of intermediate outcomes. To obtain deeper insights about bias in rulemaking, the model suggests focusing on the cost of rule revision, rule movement following abstention, and variation in stakeholder preferences.
18 政治主权的战略基础
【题目】
The Strategic Foundations of Political Sovereignty
【作者】
Scott A. Tyson University of Rochester
【摘要】
维护秩序可能是社会面临的最重要的问题，而建立一个对暴力执行具有垄断控制的主权统治者会产生两个明显的安全问题:一个是普通公民之间的问题(水平维度)，另一个是统治者与普通公民之间的问题(垂直维度)。我开发了一个框架来研究这些双重安全问题以及在共同解决这些问题中所产生的动机。我发现自我执行的政治主权产生了相互代理的问题，即每个人同时是委托人和代理人，统治者为了维护社会契约(社会契约税)而勒索地租，这关键依赖于平衡两种不同的激励，即对政治秩序占据先机的意愿和对政治秩序的机会成本。我对统治者选举问题进行研究，并发现，根据经济不平等程度，那些勒索最少的公民要么是最富有的，要么是最穷的。
Maintaining order is perhaps the most important problem confronting society, and establishing a sovereign ruler with monopoly control over the execution of violence creates two distinct security problems: one between private citizens (the horizontal dimension) and the other between the ruler and private citizens (the vertical dimension). I develop a framework to study these dual security problems and the incentives created in solving them together. I show that self-enforcing political sovereignty presents a problem of reciprocal agency, where every individual is simultaneously a principal and an agent and that a ruler will extort rents in exchange for upholding the social contract—the social contract tax—which crucially relies on balancing two distinct incentives, the desire to predate and the opportunity cost of political order. I consider the problem of selecting a ruler and show that the citizen who extorts the least is either the richest or the poorest, depending on the level of economic inequality.
19 有私人选择的福利国家:公众对社会保险支持的转变
【题目】
The Welfare State with Private Alternatives: The Transformation of Popular Support for Social Insurance
【作者】
Marius R. Busemeyer University of Konstanz
Torben Iversen Harvard University
【摘要】
过去几十年里，几乎所有经合组织国家都扩大了私营部门提供的福利国家服务和福利。在本文中，我们研究了这种变化如何影响公众对福利国家的支持模式，以及从长远来看如何影响团结性社会政策的政治可持续性。我们的核心论点是，私营部门替代方案的可用性削弱了公众对公共提供社会保险政策的支持，尤其是在中高收入阶层中，他们的政治支持对于普遍主义福利国家制度的政治可行性至关重要。我们使用来自20个经合组织国家的ISSP政府职能模块的调查数据，以实证我们的理论主张。
Private alternatives to the public provision of welfare state services and benefits have expanded in almost all OECD countries over the past decades. In this paper, we study how this change affects patterns of public support for the welfare state and, in the long term, the political sustainability of solidaristic social policies. Our core argument is that the availability of private alternatives undermines support for public provision of social insurance policies, in particular among the middle and upper-income classes, whose political support is crucial for the political viability of the universalist welfare state regime. We test our theoretical claim empirically with survey data from the ISSP Role of Government module for 20 OECD countries.
20 自我执行的法律限制:紧急状态下镇压的官僚限制
【题目】
Self-Enforcing Legal Limits: Bureaucratic Constraints on Repression under Emergency Powers
【作者】
Tiberiu Dragu and Xiaochen Fan New York University
【摘要】
各国政府都试图在紧急状态权的掩护下，逾越一般的法律限制，侵犯权利和自由。与普通法下采取的压制性政策相比，紧急状态法下采取的压制性政策是否会更不遵守现有的法律限制?有哪些机制可以限制可能被滥用的紧急权力?为了回答这些问题，我们开发了一个博弈论模型，该模型建立在政治统治者依赖安全代理人来执行镇压政策的事实之上。我们发现，统治者总是倾向于在紧急状态法下制定政策，而安全代理人更倾向于这样的法律制度，即激励统治者去选择更符合普通法律限制的政策。由于统治者必须依靠安全代理人来执行其镇压性决定，因此对滥用紧急权力存在潜在的内在限制。
Governments of all stripes have attempted to transgress ordinary legal limits and infringe upon rights and liberties under the cover of emergency powers. Are repressive policies adopted under emergency law less likely to comply with extant legal limits, as compared to repressive policies adopted under normal law? What are the mechanisms by which the potential abuse of emergency powers can be constrained? To answer these questions, we develop a game-theoretic model that builds upon the fact that political rulers rely on security agents to execute their repressive policies. We show that rulers always prefer to make policy under emergency law while security agents actually prefer the legal regime that incentivizes rulers to choose a policy more likely to comply with ordinary legal limits. Consequently, there is a potential endogenous constraint on the abuse of emergency powers given that rulers must rely on security agents to implement their repressive decisions.
21 给无权者的权力：马丁·路德·金的后期非暴力反抗理论
【题目】
Power for the Powerless: Martin Luther King, Jr.’s Late Theory of Civil Disobedience
【作者】
Alexander Livingston Cornell University
【摘要】
马丁·路德·金的《来自伯明翰监狱的信》被奉为非暴力反抗政治理论的重要宣言。本文检视了对金的文章的早期反应和已成为它的同义词的非暴力反抗自由思想的发展，认为金的文章的封圣在与金的发展反抗思想的激进化是一致发展的同时，也取代了这一反抗思想的激进化。本文检视了1965年至1968年期间已出版及存档的著作，以重建马丁·路德·金的权力导向的“大众”非暴力反抗理论，该理论在回应白人反抗和黑人权力的双重挑战时发展起来。大众不服从的基本挑战是，如何动员解放的行动以夺取权力，而不削弱通过分享权力实现变革性整合的可能性。为了阐明这一困境，本文从约翰·罗尔斯的正义理论中提取了一个未理论化的范畴，将不服从概念化为一种战斗之爱的实践。
Martin Luther King, Jr.’s “Letter from a Birmingham Jail” has been canonized as an essential statement of the political theory of civil disobedience. This article examines the early reception of King’s essay and the development of the liberal idea of civil disobedience it has become synonymous with to argue that its canonization coincided with, and displaced, the radicalization of King’s developing thinking about disobedience. It examines published and archival writings from 1965 through 1968 to reconstruct King’s power-oriented theory of “mass” civil disobedience as it developed in response to the dual challenges of white backlash and Black Power. The basic challenge of mass civil disobedience is how to mobilize liberating acts of taking power without undercutting the possibility of transformative integration through sharing power. To articulate this dilemma, this article draws on an undertheorized category from John Rawls’s A Theory of Justice to conceptualize disobedience as a practice of militant love.
22 无党派的规划政策是否会对党派选举产生影响?来自两个大型实验的证据
【题目】
Do Nonpartisan Programmatic Policies Have Partisan Electoral Effects? Evidence from Two Large-Scale Experiments
【作者】
Kosuke Imai and Gary King Harvard University
Carlos Velasco Rivera Institute for Advanced Study in Toulouse
【摘要】
大量文献表明，在世界各地，从政府可自由支配支出中受益的选民，会增加他们在选举中对现任政党的支持。但是，与政治问责理论相反的是，一些人认为选民也会因为“程序化”的开支而奖励现任政党，即使这些开支得到了所有主要政党的支持，在任者也没有任何决定权。为什么选民会在责任不存在的情况下将责任归属于现任政党是不清楚的，就像为什么少数党会支持耗费他们选举成本一样。我们研究两项重要的纲领性政策。首先，我们设计并实施了有史以来最大的随机社会实验之一。第二，我们通过大规模随机实验和自然实验对得出相反结论的研究进行了重新分析。通过改进统计方法和纠正数据错误，我们发现，对这两项政策的所有分析得出的证据是一致的:程序性政策对选民是否支持现任总统没有可衡量的影响。
A vast literature demonstrates that voters around the world who benefit from government discretionary spending increase their electoral support for the incumbent party. But, contrary to theories of political accountability, some suggest that voters also reward incumbent parties for “programmatic” spending, over which incumbents have no discretion, even when passed with support from all major parties. Why voters would attribute responsibility when none exists is unclear, as is why minority parties would support legislation that costs them votes. We study two prominent programmatic policies. For the first, we design and implement one of the largest randomized social experiments ever. For the second, we reanalyze studies that came to opposite conclusions, using a large-scale randomized experiment and a natural experiment. By improving statistical methods and correcting data errors, we show that evidence from all analyses of both policies is consistent: programmatic policies have no measurable effect on voter support for incumbents.
23 国际政治中的等级制度和秩序供应
【题目】
Hierarchy and the Provision of Order in International Politics
【作者】
Kyle Beardsley Duke University
Howard Liu University of Essex
Peter J. Mucha University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill
David A. Siegel Duke University
Juan F. Tellez University of South Carolina
【摘要】
无政府主义的国际体系实际上是高度结构化的：为共同利益而联合的国家共同体；强国家与弱国家形成等级关系，以强制执行秩序，并获得首选的结果。与之前的研究不同，我们将社区和层级等结构概念化为国家互动网络的属性，这些属性可以捕捉到国家行为中未观察到的约束，这些约束可能可以减少冲突。我们提出两个观点。第一，贸易共同体的共同成员身份能够平息冲突，因为打破贸易联系将带来高昂的转换成本：因此，我们认为重型武器贸易比大多数商业贸易更能减少共同体内的冲突。第二，冲突的减少是由分层共同体驱动的，在这种共同体中，强国可以利用高转换成本作为杠杆，限制共同体中弱国之间的冲突。我们利用一个时间依赖多层次网络模型和一种基于网络中心性的对等级的新测量，为这些观点找到了实证支持。
The anarchic international system is actually heavily structured: communities of states join together for common benefit; strong states form hierarchical relationships with weak states to enforce order and achieve preferred outcomes. Breaking from prior research, we conceptualize structures such as community and hierarchy as properties of networks of states’ interactions that can capture unobserved constraints in state behavior, constraints that may reduce conflict. We offer two claims. One, common membership in trade communities pacifies to the extent that breaking trade ties would entail high switching costs: thus, we expect heavy arms trade, more than most types of commercial trade, to reduce intracommunity conflict. Two, this is driven by hierarchical communities in which strong states can use high switching costs as leverage to constrain conflict between weaker states in the community. We find empirical support for these claims using a time-dependent multilayer network model and a new measure of hierarchy based on network centrality.
24 减少公民对犯罪率的偏见: 来自盗窃盛行率田野实验的证据
【题目】
Reducing Bias in Citizens’ Perception of Crime Rates: Evidence from a Field Experiment on Burglary Prevalence
【作者】
Martin Vinæs Larsen Aarhus University
Asmus Leth Olsen University of Copenhagen
【摘要】
一般来说，市民在评估当前犯罪趋势的轨迹时过于悲观。这项研究检验我们是否能纠正在室盗窃中的这种认知偏差。通过田野实验和一个大的长期追踪数据调查(数学处理错误)，我们探索了一个公共信息运动是否可以减少对入室盗窃盛行的误解。我们发现，在“直接邮递”运动中放入正确的入室盗窃率信息，可能大大减少市民的误解。重要的是，这些影响不是短暂的：它们在邮件发送几周后就能被发现，但它们是暂时的，最终认知偏差会重新产生。我们的结果表明，如果公民持续得到有关犯罪率的正确信息，他们就不会那么悲观。因此，减少公民对犯罪率的偏见可能需要调整有关犯罪的(错误)信息的供应。
Citizens are, on average, too pessimistic when assessing the trajectory of current crime trends. In this study, we examine whether we can correct this perceptual bias with respect to burglaries. Using a field experiment coupled with a large panel survey ([Math Processing Error]), we explore whether a public information campaign can reduce misperceptions about the prevalence of burglaries. Embedding the correct information about burglary rates in a direct mail campaign, we find that it is possible to substantially reduce citizens’ misperceptions. Importantly, the effects are not short-lived: they are detectable several weeks after the mailer was sent, but they are temporary and eventually the perceptual bias reemerges. Our results suggest that if citizens were continually supplied with correct information about crime rates they would be less pessimistic. Reducing bias in citizens’ perception of crime rates might therefore be a matter of adjusting the supply of (dis)information about crime.
25 反对分离投票的义务
【题目】
Against Detaching the Duty to Vote
【作者】
Ben Saunders University of Southampton
【摘要】
许多人认为，民主国家的公民有投票的义务，但这忽视了良好投票与不良投票之间的重要区别。 投票得当的人可能正在做他们应该做的事情，但并不意味着投票不当的人正在做他们应该做的事情。如果一个人不投票就不能投好票，那么投票的义务就不能与更具体的义务——投票得当的义务相分开。因此，即使人们有投票得当的义务，却可能没有义务简化投票。
Many people believe that citizens of a democracy have a duty to vote, yet this overlooks an important distinction between voting well and voting badly. Those who vote well may be doing what they ought to do, but it does not follow that those who vote badly are doing anything that they ought to do. While one cannot vote well unless one votes, a duty to vote as such cannot be detached from a more particular duty to vote well. Thus, even if there is an obligation to vote well, there may be no obligation to vote simpliciter.
26 如何解释资源丰富的叛乱者的征税行为?来自叙利亚伊斯兰国的证据
【题目】
What Explains Taxation by Resource-Rich Rebels? Evidence from the Islamic State in Syria
【作者】
Mara Redlich Revkin Georgetown University Law Center
【摘要】
基于贪婪的内战理论预测，反叛组织只会在他们缺乏可开发资源的地区从事税收和其他国家建设活动。然而，这一预测与伊斯兰国跨越时间和空间的征税模式相矛盾。一组新的数据显示了2013年至2017年期间圣战叛乱组织伊斯兰国(Islamic State)在其管辖的19个叙利亚地区实施的七种收入提取政策。数据显示，这些政策在资源丰富的地区和资源贫乏的地区同样普遍。我提出了一种新的理论，可以更好地解释这种模式——叛军集团的征税模式是由（1）意识形态和（2）战争成本共同决定的，并通过对al-Mayadin的案例研究确定了该理论的合理性。al-Mayadin是由伊斯兰国管理的石油最丰富的地区，因而是调查关于资源丰富的叛乱者的税收难题的理想地点。
Greed-based theories of civil war predict that rebel groups will only engage in taxation and other state-building activities in areas where they lack exploitable resources. However, this prediction is contradicted by the Islamic State’s pattern of taxation across time and space. A new data set mapping seven types of revenue-extracting policies imposed by the Islamic State, a jihadist rebel group, in the 19 Syrian districts that it governed between 2013 and 2017 indicates that these policies were just as prevalent in resource-rich as in resource-poor districts. I propose a new theory that better explains this pattern—a rebel group’s pattern of taxation is codetermined by (1) ideology and (2) the costs of warfare—and establish the plausibility of this theory through a case study of al-Mayadin, the most oil-rich district governed by the Islamic State and therefore an ideal site in which to investigate the puzzle of taxation by resource-rich rebels.
27 不平等增长与经济政策自由主义：经典理论的最新检验
【题目】
Inequality Growth and Economic Policy Liberalism: An Updated Test of a Classic Theory
【作者】
Benjamin J. Newman University of California, Riverside
【摘要】
长期的政治经济学理论认为，经济不平等的加剧将增加公众对自由经济政策的需求。但是，对这一命题的实证支持相对不一致，结果是该理论的有效性尚不确定。然而，自从这样的理论诞生以来，学术界就如何概念化这个衡量不平等的理论化的指标提出了新的见解。与之前的研究不同，之前的研究主要关注公民对国家层面不平等的反应（这现在看来似乎是一种难以置信的衡量标准），而本文则关注这篇文献所建议的一种更可信的衡量标准：公民背景环境的不平等增长。本文使用国家面板数据，对再分配民主假说提供了理论上更新和更严格的检验。结果表明，当地收入不平等的急剧增加与对公民对自由经济政策的支持增加有关。
Long-standing political economy theory argues that increases in economic inequality will increase public demand for liberal economic policy. Empirical support for this proposition is relatively inconsistent, though, with the result being uncertainty about the validity of the theory. Since the inception of such theory, however, scholarship has rendered new insights about how to conceptualize the most theoretically plausible measure of exposure to inequality. In contrast to prior work, which largely focuses on citizens’ responses to what may now be viewed as an implausible measure, national-level inequality, this article focuses on what this literature suggests to be a more plausible measure: inequality growth in citizens’ local context. Using national panel data, this article offers a theoretically updated and more rigorous test of the redistributive democracy hypothesis. The results demonstrate that drastic increases in local income inequality are associated with increasing support for liberal economic policy.
28 一场选举接一场:少数族裔的现任者和得票率较低的少数族裔候选人的出现
【题目】
One Run Leads to Another: Minority Incumbents and the Emergence of Lower Ticket Minority Candidates
【作者】
Bernard L. Fraga Indiana University
Eric Gonzalez Juenke Michigan State University
Paru Shah University of Wisconsin–Milwaukee
【摘要】
少数人担任公职的主要决定因素是立法选区的种族/族裔组成。通过对2012年和2014年各州立法候选人种族／族裔的综合数据分析，我们发现，在将选区构成因素考虑在内后，少数族裔候选人的比例仍然低于白人候选人。利用关于国会和州立法选区重叠的信息，我们证明了国会有色人种候选人的胜利降低了与州立法候选人资格相关的种族/种族的人口统计阈值，同样的模式也适用于在任的白人和州立法候选人。一旦考虑到现任国会议员的种族和州立法选区的种族构成，白人、拉丁美洲人、非洲裔美国人和亚裔美国人的州立法候选人的比例也差不多。这些结果表明，对少数族裔候选人生存能力的认知在构成竞选公职人员的当代差异方面发挥了关键作用。
The primary determinant of minority office holding is the racial/ethnic composition of the legislative district. Using comprehensive data on the race/ethnicity of state legislative candidates in 2012 and 2014, we find that minority candidates still emerge at lower rates than whites after accounting for district composition. Leveraging information about the overlap between congressional and state legislative districts, we demonstrate that the victories of candidates of color for Congress reduce the coethnic/racial demographic thresholds associated with state legislative candidacy and that the same pattern holds for white incumbents and state legislative candidacies. Once accounting for both the race of congressional incumbents and the racial/ethnic composition of state legislative districts, white, Latino, African American, and Asian American state legislative candidates emerge at similar rates. These results suggest that perceptions of minority candidate viability play a key role in structuring contemporary disparities in who runs for office.
29 民主化作为一个持续的选择：评论Acemoglu和Robinson对“为什么西方国家要扩展特许经营权？”的修正
【题目】
Democratization as a Continuous Choice: A Comment on Acemoglu and Robinson’s Correction to “Why Did the West Extend the Franchise?”
【作者】
Paul Castañeda Dower University of Wisconsin–Madison
Evgeny Finkel Johns Hopkins University
Scott Gehlbach University of Chicago
Steven Nafziger Williams College
【摘要】
Acemoglu和Robinson最近对“西方为何扩展特许经营权”（Acemoglu和Robinson 2000）中的命题1进行了修正，表明对于q的中间值（未来社会动乱的可能性），唯一的马尔可夫完美均衡是在混合策略中。我们在最近对Acemoglu-Robinson模型进行概括化的背景下讨论了这种修正，该模型允许精英进行连续的制度选择。我们认为在这种背景下，无需进行任何校正：存在唯一的阈值q*，例如如果q<q*，则精英放开特许经营权，否则不放开。 此外，Acemoglu和Robinson（2000）的主要经验预测得出结论：精英不仅没有在被排斥的群体构成频繁的动荡威胁时放开特许经营权，而且（其对于特许经营权的自由化态度）是基于一定的代表性被授予的情况的，因为代表性的降低伴随着动荡概率的上升。
Acemoglu and Robinson recently provided a correction to proposition 1 in “Why Did the West Extend the Franchise” (Acemoglu and Robinson 2000), showing that for intermediate values of q (the probability of social unrest in the future) the unique Markov perfect equilibrium is in mixed strategies. We discuss this correction in the context of a recent generalization of the Acemoglu-Robinson model that allows for a continuous institutional choice by the elite. In that environment, no correction is necessary: there is a unique threshold q* such that the elite liberalizes if q<q∗ and does not liberalize otherwise. Moreover, the main empirical prediction of Acemoglu and Robinson (2000) generalizes: not only does the elite not liberalize when the excluded group poses a frequent threat of unrest, but conditional on some representation having been granted, the level of representation is decreasing in the probability of unrest.
30 教育接收不平等:女教师如何缩小政治知识方面的性别差距
【题目】
Unequal Returns to Education: How Female Teachers Narrow the Gender Gap in Political Knowledge
【作者】
Jason Giersch, Martha Kropf, and Elizabeth Stearns
University of North Carolina at Charlotte
【摘要】
在传统政治知识方面，男性的平均得分高于女性。研究表明，部分知识差距产生于成年之前，令人信服的研究表明，这可能是教育接收不平等的结果。但是，据我们所知，没有研究检验过教育者的作用。考虑到代表性官僚主义的研究，以及学生和教师之间的性别匹配如何提高女孩在她们可能认为由男性主导的领域中的表现，我们检验了该理论在政治知识方面的应用。利用北卡罗莱纳五组公立学校学生的管理数据，我们检验了这样一种假设：如果老师是女性，女学生在公民和经济方面的国家考试中表现会更好。我们的分析结果显示，当学生有女老师时，他们的考试成绩差距会显著缩小，从而支持了这一假设。
Where it concerns traditional political knowledge, on average, men have outscored women. Research indicates that part of the knowledge gap originates before adulthood, and convincing work indicates it is likely the result of unequal returns to education. Yet, no research that we know has examined the role of educators. Given research about representative bureaucracy and how a gender match between student and teacher improves girls’ performance in fields that they may otherwise perceive as dominated by men, we examine the theory’s application to political knowledge. Using administrative data from five cohorts of public school students in North Carolina, we test the hypothesis that female students will do better on a state exam in civics and economics when their teacher is a woman. Results of our analyses support the hypothesis by revealing a small but significant narrowing of the gap in test scores when students have a female teacher.
编 译：夏小奇、张梓妍
审 校：王悦霖
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编辑：张笑吟
一审：陈佳林
二审：袁 丁
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