刊讯｜SSCI 期刊《心智与语言》2023年第4-5期

MIND & LANGUAGE

Volume 38, Issue 4-5, 2023

MIND & LANGUAGE（SSCI一区，2022-2023 IF：2，排名：57/194）2023年第4-5期共刊文23篇，其中2023年第4期刊文13篇，研究论文涉及刻板印象、语义感知主义、谈论气味的方式、科塔尔综合征、元认知、专有名词的指称机制等主题。2023年第5期刊文10篇，研究论文涉及高层次知觉内容、信任的成本效益、厌食症的心理特征、婴儿的认知等主题。欢迎转发扩散！（2023年已更完）

往期推荐：

目录

ISSUE4

SUBMITTED ARTICLES

■How language shapes our minds: On the relationship between generics, stereotypes and social norms, by Leda Berio,  Kristina Musholt, Pages 944–961.

■Self-signs and intensional contexts, by Ruth Garrett Millikan, Pages 962–980.

■Backtracking through interventions: An exogenous intervention model for counterfactual semantics, by Jonathan Vandenburgh, Pages 981–999.

■The empirical status of semantic perceptualism, by Fabrizio Calzavarini, Pages 1000–1020.

■ The rational role of the perceptual sense of reality, by Paweł Gładziejewski, Pages 1021–1040.

■How we talk about smells, by Giulia Martina, Pages 1041–1058.

■A vessel without a pilot: Bodily and affective experience in the Cotard delusion of inexistence, by Philip Gerrans, Pages 1059–1080.

■A metacognitive account of phenomenal force, by Lu Teng, Pages 1081–1101.

■Language and children's understanding of knowledge: Epistemic talk in early childhood, by Derek E. Montgomery, Pages 1102–1119.

■Notions of arbitrariness, by Luca Gasparri,  Piera Filippi,  Markus Wild,  Hans-Johann Glock, Pages 1120–1137.

REVIEW ARTICLES

■From the epistemic perspectives in experimental semantics to the ambiguity of proper names: Is the inference warranted? A critical notice of Jincai Li's The referential mechanism of proper names, by Nicolò D'Agruma, Pages 1138–1146.

■Red herrings in experimental semantics: Cultural variation and epistemic perspectives. A critical notice of Jincai Li's The referential mechanism of proper names, by Michael Devitt, Pages 1147–1156.

REPLY

■Cross-cultural variation and perspectivalism: Alignment of two red herrings?, by Jincai Li, Pages 1157–1163.

ISSUE5

SUBMITTED ARTICLES

■How to think about higher-level perceptual contents, by Daniel C. Burnston, Pages 1166–1186.

■Assertion, denial, and the evolution of Boolean operators, by Fausto Carcassi,  Giorgio Sbardolini, Pages 1187–1207.

■In defense of epicycles: Embracing complexity in psychological explanations, by Ansgar D. Endress, Pages 1208–1237.

■Should credence be sensitive to practical factors? A cost–benefit analysis, by Jie Gao, Pages 1238–1257.

■Distributed autobiographical memories, distributed self-narratives, by Regina E. Fabry, Pages 1258–1275.

■Is meaning cognized?, by David Balcarras, Pages 1276–1295.

■On the roles of false belief and recalcitrant fear in anorexia nervosa, by Somogy Varga,  Asbjørn Steglich-Petersen, Pages 1296–1313.

CRITICAL COMMENTARIES

■The missing link between core knowledge and language: Review of Elizabeth Spelke's What babies know, volume 1 (2022), by Barbu Revencu,  Gergely Csibra, Pages 1314–1322.

■Core morality? Or merely core agents and social beings? A response to Spelke's what babies know, by J. Kiley Hamlin, Pages 1323–1335.

RESPONSE

■Core knowledge, language learning, and the origins of morality and pedagogy: Reply to reviews of What babies know, by Elizabeth S. Spelke, Pages 1336–1350.

摘要

How language shapes our minds: On the relationship between generics, stereotypes and social norms

Leda Berio, Institut für Philosophie II, Ruhr-Universität Bochum, Bochum, Germany

Kristina Musholt, Department of Philosophy, Leipzig University, Leipzig, Germany

Abstract In this article, we discuss the role of labels and generics referring to social kinds in mindshaping practices, arguing that they promote generalizations that foster essentialist thinking and carry a normative force. We propose that their cognitive function consists in both contributing to the formation and reinforcement of schemata and scripts for social interaction and in activating these schemata in specific social situations. Moreover, we suggest that failure to meet the expectations engendered by these schemata and scripts leads to the activation of “reactive attitudes” embedded in feedback loops of reactive exchange that are constitutive of our mindshaping practices.

Self-signs and intensional contexts

Ruth Garrett Millikan, Department of Philosophy, University of Connecticut, Storrs, Connecticut, USA

Abstract Paradigm intensional contexts result from the unmarked use of referential expressions as “self-signs”, signs that refer to themselves as tokens, types, or members of Sellarsian “dot-quoted” kinds. Self-signing (but unquoted) linguistic expressions are more difficult to recognize than non-linguistic self-signs such as the color of a felt pen's casing that represents the color of ink inside. I will discuss non-linguistic self-signing, then examine self-signing in quotation, in “said that …” contexts and in “believes that … ” contexts. The phenomenon of intensionality may reduce to a kind of equivocation, a matter of notation rather than a necessary feature of language.

Backtracking through interventions: An exogenous intervention model for counterfactual semantics

Jonathan Vandenburgh, Department of Philosophy, Northwestern University, Evanston, Illinois, USA

Abstract Causal models show promise as a foundation for the semantics of counterfactual sentences. However, current approaches face limitations compared to the alternative similarity theory: they only apply to a limited subset of counterfactuals and the connection to counterfactual logic is not straightforward. This article addresses these difficulties using exogenous interventions, where causal interventions change the values of exogenous variables rather than structural equations. This model accommodates judgments about backtracking counterfactuals, extends to logically complex counterfactuals, and validates familiar principles of counterfactual logic. This combines the interventionist intuitions of the causal approach with the logical advantages of the similarity approach.

The empirical status of semantic perceptualism

Fabrizio Calzavarini, University of Bergamo, Bergamo, Italy; Center for Logic, Language, and Cognition, University of Turin, Turin, Italy

Abstract Semantic perceptualism is the thesis that meaning experiences are forms of perceptual experiences. According to its defenders, this view is motivated not only by philosophical considerations, but also by empirical evidence. In the present article, I shall provide the first comprehensive and critical review of the empirical evidence in support of semantic perceptualism, including a detailed analysis of the relevant neuroanatomical data. The conclusions of my analysis are largely pessimistic. I believe that the relevant behavioral, cognitive, and patient data are suggestive but hardly conclusive. Moreover, neuroanatomical data speak strongly against semantic perceptualism.

The rational role of the perceptual sense of reality

Paweł Gładziejewski, Department of Cognitive Science, Nicolaus Copernicus University in Toruń, Toruń, Poland

Abstract Perceptual experience usually comes with “phenomenal force”, a strong sense that it reflects reality as it is. Some philosophers have argued that it is in virtue of possessing phenomenal force that perceptual experiences are able to non-inferentially justify beliefs. In this article, I introduce an alternative, inferentialist take on the epistemic role of phenomenal force. Drawing on Bayesian modeling in cognitive science, I argue that the sense of reality that accompanies conscious vision can be viewed as epistemically appraisable in light of its rational etiology.

How we talk about smells

Giulia Martina, Department of Philosophy and Education Sciences, University of Turin, Turin, Italy

Abstract Smells are often said to be ineffable, and linguistic research shows that languages like English lack a dedicated olfactory lexicon. Starting from this evidence, I propose an account of how we talk about smells in English. Our reports about the way things smell are comparative: When we say that something smells burnt or like roses, we characterise the thing's smell by noting its similarity to the characteristic smells of certain odorous things (burnt things, roses). The account explains both the strengths and limitations of our smell discourse, and has implications for philosophical discussions of the relation between language and appearances.

A vessel without a pilot: Bodily and affective experience in the Cotard delusion of inexistence

Philip Gerrans, Department of Philosophy, University of Adelaide, Adelaide, South Australia, Australia

Abstract The initial cause of Cotard delusion is pervasive dyshomeostasis (dysregulation of basic bodily function).This explanation draws on interoceptive active inference account of self-representation. In this framework, the self is an hierarchical predictive model made by the brain to facilitate homeostatic regulation. The account I provide is an alternative to two factor accounts of the Cotard delusion that treat depersonalisation experience as the first factor in genesis of the Cotard delusion. I argue that depersonalisation experience and the Cotard delusion are produced by different breakdowns in the process of self-modelling.

A metacognitive account of phenomenal force

Lu Teng, New York University Shanghai, Shanghai, China; NYU-ECNU Institute of Brain and Cognitive Science at NYU Shanghai, Shanghai, China

Abstract According to phenomenal conservatism or dogmatism, perceptual experiences can give us immediate justification for beliefs about the external world in virtue of having a distinctive kind of phenomenal character—namely phenomenal force. I present three cases to show that phenomenal force is neither pervasive among nor exclusive to perceptual experiences. The plausibility of such cases calls out for explanation. I argue that contrary to a long-held assumption, phenomenal force is a separate, non-perceptual state generated by some metacognitive mechanisms that monitor one's first-order mental processes and states. This new account advances our understanding of the nature of phenomenal force.

Language and children's understanding of knowledge: Epistemic talk in early childhood

Derek E. Montgomery, Department of Psychology, Bradley University, Peoria, Illinois, USA

Abstract Research on children's theory of mind often restricts conceptually meaningful talk about knowledge to instances where know references a corresponding mental state. This article offers a reappraisal of that view. From a social-pragmatic perspective, even nonreferential talk is meaningful when appropriately embedded in social routines. A synthesis of corpus data suggests children's early talk about knowledge routinely occurs in question–answer contexts. It is argued that the influence of interrogative contexts is evident in children's over-attributions of knowledge when someone is only guessing. This influence is taken as evidence for the role of linguistic practices in shaping the concept of knowledge.

Notions of arbitrariness

Luca Gasparri, Université de Lille, CNRS, UMR 8163—STL—Savoirs Textes Langage, Lille, France

Piera Filippi, Department of Philosophy, University of Zurich, Zurich, Switzerland

Markus Wild, Department of Philosophy, University of Basel, Basel, Switzerland

Hans-Johann Glock, Department of Philosophy, University of Zurich, Zurich, Switzerland

Abstract Arbitrariness is a distinctive feature of human language, and a growing body of comparative work is investigating its presence in animal communication. But what is arbitrariness, exactly? We propose to distinguish four notions of semiotic arbitrariness: a notion of opaque association between sign forms and semiotic functions, one of sign-function mapping optionality, one of acquisition-dependent sign-function coupling, and one of lack of motivatedness. We characterize these notions, illustrate the benefits of keeping them apart, and describe two reactions to our proposal: abandoning arbitrariness-talk in favor of the newly introduced conceptual vocabulary, or feeding the distinctions back into the parent concept.

From the epistemic perspectives in experimental semantics to the ambiguity of proper names: Is the inference warranted? A critical notice of Jincai Li's The referential mechanism of proper names

Nicolò D'Agruma, Department of Philosophy, Università Vita-Salute San Raffaele, Milano, Italy

Abstract In her engaging book, The referential mechanism of proper names, Li presents empirical studies involving American and Chinese laypeople. Li interprets her results as supporting an epistemic-perspective reading of the variability in referential intuitions on proper names. Building upon this thesis, Li defends the ambiguity view, claiming that names are ambiguous between a descriptivist and a causal-historical meaning. I argue that either Li's data do not enable a comparison of the two theories of reference, or support for the ambiguity view is limited to the Chinese sample at most and does not rely upon the inference that Li employs.

Red herrings in experimental semantics: Cultural variation and epistemic perspectives. A critical notice of Jincai Li's The referential mechanism of proper names

Michael Devitt, Graduate Center, City University of New York, New York, New York, USA

Abstract Concerns with cultural variation and epistemic perspectives have played major roles in experimental semantics. They dominate Li's book (2023). Li's own experimental work provides two promising explanations of the cultural variation: Chinese, but not Americans, tend to agree with a character's false statement because they think it is not her fault that she is wrong or because they are socially conforming. So, the notice argues, the cultural variation is a red herring to the theory of reference. Li preferred explanation is that Chinese and Americans take different epistemic perspectives. The notice argues that this is misguided and another red herring.

Cross-cultural variation and perspectivalism: Alignment of two red herrings?

Jincai Li, School of Foreign Languages, East China Normal University, Shanghai, China

Abstract In this brief reply I respond to criticisms of my book, The referential mechanism of proper names, from Michael Devitt and Nicolo D'Agruma. I focus on the question of whether the perspectivism advocated in the book explains the empirical results there detailed.

How to think about higher-level perceptual contents

Daniel C. Burnston, Philosophy Department, Tulane Brain Institute, Tulane University, New Orleans, Louisiana, USA

Abstract The standard assumption for what perception must do in order to represent a “higher level” content—say, tiger—is that it must represent the kind as such. I argue that this “as such condition” is not constitutive of what it means for a content to be “higher-level”, and that embracing it produces a range of unfortunate dialectical consequences. After offering this critique, I give an alternative construal, the “extended perceptual space” view of higher-level contents. This view captures the phenomena targeted by the “higher-level content” thesis, is empirically supported, and avoids the negative dialectical consequences of the as such condition.

Assertion, denial, and the evolution of Boolean operators

Fausto Carcassi, Department of Linguistics, University of Tübingen, Tübingen, Germany

Giorgio Sbardolini, ILLC and Department of Philosophy, University of Amsterdam, Amsterdam, Netherlands

Abstract Given current data, only a few binary Boolean operators are expressed in lexically simple fashion in the world's languages: and, or, nor. These do not occur in every combination, for example, nor is not observed by itself. To explain these cross-linguistic patterns, we propose an encoding of Boolean operators as update procedures to accept or reject information in a context. We define a measure of conceptual simplicity for such updates, on which attested operators are conceptually simpler than the remaining Booleans. Moreover, we show that language evolution selects for the attested lexical inventories by minimizing the complexity of using a lexical inventory compositionally to convey precise information.

In defense of epicycles: Embracing complexity in psychological explanations

Ansgar D. Endress, Department of Psychology, City, University of London, London, UK

Abstract Is formal simplicity a guide to learning in humans, as simplicity is said to be a guide to the acceptability of theories in science? Does simplicity determine the difficulty of various learning tasks? I argue that, similarly to how scientists sometimes preferred complex theories when this facilitated calculations, results from perception, learning and reasoning suggest that formal complexity is generally unrelated to what is easy to learn and process by humans, and depends on assumptions about available representational and processing primitives. “Simpler” hypotheses are preferred only when they are also easier to process. Historically, “simpler”, easier-to-process, scientific theories might also be preferred if they are transmitted preferentially. Empirically viable complexity measures should build on the representational and processing primitives of actual learners, even if explanations of their behaviour become formally more complex.

Should credence be sensitive to practical factors? A cost–benefit analysis

Jie Gao, School of Philosophy, Zhejiang University, Hangzhou, China; Faculty of Humanities, University of Johannesburg, Johannesburg, South Africa

Abstract According to evidentialist views, credence in a proposition p should be proportional to the degree of evidential support that one has in favor of p. However, empirical evidence suggests that our credences are systematically sensitive to practical factors. In this article, I provide a cost–benefit analysis of credences' practical sensitivity. The upshot of this analysis is that credences sensitive to practical factors fare better than practically insensitive ones along several dimensions. All things considered, our credences should be sensitive to practical factors.

Distributed autobiographical memories, distributed self-narratives

Regina E. Fabry, Department of Philosophy, Macquarie University, Sydney, New South Wales, Australia

Abstract Richard Heersmink argues that self-narratives are distributed across embodied organisms and their environment, given that their building blocks, autobiographical memories, are distributed. This argument faces two problems. First, it commits a fallacy of composition. Second, it relies on Marya Schechtman's narrative self-constitution view, which is incompatible with the distributed cognition framework. To solve these problems, this article develops an alternative account of self-narratives. On this account, we actively connect distributed autobiographical memories through distributed conversational and textual self-narrative practices. This account enhances our understanding of the memory–narrative nexus and has implications for philosophical conceptions of self.

Is meaning cognized?

David Balcarras, Department of Linguistics and Philosophy, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Cambridge, Massachusetts, USA

Abstract In this article, I defend an account of linguistic comprehension on which meaning is not cognized, or on which we do not tacitly know our language's semantics. On this view, sentence comprehension is explained instead by our capacity to translate sentences into the language of thought. I explain how this view can explain our capacity to correctly interpret novel utterances, and then I defend it against several standing objections.

On the roles of false belief and recalcitrant fear in anorexia nervosa

Somogy Varga, Department of Philosophy and History of Ideas, Aarhus University, Aarhus, Denmark

Asbjørn Steglich-Petersen, Department of Philosophy and History of Ideas, Aarhus University, Aarhus, Denmark

Abstract The DSM-5 highlights two essential psychological features of anorexia nervosa (AN): recalcitrant fear of gaining weight and body image disturbance. Prominent accounts grant false beliefs about body weight and shape a central role in the explanation of AN behavior. In this article, we propose a stronger emphasis on recalcitrant fear. We show that such fear can explain AN behavior without the intermediary of a false belief, and thus without the associated explanatory burdens and conceptual difficulties. We illustrate how shifting the emphasis from false belief to recalcitrant fear can supplement a number of different non-doxastic models of AN.

The missing link between core knowledge and language: Review of Elizabeth Spelke's What babies know, volume 1 (2022)

Barbu Revencu, Cognitive Development Center, Department of Cognitive Science, Central European University, Vienna, Austria

Gergely Csibra, Cognitive Development Center, Department of Cognitive Science, Central European University, Vienna, Austria

Abstract Spelke's book defends two hypotheses about human cognition. First, humans and other species are endowed with core knowledge systems—innate computational structures that use abstract concepts to represent various aspects of the environment. Second, humans, and only humans, acquire natural languages, whose syntax and compositional semantics allow them to construct new concepts by combining the outputs of core systems. We endorse the first hypothesis but doubt that language acquisition alone explains the productivity of human cognition. In particular, we argue against the claim that infants use aspects of language to develop a new conception of other people.

Core morality? Or merely core agents and social beings? A response to Spelke's what babies know

J. Kiley Hamlin, Department of Psychology, The University of British Columbia, Vancouver, Canada

Abstract Spelke's What babies know describes the remarkably sophisticated mental lives of infants through the theoretical framework of core knowledge. To Spelke, young infants possess six independent core domains, two of which allow them to reason about the social world: the core agent and the core social being systems. Critically, Spelke argues that these core systems fail to communicate prior to 10 months, resulting in an inability to understand social goals. In this commentary, I review evidence that, contrary to Spelke's claims, young infants show robust understanding of social goals and intentions, consistent with claims of an early emerging moral core.

Core knowledge, language learning, and the origins of morality and pedagogy: Reply to reviews of What babies know

Elizabeth S. Spelke, Department of Psychology, Harvard University, Center for Brains, Minds and Machines, Cambridge, Massachusetts, USA

Abstract The astute reviews by Hamlin and by Revencu and Csibra provide compelling arguments and evidence for the early emergence of moral evaluation, communication, and pedagogical learning. I accept these conclusions but not the reviewers' claims that infants' talents in these domains depend on core systems of moral evaluation or pedagogical communication. Instead, I suggest that core knowledge of people as agents and as social beings, together with infants' emerging understanding of their native language, support learning about people as moral agents, moral patients, communicators, and teachers. These issues are open, however, and our competing views invite further testing.

期刊简介

The phenomena of mind and language are currently studied by researchers in linguistics, philosophy, psychology, artificial intelligence, cognitive anthropology and cognitive archaeology. Mind & Language brings this work together in a genuinely interdisciplinary way. Along with original articles, the journal publishes forums, survey articles and reviews, enabling researchers to keep up-to-date with developments in related disciplines as well as their own.

目前，语言学、哲学、心理学、人工智能、认知人类学和认知考古学的研究人员正在研究心理和语言现象。Mind & Language 以真正跨学科的方式将这些研究工作结合在一起。除了原创文章，该期刊还发表论坛、调查文章和评论，使研究人员能够及时了解相关学科以及他们自己所在学科的最新发展。

It is an important forum for sharing the results of investigation and for creating the conditions for a fusion of effort, thus making real progress towards a deeper and more far-reaching understanding of the phenomena of mind and language.

它是一个重要的论坛，学者们可以在这里分享调查结果并为合作研究创造条件，从而真正更深入、更深远地理解思维和语言现象。

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