如何精读《斯坦福哲学百科全书》的词条（二）？吕炳强解剖Relativism

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Comments on the SEP entry “Relativism”(2)

The entry was published Sep 11, 2015 by Baghramian, Maria and Carter, J. Adam, "Relativism",The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Summer 2017 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.),

URL = https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2017/entries/relativism/>.

Draft 20171224

Text:4.2 Conceptual relativism

Conceptual relativism is a narrowly delineated form of relativism where ontology, or what exists, rather than ethical and epistemic norms, is relativized to conceptual schemes, scientific paradigms, or categorical frameworks. In this sense, conceptual relativism is often characterized as a metaphysical doctrine rather than as variant of epistemic or cultural relativism. The underlying rationale for this form of relativism is the anti-realist thesis that the world does not present itself to us ready-made or ready-carved; rather we supply different, and at times incompatible, ways of categorizing and conceptualizing it. Reflection on the connections between mind and the world, rather than empirical observations of historic and cultural diversity, is the primary engine driving various forms of conceptual relativism, but data from anthropology and linguistics are also used in its support. The thought, at least since Kant, is that the human mind is not a passive faculty merely representing an independent reality; rather, it has an active role in shaping, if not constructing, the “real”. The conceptual relativist adds, as Kant did not, that human beings may construct the real in different ways thanks to differences in language or culture.

In the 20th century, a variety of positions sympathetic to conceptual relativism were developed. Quine’s ontological relativity, Nelson Goodman’s “irrealism” with its claim of the plurality of “world-versions” and Hilary Putnam’s conceptual relativity are prominent examples. What these authors have in common is an insistence that there could be more than one “right” way of describing what there is, that incompatible “manuals of translation” and “world-versions” can be equally correct or acceptable.

Quine’s thesis of ontological relativity, probably the most influential of 20th century approaches to conceptual relativity, is expressed both in an epistemic as well as in a stronger metaphysical form. Quine supports an epistemic thesis when he claims that incompatible scientific theories can account equally adequately for the data available to us (his underdetermination thesis) and that “there are various defensible ways of conceiving the world”, (Quine 1992: 102). But his thesis of the indeterminacy of translation makes the stronger claim that different incompatible manuals of translation, or conceptual schemes, can account for one and the same verbal behavior and the indeterminacy resides at the level of facts rather than our knowledge, a position that leads to unavoidable ontological relativity.

Nelson Goodman’s irrealism is an even more radical claim to the effect that the existence of many adequate, and indeed correct, but irreconcilable descriptions and representations of the world shows that there is no such thing as one unique actual world; rather there are many worlds, one for each correct description (e.g., Goodman 1975; cf. Sider 2009). Hilary Putnam disagrees with Goodman’s formulation of relativity with its radical talk of “world-making” but relies on arguments from conceptual plurality to reject metaphysical realism, the view that there is one single correct account of what the world is like. According to Putnam, our most basic metaphysical categories, e.g., objecthood and existence, could be defined variously depending on what conceptual scheme we use. What counts as an object itself, he argues, is determined by and hence is relative to the ontological framework we opt for.

Thomas Kuhn’s highly influential discussion of the governing role of paradigms in science (see §4.4.3) has also been interpreted as a form of conceptual relativism by friends (Kusch 2002) and critics (Davidson 1974) of relativism alike.

The key difficulty facing conceptual relativism is that of formulating the position in a coherent but non-trivial manner. Trivial versions allow that the world can be described in different ways, but make no claims to the incompatibility of these descriptions. The charge of incoherence arises from the claim that there could be genuinely conflicting and equally true accounts or descriptions of one and the same phenomenon. To use an example that is the corner-stone of Hilary Putnam’s conceptual relativity, Putnam claims that the simple question how many objects there are (say on a given table) could be answered variously depending on whether we use “a mereological or a Carnapian, common-sense, method of individuating objects. In circumstances where a Carnapian counts three objects A, B and C, a mereologist will count seven: A, B, C, plus the mereological sum objects A+B, A+C, B+C, A+B+C. As Putnam puts it:

The suggestion … is that what is (by commonsense standards) the same situation can be described in many different ways, depending on how we use the words. The situation does not itself legislate how words like “object”, “entity”, and “exist” must be used. What is wrong with the notion of objects existing “independently” of conceptual schemes is that there are no standards for the use of even the logical notions apart from conceptual choices. (Putnam 1988: 114)

The puzzle is to explain how both the Carnapian and mereological answers to the one and same question could be correct and yet mutually incompatible, for unless we abandon the most fundamental law of logic, the law of non-contradiction, we cannot deem one and the same proposition true and not true. Relativists respond that both answers are correct, each relative to the conceptual scheme it invokes. So, once we accept the insight that there is no Archimedean vantage point for choosing among conflicting frameworks, we no longer face a genuine contradiction. The response invokes, often implicitly, a relativized conception of truth, which as we shall see below, faces its own difficulties.

Lui:In order to understand the above section of text in a useful way, let us go back to Table 1. As relativized variables, row (D) “thought, perception”, is different from rows (A) “cognitive norms”, (B) “moral values” and (C) “aesthetic values”, with respect to the stake-holders（持份者）, by this I mean particularly who stake-holds “thought, values”. Needless to say, a stake-holder is some type of actor（行動者）.  

Take for example the typology of actor (six types, namely, the ruler, the ruled, the ideologue, the social theorist, the theoretical sociologist and the sociological theorist) I mentioned earlier,. Let me simplify it into two broad categories, namely, the category “researcher”（研究者）which includes only the theoretical sociologist and the sociological theorist, and the residual category “actor” which includes all the remaining types. It is a simplification based on the scientific project of sociology, in which the ideologue is not considered as a scientific researcher. Clearly, the researcher is the sole stake-holder of the relativized variable row (D) “thought, perception”.  

Turn to the relativizing parameter column (IV) “conceptual schemes, languages, frameworks”. It intersects the relativized variable row (D) “thought, perception” at “thought/percept conceptual relativism, linguistic relativity”. (To be consistent in naming, I suggest linguistic relativity be renamed “linguistic relativism”.) Who stake-holds the “thought/percept conceptual relativism, linguistic relativism”? The theoretical sociologist or the sociological theorist (only they are in the “researcher” category) or both?

Now the theoretical sociologist and the sociological theorist are assigned different tasks in the scientific project of sociology, that is, the former is to recruit all known sociological theories as exemplars of his theoretical sociology in order to raise it to the paradigm of sociology while the latter is to carry out positive investigation under certain conditions in accordance to his sociological theory. (Both theoretical sociology and sociological theory are, in the first instance, social theory.)  This assignment of tasks is stipulated by me, and is unlikely to be shared by fellow theoretical sociologists.

In my version of theoretical sociology, recruitment（收編）by the theoretical sociologist is to be achieved by settling or accommodating the semiotic system（語意學系統）of every known sociological theory within that of his theoretical sociology and hence has nothing to do with data（數據）(in the broadest sense), although the sociologist theorist cannot carry out his positive investigation without them. Clearly, each sociological theorist has his own sociological theory for his positive investigation, and the theoretical sociologist needs to recruit each sociological theory differently.

We know that the semiotic system is language (in original French, langue) in the Saussurean sense, and hence I may take the liberty to imagine that if the theoretical sociology (to be exact, its semiotic system) is taken to be the relatvizing parameter then all known sociologies (again to be exact, their respective semiotic systems) will be relativized variables at the intersection of column (IV) and row (D). What are they precisely? Different forms of linguistic relativism! Thus, I may claim that recruitment of all known sociological theories by the theoretical sociologist is linguistic relativism, with the sociological theories and his theoretical sociology being relativized variables and the relativizing parameter respectively. The theoretical sociologist thus stake-holds linguistic relativism.  

With the above preparatory remarks in mind, one who reads the above section of the text will not fail to recognize the connections or hints to the tasks assigned to the theoretical sociologist and the sociological theorist:

 (1)“Conceptual relativism is often characterized as a metaphysical doctrine” (shaded), where “ontology, or what exists, [...] is relativized to conceptual schemes, scientific paradigms, or categorical frameworks” (shaded).

As a speech（說話）within its language (semiotic system), theoretical sociology is not concerned with empirical observations (data), and can thus be characterized as a metaphysical doctrine. My version of theoretical sociology comprises an ontology（存在論）, a realism（實在論）and a hermeneutics（詮釋論）but most if not all sociological theories do not mention any ontology at all. It however does not mean that they do not have some sort of ontology, since almost without any exception all of them employ a typology of actor. The presence of a typology of actor entails that of some sort of ontology, or what exists.

If I can show that the six-fold typology of actor I mentioned earlier can be derived from or accommodated within my version of theoretical sociology (by the way, because I believe I can, I call it the fundamental typology of actor（行動者的基礎類型學）), then the recruitment of all known sociological theories can continue, that is, relativization can continue.     

(2) it is driven by “the connections between mind and the world, rather than empirical observations of historic and cultural diversity” (shaded).

As said earlier, data are absent in the relativization; and therefore relativization is not driven by empirical observation of any kind. The connection between mind（心靈）and the world（世界）is present in the theoretical sociology and the sociological theory (pieces of speech within their respective languages), if by mind it means the theoretical sociologist and the the sociological theorist, and by world the realism signified by their respective theories as the signifiers（能指）.      

(3) its underlying rationale is that “the world does not present itself to us as ready-made or ready-carved” (shaded).

For sure, this rationale holds at least for the known sociological theories since each of them needs to be tailored to satisfy the conditions under which positive investigation is possible.   

In retrospect, it is a marvel that philosophers have managed to describe, even though quite obliquely, the recruitment of sociological theories by the theoretical sociologist as a type of conceptual relativism, while almost no theoretical sociologist or sociological theorist know its existence. The scientific project of sociology is still wandering in the wilderness.  

We can now turn to the philosophers concerned and their views. There are four arguments for conceptual relativism:

(1) “[I]ncompatible scientific theories can account equally adequately for the data available to us” (shaded) and “there are various defensible ways of conceiving the world” (shaded); by Quine.

(2)“[I]ncompatible manuals of translation, or conceptual schemes, can account for one and the same verbal behavior and the indeterminacy resides at the level of facts rather than our knowledge” (shaded); also by Quine.

(3)“[T]he existence of many adequate, and indeed correct, but irreconcilable descriptions and representations of the world shows that there is no such thing as one unique actual world; rather there are many worlds, one for each correct description” (shaded); by Nelson Goodman.

(4)“What counts as an object itself [...] is determined by and hence is relative to the ontological framework we opt for” (shaded); by Hilary Putman.

Looking at these arguments on the surface, they are concerned with “alethic relativism or epistemic relativism” at the intersection of the relativizing parameter column (IV) “conceptual schemes, languages, frameworks” and the relativized variable row (A) “cognitive norms”. In the case of the scientific project of sociology, the relatvizing parameter seems to be more likely the sociological theory than the theoretical sociology, since “the world”, “the facts” and “the object” are invoked and all of them are in the vicinity of empirical observations. If my guess is not too wrong, these arguments for conceptual relativism concern my version of theoretical sociology only remotely.

Text:4.3 Relativism about truth or alethic relativism

Relativism about truth, or alethic relativism, at its simplest, is the claim that what is true for one individual or social group may not be true for another, and there is no context-independent vantage point to adjudicate the matter. What is true or false is always relative to a conceptual, cultural, or linguistic framework.

Alethic relativism is the most central of all relativistic positions since other subdivisions of the philosophical theses of relativism—with the possible exception of some narrowly defined versions of conceptual relativism such as Nelson Goodman’s irrealism (see §4.2)—are in principle, reducible to it (Baghramian 2004: 92). For instance, relativism about logic may be restated as a view according to which the standing of logical truths (including truths about consequence relations) is relative to cultures or cognitive schemes. Ethical relativism can be seen as the claim that the truth of ethical judgments, if such truths exist, is relative to context or culture. If truth is to be seen as equally applicable to all areas of discourse and also unitary, rather than domain specific or plural, then alethic relativism is not only a strong form of global relativism but it also entails the denial of the possibility of more local forms of relativism because all localized relativistic claims are also attempts at relativizing truth (seemingly in a particular domain of discourse).

The central claim of the alethic relativism is that “is true”, despite appearances to the contrary, is (at least, in some relevant domains of discourse) not a one-place but a two-place predicate such that “P is true” should correctly be understood as (modulo differences in particular ways of developing this idea) shorthand for “P is true for X”, where X is a culture, conceptual scheme, belief framework, etc. And within the broad camp of alethic relativists, the matter of how it is that which we should opt for “P-is-true-for-X”, rather than “P is true”, simpliciter, is developed in different ways (e.g., see Meiland 1977; MacFarlane 2014: ch. 5; Egan 2007). One shared commitment of relativizing the truth predicate is that claims such as “misfortune is caused by witchcraft” could be true according to the Azande cultural framework and false in the Western scientific framework. One major difficulty facing alethic relativists is to explain what “true for” actually means, and how “true for” should be understood as related to the more familiar absolutist truth predicate. For instance, should relative truth be understood as a modification on an already familiar strategy for thinking about truth (e.g., the correspondence, pragmatic or epistemic model) or in some different way, entirely? (MacFarlane 2014: ch. 2). Much of the work of New Relativists such as John MacFarlane (see §5) can be see as an attempt to clarify this thorny issue.

Lui:This is a crucial section, and the content of which should be committed to memory. It relativizes the absolutist truth predicate “P is true” into a relative one “P is true for X”. It is also a sociologization of logic（邏輯學的社會學化）because X is a conceptual, cultural or linguistic framework held by an individual（he is no doubt an actor）or a social group（a collectivity of actors）. From now on, the truth-value of a proposition must be understood in the relativist sense.    

4.3.1 Alethic Relativism and the charge of self-refutation

[...]

Lui:The authors offer a self-restrained defense for alethic relativism. The choice between absolutism and relativism needs careful weighing since each of them has its own merits and dismerits. Text omitted.  

Text: 4.4 Epistemic relativism

[...]

4.4.1 Relativism about Rationality

[...]

4.4.2 Relativism about Logic

[...]

Lui:The above subsections are worth reading, though omitted in order to keep quotations manageable.

Text:4.4.3 Relativism about Science

Discussions of relativism about science gained currency with the publication of Thomas Kuhn’s The Structure of Scientific Revolutions (1962) and the emergence of a historicist approach to question of change and progress in science. Pronouncements such as

In so far as their only recourse to [the] world is through what they see and do, we may want to say that after a revolution scientists are responding to a different world (Kuhn 1970 [1962]: 111)

and

The very ease and rapidity with which astronomers saw new things when looking at old objects with old instruments may make us wish to say that, after Copernicus, astronomers lived in a different world (Kuhn 1970 [1962]: 117)

were taken to suggest that not only standards of epistemic appraisal but even the data gathered by scientists were, to a significant extent, determined by governing paradigms and hence relative to them. Although Kuhn stepped back from such radical relativism, his views gave currency to relativistic interpretations of science.

Relativism about science is motivated by considerations arising from the methodology and history of science (Baghramian 2007). As we saw in §4.2, Quine has argued that

Physical theories can be at odds with each other and yet compatible with all possible data even in the broadest possible sense. In a word, they can be logically incompatible and empirically equivalent. (1970: 179)

Relativists about science have argued that only with the addition of auxiliary hypotheses could the scientist choose between various theories and that such auxiliary hypotheses are colored by socially and historically grounded norms as well as by personal and group interests. Paul Feyerabend’s “democratic relativism”—the view that different societies may look at the world in different ways and regard different things as acceptable (1987: 59) and that we need to give equal voice to these differing perspectives—is one instance of the use of the underdetermination thesis in support of relativism. According to Feyerabend, underdetermination ultimately demonstrates that

for every statement, theory, point of view believed (to be true) with good reason there exist arguments showing a conflicting alternative to be at least as good, or even better. (1987: 76)

Larry Laudan usefully lists the ways underdetermination is used to motivate relativism or its proximate doctrines. He says:

Lakatos and Feyerabend have taken the underdetermination of theories to justify the claim that the only difference between empirically successful and empirically unsuccessful theories lies in the talents and resources of their respective advocates (i.e., with sufficient ingenuity, more or less any theory can be made to look methodologically respectable). Hesse and Bloor have claimed that underdetermination shows the necessity for bringing noncognitive, social factors into play in explaining the theory choices of scientists (on the grounds that methodological and evidential considerations alone are demonstrably insufficient to account for such choices). H. M. Collins, and several of his fellow sociologists of knowledge, have asserted that underdetermination lends credence to the view that the world does little if anything to shape or constrain our beliefs about it. (Laudan 1990: 321)

Lui:The above is the opening portion of the subsection. As far as physics is concerned, the underdetermination of theory by data occurs in experimental physics only, and the theoretical physics remains aloft as the paradigm in the state of normal science.   

Text:Laudan even connects Derrida’s deconstructionism and the view that texts do not lend themselves to determinate readings with underdetermination (ibid.). He also believes that an appropriately modest understanding of what underdetermination entails will distance it from relativism, but most relativistically inclined advocates of underdetermination are not willing to follow Laudan’s advice to circumscribe its scope. The key issue is that both the relativists and the anti-relativists could agree that the totality of evidence available does not prove the truth of any given theory. But the anti-relativists responds to this fact of underdetermination by pointing out that [...] we have good reasons for embracing the best theory available and moreover that there are indeed objective facts about the world, even if we are not in possession of them. The relativist, in contrast, argues that there are many, equally acceptable principles for accepting theories, all on the basis of evidence available, but such theories could result in very different verdicts. They also argue that in the absence of any strong epistemic grounds for accepting the existence of absolute facts in any given domain, we have no grounds, other than some kind of metaphysical faith, for thinking that there are such facts.

Relativism about science is also influenced by the related doctrine that all observations are theory-laden. Even anti-relativists such as Karl Popper admit that the idea that observations are not in some way tinted by theoretical assumptions is naïve. But some relativists about science offer a particularly extreme form of the doctrine of the widely accepted thesis of theory-ladenness. Feyerabend, for instance, goes so far as to argue that different systems of classification can result in perceptual objects that are not easily comparable.

Relativists about science also point to the prevalence of both synchronic and diachronic disagreement among scientists as a justification of their view. Looking at the history of science, Kuhn and his followers argued that Aristotelian physics presupposes a totally different conception of the universe compared to Newtonian physics; the same is true of Einsteinian physics compared to its predecessors. Moreover, these differing conceptions may be incommensurable in the sense that they are not readily amenable to comparison or inter-theoretical translation. There are also strong and unresolved disagreements between scientists working contemporaneously. The many different interpretations of quantum mechanics are a case in point.

Anti-relativist philosophers of science are often willing to concede all three points above, but insist that they do not, singly or jointly, justify the claim that scientific knowledge, in any philosophically interesting sense, is relative to its context of production. The success of science, both theoretical and applied, indicates that progress does take place. Fallibilism, the view that all scientific claims are provisional and liable to fail, they argue, is sufficient for dealing with difficulties arising from considerations of underdetermination and theory-ladenness of observations. Relativism, with its attendant denial that there could be objective and universal scientific truths or knowledge exacts too high a price for dealing with these allegedly troublesome features of the methodology and history of science.

Lui:I reorganize the views of the relativist and the anti-relativist. They are philosophers (Marx: “The philosophers interpret the world only, [...]”), their differing views reflect their different philosophical beliefs and attitudes, not their scientific knowledge.

The relativist dicta according to the authors:

R1Strong epistemic grounds are absent for accepting the existence of absolute facts in any given domain. (Lui: A relativist doubt.)

R2All observations are theory-laden. (It is an epistemic principle, and I call it theory ladenness.)

R3Different systems of classification can result in perceptual objects that are not easily comparable. (Lui: Take a system of classification as a theory or part thereof. A fact about science in general.)

R4There could not be objective and universal scientific truths. (Lui: Truths of theory. A doubt, could be an epistemic principle for the relativist.)

R5 The totality of evidence available does not prove the truth of any given theory. (Lui: Take evidence as facts. An epistemic principle I call incompleteness of evidence.)

R6There are many equally acceptable principles for accepting theories, all on the basis of evidence available, but such theories could result in very different verdicts.[(Lui: they are epistemic principles.)

R7Diachronically differing conceptions of theoretical physics are not readily amenable to comparison or inter-theoretical translation. (Lui: The authors are talking about Aristotelian, Newtonian and Einsteinian physics. A fact about theoretical physics.)

R8Synchronically differing interpretations of the same theoretical physics disagree among themselves. (Lui: The authors are talking about quantum mechanics. A fact about theoretical physics.)

Also according to the authors, the anti-relativist dicta:

A1There are indeed objective facts about the world, even if we are not in possession of them. (Lui: It is an epistemic principle on the partial possession of objective facts by human beings.)

A2Scientific knowledge is not relative to its context of production. (Lui: I take “scientific knowledge” as a near-synonym of “objective facts” in the case of the anti-relativist. This is also an epistemic principle, and I call it context-free production.)

A3All observations are theory-laden. (Lui: I also take “observations” as a near-synonym of “objective facts”. An epistemic principle, same as R2. )

A4 The totality of evidence available does not prove the truth of any given theory. (Lui: I take “evidence” as a near-synonym of “scientific knowledge”. An epistemic principle, same as R5.)

A5Fallibilism, the view that all scientific claims are provisional and liable to fail [...] is sufficient for dealing with difficulties arising from considerations of underdetermination of theory by data as well as theory-ladenness of observations. (Lui: I take “data” as a near-synonym of “observations”. Fallibilism is an epistemic principle.)

A6We have good reasons for embracing the best theory available.

A7 Progress of science does take place.

I chart out the connections between all dicta above in a semiotic system (Diagram 1). 

Note the following salient features:

(1) The anti-relativist lays down all his epistemic principles (A1, A2, A3, A4, A5) clearly but his relativist counterpart does not, except for the principle of theory ladenness (A3, R2) and that of incompletness of evidence (A4, R5) which they share together.

(2)The anti-relativist dictum A6 (“best theory”) is a methodological decision, and A7 a fact about physics as a mature science (“progress of science”). The relativist would not raise any explicit objection but simply brushes them aside.  

(3)Dicta R7 and R8 facts about theoretical physics in particular, but the relativist would generalize them to science in general.

(4)Dicta R1, R4 and R6 are doubts based on non-specific or unspecified epistemic principles. R6 can be seen as a relativist version of the anti-relativist admission of his dictum A5 (underdetermination of theory by data), in other words, there should be no dispute between the two parties. Doubt R4 (“objective and universal truths of theory”) and R1 (“absolute facts in any domain”) can easily be contained, if not dismissed, by the anti-relativist dictum A5 (“fallibilism”).   

(5)Dictum R3 is a doubt (“comparability”) arising from methodological considerations, and could as well be a fact about science in general.

(6) As noted in (1), the relativist accepts the epistemic principles R2 and R5.

Are the relativist and his anti-relativist counterpart really in dispute? I think not really, at least as far as experimental sociologists are concerned. I believe that those who are anti-relativists have either given up their insistence on their principle A2 (“context-free production of scientific knowledge”) and those who are relativists keep firmly their principle (“context-bound production”, name it dictum A2*). In fact, it is all that the so-called “new relativism” is about. Consequently, the anti-relativist position is largely gone in experimental sociology and its semiotic system is largely a relativist one.

Is there any room for the theoretical sociologist? I think he has to make his own. How? He may split first “scientific knowledge” into two connected halves, namely, “experimental knowledge” and “theoretical knowledge”, that is, “scientific knowledge = theoretical knowledge + experimental knowledge”. Then he rewrites A2 as A2* “production of knowledge—context of knowledge—context-bound production, an epistemic principle” for experimental knowledge, and keeps the original A2 “production of knowledge—context of knowledge—context-bound production, an epistemic principle” for theoretical knowledge, that is, the two kinds of knowledge are produced in different modes of production. Thus, he can rewrite dictum A7 into two, namely, “progress of science—theoretical knowledge” and “progress of science—experimental knowledge”.

The semiotic system of theoretical sociology is then as follows:

Diagram 2: The semiotic system containing theoretical sociology and its connection to experimental sociology

Dictum T1 is the key node for the connection between theoretical sociology and experimental sociology, which can be stated like this: The state of normal science is reached for sociology when the semiotic systems of all known experimental sociologies can be derived from that of the particular theoretical sociology so that all of the former are exemplars of the latter as the paradigm of sociology. In fact, it is exactly the key statement of the scientific project of sociology—as I propose.

Note that dictum T1 is equivalent to a claim I made earlier, that is, recruitment of all known sociological theories by the theoretical sociologist is linguistic relativism, with the sociological theories and his theoretical sociology being relativized variables and the relativizing parameter respectively, if he succeeds. My clarification-cum-argument is as follows:

(1)Experimental sociology and sociological theory mean the same thing, and the experimental sociologist and the sociological theorist are the same person.

(2)The context of production is taken to be the context of experiment since production of theoretical knowledge is supposed to be free other than the sociologist’s own limitations.

(3)The semiotic system of the paradigm and those of the exemplars are the relativizing parameter and the relativized variables that it relativizes.

(4)A semiotic system is the language (in the Saussurean sense) in which dictum T1 as a speech is realized, and hence T1 is a linguistic relativism.    

The jargon of relativization needs some terminological translation. In the state of normal science, the paradigm (a certain theoretical sociology) in the first place must be able to recruit all exemplars (experimental sociologies) and in the second place has to recruit every one without distorting its particularities, hence it itself must be universal. Thus, the universal semiotic system (of the paradigm) from which all particular semiotic systems (of the exemplars) are derived can be seen as the relativizing parameter, and the particular ones the relativized variables that it relativizes.    

You should notice that the first opposition “theoretical sociology―experimental sociologies” is sociological, the second one “paradigm―exemplars” scientific, and the third “relativizing parameter―relativized variable” methodological. An epistemic opposition “universalism―particularism” is introduced by way of “universal semiotic system―paritcular semiotic systems”. Elsewhere in a separate discussion on the SEP entry “communitarianism”, you shall see that the opposition “liberalism―communitarianism” in political philosophy can be added to this series of oppositions, which transverses a series of broad or specific academic domains. It implies that the scientific project of sociology needs to admit any of these oppositions wholly, not only one pole of it. Perhaps I may say that it is the scientific imperative（科學誡令）—any project that refuses or fails to meet it will be an outcast from science.  

When Diagram 2 is achieved, Diagram 1, with suggested changes as above, can be re-titled “The semiotic system containing experimental sociology”. Notice that the “conflict”（衝突）or “contradictions”（矛盾）, real or fictious, between the relativist and the anti-relativist are all dissolved in the case of experimental sociology whereas only anti-relativist dicta A2 and A7 are kept, with due modifications, in the case of theoretical sociology.

（Sociological理论大缸第177期）

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