如何精读《斯坦福哲学百科全书》的词条（一）？吕炳强解剖Relativism

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Comments on the SEP entry “Relativism”

The entry was published Sep 11, 2015 by Baghramian, Maria and Carter, J. Adam, "Relativism", The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Summer 2017 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.),

URL = https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2017/entries/relativism/>.

Draft 20171224

Lui:I have overlooked the term “relativism” （相對主義）until most recently when I read艾彥（霍桂桓）makes the following comment on it:

〔…〕自從十九世紀下半葉歐洲大陸出現有關科學方法的大討論以來，西方哲學界和社會科學界一直存在一個懸而未決的基本問題——社會科學和人文科學既然稱之為『科學』，它們的基本出發點和方法，與真正的自然科學究竟是甚麼關係？假如它們應當以自然科學的基本立場、出發點和方法為楷模，甚至直接採用這樣的立場、出發點和方法（其實，以實證主義社會科學理論和推崇定量研究的某些社會科學為突出代表的經濟學、社會學等等，一直是在努力追求做到這一點的），那麼，它們如何消除由於形式化而出現的各種與社會實在研究的本性相悖的弊端？因為這裡不僅存在著進行形式化和量化的研究立場和方法能不能用於研究各種社會現象的問題，而且也存在著能不能用理性主義的立場和方法來消除這種立場和方法本身的弊病的問題。另一方面，如果社會科學和人文科學具有自己所特有的基本立場和研究方法，那麼，這樣的立場和方法究竟是甚麼？它們能夠使這些科學成為真正的『科學』嗎？〔…〕

〔…〕要想徹底擺脫這種困境，就必須對西方自古希臘以來由一座又一座思想高峰組成的巍巍群山，進行徹底的顛覆；〔…〕。

其實，上述問題還隱含著一個更加深刻、更加令西方某些堅持傳統的認識論立場的思想家頭痛的問題——它就是相對主義問題。就西方社會科學和人文科學的研究現狀而言，『相對主義』可以說既是一個令某些人頭痛的問題，也是一股已經開始大行其道的潮流；從發展趨勢的角度來說，這種潮流其實就是直接由上述『科學方法大討論』發源的。因此，我們認為，無論我們的基本意圖是使自己的哲學研究、社會科學和人文科學研究與西方的研究接軌，達到趕超西方的研究水平，還是鑒於哲學的社會科學化的基本趨勢為社會科學和人文科學建立牢固的理論基礎，我們的都決不能無視相對主義問題，而毋寧說必須對它加以深入細致的探討和研究〔…〕

Why we cannot ignore relativism? I wonder but realize why when I read the first sentence (shaded) of the SEP entry “Relativism”.

Text: Relativism, roughly put, is the view that truth and falsity, right and wrong, standards of reasoning, and procedures of justification are products of differing conventions and frameworks of assessment and that their authority is confined to the context giving rise to them. More precisely, “relativism” covers views which maintain that—at a high level of abstraction—at least some class of things have the properties they have (e.g., beautiful, morally good, epistemically justified) not simpliciter, but only relative to a given framework of assessment (e.g., local cultural norms, individual standards), and correspondingly, that the truth of claims attributing these properties holds only once the relevant framework of assessment is specified or supplied. Relativists characteristically insist, furthermore, that if something is only relatively so, then there can be no framework-independent vantage point from which the matter of whether the thing in question is so can be established.

Lui:We know well that “truth and falsity, [...] are products of differing conventions and frameworks of assessment” but often forget that “their authority is confined to the context giving rise to them.” This is especially true for the Chinese translation 『相對主義』for the term “relativism”. It is in fact an epistemic term emphasizing the differing conventions（約定）and frameworks（框架）that make assessments（評估）(true or false, good or bad, justified or not justified, etc.) about some object（人、事、物，對象） also differing. The focus should be on the conventions and frameworks of assessment, which are later called domains of relativization（相對化領域）by the authors.

Being relative is always being relative to some domains, among which you can find later examples such as “individual’s viewpoints and preferences” and “historical epochs”, and the resulting types of relativism are respectively subjectivism（主體主義）and historicism（歷史主義）. They are types of relativism—quite surprising to the ignorant like me—and should be properly called subjective relativism（主體相對主義）and historical relativism（歷史相對主義）. This shift of emphasis takes me awhile to get used to; and you will discover later that types of relativism can be looked upon as typologies（類型學）of some object, such as typology of the actor（行動者類型學）and typology of history（歷史類型學）.

I shall for most of the time look upon relativism as typology. I shall claim elsewhere that the typology of the actor is indispensable to sociological theories（社會學理論）(that is, social theories（社會理論）that can sustain positive investigation（實證探究）under certain conditions) so that every one of them must carry it to make positive investigation possible. You will seen later that certain particular kinds of relativism go beyond typology and point to the scientific project of sociology（社會學的科學課題）, whose complexities and subtleties I shall discuss in due course. Please be patient.

Text:Relativism has been, in its various guises, both one of the most popular and most reviled philosophical doctrines of our time. Defenders see it as a harbinger of tolerance and the only ethical and epistemic stance worthy of the open-minded and tolerant. Detractors dismiss it for its alleged incoherence and uncritical intellectual permissiveness. Debates about relativism permeate the whole spectrum of philosophical sub-disciplines. From ethics to epistemology, science to religion, political theory to ontology, theories of meaning and even logic, philosophy has felt the need to respond to this heady and seemingly subversive idea. Discussions of relativism often also invoke considerations relevant to the very nature and methodology of philosophy and to the division between the so-called “analytic and continental” camps in philosophy. And yet, despite a long history of debate going back to Plato and an increasingly large body of writing, it is still difficult to come to an agreed definition of what, at its core, relativism is, and what philosophical import it has. This entry attempts to provide a broad account of the many ways in which “relativism” has been defined, explained, defended and criticized.

Lui:Since I am interested mainly in relativism as typology, the debates and controversies mentioned above are not relevant to my discussion.

Text:1. What is Relativism?

The label “relativism” has been attached to a wide range of ideas and positions which may explain the lack of consensus on how the term should be defined. The profusion of the use of the term “relativism” in contemporary philosophy means that there is no ready consensus on any one definition. Here are three prominent, but not necessarily incompatible, approaches:

1.1 The co-variance definition

A standard way of defining and distinguishing between different types of relativism is to begin with the claim that a phenomenon x (e.g., values, epistemic, aesthetic and ethical norms, experiences, judgments, and even the world) is somehow dependent on and co-varies with some underlying, independent variable y (e.g., paradigms, cultures, conceptual schemes, belief systems, language). The type of dependency relativists propose has a bearing on the question of definitions. Let us take some examples.

(a)Justice is relative to local norms.

(b)Truth is relative to a language-game.

(c)The measurement of temperature is relative to the scale we use.

Each of (a)–(c) exhibits a relation of dependence where a change in the independent variable y will result in variations in the dependent variable x. However, of the three examples cited above, normally only (a) and (b) are deemed relevant to philosophical discussions of relativism, for one main attraction of relativism is that it offers a way of settling (or explaining away) what appear to be profound disagreements on questions of value, knowledge and ontology and the relativizing parameter often involves people, their beliefs, cultures or languages.

The co-variance definition proceeds by asking the dual questions: (i) what is relativized? and (ii) what is it relativized to? The first question enables us to distinguish forms of relativism in terms of their objects, for example, relativism about truth, goodness, beauty, and their subject matters, e.g., science, law, religion. The answer to the second question individuates forms of relativism in terms of their domains or frames of reference—e.g., conceptual frameworks, cultures, historical periods, etc. Such classifications have been proposed by Haack (1996), O’Grady (2002), Baghramian (2004), and Swoyer (2010). The following table classifies different relativistic positions according what is being relativized, or its objects, and what is being relativized to, or its domains.

Lui:Note the terminology. The independent variable（自變項）y is also called the relativizing parameter（相對化參數）, In that case, the dependent variable（依變項）x can be called the relativized variable（被相對化變項）. The relativizing parameter is the domain of relativization and the relativized variable the object of relativization（相對化對象）. Personally I prefer the (relativizing parameter, relativized variable) pair of terms to the other two pairs, since it is closer to the terminology of probability theory. I shall rewrite Table 1: Domains of Relativization (y), which is omitted due to its undesirable format, in the immediately following text. 

Table 1 reflects the availability of fine-grained distinctions between different forms of relativism as functions of both objects (x) and domains (y) of relativization. In practice, however, much contemporary discussions of relativism focus on subjectivism, historicism, cultural relativism and conceptual relativism, along the axis of y, and cognitive/epistemic relativism, ethical or moral relativism and aesthetic relativism, along the axis of x. As we shall see in §5, New Relativism, where the objects of relativization (in the left column) are utterance tokens expressing claims about cognitive norms, moral values, etc. and the domain of relativization is the standards of an assessor, has also been the focus of much recent discussion.

Lui:The five relativizing parameters (columns) are as follows:

(I)   Individual’s viewpoints and preferences     

(II)  Historical epochs                                          

(III) Cultures, society, social groupings      

(IV) Conceptual schemes, languages, frameworks                  

(V)  Context of assessment, e.g., taste parameter, assessor’s/agent’s set of beliefs

          The five relativized variables (rows) are as follows:                                                                                                    

(A) Cognitive norms, e.g., rationality, logic

(B) Moral values

(C) Aesthetic values

(D) Thoughts, Perception

(E) Propositions or tokens of utterances expressing personal preferences, future contingents, epistemic models, aesthetic and moral predicates

Under column (I), there are (A) Alethic Subjectivism and Epistemic Subjectivism; (B) Moral Subjectivism; (C) Aesthetic Subjectivism; (D) Thought/percept Subjectivism; (E) N/A.

Under column (II), there are (A) Alethic and Epistemic Historicism; (B) Ethical Historicism; (C) Aesthetic Historicism; (D) Thought/percept Historicism; (E) N/A.

Under column (III), there are (A) Alethic Cultural Relativism and Epistemic Cultural Relativism; (B) Ethical Cultural and Social Relativism; (C) Aesthetic Cultural and Social Relativism; (D) Thought/percept Cultural and Social Relativism; (E) N/A.

Under column (IV), there are (A) Alethic Relativism and Epistemic Relativism; (B) Moral Conceptual Relativism; (C) Aesthetic Conceptual Relativism; (D) Thought/percept Conceptual Relativism, Linguistic Relativity; (E) N/A.

Under column (V), there are (A) Alethic; (B) (New) Moral Relativism; (C) (New) Aesthetic Relativism; (D) N/A; (E) New Relativism.

Table 1 has much to be desired, as far as sociology is concerned. For instance, relativizing parameter (column) (III) cultures, society, social groupings should be delineated into more columns, if sociologically considered. Also for instance, as far as the scientific project of sociology is concerned, I may very roughly say that rows (A) to (D) point to different areas of positive research（實證研究）, namely, sociology of action（行動社會學）, sociology of value（價值社會學）, sociology of arts（藝術社會學）, sociology of knowledge（知識社會學）respectively. Clearly, the relativized variables (rows) can be refined, modified and expanded to fit the current sociological classification of sub-disciplines.

Row (E) cannot be relativized by columns (I) to (IV). The authors do not give an explanation here, and I shall give one. Notice that “propositions or tokens of utterances expressing personal preferences, future contingents, epistemic models, aesthetic and moral predicates” in the row (E) are exactly the propositions or tokens of utterances about columns (I) to (IV). As a consequence, row (E) is on a higher logical plane than that of rows (A) to (D) under columns (I) to (IV), and hence it is a variable that cannot be relativized by the relativizing parameters (I) to (IV) of which it is the explicit expressions in writing or speaking. In fact it is relativized by the relativizing parameter (E) and thus gives rise to the so-called “New Relativism” （新相對主義）under column (E). The authors later suggest that New Relativism is “a sophisticated semantic version of relativism about truth, known as truth-relationism”.

In fact, row (E) can be considered as the Saussure-Boudieuen network of speech（索緒爾—布迪厄話說網絡）(hereafter abbreviated as S-B network of speech) in my theoretical sociology（理論社會學）. It is first an interobjectivity（交互對象性）and an objectivity（對象性）for the intersubjectivity（交互主體性）and the subjectivity（主體性）respectively in the ontology of my theoretical sociology, and second a social reality（社會實在）in the realism（實在論）for all types of actors (who are subjectivities) including, for example, the ruler（治人者）, the ruled（治於人者）, the ideologue（意識形態人）, the social theorist（社會理論家）, the theoretical sociologist（理論社會學家）, the sociological theorist（社會學理論家）. It is a public stock of knowledge（公共的知識庫存）from which all actors can choose at will whatever reference position (specific propositions or tokens of expressions, that is, a piece of speech). But row (E) has content only under column (V).

As a result, New Relativism is nothing but the S-B network of speech, that is, the public stock of knowledge. If the “assessor” or the “agent” is understood as an actor（for example, the ruler, the ruled, the ideologue, the social theorist, the theoretical sociologist or the sociological theorist as aforesaid）, the relativization of the public stock of knowledge afforded by column (V) is then accomplished by the actor when he chooses a reference position to defend against all other ones which are at odds with the one he chooses.  

The relatization of rows (A) to (C) by column (V) needs no explanation. But why row (D) cannot be relativized by the same column? My guess is this: If by “taste parameter”（喜惡參數）it is meant the “thoughts, perception” （受想行識 ）of the actor, and since his assessment is an act（舉止）which presupposes his taste parameter, he is incapable of assessing it as his presupposition.      

Text:1.2 Relativism by contrast

A second approach to defining relativism casts its net more widely by focusing primarily on what relativists deny. Defined negatively, relativism amounts to the rejection of a number of interconnected philosophical positions. Traditionally, relativism is contrasted with:

Absolutism, the view that at least some truths or values in the relevant domain apply to all times, places or social and cultural frameworks. They are universal and not bound by historical or social conditions. Absolutism is often used as the key contrast idea to relativism.

Objectivism or the position that cognitive, ethical and aesthetic norms and values in general, but truth in particular, are independent of judgments and beliefs at particular times and places, or in other words they are (non-trivially) mind-independent. The anti-objectivist on the other hand, denies that there is such thing as simply being “true’, “good”, “tasty” or “beautiful” but argues that we can coherently discuss such values only in relation to parameters that have something to do with our mental lives.

Monism or the view that, in any given area or topic subject to disagreement, there can be no more than one correct opinion, judgment, or norm. The relativist often wishes to allow for a plurality of equally valid values or even truths.

Realism, when defined in such a way that it entails both the objectivity and singularity of truth, also stands in opposition to relativism.

Relativism in this negative sense is a prominent feature of the work of the relativists malgré eux such as Richard Rorty (1979) and Jacques Derrida (1974). What justifies the appellation “relativist”, rather than “skeptic”, is not only these philosophers’ suspicion of the possibility of objectivity but their insistence on the role of socio-historical, psychological and textual contexts in accounts of “truth” and “knowledge” claims.

Lui:The scientific project of sociology largely goes beyond relativism by contrast. Exactly it is the complexities and subtleties of relativism depicted by the co-variance definition that interests the sociological theorist and the theoretical sociologist.   

Text:1.3 The hidden parameter definition

What also binds various forms of relativism is an underlying idea that claims to truth, knowledge or justification have an implicit, maybe even unnoticed, relationship to a parameter or domain. Gilbert Harman (1975), Robert Nozick (2001), and Crispin Wright (2008) are among the philosophers to propose versions of this thesis. Paul Boghossian summarizes the position this way:

the relativist about a given domain, D, purports to have discovered that the truths of D involve an unexpected relation to a parameter. (Boghossian 2006b: 13)

To take an example, moral relativism, according to this approach, is the claim that the truth or justification of beliefs with moral content is relative to specific moral codes. So the sentence “It is wrong to sell people as slaves” is elliptical for “It is wrong to sell people as slaves relative to the moral code of …”. Or alternatively, as Kusch (2010) formulates the idea on behalf of the relativist: “It is wrong-relative-to-the-moral-code-of-…” to sell people as slaves. The resulting sentence(s) turns out to be true, according to the relativist, depending on how we fill in the “…”. So, “It is wrong to sell people as slaves” comes out true relative to the moral code of the United Nations Charter of Human Rights and false relative to the moral code of ancient Greece. The justifying thought is that judgments about the morality of slavery, or any other ethical issue, are based on differing conventions, and there is no universal or objective criterion for choosing among differing competing socio-historically constituted conventions. Moreover, as a corollary of this approach, there is no truth of the matter of whether it is wrong to sell people as slaves, independently of the specification of some standard. Thus on the hidden parameter account, a consequence is that the relevant claims will be true, if at all, only relative to some parameter.

This particular approach to relativism is often expressed in explicitly linguistic terms and is favored by philosophers interested in the semantic dimensions of relativism. The claim is that predicates such as “is true”, “is rational”, “is right”, “is good” etc. in a natural language have the apparent logical form of one-place predicates, but their surface grammatical form is misleading, because upon further investigation they prove to be elliptical for two-place predicates such as “is true relative to…”, “is right according to”, etc., (of course, where such predicates are available). Relativism, according to this approach, is the claim that a statement of the form “A is P” within a given domain (e.g., science, ethics, metaphysics, etc.) is elliptical for the statement “A is P in relation to C”, where A stands for an assertion, belief, judgment or action, P stands for a predicate such as “true”, “beautiful”, “right”, “rational”, “logical”, “known” etc., and C stands for a specific culture, epistemic framework, language, belief-system, etc.

The three approaches outlined here are compatible and sometimes complementary. A relativistic thesis as captured by the approach outlined in §1.1 for instance, will also be relativistic in at least one of the negative senses outlined in §1.2. Moreover, as we shall see, since various subdivisions of relativism appearing in table 1 could, with appropriate modification, be expressed as claims about the truth of sentences falling in a particular domain, then the hidden predicate approach is applicable to them as well. (See §5 for a more detailed way to give expression to the hidden parameter insight within recent work in the philosophy of language.)

Lui:Sociologists of all kinds would agree with the assertion that “What also binds various forms of relativism [...] to a parameter or domain.” (shaded). The hidden parameter definition can be regarded as supplementary to the co-variance definition, so far as sociological theories are concerned.

Text:1.4 The scope of relativism

A further consideration relevant to defining relativism is its scope.

1.4.1 Global vs. Local Relativism

The basic idea of global relativism is captured by the oft-repeated slogan “all is relative”. The claim is that all beliefs, regardless of their subject matter, are true only relative to a framework or parameter. Local relativists, by contrast, limit their claim of relativization to self-contained areas of discourse, e.g., ethics, aesthetics and taste but argue that, for instance, scientific truths are not suitable candidates for a relativistic understanding (but also see §4.4.3). It is worth noting that local relativisms, typically, are endorsed on the basis of philosophical considerations connected to the kinds of features that are claimed to be relative (e.g., aesthetic standards, epistemic principles), or relatedly, semantic considerations to do with discourse where such features are attributed. Global relativism, by contrast, seems to be motivated not so much by considerations about particular features, but by more general considerations about truth itself.

As we will see, global relativism is open to the charge of inconsistency and self-refutation, for if all is relative, then so is relativism. Local relativism is immune from this type of criticism, as it need not include its own statement in the scope of what is to be relativized. Unsurprisingly, local rather than global relativism is much more common within contemporary debates. There is also a question mark on whether we could apply relativism to all truths in a completely unrestricted way; for instance, Kölbel (2011) has argued that claims such as “an object is beautiful and not beautiful” and “an object is identical to itself” have to be excluded.

Lui:The sociological theorist would agree with the local relativism more than the global one, since he conducts positive investigation which is often local.

Text:1.4.2 Strong vs. Weak Relativism

A further distinction is made between weak and strong forms of relativism. Strong relativism is the claim that one and the same belief or judgment may be true in one context (e.g., culture or framework or assessment) and false in another. Weak relativism is the claim that there may be beliefs or judgments that are true in one framework but not true in a second simply because they are not available or expressible in the second. Bernard Williams’ “relativism of distance” (Williams 1985) and Ian Hacking’s (1982) defense of variability in styles of reasoning are instances of weak relativism. Williams argues that certain concepts are only available to people who live a particular form of life. These are concepts that are not a part of what Williams calls the “absolute conception of the world” and do not express truths that any rational creature, regardless of her culture, would in principle acknowledge. Truths that require these concepts for their formulation are expressible only in languages whose speakers take part in that particular form of life. Such truths need not be true in a relativized sense—true relative to some parameters, false relative to others; rather, such truths are perspectival: real but visible only from a certain angle, i.e., for people who adopt a certain way of life. This weaker form of relativism, in so far as it denies the universality of certain truth claims, is captured more readily by the negative definition (§1.2) of relativism.

Lui:The sociological theorist would take a case-by-case stand regarding weak and strong forms of relativism.

Text:2. Why Relativism?

Interest in relativism as a philosophical doctrine goes back to ancient Greece. In more recent decades, however, relativism has also proven popular not only as a philosophical position but also as an idea underwriting a normative—ethical and political-outlook. (see Bloom 1987, in particular the Introduction). A number of philosophical considerations as well as socio-historical developments explain the enduring interest in and the more recent popularity of relativism.

2.1 Empirical claims of diversity and their consequences

Data regarding diversity of belief systems, conceptual frameworks and ways of life have frequently been used by philosophers and anthropologists alike to give credibility to philosophical arguments for relativism (For example see Hollis & Lukes 1982 and Wilson 1970). The mere fact of empirical diversity does not lead to relativism, but, relativism as a philosophical doctrine, has often been taken as a natural position to adopt in light of empirical diversity, in part, because relativism helps to make sense of such diversity without the burden of explaining who is in error.

Descriptive relativism, an empirical and methodological position adopted by social anthropologists, relies on ethnographic data to highlight the paucity of universally agreed upon norms, values and explanatory frameworks. From polygamy to cannibalism, from witchcraft to science we find major differences between the worldviews and outlooks of individuals and groups. Descriptive relativism is often used as the starting point for philosophical debates on relativism in general and cultural relativism in particular. The observed radical differences among cultures, it is argued, show the need for a relativistic assessment of value systems and conceptual commitments. Some anti-relativist universalists, on the other hand, argue that underlying the apparent individual and cultural differences, there are some core commonalities to all belief systems and socio-cultural outlooks (e.g., Nussbaum 1997). But the relativistically inclined respond by first pointing to the seeming incommensurability of various ethical and conceptual frameworks and the variability of cognitive norms and practices in difference cultures, and then, on this basis, maintain that the so-called “commonalities” belie significant differences. The anti-relativist may concede the point and insist that where such disagreements exist, at most one view is correct and the rest mistaken. But in so far as we are reluctant to impute widespread and systematic error to other cultures, or to our own, relativism remains an attractive option. Descriptive relativism is also central to the brand of relativism advocated by the sociologists of scientific knowledge and other social constructionists who argue that, even in the so-called “hard sciences”, we cannot escape the specter of irresolvable differences and even incommensurability (see §4.4.3).

Lui:I agree.

Text:2.2 Disagreements and intractability

There is not only a marked diversity of views on questions of right and wrong, truth and falsehood, etc., but more significantly, many disputes arising from such differences seem intractable. There are instances of long-standing disagreement, such that the disputants are very plausibly talking about the same subject matter (thus avoiding incommensurability) and genuinely disagreeing with each other; and yet, no amount of information and debate enables them or us to resolve the disagreement. And moreover, in such cases, it can seem that neither side seems to have made any obvious mistake (see, e.g., Hales 2014).

If well-informed, honest and intelligent people are unable to resolve conflicts of opinion, we should, some relativists argue, accept that all parties to such disputes could be right and their conflicting positions have equal claims to truth, each according to their own perspective or point of view. Their disagreement is faultless (Kölbel 2004; Brogaard 2007; Hales 2014). Many relativistically inclined philosophers, (e.g., Max Kölbel (2004), Wright (2006) and John MacFarlane with terminological qualification (2014: 133–136)) see the presence of faultless disagreements as central to motivating and justifying relativism. The anti-relativists counter that the very notion of a “faultless” disagreement is incompatible with our common understanding of what it means to disagree. It is a hallmark of disagreement, as commonly understood, that the parties involved find fault with the other sides’ views. When people disagree at least one of them is making a mistake or is failing to believe what he or she ought to believe given his or her cognitive aims. Relativism accordingly offers a revisionary account of what it means to disagree (e.g., MacFarlane 2007, 2014; see §5 where the point has been discussed in some detail); but it is not clear if the account can explain what is left of a disagreement to preserve once we allow that both parties to a disagreement could be right (Carter 2013; Dreier 2009).

A sophisticated semantic version of relativism about truth, known as truth-relativism, and alternatively as “new relativism”, has been proposed in recent years and which attempts to deal with some of these issues (e.g., MacFarlane 2014). We will return to this variety of relativism in §5.

A different perspective on the move from disagreement to relativism is offered in recent work by Carol Rovane (2012 and 2013), who rejects the prevailing consensus on what she calls the “disagreement intuition of relativism” in favor of an “alternatives intuition”. According to Rovane, relativism is motivated by the existence of truths that cannot be embraced together, not because they contradict and hence disagree with each other but because they are not universal truths. The example Rovane gives is conflict between a belief that deference to parents is morally obligatory in Indian traditionalist sense and the belief that it is not morally obligatory in the American individualist sense. Each belief is true within its particular ethical framework but the two beliefs cannot be conjoined or embraced together. Or more generally, it is not possible both to exercise full autonomy and simultaneously be dedicated to one’s community and its norms. The underlying thought, for Rovane, is that not all truth-value-bearers are in logical relations to one another, that there are many noncomprehensive bodies of truths that cannot be conjoined.

What the two approaches have in common is the claim that truth and justification are plural, that there could be more than one correct account of how things stand in at least some domains and their correctness has to be decided relative to a framework of context of assessment.

Lui:The sociological theorist would agree that “the parties involved find fault with the other sides’ views” and that “truth and justification are plural, [...] to a framework of context of assessment” (both shaded).

Text:2.3 No neutral ground

Additionally, the relativistically inclined find further support for their position in the contention that there is no meta-justification of our evaluative or normative systems, that all justifications have to start and end somewhere (see Sankey 2010 and 2011) and that there are no higher-order or meta-level standards available for adjudicating clashes between systems in a non-question begging way. Steven Hales, for instance, argues that faced with disagreement and given non-neutrality, relativism is the most viable non-skeptical conclusion to draw (Hales 2006: 98; 2014). Similar considerations apply to attempts to anchor beliefs on secure foundations. Various intellectual developments, leading to loss of old certainties in the scientific and social arena have strengthened the appeal of this point. The scientific revolution of the early 20th century, brought about by, for instance, the advent of Relativity Theory and Quantum Mechanics and the loss of faith in lasting religious or political truths (Marxism in particular), as well as the failure of foundationalist philosophical programs have been used in arguments to vindicate relativistic views (for relativism about science see §4.4.3). The relativists often argue that justifications are not only perspectival but also interest-relative and there is no neutral or objective starting ground for any of our beliefs (see Seidel 2014; Carter 2015: ch. 4 and Siegel in Hales 2011: 205 for criticisms of this type of justification of relativism).

Lui:I agree.

Text:2.4 Underdetermination of theory by data

Pierre Duhem’s (1861–1916) thesis of underdetermination of theory by data, the claim that empirical evidence alone is not adequate for providing justification for any given scientific theory, has played an important role in building up a case both for conceptual relativism (§4.2) and for constructionism and relativism about science (§4.4.2 and §4.4.3). According to the underdetermination thesis, incompatible theories can be consistent with available evidence. Relativism threatens whenever conflicting theories or views appear to have equal claim to truth or justification. The relativistically inclined use underdetermination to claim that evidence could be brought to justify opposing explanations and justification. The underdetermination thesis is also used to highlight the absence of neutral starting points for our beliefs. Choices between incompatible but equally well-supported rival theories, it is argued, are often made based on interests and local preferences rather than neutral universal grounds.

2.5 Context Dependence

Relativists argue that beliefs and values get their justification or truth only relative to specific epistemic systems or practices (see Kusch forthcoming). Strong support for this view has come from social scientists and cultural theorist who focus on the socio-cultural determinants of human beliefs and actions. The social sciences, from their very inception, were hospitable to relativism. Indeed, August Comte, the father of sociology, claimed that a strength of “positive sociology” was its “tendency to render relative the ideas which were at first absolute” (Comte 1976 [1830–42]: 89). Comte also was responsible for the battle cry “all is relative”, but immediately and no doubt self-consciously contradicted himself by adding “and that’s the only absolute”. Other social scientists, under the influence of Karl Marx (1818–1883), Max Weber (1864–1920), and Wilhelm Dilthey (1833–1911), have given credence to the idea that human beliefs and actions could be understood and evaluated only relative to their social and economic background and context. Beliefs, desires and actions, the argument goes, are never independent of a background of cultural presuppositions, interests and values. We cannot step out of our language, culture and socio-historical conditions to survey reality from an Archimedean vantage point. Even perceptions are “theory-laden” and could vary between linguistic and cultural groupings. The sociological view that beliefs are context-dependent, in the sense that their context helps explain why people have the beliefs they do, has also been used to support what is sometimes called “social” or “sociological relativism” or the view that truth or correctness is relative to social contexts because we can both understand and judge beliefs and values only relative to the context out of which they arise. Context-dependence is also used to explain empirical observations of diversity in beliefs and values; different social contexts, the argument goes, give rise to differing, possibly incompatible norms and values.

Lui:An accurate description of the advocacy of relativism, at least in the scientific project of sociology. Note that underdetermination of theory by data is a matter for the experimental physics, a point that should be borne in mind. It gives rise to relativism about science (see Text: Subsection 4.4.3, below).

Text:2.6 The Principle of Tolerance

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3. A Brief History of an Old Idea

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4. Varieties of Relativism

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4.1 Cultural relativism

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Lui:The above sections or subsections are worth reading, though omitted in order to keep quotations manageable.

（Sociological理论大缸第176期）

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