混合所有制与民营经济健康发展——基于企业违规视角的研究

《财经研究》 2022年48卷第3期 页码：33 - 47  online：2022年3月2日

混合所有制与民营经济健康发展——基于企业违规视角的研究

Mixed Ownership and Healthy Development of Private Economy: Based on the Perspective of Enterprise Violations

作者（中）：于瑶, 祁怀锦

作者（英）：Yu Yao, Qi Huaijin

作者单位：1.中央财经大学 会计学院, 北京 100081

摘要：从理论上看，国有股东参股民营企业既可能产生产业保护效应并激化内部治理矛盾而促进企业违规，也可能缓解资源约束并强化股权制衡而抑制企业违规。文章考察了民营企业混合所有制形式下，国有参股股东对民营企业违规的影响。研究发现，国有参股股东显著抑制了民营企业违规，缩短了违规后被查处的时间间隔，降低了违规倾向，提高了被稽查的概率。区分违规类型发现，这种抑制作用主要体现在信息披露违规、经营违规以及严重程度更高的违规行为中。区分国有参股股东属性发现，地方国有参股股东对民营企业违规具有更强的抑制效果。国有参股股东对民营企业违规的抑制路径包括监督治理民营企业双重代理问题和通过促进银行信贷、商业信用融资以及政府补贴为民营企业提供资源支持。结论表明，民营企业混合所有制建设并未降低正式制度的有效性，而是通过监督治理与资源支持促进了民营企业合法合规健康发展。本文从股权混合层面丰富了民营企业混合所有制建设经济后果的相关文献，尤其是挖掘了地方国有股东在民营企业混合所有制建设中的优势，为提升混合所有制改革效果，促进资本市场稳定发展提供了政策参考。

关键词：民营企业; 混合所有制; 企业违规

Summary: Private enterprises and state-owned enterprises have differentiated resource endowments and governance structures. Theoretically, in the process of state-owned shareholders’ participation in private enterprises, it may not only produce protective effects and strengthen the illegal motivation of private enterprises, but also obtain more external resource support due to government endorsement, alleviate resource constraints and weaken the illegal motivation. It may not only become a participant in intensifying the internal agency problem of private enterprises, so as to improve the probability of violations, but also build a more effective internal governance check and balance system to curb violations. Therefore, it is necessary to clarify the impact of state-owned shareholders’ participation on the violations of private enterprises and its action path through empirical analysis, so as to better guide the mixed ownership reform of private enterprises and achieve the purpose of the healthy development of private economy.This paper examines the impact of state-owned shareholders on the violations of private enterprises under the form of mixed ownership of private enterprises. It is found that state-owned shareholders significantly inhibit the violations of private enterprises, which is embodied in shortening the time interval after violations, reducing the tendency of violations and improving the probability of being audited. By distinguishing the types of violations, it is found that this inhibitory effect is mainly reflected in information disclosure violations, business violations and violations with higher severity. Distinguishing the attributes of state-owned shareholders, it is found that local state-owned shareholders have a stronger inhibitory effect on violations of private enterprises. The ways for state-owned shareholders to restrain the violations of private enterprises include supervising and governing the dual agency problem of private enterprises, and providing resource support for private enterprises by promoting bank credit, commercial credit financing and government subsidies. The conclusion shows that the construction of mixed ownership of private enterprises does not reduce the effectiveness of the formal system, but promotes the healthy development of legal compliance of private enterprises through supervision and governance and resource support.The possible contributions of this study are as follows: Firstly, from the perspective of mixed ownership of “state-owned participation and private holding”, it enriches the relevant literature on the influencing factors of enterprise violations, and especially excavates the advantages of local state-owned shareholders in restraining enterprise violations compared with central state-owned shareholders under the theory of political promotion championship. Secondly, it enriches the literature on political connection and enterprise violations. This paper finds that, contrary to the conclusion that “personnel political connection” weakens the effectiveness of formal system, “equity political connection” can strengthen the effectiveness of formal system. Thirdly, it enriches the research on the economic consequences of state-owned shareholders’ participation in private enterprises from the perspective of equity mixing, identifies the mechanism of the impact of state-owned shareholders’ participation on the behavior of private enterprises, and especially provides new evidence for the dispute over the role of state-owned shareholders’ supervision and governance.

Key words: private enterprises; mixed ownership; enterprise violations

DOI：10.16538/j.cnki.jfe.20211218.302

收稿日期：2021-7-13

基金项目：财政部会计名家培养工程项目；教育部人文社会科学研究规划基金项目（19YJA790068）

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