魏尚进、余心玎：如何重振世贸组织 | 趋势

■本文选自《复旦金融评论》

■作者：魏尚进 复旦大学泛海国际金融学院学术访问教授、哥伦比亚大学终身讲席教授；余心玎 对外经济贸易大学国际经济贸易学院经济学副教授

■公众号：复旦金融评论

世界贸易组织的上诉机构正在面临的威胁来自美国而不是中国。美国正阻挠世贸组织新法官遴选。重振世贸组织需要变革其规则，但废除其争端裁定机制并不是解决之道。

本文共计2018字，预计阅读时长4分钟

拉至底部，阅读英文原文

2019年12月11日是中国加入世界贸易组织（WTO，以下简称“世贸组织”）18周年纪念日，同时也标志着一个时代的开始——从此世贸组织不再拥有一个正常运转的上诉机构来裁定成员国之间的贸易争端。那么世贸组织为什么会面临瘫痪？还有机会在为时已晚之前复苏吗？

在2001年中国加入世界贸易组织之前，许多人担心给予中国成员资格会令世贸组织走向自我毁灭，担心的渠道有三种可能：第一，中国可能大肆违反世贸组织规则，导致针对中国的上诉案件激增，从而超出由七名法官组成的上诉机构的受理能力；第二，中国可能会通过对其他国家提起大量吹毛求疵的上诉案来表达自身不忿，这也会超出世贸组织的受理能力；第三，中国可能会无视世贸组织对其做出的任何裁决，从而损害该体系的信誉和效用。

然而上述三种情况都未发生。自2001年底起（统计截止至2019年11月15日）。如图1所示，提请世贸组织裁决的349宗贸易争端中以中国作被告的仅有44宗，占案件总数的12.6％，与2018年中国在全球出口中所占的12.8％份额大致相符。而该数字要少于同期起诉美国的99宗和起诉欧盟的52宗。中国没有铺天盖地被告违反规则的重要原因之一在于中国一直在依据、甚至超出其入世协定条款，不断减少关税和非关税贸易壁垒并放宽投资限制。事实上，很少有国家在同期能像中国这样在大力降低此类壁垒。

同样，中国也并没有成为一个过于激进的上诉方。2001年12月以来，如图2所示，中国一共向世贸组织提交了21宗上诉案，仅占上诉案件总数的6％，远低于其2018年在全球进口中所占的10.8％份额。引人注目的是，这一数字也大大低于美国和欧盟分别提交的55宗和46宗。

全球经济中的大国一般都没能完全遵守世贸组织的裁定。但是自2001年以来起诉中国的44宗案件中，其他国家不得不再次求助世贸组织、以确保中国更好履行裁决的案件仅有2宗，而同期针对美国的99宗案件中却有15宗要再次上诉。

世贸组织允许各个成员国在一定规则下利用自身国家制度来执行贸易规则，尤其在补贴和倾销（以低于成本价出售）方面。这可以广义地解释为全球贸易规则框架的一部分。借助2017年的数据，我们发现所有世贸组织成员国对出口国提出的反倾销和反补贴案件数量（每千亿美元出口平均被诉次数的对数值见下图纵轴）会随着出口国收入水平的提高（由横轴上的对数人均GDP显示）而下降。

图中的每个蓝点都代表一个世贸组织成员经济体，黑色实线代表国际平均值（参照除中国之外的所有成员经济体绘制）。由此展现的数据特征非常清晰：随着一个国家变得更加富裕，针对它的反补贴或反倾销案件也越来越少。这可能是因为较富裕的国家会更加遵守规则，或者因为劳动力成本上升、惹来投诉的几率更小，又或是这两项因素的结合。

在这种国际普遍规律下，我们可以检验其他国家是否认为中国带来了特别头痛的问题。为此，我们将1995~2017年间所有其他世贸组织成员对中国出口商提出的反倾销/反补贴案件总数（相对于中国出口量）叠加在同一张图表上。自从中国于2001年入世以来，此类案件与出口数量的比例随着中国收入的增加而下降，也与国际平均经验所预测的情况相吻合。换句话说，跨国比较数据表明，中国的贸易行为与其他世贸组织成员国相比并未带来什么特别的问题（当然中国的体量意味着针对中国上诉案的绝对数量较大）。

从世贸组织创始之刻一直到最近，从未有人想过美国这个世贸组织规则的主要制定者会选择废除其上诉机构。但这场戏似乎正在上演。2017年以来，随着世贸组织的几位在任法官四年任期陆续结束，美国全面系统地否决了其他国家提名的所有继任者，而这样做的目的想让该体系陷入停摆，直到其他国家同意以美国的意愿再次更改规则。

任何世贸组织争端的最后仲裁小组都需要至少配备三名法官。因此随着上诉机构余下的三名法官中的两名已于2019年12月10日卸任，其“最高法院”现已名存实亡。

自世贸组织1995年成立以来，全球GDP已经累计增长了近250％，而全球贸易额则增长了约270％。一个专业且客观公正的国家间贸易争端裁决程序是这一成功的关键。因为在双边或区域贸易谈判中，大国总会比小国拥有更高的议价能力，世贸组织的贸易争端解决程序营造的公平竞争环境对为数众多的中、小成员国尤其重要。

重振世贸组织就难免要改变其游戏规则。今后也许应该采用通过多数或绝对多数投票去任命上诉机构法官，从而让任何一个国家都不能单方面阻止候选人的任命。此外，根据贸易量的增长，该机构或可扩容为15名法官并延长其任期，也可以暂时延长最后三名法官的任期。

不过，仅有这些措施还不够。与时俱进地改进世贸组织在国有企业、政府采购、反倾销案件和数字贸易方面规则也符合美国、中国以及其他国家的利益。但无论这些国家希望进行何种改革，扼杀该组织的争端解决体系都不是解决方案。

向上滑动阅览英文原文

How to Revive the WTOSHANG-JIN WEI, XINDING YUThe World Trade Organization’s appellate body is under threat not from China, but from the United States, which is blocking the appointment of new judges to the panel. Reviving the WTO will require changes to the organization's rules – but killing its dispute-settlement system is not the solution.December 11, 2019, is the 18^th anniversary of China’s accession to the World Trade Organization. It also marks the start of an era in which the WTO no longer has a functioning appellate body to adjudicate trade disputes among member countries. Why is the WTO imploding, and can it be resuscitated before it’s too late?

Before China joined the WTO in 2001, many feared that its membership could doom the organization in one of three ways. First, Chinese rule breaking might be so common, skeptics claimed, that it would trigger an explosion of cases against the country that would overwhelm the appellate body of seven judges. Second, China might express its grievances by bringing countless potentially frivolous cases against other countries, which would also exceed the organization’s capacity constraint. And, finally, China might ignore any WTO ruling against it, undermining the system’s credibility and usefulness.

None of that happened. Of the 349 trade disputes brought to the WTO for adjudication since the end of 2001, China has been a defendant in 44, or 12.6% of the total – in line with the country’s 12.8% share of global exports in 2018. Interestingly, this number is fewer than the 99 brought against the United States and the 52 brought against the European Union during the same period. Part of the reason is that China has continued to reduce tariff and non-tariff trade barriers, and ease investment restrictions, in accordance with – and sometimes going beyond – the terms of its WTO accession agreement. In fact, few countries have reduced such barriers more than China has during this period.Likewise, China has not turned out to be an overly aggressive complainant. Since December 2001, China has lodged 21 cases at the WTO, or 6% of the total – lower than its 10.8% share of global imports in 2018. Strikingly, this number also is substantially lower than the 55 cases lodged by the US, and the 46 filed by the EU.Large countries tend not to have a perfect record of complying with WTO rulings. But of the 44 cases against China since 2001, other countries have had to return to the WTO to secure better compliance only twice, compared to 15 times in the 99 cases against the US over the same period.

The WTO allows individual member countries to have their own national systems for enforcing trade rules, particularly regarding subsidies and dumping (selling below cost). This may be interpreted broadly as part of the rules-based global trade framework. Using data for 2017, we find that the number of anti-dumping and countervailing (anti-subsidy) cases lodged by all WTO member countries against exporting countries (the log value of which is on the vertical axis of the graph below) tends to decline as the income level of the exporter increases (shown by the log value on the horizontal axis).

Each blue dot on the graph represents a WTO member economy, and the solid black line shows the international average (drawn from all member economies excluding China). The data pattern is fairly clear: as a country becomes richer, there are fewer anti-subsidy or anti-dumping cases against it. This could be because richer countries observe rules better, are less likely to attract complaints as their labor costs rise, or some combination of the two.Given this international pattern, we can check whether other countries have considered China to be a special problem. We do so by superimposing on the same graph the total number of anti-dumping and anti-subsidy cases lodged against Chinese exporters by all other WTO members from 1995 to 2017, relative to China’s export volume. Since China’s accession in 2001, the number of such cases relative to exports has declined as China’s income has increased, much as the average international experience would have predicted. In other words, cross-country comparative data suggest nothing especially problematic about China. (Of course, China’s size means that the absolute number of cases against China is large.)

Until recently, no one would have thought that the US, a key architect of the rules governing the WTO, would choose to kill the organization’s appellate body. But that is what appears to be happening now. Since 2017, as the body’s current judges have completed their four-year terms, the US has systematically rejected any proposed successor nominated by other countries, apparently with the aim of rendering the system inoperative until other countries agree to alter the rules to America’s liking.

Any WTO dispute-settlement panel is required to have at least three judges. So, with two of the appellate body’s three remaining judges having completed their terms on December 10, the organization’s “highest court” is now functionally dead.Since the WTO was established in 1995, global GDP has grown by about 250% on acumulative basis, while global trade has increased by about 270%. A professional disinterested process for adjudicating trade disputes between countries has been key to this success. Because larger countries always have greater bargaining power than smaller ones in bilateral or regional trade negotiations, this process has helped to level the playing field in favor of the WTO’s vast majority of small- and medium-size members.Resuscitating the WTO will require changing its rules. Perhaps appellate body judges should be appointed by a majority or supermajority vote, so that no single country can block a nominee. In addition, the body could be expanded to 15 judges, in line with growth in trade volumes, and appointees’ terms could be lengthened. Or the terms of the last three judges could be extended temporarily.But none of these measures will be enough. The US, China, and other countries also have an interest in modernizing WTO rules regarding state-owned firms, government procurement, anti-dumping cases, and digital trade. Whatever reforms these countries wish to see, killing the organization’s dispute-settlement system is not the solution.

*本文经原作者授权，如需转载请联系授权并注明出处。

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