前外交部副部长：大选后中美关系调整的空间与可能 (中英双语）

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编者按：作者何亚非（He Yafei）系外交部前副部长及国务院侨务办公室副主任，中国人民大学重阳金融研究院高级研究员、全球治理研究中心主任，本文刊于11月30日《中美聚焦网》，原标题为《何亚非：大选后中美关系调整的空间与可能》。

 美国大选结束，拜登当选为美国总统似乎已无悬念，民主党时隔四年再次入主白宫，标志着美国政治步入新阶段。有几点值得注意：一是美国政治中特朗普现象“不可预测性”将告一段落，但是特朗普获得7100万选票表明，民粹主义和“美国优先”作为社会主流意识将继续影响美国内外政策；二是美国对外单边主义和“退群”行为会有所收敛，多边主义和国际组织作用可能上升，但美国想重新领导“自由世界”并非易事；三是中美关系出现恢复对话、重新评估的空间，但两国战略竞争关系已经坐实，不可能回到从前合作竞争共存、合作占主流的局面。

     美国新政府上台后，两国有可能伸出双手共同托住两国关系的“自由落体”，并通过对话寻求摆脱困境的办法吗？答案是谨慎肯定。“停止按钮”确实触手可及，但能否摆脱战略恶性竞争需要走一步看一步。中美作为霸权国家和新兴国家不是命中注定就有一战。中美有足够智慧在几十年合作共赢基础上，结合国际格局新变化重新认识对方、认识世界，制定双方都能接受的“游戏规则和行为框架”以指导两国关系。关键是按下“停止按钮”、开启对话空间后怎么做才能制止两国关系的“自由落体”。 

      第一，需要停止奢谈“冷战”或者“热战”，尽力为两国关系的紧张状态降温。美国“两院一府”和一些重要智库意识形态浓厚的冷战式讲话这两年持续不断，严重恶化了两国关系的生态环境，误导了社会和民众。

      目前，对中美关系有两个偏激解读。一是过分乐观，认为中美关系恶化前所未有，但依然是“两国关系好也好不到哪里去，坏也坏不到哪里去”，因为两国经济相互依赖程度高，又有“确保相互摧毁”的核威慑（MAD），不可能发生全面冲突和战争；二是过度悲观，认为如今中美关系与1914年前英德关系从架构和驱动因素看都惊人相近，战争恐怕难以避免。

这两种观点各持一词，争论不休，却从根本上忽视了中美关系这几十年在全球化背景下稳步发展带来的启示。

中美不是一战前的英德，也不是冷战期间的美苏，21世纪国际格局与20世纪初不可同日而语。中美在过去40年可以根据局势变化找到战略利益契合点，并就此开展合作，现在依然存在合作空间和契合点。两国全面对抗和战争的灾难性后果显然易见，谁也不愿意走进“死胡同”。

还有，中美只是世界的一部分，而不是全部。当今世界已从“美国的世界”演变成“各国的世界”，全球治理也从“西方治理”向“东西方共同治理”转变。虽然美国竭力以意识形态划线，把中美关系描述成“民主”与“非民主”、“善良”与“邪恶”之争，然而许多国家并不赞同也不愿站队。最近基辛格博士、法国总统和新加坡总理的讲话都明确表达了这层意思，呼吁中美保持清醒。前几天内效俭大使与我对话时同样不赞成类似说法。

著名学者罗伯特·卡根和欧逸文（Evan Osnos）说，如果不加管控，美中有可能步一战前英德后尘，“梦游”式地进入战争。中美绝不能容许“梦游”，世界其他国家也在高度关注中美下阶段互动。

第二，两国需要抓住即将出现的恢复对话空间，着手为对话做准备，以期从中寻找缓和双边关系、开展有规则竞争和适度合作的契机。

从拜登外交班子人选和美国政治现实看，中美战略竞争关系难以逆转，意识形态之争可能升级。库尔特·坎贝尔和杰克·苏利文2019年在《外交事务》撰文称，“中国最终对美国的意识形态挑战将超过前苏联”。

中美战略竞争需要与意识形态脱钩，需要建立有序竞争的规则和框架，这是问题的关键，也是今后可能恢复的中美战略对话的核心议题。而以规则为基础的有序竞争，其要点是双方需要接受世界秩序正在被重新塑造的现实。如今的世界不可能回到单极，只会朝着多极的方向加速发展。“分享和共同”是关键词。

从现实看，近期内中美恢复战略对话时机尚不成熟，但是新政府上台后，在双方共同关切的若干领域先接触对话，并尽可能同步采取一些建立信任措施，还是有可能的。

似可考虑先从防控新冠疫情、经济贸易、金融、网络、危机管控等领域着手。

        一、新冠疫情短期内难以消灭，拜登已经把应对新冠疫情作为上任后首要工作，双方就疫苗和疫情防控进行合作有较大空间。两国还需要就新冠疫情后世界经济复苏的思路和路径尽早商谈，做好政策储备。

       二、两国供应链由于美国对华战略变化和新冠疫情冲击需要进行调整，但两国贸易和经济合作事关共同利益和百姓日常生活，需要尽早恢复正常。至于是否继续落实第一阶段贸易协定，然后开始第二阶段谈判，还是重新谈判双边贸易问题，可以顺其自然。同时就WTO改革等涉及全球贸易体系的问题进行协商，以修复该体系。

图源：经济观察报

        三、金融对话有基础也有需要。两国在2008年世界金融危机期间合作抗击危机的“同舟共济”精神至今历历在目。对话可侧重两方面：一是日益积累的全球金融风险。G20国家已经注入17万亿美元流动性，其中美联储就达4万亿美元，加上美国财政刺激3万亿。美元贬值和资本市场大起大落在所难免。如何防范新金融危机，缩短世界经济谷底运行时间是共同难题。中美作为两大经济体应再度携手，推动G20再次发挥“全球经济治理首要平台”领导作用。二是中国金融市场稳步开放与美国资本大量涌入的磨合和风险管控，需要两国央行和金融机构进行仔细推演研究。

        四、网络安全事关两国国家安全和国计民生。中美就网络安全问题进行对话具有紧迫性和实际意义，内容可以包括制定可操作的规则防止网络攻击、确定何种网络攻击构成战争行为门槛、建立全球网络治理规则和治理体系、建立网络合作和危机管控平台就两国网络空间已经和可能出现的问题及时进行沟通。

        五、军事冲突管控危机机制细化更新。在网络技术日新月异、两国关系持续下滑、军事紧张局势上升的情况下，如何防止在南海、台海、朝鲜半岛、东海等地擦枪走火，以及一旦出现摩擦或冲突如何防止冲突升级为危机，需要有常态化、可操作的军队和外交两条线的危机管控工作机制，还要重新确认高层热线沟通机制的畅通。

        第三，中美都需要集中精力解决各自的国内问题。中国正在制定“十四五”国民经济规划和前瞻性的2035经济发展设想，提出“双循环”经济新发展思想、新发展格局，以促进经济的转型和可持续发展。美国国内问题重重叠加，如民粹主义泛滥、身份政治流行、贫富差距和不平等现象严重、种族矛盾激化、经济持续下滑。要解决好国内问题不仅需要自身艰苦努力，也离不开双方一定程度的合作以构建相对有利的国际环境。

图源：搜狐网

        历史告诉我们，中美和则世界和、中美斗则世界乱。这次处理疫情已经引出中美两种经济发展思路和政治制度的比较，未来经济发展好坏还会加深这一现象，美英等国学者和百姓为此开始质疑西方“民主制度”的有效性。中国完全无意展开任何形式的意识形态竞争，疫情政治化、经济政治化都不可取。中国主张各国根据本国国情采取适合自己的发展模式和政治制度。中美都需要找到符合自身发展规律的经济转型思想和落实路径。唯有两国相互包容、加强合作才能互补、互利、共赢。

      第四，在全球治理体系日益碎片化和“无政府化”期间，重拾“中美共治”显然不现实也不可能，但是两国体量大且影响力强，增加互信与合作，坚持多边主义，在处理国际事务、应对传统和非传统安全威胁方面发挥表率作用，并与欧洲和其他国家积极携手合作至关重要。人类的未来是共同的，是可以相互塑造的，没有一个国家能够独善其身。 

二、我

英文原文：Adjustments After the Election

The result of the U.S. presidential election is a foregone conclusion, with Democrat Joe Biden emerging as the victor. The election marks a new era for U.S. politics, with Democrats at the helm again after a hiatus of four years. A few underlying trends warrant attention. First, while Trump-style unpredictability is no more, his “America first” populism may not be easily rooted out and may continue to taint U.S. domestic and foreign policy. After all, 73 million votes went to Trump. Second, the U.S. will become more restrained in terms of unilateralism or withdrawing from international obligations, and will elevate multilateralism and the role of international organizations, but it is by no means a cakewalk to reset U.S. leadership. Third, even when China and the U.S. resume dialogue and reset the space for cooperation, a relationship defined by strategic competition is set in stone. The clock cannot be turned back to the days of coexistence of cooperation and competition, with cooperation dominant.  The question of the day is: Under the Biden administration, will both sides reach out with open arms to arrest the freefall of bilateral ties, and jointly negotiate their way out of gridlock? The answer is a cautious yes. But while the pause button is within reach, whether or not they can shake off pernicious strategic competition is anyone’s guess. A war is not predestined between the U.S. and China, as the respective hegemonic and emerging power. Both sides command the wisdom to understand each other, and to comprehend the world through renewed efforts that draw from mutually beneficial cooperation over past decades. They can adapt to the evolving international landscape and reach a mutually acceptable set of rules and a framework to steer bilateral ties forward. The crux of the issue is what should be done to arrest the freefall once the pause button has been activated and negotiations on cooperative space are poised to kick off. 

图源：China US Focus

First, they must pull the plug on rhetoric about “cold war” or “hot war” to take the heat out of ongoing tensions. In the past two years, ideologically charged narratives on the part of the U.S. administration, both houses of Congress and prestigious think tanks have materially poisoned the ecosystem of China-U.S. relations and misled both news coverage and public opinion. 

It seems that any reading of bilateral ties tends to take place at the extremes of the political spectrum. There are those who are overly optimistic, believing that despite the recent rough patch, bilateral relations are not getting any better but won’t get any worse. They note that the two sides have highly intertwined economic interests and are constrained by mutually assured destruction, or MAD, so there is no way a full-fledged war will break out. 

The other view is overly pessimistic, working on the assumption that current China-U.S. relations bear a strong resemblance to relations between Britain and Germany before 1914 — both in terms of structure and driving force — and therefore conclude that war is inevitable.

The two arguments go back and forth, but neither recognizes the fact that China-U.S. relations have evolved in the course of globalization. China and the U.S. are not Britain and Germany in the pre-World War I period, nor does the analogy of tensions between the Soviet Union and the U.S. stand. The international landscape in the 21st century cannot be compared in the same breath with that of a century ago. 

Just four decades ago, China and the U.S. managed to find strategic convergence in the midst of changing circumstances and engage in cooperation. And space for cooperation and convergence still exists. Fully aware of the consequences of a full-blown confrontation and war, neither country is willing to take bilateral relations into a cul-de-sac. 

China and the U.S. are only a part of the world, not the whole thing. The world today has evolved from an America-centric world to a cosmopolitan one, and global governance has also been transformed — from governance by the West to shared governance between East and West. 

While the U.S. has left no stone unturned to label the China-U.S. relationship as democracy vs. non-democracy, or good vs. evil, most countries don’t take sides. They don’t automatically subscribe to the U.S. view. Henry Kissinger, French President Emmanual Macron and Prime Minister of Singapore Lee Hsien-Loong have explicitly conveyed similar messages in their recent remarks, and call for levelheaded thinking on both sides. Former U.S. Ambassador to China J. Stapleton Roy expressed disapproval of the U.S. administration’s rhetoric in a conversation with me several days ago. 

Eminent scholars such as Robert Kagan and Evan Osnos said that if left unmanaged the U.S.-China relationship may follow in the footsteps of the UK and Germany before WWI, namely “sleepwalking” into war. But neither country can afford to sleepwalk, and how they interact going forward is under close scrutiny. 

Second, the two countries need to seize on the imminent window of opportunity to resume dialogue, and pave the ground in advance to capture the opportunity for detente, rules-based competition and an appropriate level of cooperation. 

In light of Biden’s foreign policy cabinet lineup and U.S. political realities, strategic competition will not be reversed. There will be escalated ideological confrontation. Back in 2019, Kurt Campbell and Jake Sullivan co-authored an article in Foreign Affairs claiming that “China may ultimately present a stronger ideological challenge than the Soviet Union did.”

China-U.S. strategic competition must shake off ideologically driven thoughts and build a framework for orderly competition, which holds the key to all issues and sits at the center of future strategic dialogue. 

Central to orderly rules-based competition is the recognition that the world order is being reshaped, and the world we live in is not going back to unipolarity in favor of accelerated development toward multipolarity. “Shared” and “common” are the key words. 

As things stand now, it's premature to restart strategic dialogue, but it's possible for both sides to engage and converse in relevant areas and take measures to rebuild confidence and trust in tandem with Biden’s taking office. Possible areas for such early engagement include pandemic control and mitigation, economic and trade ties, financial cooperation, cybersecurity and crisis control. 

Here are some steps:

1. As the pandemic will not be going away in the short term, Biden has made it his first priority, which suggests there is ample room for cooperation between the two countries. Also, they need to sit down and share visions of pathways to spur economic recovery in the post-COVID era and compare notes on respective policies.      

2. Supply chains are undergoing adaptation, with strategic policy shifts and fallout from the pandemic. But trade and economic cooperation have a direct bearing on shared interests and people’s daily lives, and must be restored at an early date. 

As for whether to stick to the phase one trade agreement before moving to phase two, or starting a new bilateral trade negotiation, both sides can just see how things flow. In the meantime, talks about reforming the WTO and issues related to the multilateral trading system can be pursued with a view toward restoring and improving the system.  

3. It is necessary to engage in dialogue in the financial sector. And conditions are already in place. In the aftermath of the 2008 financial crisis, China and the U.S. worked in sodality to tide over the crisis. It is remembered as a highlight of bilateral ties to this day. 

Dialogue could focus on two fronts: First is the mounting global financial crisis. Members of the G20 have injected $17 trillion to boost liquidity, with U.S. Federal Reserve pandemic response programs totaling $4 trillion and fiscal stimulus mounting to $3 trillion. Dollar depreciation and financial fluctuations are bound to happen at some point, posing a common challenge for the U.S. and China to forestall a new financial crisis and propel the global economy out of the trough at an early date. 

China and the U.S., as the two biggest economies in the world, must work together to empower the G20 to play its role as the premier platform for global economic governance. 

With China’s steady and further financial opening, and the influx of U.S. capital, central banks and financial institutions in both countries must examine various scenarios to adapt to new circumstances and manage risks. 

4. Cybersecurity concerns national security and livelihoods. There is a pressing need for the two countries to engage in cybersecurity dialogue, including operational rules to prevent cyberattacks, and to specify what kind of attacks constitute an act of war. A global governance network is needed, as are the establishment of cyber cooperation and crisis control platforms to ensure timely communication on existing and prospective problems in cyberspace.  

5. Military confrontation control mechanisms and other crisis controls need to be refined and updated. Rapid development of technology may compound the consequences of rising tensions in the bilateral and military arenas. It is therefore necessary to put into place regular crisis control mechanisms under the military and diplomatic remits to prevent frictions from escalating into crisis, and to ensure high-level hot lines are open and smooth.  

Third, both sides need to focus on domestic issues. China is rolling out its 14th Five-Year Plan and economic strategies for 2035. It’s striving to foster a dual circulation economic development paradigm with domestic circulation as the mainstay, while international circulation and domestic circulation would reinforce each other, in a bid to promote economic transformation and sustainable development. 

For the U.S., multiple domestic challenges are emerging, with rife populism, identity politics and income inequality converging with soaring racism and economic doldrums. Much needs to be done at the domestic level, but a favorable international environment through cooperation with China is also essential. 

History has borne out that when China and the U.S. are at peace, the world is in harmony. The opposite is true as well. Differing approaches in response to the pandemic have invoked comparisons of the economic development paths and political systems in the two countries, and the economic trajectory in each country will fuel such comparisons. Academics and the general public are questioning the effectiveness of the Western democratic system. 

China doesn’t seek to engage in any form of ideological competition, and rejects politicization of the pandemic and economic engagements. It believes that all countries should pursue development models and political systems in keeping with their own national realities. China and the U.S. need to explore the philosophy of economic transformation and pathways of implementation suitable to themselves. Only with accommodation and closer cooperation can the two forge a complementary relationship for mutual benefit.  

Fourth, with the increasing fragmentation of global governance and anarchy in global affairs, “Chimerica” is neither realistic nor workable. At the end of the day, however, the two giants need to strengthen trust and cooperation while upholding multilateralism and play a leading role in international affairs and tackling threats arising from conventional and nonconventional threats. Cooperation with Europe and others is essential. Humanity has a shared future. It is within our ability to shape and influence each other. We will sink or swim together. 

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中国人民大学全球治理研究中心(Global Governance Research Center，RUC)成立于2017年3月9日，是北京巨丰金控科技有限公司董事长马琳女士向中国人民大学捐赠并由中国人民大学重阳金融研究院（人大重阳）负责运营管理的教育基金项目。中国人民大学全球治理研究中心由原外交部副部长、人大重阳高级研究员何亚非领衔，前中国银行副行长、国际商会执行董事、人大重阳高级研究员张燕玲担任学术委员会主任，旨在构建高层次、高水准的全球治理思想交流平台，并向社会发布高质量的全球治理研究报告，努力践行咨政、启民、伐谋、孕才的智库使命。

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