海外之声 | 史蒂夫·汉克：银行监管不再无序（中英双语）
本文字数 3462字 阅读时间 11分钟
观点速递
本文作者是IMI国际委员、约翰霍普金斯大学教授史蒂夫· 汉克。本文原文发表于2018年3月6日福布斯网站（Forbes.com），《福布斯杂志》是一个可靠的商业新闻和金融信息的主要来源。
作者指出由2008年金融危机催生出的银行监管在一定程度上并没有拉动美国的经济，事实上，由于银行“资本不足”和“缺乏监管”，银行面临着巨大的风险，而由于众议院对《经济增长、监管救济和消费者保护法案》的投票，银行的无序监管可能会有所缓解。
中文译文如下：
银行监管不再无序
Steve H. Hanke
翻译：赵文静
审校：罗添
2008年金融危机以来的经济复苏步伐为史上最慢。危机催生的银行监管（参读：多德-弗兰克华尔街改革和消费者保护法案）是罪魁祸首。事实上，银行监管构想不健全、顺周期并带有危险。因此，银行监管不仅没有拉动美国经济反而导致了经济的下滑，同时也令人们陷入愈发不安全的境地。
为了理解其中缘由，我们必须努力回溯约翰·梅纳德·凯恩斯最擅长的领域——尤其是他1930年的两卷著作《货币论》，这一作品不下于米尔顿弗里德曼1997年作品。
尤其值得一提的是，凯恩斯把货币分成两类：国家货币和银行货币。国家货币是由中央银行生产的高能货币（所谓的货币基础）。银行货币是由商业银行通过存款产生的。
凯恩斯在《货币论》里花了很多篇幅来讲述银行货币——这并不令人意外，因为凯恩斯明确指出，在1930年，银行货币的规模比国家货币大得多。而自1930年后，情况也没改变多少。今天，银行货币占广义货币（M4）总量的82％。
所以银行的钱就是“房间里的大象（虽然明显但因太麻烦而让大家不愿多谈的问题）”。任何会影响银行货币的因素都会主导广义货币的创造。货币和信贷的变化为经济活动设定了方向。
我们已经搭好了舞台——现在该开始游戏了。对于政治家和央行管理者来说，游戏的名字就是让他人来背世界经济和金融危机的锅。
在2008年危机之后，政治家和央行管理者把这归咎于银行和银行家。建制派称，由于银行“资本不足”和“缺乏监管”，银行面临着巨大的风险。因此，多德—弗兰克法案全胜通过毫不令人意外，银行现在承受着超过22,000页的新监管法规的负担——并且还在数着。这导致了在经济低迷时期出现具有破坏性的顺周期政策立场——而这恰恰是美国不需要的。事实上，这一切对于反银行式的监管的热情造成了信贷紧缩。
美国的货币立场一直是错误而且偏执的。对于“房间里的大象”——银行存款——其始终保持紧缩政策。但在国家货币方面，政策却极度宽松。这样做的结果是，危机后一方面国家货币快速增长，另一方面银行货币在经历了起初的收缩之后增长停滞不前。作为经济增长动力的广义货币（Divisia M4）仅仅以每年4.8％的速度缓慢增长。
后危机时代的监管热情是荒谬的，因为其建立在一个虚构的说法之上。这个虚构的说法 是由全国顶级银行家之一的约翰·艾利森诠释的。艾利森在他的著作《金融危机与自由市场治理》（McGraw-Hill，2013）一书中阐述了这样一个说法：银行业在乔治·W·布什政府时期放松了管制，这是引发金融危机的主要原因。正如艾利森所写的那样，这个说法是无稽之谈。小布什时期，大幅度的增加监管影响了银行。金融行业没有放松管制，而是被隐私法、萨班斯—奥克斯利法案以及爱国者法案等的规定错误管制，此处仅举三例。
如果我们回到与多德—弗兰克相关的监管疯狂，我们就能注意到，尽管所有金融机构都处于监管之中，但社区银行却尤其被陷于挤压状态。
那么是什么构成了社区银行？想知道答案的话，没有比哈佛大学肯尼迪学院的一篇文章更好的资料了。这篇文章的名字叫做《社区银行的状况和命运》，作者是马歇尔·卢克斯和罗伯特·格林尼（2015年2月）：
美国社区银行的全貌很复杂。我们发现，虽然在过去二十年里，社区银行在美国银行贷款市场和美国银行资产中所占的份额下降了约50％，但他们仍然在主要贷款领域发挥着重要作用。社区银行提供了77％的农业贷款和50％以上的小企业贷款。农业贷款是一个需要农业知识的专门领域，通常因地区、农场、农场主和长期预期而异;而且农业周期相当长。社区银行在当地房地产贷款中也发挥着主要作用，尤其是在住房这一项需要了解当地情况和借款人业务的行业。 2013年，对小型社区银行（拥有10亿美元或更少资产的银行）而言，由一到四户住宅房产担保的贷款的违约率为3.47％，与之相比，对于资产超过10亿美元的银行来说，违约率为10.42％。
卢克斯和格林尼明确指出，多德—弗兰克法案的出台令社区银行遭受到了不成比例的巨大打击。确实，该法案创造了一些被社区银行家自嘲为“小而不活”的银行。
幸运的是，救援可能即将到来。在接下来的几天里，参议院将对《经济增长、监管救济和消费者保护法案》进行投票。该法案由共和党和民主党两党人士共同发起，且准备充分。没错，有几个声名在外的改革派—比如参议员伊丽莎白·沃伦（马萨诸塞州民主党议员）和谢罗德·布朗（俄亥俄州民主党议员）—从未见过哪个银行或银行家他们不讨厌；但尽管如此，这项法案有望在参议院获得通过。
对于社区银行、他们的客户和经济来说，这将是一个好消息。毕竟，该法案将令资产不足1000亿美元的银行免于美联储年度压力测试。因此，对于社区银行和信用合作社来说，他们似乎即将摆脱多德—弗兰克法案带来的的繁琐规定。
英文原文如下：
Relief for Bank Regulatory Madness Might Be on the Way
Steve H. Hanke
The economic recovery from the financial crisis of 2008 has been one of the slowest in history. Bank regulations spawned by the crisis (read: the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act) are the main culprit. Indeed, bank regulations have been ill conceived, pro-cyclical and fraught with danger. In consequence, bank regulations have pushed the U.S. down, not pulled it up. And they have made us less, not more, safe.
To understand why, we must revert back to John Maynard Keynes at his best — specifically, his two-volume 1930 work, A Treatise on Money, a work that no less than Milton Friedman wrote about approvingly in 1997.
In particular, Keynes separates money into two classes: state money and bank money. State money is the high-powered money (the so-called monetary base) that is produced by central banks. Bank money is produced by commercial banks through deposit creation.
Keynes spends many pages in the Treatise dealing with bank money — not surprising given that, as Keynes makes clear, bank money was much larger than state money in 1930. Well, not much has changed since then. Today, bank money accounts for 82% of the total broad money measure, M4.
So bank money is the elephant in the room. Anything that affects bank money dominates the production of money, broadly measured. And changes in money and credit set the course for economic activity.
We have prepared the stage - now for the play. For politicians, as well as central bankers, the name of the game is to blame someone else for the world’s economic and financial troubles.
In the wake of the 2008 crisis, their accusatory fingers pointed at banks and bankers. The establishment asserted that banks were too risky and dangerous because they were “undercapitalized” and “underregulated.” It is, therefore, not surprising that the Dodd-Frank Act passed with flying colors, and that banks are now burdened with more than 22,000 pages of new regulation — and counting. This resulted in a damaging pro-cyclical policy stance in the middle of a slump — just what U.S. did not need. Indeed, all this anti-bank regulatory zeal created a credit crunch.
The U.S. monetary stance has been wrongheaded and schizophrenic. When it comes to the big elephant in the room - bank money - the stance has been very tight. But when it comes to state money, the stance has been ultra-loose. The end result has been one in which state money exploded after the crisis while bank money initially contracted and then stagnated. In consequence, broad money (Divisia M4), which is the fuel for the economy, is growing at a modest 4.8% annual rate.
What makes the post-crisis regulatory zeal so absurd is that it is based on a myth — one identified by John Allison, one of the country’s top bankers. Indeed, in his book The Financial Crisis and the Free Market Cure (McGraw-Hill, 2013), Allison shines a light on the myth that the banking industry was deregulated during the administration of George W. Bush and that this was a major cause of the financial crisis. As Allison documents, this argument is nonsense. There was a massive increase in regulations that affected banks during the Bush years. The financial industry was not deregulated, but misregulated, with the likes of the Privacy Act, the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, and the Patriot Act, to name but three.
If we return to the regulatory madness associated with Dodd-Frank, we see that, while all financial institutions were put in a vise, community banks were put in a super-squeeze.
Just what constitutes a community bank? For the answers, there is no better source than a Harvard Kennedy School working paper, “The State and Fate of Community Banking,” by Marshall Lux and Robert Greene (February 2015):
The full picture of community banking in the U.S. is quite complex. We found that although community banks’ share of the U.S. bank-lending market and of U.S. banking assets has declined by about 50 percent in the last two decades, the sector continues to play a vital role in key lending segments. Community banks provide 77 percent of agricultural loans and over 50 percent of small business loans. Agricultural lending, in particular, is a specialty that requires a knowledge of farming, often very specific to the region, to the farm or to the farmer, and a longer-term perspective; agricultural cycles are fairly long. Community banks also play a major role in local real estate lending, particularly for housing, another business where knowledge of local conditions and borrowers is necessary. In 2013, the default rates for loans secured by one to four-family residential properties ran at 3.47 percent for small community banks (banks with $1 billion or less in assets) versus 10.42 percent for banks with more than $1 billion in assets.
Lax and Greene make it clear that the community banks took a disproportionately big hit as a result of the passage of the Dodd-Frank Act. Indeed, Dodd-Frank created what some community bankers quip is a class of banks that are “too small to succeed.”
Fortunately, relief might be on the way. In the next few days, the Senate will vote on the Economic Growth, Regulatory Relief and Consumer Protection Act. It is co-sponsored by a bipartisan group of Republicans and Democrats who have done their homework. Yes, there are a few loud progressives — like Senator Elizabeth Warren (D-Mass.) and Sherrod Brown (D-Ohio) — who have never seen a bank or banker that they didn’t love to hate; nonetheless, it looks like the legislation will pass muster in the Senate.
This will be good news for community banks, their customers and the economy. After all, the legislation will, among other things, exempt banks with less than $100 billion in assets from the Federal Reserve’s annual stress tests. So for community banks and credit unions, relief from the onerous regulations spawned by the Dodd-Frank Act appears to be just around the corner.
观点整理 叶祎然
图文编辑 叶祎然
审校 田雯
监制 朱霜霜
点击查看近期热文
欢迎加入群聊
为了增进与粉丝们的互动，IMI财经观察建立了微信交流群，欢迎大家参与。
入群方法：加群主为微信好友（微信号：imi605）,添加时备注个人姓名（实名认证）、单位、职务等信息，经群主审核后，即可被拉进群。
关于我们
中国人民大学国际货币研究所（IMI）成立于2009年12月20日，是专注于货币金融理论、政策与战略研究的非营利性学术研究机构和新型专业智库。研究所聘请了来自国内外科研院所、政府部门或金融机构的90余位著名专家学者担任顾问委员、学术委员和国际委员，80余位中青年专家担任研究员。
研究所长期聚焦国际金融、宏观经济理论与政策、金融科技、财富管理、金融监管、地方金融等领域，定期举办高层次系列论坛或讲座，形成了《人民币国际化报告》《金融机构国际化报告》《中国财富管理报告》《金融科技二十讲》等一大批具有重要学术和政策影响力的产品。
2016年，研究所入围《中国智库大数据报告》影响力榜单列高校智库第4位，并在“中国经济类研究机构市场价值排行榜（2016）”中名列第32位。
国际货币网：www.imi.org.cn
微信号：IMI财经观察
（点击识别下方二维码关注我们）
理事单位申请、
学术研究和会议合作
联系方式:
只分享最有价值的财经视点
We only share the most valuable financial insights.