海外之声 | TARGET-2困境亟待解决方案：德国债券使EMU团结一致（中英双语）

观点速递

本文作者是意大利证券监管机构Consob的定量分析和金融创新主管、伦敦数学金融研究所博士生讲师、博科尼大学数量金融学兼职教授马塞罗·米恩纳（Marcello Minenna）和意大利国有银行首席经济学家、国际社会科学自由大学经济学教授爱德华多·瑞威格里欧（Edoardo Reviglio）。

作者指出，欧洲货币联盟（EMU）的规则导致德国央行对欧洲中央银行的Target2索赔大幅增加，Target-2的增长反映了贸易和资本流动的失衡。德国想要通过单纯退出EMU来解决这个问题并不容易，德国政府和德国央行在缓解Target-2困境上可能会面临越来越大的压力。

中文译文如下：

TARGET-2困境亟待解决方案

德国债券使EMU团结一致

马塞罗·米恩纳和爱德华多·瑞威格里欧

翻译：来程颖

审校：熊若洁

2018年7月23日

欧洲货币联盟（EMU）的规则导致德国央行对欧洲中央银行的Target2索赔大幅增加，因此德国为保障自身信用情况会尽力维持欧元区成员国的身份。

只有广泛的政治协议才能彻底改变经济条约固有的联合融资。德国目前持有9750亿欧元的巨额Target2债券，货币联盟为其在六月底前收回部分债券提供了空间。

慕尼黑Ifo经济研究所所长克雷门斯·福斯特（Clemens Fuest）教授建议应当改变法律框架，提供退出机制，使德国得到他们想要的“逃避”条款，即在退出EMU的同时并不危及自身信用情况。

然而，考虑到EMU债务国投票权受限，该提案似乎并不能在政治上奏效。合理的替代方案是创建一个风险共担的框架，消除会员国退出的风险。这就需要引入银行联盟和财政转移支付体系，加大欧洲预算。

米兰意大利中央银行风险管理部高级主管罗伯托•维奥力(Roberto Violi)，比萨圣安娜大学（是一所享有盛誉的精英学院，位于意大利比萨市）的乔瓦尼·多西（Giovanni Dosi）和安德里亚•罗文蒂尼（Andrea Roventini）教授，以及经济学家马塞罗·米恩纳（Marcello Minenna）提出了新的技术性框架，从市场角度逐步分担欧元区共同债务的风险。不幸的是，这样的计划实施起来不容易。

德国央行对其他EMU央行的风险敞口达到德国国际净投资的50%。一些德国经济学家认为这些资产基本上是不可挽回的。意大利和西班牙的Target-2余额在五月也达到历史新高，分别为4650亿欧元和3930亿欧元。而到六月，这些数据可能会更糟糕。

Target-2已经演变为一个复杂的中央银行间债务和债券核算体系，为私人银行间90%的跨境交易提供了媒介。它具有以下优点：交易对手风险最低，结算时间快，成本低。

Target-2的增长反映了贸易和资本流动的失衡。德国在过去的两年间经常账户年均盈余占GDP的7%（尽管并非所有盈余都来自于欧元区内部交易），而德国银行对欧元区其他国家的信贷情况却相应发生了增长，两者并不相符。鉴于2008年金融危机后风险意识变高，德国银行减少了对欧元区的贷款。

南欧国家近期Target2债务增长源于欧洲央行自2015年3月开始的超过2万亿欧元的量化宽松政策。意大利和西班牙的私人投资者已经逐步将其持有的超过一半政府债券出售给央行，并将收益投资到北部国家，如英国和美国。

过去的三年间，南欧经济体资本外逃高达5000亿欧元。欧洲央行将此视为投资者逐利和分散风险的健康做法。一大原因是投资者为对冲成员国退出可能带来的货币单位重定风险。

重新出现的Target-2分歧其实早有征兆。早在2015年，著名意大利经济学家保罗·萨沃纳(Paolo Savona)，如今出任意大利政府欧洲事务部长，就曾警告欧洲央行量化宽松的政策会引发弱势国家的资本出逃，并助长德国债券国的地位。

如果欧元区保持稳定不变，Target-2余额不可收回，没有期限和利息（即目前状态）是完全合理的。在任何标准场景中，这些账目都不会承担任何风险。

但现状是政治纷争频发，意大利政府对欧元持怀疑态度，德国联邦政府权力削弱。尽管会员国退出欧元区并非众人所望，但如果发生，退出的中央银行将恢复其独立地位。欧洲央行的股东米兰意大利中央银行将分割所有权。在正常交易中，退出股东将偿还（以欧元计算）来自其他会员国的实际贷款。

欧洲央行在过去的官方声明中似乎支持这一立场。但根据现行法规，没有任何法律手段可以迫使退出的国家以欧元结算债务。如果债务国离开，德国央行将很难收回其Target-2债券，哪怕只是一小部分。德国单方面退出EMU意味着它将丧失全部债券。而如果欧元区完全解体，也会发生同样的情况。

这个无法妥协的等式是将EMU紧密捆绑的一部分理由。面对持续存在的各种道德风险，德国经济学家发现这种立场越来越难以接受。德国政府和德国央行在缓解Target-2困境上可能会面临越来越大的压力。

英文原文如下：

US fiscal policy may burst asset bubble

Painful repricing of credit will damage emerging markets

Marcello Minenna&EdoardoReviglio

  23 July 2018

Europe's monetary union rules that have generated a sharp increase in the Bundesbank's Target-2 claims on the European Central Bank provide a strong incentive for Germany to remain a euro member to safeguard its credit position.

Only a broad political agreement to change radically the mutual financing inherent in the treaties on economic and monetary union would give Germany room to reclaim part of its enormous Target-2 credit of €975bn at end-June.

Prof. Clemens Fuest, head of the Munich Ifo economic research institute, has proposed changing the legal framework with an exit mechanism that would supply the 'get-out' clause some Germans apparently desire – allowing the country's possible EMU escape with its credit intact.

However, considering that EMU debtor countries have a blocking share of votes, that proposal appears a political non-starter. The reasonable alternative would be to set up a risk-sharing framework to eliminate the risk of a country leaving. This would entail the completion of banking union, a sizeable European budget and a system of fiscal transfers.

Roberto Violi, senior director in the Banca d'Italia's risk management department, Giovanni Dosi and Andrea Roventini of the Sant'Anna School of Advanced Studies (a university centre of worldwide renown based in Pisa) and Marcello Minenna have proposed a technical mechanism to share gradually the risks of euro area public debt in a market perspective. Unfortunately, implementing such a plan will not be easy.

The Bundesbank's exposure towards other EMU central banks represents 50% of Germany's net international investment position. Some German economists believe these assets may be substantially irredeemable. The Target-2 balances of Italy and Spain reached record heights of €465bn and €393bn respectively in May. The June data will probably be even worse.

Target-2 has grown into a complex accounting system of debts and credits between national central banks that intermediate 90% of cross-border transactions between private banks. It has several advantages: minimum counterparty risk, quick settlement times and reduced costs.

Target-2 growth reflects imbalances in trade and capital flows Germany's average annual current account surplus of 7% of GDP over the past decade (although not all of this from intra-euro area transactions) has not been matched by a corresponding increase of banks' credits towards the rest of the euro area. Owing to higher post-2008 financial crisis risk perceptions, German banks' lending towards the euro area has declined.

The more recent build-up of southern European countries' Target-2 debts has stemmed from the ECB's €2tn-plus quantitative easing that started in March 2015. Italian and Spanish private investors have progressively sold more than half their government bond holdings to their national central banks and invested the proceeds in financial assets in northern countries, the UK and US.

The last three years have seen over €500bn in capital flight from southern economies. The ECB has played this down as healthy behaviour of investors seeking to improve returns and diversify risks. A less benevolent reason could be investors' search for a hedge against the redenomination risk that would arise from a member state's exit.

Renewed Target-2 divergence was not completely unexpected. Already in 2015 Paolo Savona, the renowned Italian economist who is now Europe minister in the Rome government, warned that the ECB's QE would drive capital flight from weaker countries and increase the German credit position.

In an eternally immutable euro area, it would be perfectly reasonable for Target-2 balances to be non-collectable, without expiry and without interest (as they are currently). In any standard scenario, these accounting entries would bear no risk at all.

But the scenario now – increasing political discord, with a eurosceptic government in Rome and a weakened administration in Berlin – is not standard. In the hopefully unlikely event of a euro exit, the departing national central bank would regain independent status. The Banca d'Italia, an ECB shareholder, would separate itself from ownership. In a normal transaction, the exiting shareholder would pay back (in euros) what is effectively an intra-group loan from the subsidiary.

The ECB has seemed to support this position in past official declarations. But, under current regulations, there is no legal tool that could force an exiting country to settle its debts in euros. If a debtor country departed, the Bundesbank would find it very difficult to collect even a small fraction of its Target-2 credit. A unilateral German exit would imply total loss of the credit. The same would happen if the euro area broke up entirely.

This uncompromising equation is part of the cement holding EMU together. Perpetually alive to any form of moral hazard, German economists find this position increasingly unpalatable. Pressure on the German government and the Bundesbank to mitigate the Target-2 dilemma may increase.

内容整理 罗梦宇

图文编辑 罗梦宇

审校  田雯

监制  朱霜霜

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