学者观点｜赵蓉晖，周明朗，高雪松：中国双语教育的话语空间（SSCI）

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作者：

上海外国语大学中国外语战略研究中心　赵蓉晖

美国马里兰大学　周明朗

澳大利亚新南威尔士大学　高雪松

来源：

International Journal of Bilingual Education and Bilingualism（SSCI），2018年12月

摘要

In this closing commentary, two Chinese scholars working in different contexts offer their views on the space for and prospect of different bilingual education in China. Professor Ronghui Zhao from Shanghai International Studies University contends that shifting discursive constructions of language and language-related works in national language policy texts carve out a valuable discursive space for the implementation and promotion of bilingual education initiatives, since languages are increasingly seen as resources for the nation rather than challenges to be overcome for national unity. Professor Minglang Zhou draws attention to the ideological boundaries that constrain individual agents’ efforts to promote bilingual education programs. He argues that the promotion of bilingual education programs takes place within the limits imposed by the Chinese State’s language ideology, and reflects an institutionalized language hierarchical order which regulates their speakers’ access to resources and power.

Keywords: Bilingual education; discursive space; language ideology; language hierarchy

正文

Overview

The picture of bilingual education in China is understandably complex, as bilingual education programs take place within a huge, linguistically diverse context. The Chinese government has always regarded linguistic unity as foundational to political unity (e.g. Coblin 2000; Shen and Gao 2018). The government also adopts a highly instrumental approach to language policymaking, in which ‘majority languages’ are promoted ‘as instruments of modernity and economic progress and minority languages as (merely) carriers of “tradition” and “cultural identity”’ (Tan and Rubdy 2008, 11). Recent studies have increasingly challenged traditional language policymaking, which has been largely driven by the particular visions and aspirations that a centralized government department and powerful individuals may have about a specific country (e.g. Tollefson and Tsui 2007; Lo Bianco, Orton, and Gao 2009; Park and Wee 2012; Tollefson 2013). Such a top-down approach to policymaking and implementation usually leads to prescriptive language usage and related pedagogical practice in a given context. 

However, the relevant policymaking mechanism and process now has to respond to ever more complex demographic and sociocultural realities where relevant language policies are to be initiated and implemented (e.g. Lo Bianco, Orton, and Gao 2009; Park and Wee 2012; Zhao and Baldauf Jr. 2012). The process also needs to accommodate increasingly strong bottom-up voices, by involving individuals in making decisions about which languages to learn and with whom they are to be used, as well as when, why and how these languages are used (Shen and Gao 2018). These shifts add substantial complications to language policymaking, and require that attention be paid to the roles of various agents in the policymaking and implementation process (Xia and Shen 2018). 

Therefore, we invite two scholars working in different contexts to comment on bilingual education and the relevant studies in this special issue. In the following sections, Professor Ronghui Zhao from Shanghai International Studies will elaborate the nuanced changes in the discursive constructions of language and language-related works in national language policy texts issued by the State Language Commission, which are indicative of a shift in favor of seeing languages as valuable resources. In contrast, Professor Minglang Zhou reminds readers that individual agents who are actively promoting various bilingual education programs all operate within the limits of the superstructure of the Chinese State’s language ideology and the base of an institutionalized hierarchical order of languages, which regulate language users’ access to resources, power and so on.

Shifting discursive constructions in national language policy texts (Ronghui Zhao)

While recent studies have focused on individuals’ responses and influences on language policymaking (e.g. Perez-Milans 2015), I contend that the State Language Commission of the People’s Republic of China (‘the State Language Commission’) has been responding to these socio-contextual changes with regard to bilingual education in China. The State Language Commission is responsible for drafting national language policies, but it has more involvement in the development and promotion of national standard Chinese varieties including the spoken variety (Putonghua) and standard written Chinese. While the State Language Commission plays a critical role in promoting linguistic unity throughout the country, its policy texts have shown some subtle changes in the ideological constructions of language, which provide the discursive space for the three types of bilingual education programs examined in this special issue (e.g. Shen and Gao 2018). 

As indicated earlier, language policy texts issued by the State Language Commission have always been dominated by a discourse of linguistic instrumentalism (Tan and Rubdy 2008). For instance, in the 8th Five-Year Plan the State Language Commission explicitly defines language as ‘an important instrument for communication and a medium to convey information (重要的交际工具和信息载体)’ (the 8th Five-Year Plan). In the 9th Five-Year Plan the State Language Commission stresses the importance of language in coordinating societal production and social life. Therefore, language is defined as ‘the medium to convey information and instrumental in coordinating societal production and social life (协调社会生产和社会生活的交际工具)’ (the 9th Five-Year Plan). The 10th Five-Year Plan used exactly the same phrase as the 8th Five-Year Plan to define language as ‘the instrument for communication and medium for conveying information’ (the 10th Five-Year Plan). For this reason, it is particularly noteworthy that the language is presented as ‘a national resource that needs to be protected and utilized’ in the 11th Five-Year Plan. Though it is slightly different from the references to language as ‘medium’ or ‘instrument’, the ‘resource’ frame still highlights the material benefits that languages can bring to the nation. The Long- and Mid-term Plans of the State Language Commission for the first time present language not only as an important instrument for communication, but also as ‘an essential element of culture and defining marker for culture (文化的基础要素和鲜明标志)’. Though the new policy document frames language in terms of a ‘cultural marker’, it nevertheless still stresses the dominance of linguistic instrumentalism in the State Language Commission’s ideological framing of language, since language is considered critical in ‘pushing forward historical development and social progress’. 

The constructions of language-related works in the relevant policy texts confirm the dominance of linguistic instrumentalism, and elaborate its dominance in much more specific language. For instance, in the 8th Five-Year Plan policy makers presented the following statement on languagerelated work:

Language-related work is foundational to societal development and technological advance. […] they are closely related to different sectors in society. Language related work contributes to the development of science, technology and education. They play a critical role in promoting ethnic groups’ integration, national unity, social stability, economic prosperity and international exchanges.

Such ideological framing of language-related work also echoes the deeply-entrenched traditional beliefs beheld by political leaders, believing that a shared language is foundational to national unity (e.g. Coblin 2000; Li and Zhu 2010).

In the 11th Five-Year Plan, policy makers made the first reference to linguistic harmony and stated that language-related work should help realize the goal of creating ‘a well-off, harmonious socialist society’. They believe that ‘the promotion of national standard languages helps eradicate the linguistic barriers between rural and urban areas’, and language-related work may also help to address the linguistic barriers that might undermine social cohesiveness in a context of massive internal migration from rural areas to urban centers. In addition, the policy text argues:

Languages play a critical role in speeding up industrialization, urbanization, marketization and internationalization as these processes depend on high quality workers who have a good command of languages and information technology.

While these policy discourses emphasize the importance of language-related work in facilitating the creation and development of the kind of society envisioned by the political establishment, they also reflect the dominance of linguistic instrumentalism (Wee 2008). Only in the long- and mid-term plans can nuanced shifts be detected where the policy text explicitly says that ‘language-related work contributes to the construction of a shared spiritual home for Chinese, the growth of China’s soft power, and educational modernization’. For many, this still echoes the dominance of linguistic instrumentalism, but the shift, though insignificant for many, does suggest that language policymakers at the State Language Commission have begun to pay attention to the importance of the affective and emotional value that languages may have for their speakers. 

This does not mean that the State Language Commission, as the highest government department in promoting Putonghua and standardizing Chinese, has changed its core mission commitments. However, these policy texts do indicate that these policy makers have begun to demonstrate an appreciation of multilingual realities in the country. Recent policy texts cover a diversity of linguistic varieties, including ethnic minority languages, dialects, traditional Chinese characters, dying languages and so on, which are all seen as valuable linguistic resources to be protected and preserved (Hu and Duan 2018; Wang and Curdt-Christiansen 2018; Zhang 2018; Zhang and Tsung 2018). This recognition emerges from an interactive process of top-down national strategies and bottom-up societal realities with academic researchers mediating the interaction, in which the importance of national strategies outweighs the desires of individuals and social groups (Shen 2016; Shao and Gao 2018; Xia and Shen 2018). 

However, as individuals are becoming increasingly articulate about their desires to identify themselves with specific linguistic varieties such as regional Chinese dialects, language policymakers will be ever more obliged to achieve a critical balance between individual desires and national strategies, so that social harmony may be solidly built on linguistic harmony. Consequently, language policy makers and researchers are undertaking various efforts to promote the use of different languages through the kinds of bilingual or bi-dialectal programs discussed in this special issue (see Xia and Shen 2018).

Language ideology and order in China’s bilingual education (Minglang Zhou)

Discursive processes do not only involve who speaks, who makes decisions, what is said, and what is done. Importantly, they also involve the ideological framework within which various stakeholders engage in dialogues on and activities in language policy making and implementation. This ideological framework, known as language ideology, consists of beliefs, assumptions, and systems of attitudes and values that underpin discursive processes (Zhou 2017, Forthcoming). In contrast to language ideology, the reality of language order is an institutionalized relationship among languages which are ranked in accordance with their allocated access to resources, such as legal status, domain of use, and financial means, in a community, a state, a region or the world (Fishman 1998; Zhou 2017). A dialectical relationship exists between language ideology as the superstructure and language order as the base. Language ideology shapes the development of language order towards its ideal, while language order seeks its ideological representation to the full extent. 

For example, as Putonghua rises in the language order in China and the global community, the orientations of attitudes and values regarding Putonghua have aligned with the rise in Chinese diaspora communities (Li and Zhu 2010). Ideologically, there are two contrasting value orientations regarding language learning and use, a material one and a spiritual one (Zhou 2013). The material-value orientation treats a code or the whole linguistic repertoire of an individual or community as linguistic capital with the material potential for socioeconomic gain. On the other hand, the spiritual-value orientation considers a code or the linguistic repertoire as linguistic capital with spiritual potential for identity maintenance and development. These two orientations affect language learning and use in fundamentally different ways, representing language’s communicative and symbolic functions respectively. 

The six papers in this special demonstrate, in both depth and breadth, how the Tibetan students and their parents, the students receiving English medium instruction (EMI) and their professors, and the various stakeholders in Shanghainese engaged in dialogues and activities within the framework of China’s current language ideology and order. 

First, Zhang and Tsung carried out their research in a Tibetan community in Qinghai, which is significantly different from the Tibetan community where Jing Zhang conducted her research. In the Tibetan community in Qinghai, the dialogue focused on the choice between Tibetan and Chinese as the medium of instruction, but in the Snowland Tibetan community in Yunnan the dialogue was on the remaining advantage in taking Tibetan. These dialogues reflect the relationship between value orientations and local language orders. In rural Qinghai, Tibetan is still the language most commonly used in the family and community, where it meets both material and spiritual needs. However, in Snowland Tibetan is no longer the common language in the community, where it may meet Tibetan students’ spiritual needs but perhaps not their material needs. In fact, even in Qinghai, if a choice is available, a Tibetan student’s choice of medium of instruction depends on where the family’ssocial networks are (Yingji Zhuoma 2018). Family social networks are interwoven with domains of language use, which constitute an essential part of the local language order against the backdrop of the national language order. Both studies suggest that Tibetan students and parents sought a balance between their spiritual-value and material-value orientations for their mother tongue both in and out of school. 

Second, Wang and Curdt-Christiansen’s case study of translanguaging practices in English medium instruction at a Chinese university illustrates how the current global language order with English as the dominant language is localized in China. Driven by their material-value orientation, students and professors might be able to change the content of a course, but it is questionable whether they ever learned/taught the civilizational underpinning of the content and fully understood the content in its social and cultural contexts. Hu and Duan’s extensive study of questioning and responding in classrooms with English as the medium of instruction confirms the pedagogical and cognitive shortcomings of this approach. However, the problems found in these classrooms fundamentally lie outside the classroom. China’s internationalization of higher education and the English curriculum have never evolved beyond traditional thinking, which has insisted on an instrumental approach to Western knowledge, including English, since the nineteenth century (Ross 1993,16–41). This approach confines the visions for and roles of English in Chinese higher education. 

Third, studying the Shanghainese Heritage Project in Shanghai from two unique perspectives, Xia and Shen’s study examines the agency of various stakeholders in Shanghainese in a bottom-up approach to maintain the local dialect, whereas Shao and Gao’s study unearths serious ideological conflicts regarding the project in the public media. Both studies represent the reality of the language ideology and order in China. Unlike Tibetan and English, Chinese dialects do not have any legal status in or out of schools in the current language order, but mainly rely on certain policy statements which allow dialects to be treated as a linguistic resource for preservation and research, as a cultural resource for the transmission of local cultures, such as folk songs, and as an economic resource for local economic development, such as tourism (see Y. Li 2015,76–83). This order, as represented by the PRC National Common Language and Script Law, is the materialization of the dominant language ideology that treats Putonghua as the linguistic unifier of the whole of China, and minority languages, along with Chinese dialects, as complementary at best. 

Within this language ideology and order, the balance between material-value and spiritual value orientations is encouraged only for Putonghua, though the material-value orientation may be accommodated for other languages and dialects. True linguistic harmony must accommodate a balance, at multiple levels, between community languages, the national language, and global languages. 

In short, the six articles in this special issue show how China’s language ideology and order regulate, via an invisible discursive frame, the agency and discourse of various stakeholders in the country’s language policy making and implementation. Agency always operates within the limits of the superstructure and base that are embedded in the discourse.

往期阅读：

美编 | 老尘

编审 | YOYO

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