斯坦福哲学百科全书词条：感受质（中英文对照）三
Qualia
感受质
（三）
宋璐瑶 译
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来源
https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/qualia/
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哲学园鸣谢
First published Wed Aug 20, 1997; substantive revision Mon Dec 18, 2017
首发于1997年8月20日星期三；修改于2017年12月18日星期四
接上期：
8. Qualia as Intrinsic, Nonrepresentational Properties of Experiences
感受质作为内在的、非表征的属性
As noted in section 1, the term ‘qualia’ is sometimes used for intrinsic nonrepresentational, consciously accessible properties of experience. Representationalists deny that there are qualia in this sense, while identifying qualia in the broad sense (that is, qualia as phenomenal character) with representational properties. However, some philosophers hold that there are qualia in the sense of intrinsic nonrepresentational properties of experience. These philosophers deny representationalism, and identify qualia in the broad sense with intrinsic nonrepresentational properties of experience. This view is the subject of the present section.
如第1节所述，“感受质”一词有时用于内在的、非表征的、意识可通达的经验的属性。表征论者否认存在此意义上的感受质，而承认广义上的具有表征属性的感受质（即感受质作为现象特性）。然而，一些哲学家也认为，在内在的、非表征的经验属性的意义上存在着感受质。这些哲学家否认表征论，并在广义上承认具有内在的、非表征的经验特性的感受质。本节的主题便是这一观点。
As noted earlier, some philosophers deny that experience is transparent. They claim that introspection does not show that experiences lack introspectible, intrinsic, nonrepresentational properties. Further, they insist that representationalism encounters decisive objections. These objections may be seen as making up one pillar in the main foundation for the view that experiences have qualia, conceived of now as intrinsic, nonrepresentational properties. The second pillar consists in what is sometimes called “the common kind assumption”, namely that veridical and hallucinatory experiences sometimes share the same phenomenal character (have the same qualia). This assumption is accepted by all the advocates of the views discussed so far but it is denied by advocates of relational theories of qualia (see section 9).
如前所述，一些哲学家否认这种经验是透明的。他们声称内省并不表明经验缺乏可内省的、内在的、非表征的属性。此外，他们坚持认为表征论碰到了决定性的反对意见。这些反对意见可以说是如下观点的强力支撑，即“经验所具有的感受质被认为是内在的、非表征的属性”。另一支撑有时被称为“共同种类假定”，即真实的经验和幻觉经验有时会分有同样的现象特性（具有相同的感受质）。这些假定，除了关于感受质的关系论者（见第9节），被迄今为止所讨论的那些观点的支持者们所接受。
Objections to representational views of qualia often take the form of putative counter-examples. One class of these consists of cases in which, it is claimed, experiences have the same representational content but different phenomenal character. Christopher Peacocke adduces examples of this sort in his 1983. According to some (e.g., Block 1990, Shoemaker forthcoming), the Inverted Spectrum also supplies an example that falls into this category. Another class is made up of problem cases in which allegedly experiences have different representational contents (of the relevant sort) but the same phenomenal character. Ned Block's Inverted Earth example (1990) is of this type. The latter cases only threaten strong representationalism, the former are intended to refute representationalism in both its strong and weaker forms. Counter-examples are also sometimes given in which supposedly experience of one sort or another is present but in which there is no state with representational content. Swampman (Davidson 1986) — the molecule by molecule replica of one of us, formed accidentally by the chemical reaction that occurs in a swamp when a partially submerged log is hit by lightning — is one such counter-example, according to some philosophers. But there are more mundane cases. Consider the exogenous feeling of depression. That, it may seem, has no representational content. Likewise, the exogenous feeling of elation. Yet these experiences certainly differ phenomenally.
对感受质表征论的反驳往往采取假定反例的形式。其中一类由声称经验具有相同的表征内容但具有不同的现象特性的例子所组成。克里斯托弗·皮科克在1983年提出了这样的例子，而据一些哲学家所言（例如，布洛克1990年，休梅克），颠倒光谱也属于这一类例子。另一类则是由所谓的经验具有不同的表征内容（相关类别）但具有相同的现象特性的问题案例组成，内德·布洛克的颠倒地球的例子（1990）就是这一类型。后一种情况只是威胁到了强表征论，但前者则意欲驳倒强表征论与弱表征论二者。不时也会有反例被提出，假定存在这样的情况，即有经验出现但不具有带表征内容的状态。据一些哲学家所言，沼泽人（戴维森 1986）——即我们某个人的分子对分子的复制品，由一片沼泽地中的一根半淹没的木头被闪电击中时所发生的化学反应而偶然形成——就是一个这样的对照案例。但是还有更多普通的例子。设想外在的沮丧感，那似乎并没有表征内容，外在的兴奋感亦然。不过，这些经验肯定在现象学层面上有很大的不同。
There isn't space to go through all these objections. We briefly discuss just one: Inverted Earth. Inverted Earth is an imaginary planet, on which things have complementary colors to the colors of their counterparts on Earth. The sky is yellow, grass is red, ripe tomatoes are green, and so on. The inhabitants of Inverted Earth undergo psychological attitudes and experiences with inverted intentional contents relative to those of people on Earth. They think that the sky is yellow, see that grass is red, etc. However, they call the sky ‘blue’, grass ‘green’, ripe tomatoes ‘red’, etc. just as we do. Indeed, in all respects consistent with the alterations just described, Inverted Earth is as much like Earth as possible.
因为没有地方来介绍所有的反驳，所以我们就简要讨论一下颠倒地球例子。颠倒地球是一个虚构的星球，在这个星球上物体的颜色与地球上的对应物体的颜色是互补的。例如天空是黄色的，草是红色的，成熟的西红柿是绿色的，等等。颠倒地球上的居民经历的心理态度和经验有着相对于地球人而言是颠倒的意向内容，他们认为天空是黄色的，看到的草是红色的等。但是，他们也把天空称为蓝色的，草称为绿色的，成熟的西红柿称为红色的……就像我们一样。事实上，在所有与刚才所述的变动相一致的方面，颠倒地球都几乎和地球一样。
In Block's original version of the tale, mad scientists insert color-inverting lenses in your eyes and take you to Inverted Earth, where you are substituted for your Inverted Earth twin or doppelganger. Upon awakening, you are aware of no difference, since the inverting lenses neutralize the inverted colors. You think that you are still where you were before. What it is like for you when you see the sky or anything else is just what it was like on earth. But after enough time has passed, after you have become sufficiently embedded in the language and physical environment of Inverted Earth, your intentional contents will come to match those of the other inhabitants. You will come to believe that the sky is yellow, for example, just as they do. Similarly, you will come to have a visual experience that represents the sky as yellow. For the experiential state you now undergo, as you view the sky, is the one that, in you, now normally tracks yellow things. So, the later you will come to be subject to inner states that are intentionally inverted relative to the inner states of the earlier you, while the phenomenal aspects of your experiences will remain unchanged.
在布洛克所述的原初版本中，有疯狂的科学家在你的眼睛里插入了颜色反转镜头并带你到了颠倒地球上，在那里你代替了你在颠倒地球上的双胞胎。当你醒来之后，你不会意识到任何差别，因为反转镜头会抵消颠倒的颜色。你以为你还在你以前的地方，当你看到天空或其他任何东西时所感觉到的样子就是它在地球上的样子。只要经过足够长的时间，在你已经充分融入颠倒地球的语言和物理环境之后，你的意向内容就会完全与其他居民相一致。例如，你会像他们一样相信天空是黄色的；同样地，你将会有一个表征着黄色天空的视觉体验，因为你现在看到天空时所经历的经验状态，通常是在追踪黄色的东西。所以，后来的你将会成为这样的内在状态的主体，即相对于早前的你的内部状态而言在意向上是颠倒的，而你经验的现象的方面将保持不变。
Perhaps the simplest reply that can be made with respect to this objection is to deny that there really is any change in normal tracking with respect to color, at least as far as your experiences go. “Normal”, after all, has both teleological and nonteleological senses. If what an experience normally tracks is what nature designed it to track, what it has as its biological purpose to track, then shifting environments from Earth to Inverted Earth will make no difference to normal tracking and hence no difference to the representational contents of your experiences. The sensory state that nature designed in your species to track blue in the setting in which your species evolved will continue to do just that even if through time, on Inverted Earth, in that alien environment, it is usually caused in you by looking at yellow things.
也许对此反对意见所能做出的最简单的答复就是，否认对颜色的正常追踪上真的有任何变化，至少就你的经历而言。毕竟，“正常”既具有目的论的意义，也具有非目的论的意义。如果某一经验通常追踪的就是自然安排它追踪的东西、就是它有着作为其生物学目的而去追踪的东西，那么将环境从地球转换到颠倒地球上将不会对正常的追踪产生任何影响，因而也对你的经验的表征内容没有任何影响。自然在你的物种进化环境中为你的物种设计来追踪蓝色的那种感官状态，在你看到黄色事物的时候，会继续做它通常被激发的时候该做的事情，即便历经岁月、即便是在颠倒地球上、甚至即便是在外星环境中。
The suggestion that tracking is teleological in character, at least for the case of basic experiences, goes naturally with the plausible view that states like feeling pain or having a visual sensation of red are phylogenetically fixed (Dretske 1995). However, it encounters serious difficulties with respect to the Swampman case mentioned above. On a cladistic conception of species, Swampman is not human. Indeed, lacking any evolutionary history, he belongs to no species at all. His inner states play no teleological role. Nature did not design any of them to do anything. So, if phenomenal character is a certain sort of teleo-representational content, as some representationalists hold, then Swampman has no experiences and no qualia. This, for many philosophers, is very difficult to believe.
至少就基本经验而言，“追踪”在特征上是目的性的，这一建议与如下观点并行不悖——像是感觉到疼痛或有红色的视觉感受等状态是由系统发生学所固定下来的（德雷斯克1995）。然而，它在上述的沼泽人案例中遇到了严重困难。按照物种的分支分类学概念，沼泽人不是人类。确实，缺乏任何进化史的他根本就不属于任何物种。他的内在状态没有发挥目的作用。自然没有安排他们做任何事情。所以，如果现象特性是某种特定的目的性表征内容，那么如一些表征论者所认为的，沼泽人就没有经验，也没有感受质。这对许多哲学家而言简直难以置信。
There are alternative replies available (see Lycan 1996, Tye 2000) in connection with the Inverted Earth problem. These involve either denying that qualia do remain constant with the switch to Inverted Earth or arguing that a non-teleological account of sensory content may be elaborated, under which qualia stay the same.
在颠倒地球的问题中也有其他不同的回应（见莱肯1996，泰2000）。他们或是否认在转换至颠倒地球的情况下感受质会保持不变；或是争论在感受质保持不变的情况下，可以给出一个关于感觉内容的非目的论解释。
As noted above, the second pillar in the foundation of the view that qualia are intrinsic, nonrepresentational properties of experiences is the common kind assumption. Those philosophers who accept this assumption see it (in the perceptual case) as providing the simplest, best explanation of the fact that hallucinations and veridical perceptions sometimes seem exactly alike to their subjects. It is granted, of course, that it does not follow that there is something common between hallucinations and perceptions in such cases from the fact that they seem alike. Nonetheless, it is a challenge to those who reject this assumption (see section 9) to provide a better explanation.
如上所述，“感受质是内在的、非表征的经验属性”这一观点的另一支撑是共同种类假定。接受这一假设的那些哲学家将其看作给以下这一事实提供了最简单也是最佳的解释，即幻觉和真实的感觉有时对于其主体而言看起来是完全一样的（在知觉的情况下）。当然，并不是说从他们看起来很像这一事实就一定会得出，在这种情况下，幻觉和感觉之间有共有之处。尽管如此，对于拒绝这一假设的人而言，给出一个更好的解释还是一个不小的挑战（见第9节）。
9. Relational Theories of Qualia 感受质的关系理论
Relational theories of qualia typically begin with the naive realist thesis that in normal circumstances perceivers are directly aware of the objects around them and various properties that they have. It is then proposed that since perceivers are also directly aware of what their experiences are like, the phenomenal character of their experiences in such cases is to be understood in terms of the relevant objects and their properties along with the viewpoint from which they are being observed. More precisely, it is urged that the phenomenal character is constituted by the objects that the perceiver sees, some of their properties and how they are arranged relative to the viewer.(Campbell 2002; Brewer 2011)
感受质的关系理论通常以朴素实在论的观点开，朴素实在论是指，在正常情况下，感知者会直接意识到他们周围的物体和他们所具有的各种属性。因此，既然感知者也已经直接意识到他们的经验像什么，所以在此情况之下，他们经验的现象特性就应该从相关对象与其属性以及它们被观察的角度来理解。更准确地说，现象特性是由感知者所看到的物体，它们的某些属性以及它们相对于观察者的排列方式所构成的（坎贝尔 2002）。
In later work, Campbell (2009) allows that the viewer’s ‘standpoint’ needs to be factored into phenomenal character too. The standpoint a perceiver occupies includes much more than just the egocentric frame of the perceiver. It includes the sense modality used to perceive, the time and place of the perceiving as well as the distance from the perceived object, the orientation of the perceiver relative to the object, and the temporal dynamics of the experience. Consciousness of an object, for Campbell, now consists in a three-place relation between a perceiver, an object, and a standpoint. With what exactly phenomenal character itself is to be identified, on this proposal, is unclear.
在之后的著作中，坎贝尔（2009）承认观察者的“立场”也需要被算作现象特性的一个特征。一个感知者所拥有的立场不仅仅包括感知者的自我中心框架。它包括用于感知的感觉形态、感知的时间和地点以及与感知对象的距离、感知者相对于对象的方向、以及经验的时间动态。对于坎贝尔来说，关于一个对象的意识是一种在感知者、对象和立场之间的三位关系。根据这一提议，现象特性本身究竟带有什么还有待确定，或者说尚不清楚。
Bill Brewer (2011) agrees with Campbell that a third relatum is needed in naïve realist accounts of perceptual experience, where the third relatum includes the sense modality of the experience, the spatio-temporal point of view, and other relevant circumstances of perception but he does not specify what exactly these circumstances are. William Fish (2009) takes a similar position, arguing that the third element should include idiosyncracies of the perceiver’s visual system as well as attentional facts about the perceiver since two ordinary perceivers viewing the same object from the same position may nonetheless differ in the character of their visual experiences, depending upon how good their eyesight is (for example) and how they distribute their attention.
比尔·布鲁尔（2011）同意坎贝尔的观点，认为感性经验的朴素实在论解释需要第三个关系项，其中第三个关系项包括经验的感觉形态、时空观和其他相关的感知情境，但他没有具体说明这些情况究竟是什么。威廉·菲什（2009）采取了类似的立场，认为第三个要素应该包括感知者视觉系统的特质以及关于感知者的注意事实，因为两个普通的感知者从同一个位置观看相同的对象时，他们的视觉经验可能会有不同的特征，这取决于（例如）他们的视力有多好以及他们怎么分散自己的注意力。
Of course, when one is (completely) hallucinating, there are no objects that one sees. So, relationism cannot allow that the phenomenal character in this case is the same as in the veridical case. Accordingly, relationists reject what was called in the last section “the common kind assumption”. One possible view consistent with relationism is that in hallucinatory cases the phenomenal character is a matter of the representational content of the experience, as is claimed on some versions of representationalism. Another view, held by some relationists, is that there is nothing more to the phenomenal character of a hallucinatory experience — for example, an experience of a red triangle — than its being indiscriminable or indistinguishable from a veridical experience of a red triangle (Martin 2004, Fish 2009). On this view, in giving a mental characterization of a hallucinatory experience, there is nothing more to be said than that it has a certain relational and epistemological property, namely that of being indiscriminable from the relevant perceptual experience.
当然，当一个人（完全）处于幻觉中时，并不会有任何可见物体的存在。所以，关系论不会同意这种情况下的现象特性与真实情况中的相同。因此，关系论者拒绝上一节所谈到的“共同种类假定”。与关系论相一致的一种观点是，在幻觉的情况下，现象特性是一个有关经验的表征内容的问题，就如一些版本的表征论所声称的那样。另一种为某些关系论者所持的观点认为，对于一种幻觉经验的现象特性，例如一个红色三角形的经验，除了它与一个真实的红色三角形的经验不可分辨或区分之外，就再无其他了（马丁2004 ，菲什2009）。依照此观点，在给出一个幻觉经验的心理描述时，除了说它具有一定的关系的和认识论的属性，即与相关知觉经验不可区分外，也就没有什么别的东西了。
Sometimes relationists try to motivate their view by arguing that since the seen objects are constituents of veridical visual experiences and they are not in the case of hallucinatory experiences, the experiences in the two cases must themselves be different. However, even if this is correct, it does not follow that they cannot share the same phenomenal character. What follows is rather that if they do share a common phenomenal character, then the conscious experiences are not to be individuated (solely) by that phenomenal character.
有时候，关系论者试图这样说来为其观点辩护，既然所看到的对象是真实视觉体验的组成部分而且它们不是出现在幻觉经验的情况下，那么这两种情况中的经验必定本身就是不同的。然而，即使这是正确的，也不能推出它们就不能享有共同的现象特性。接下来的应该是，如果他们有共同的现象特性，那么有意识的经验就不能（仅仅）被那个现象特性所个性化。
One problem facing Martin's relational account of hallucinatory phenomenal character is that of cognitively unsophisticated perceivers. Dogs can hallucinate but they lack the cognitive wherewithal to judge that their hallucinatory experiences of bones are the same or different from their veridical experiences of squirrels. In at least one clear sense of ‘indiscriminable’, then, their hallucinatory experiences of bones are indiscriminable to them from their veridical experiences of squirrels. But the phenomenal character of these experiences is certainly different. (For a discussion of this problem and a response to it, see Martin 2004. For criticisms, see Siegel 2009.)
马丁对幻觉的现象特性的关系解释所要面临的一个问题是，认知上不复杂的感知者的幻觉的现象特性。例如狗可以有幻觉，但是它们缺乏认知能力来判断它们对骨头的幻觉经验与它们对松鼠的真实经验究竟是相同的还是不同的。至少在“不可分辨”的一种明晰的意义上，它们对骨头的幻觉经验与对松鼠的真实经验是不可分辨的。但这些经验的现象特性肯定是不同的。（有关于此问题的讨论及回应，请参阅马丁2004；相关批评请参阅西格尔2009）
Another problem for the relational view is that it cannot easily handle cases of normal misperception, for example, the Muller-Lyer illusion. Campbell tells us that idiosyncrasies of the perceiver may affect phenomenal character, but he has no account to offer of cases in which something looks other than it is even to normal observers in normal circumstances. Here the scene before the eyes fails to capture the phenomenology. Brewer says that illusions are to be accounted for in terms of visually relevant similarities to paradigms of a kind of which the perceived object is not an instance. In the case of the Muller-Lyer, the paradigm is a pair of lines one longer and more distant than its plane, the other shorter and less distant. This proposal encounters various potential difficulties (Pautz 2010). For example, in the waterfall illusion, the water appears to be moving and not moving at the same time. Here there are no suitable paradigms in the real world. (See the entry on the disjunctive theory of perception.)
关系论的另一个问题是，它无法轻松地处理正常的感知错误，例如穆勒--赖尔错觉。坎贝尔告诉我们，感知者自身的特质可能也会影响到现象特性，但是他没有对这些例子——甚至是正常情况下普通观察者的错觉——提供进一步的说明。在此，眼前之景未能捕捉到什么现象。布鲁尔说，这种错觉被解释为与如下情形的范例具有视觉上相关的相似性，这类情形中被感知的对象并非一个实例。在穆勒-赖尔幻觉中，范例是两条线，其中一条线看起来比它本身更长，而另一条则更短。该建议遇到了各种潜在的困难（鲍兹2010），例如，在有关瀑布的幻觉中，水会在同一时刻看起来既在流而又没有流，这种情况在现实世界中显然没有合适的范例。（参见词条：感知析取论。）
10. Which Creatures Undergo States with Qualia? 哪些生物会经历具有感受质的状态？
Do frogs have qualia? Or fish? What about honey bees? Somewhere down the phylogenetic scale phenomenal consciousness ceases. But where? It is sometimes supposed that once we begin to reflect upon much simpler beings than ourselves — snails, for example — we are left with nothing physical or structural that we could plausibly take to help us determine whether they are phenomenally conscious (Papineau 1994). There is really no way of our knowing if spiders are subject to states with qualia, as they spin their webs, or if fish undergo any phenomenal experiences, as they swim about in the sea.
青蛙有感受质吗？鱼有吗？蜜蜂呢？在系统发生学范围的某个较低的层次上，现象意识消失了。 但是这个地方具体在哪里？有时候，一旦我们开始反思比我们自己更简单的生物，例如蜗牛，我们就会发现，没有任何物理的或结构的东西能使我们可以合理地利用它们来帮我们确定它们在现象学上是否是有意识的（帕皮诺1994）。我们实在是无法知道当蜘蛛结网时，它们是不是具有感受质的状态的主体；或是当鱼在海里游时，它们是否有过什么现象学的经验。
Representationalism has the beginnings of an answer to the above questions. If what it is for a state to have phenomenal character is (very roughly) that it be a state that (i) carries information about certain features, internal or external, and (ii) is such that this information stands ready and available to make a direct difference to beliefs and desires (or belief- and desire-like states), then creatures that are incapable of reasoning, of changing their behavior in light of assessments they make, based upon information provided to them by sensory stimulation of one sort or another, are not phenomenally conscious. Tropistic organisms, on this view, feel and experience nothing. They have no qualia. They are full-fledged unconscious automata or zombies, rather as blindsight subjects are restricted unconscious automata or partial zombies with respect to a range of visual stimuli.
对于以上问题，表征论有一个回答线索。如果一种状态有现象特性的话（非常粗糙地），那就意味着它是这样的状态，即（i）带有某种内部或外部特征的信息，以及（ii）该信息随时预备对信念和欲望产生直接影响（或是类似信仰和欲望的状态），那么，不能基于某种感觉刺激提供给他们的信息做出判断并根据所做的判断改变其行为的动物，就不是现象学上有意识的。依此观点，向性生物就什么也感觉和经验不到。它们没有感受质，只是经过充分训练的无意识的自动机或僵尸罢了，就视觉刺激范围来讲，就相当于盲视主体是受限的、无意识的自动机或某种程度上的僵尸。
Consider, for example, the case of plants. There are many different sorts of plant behavior. Some plants climb, others eat flies, still others catapult out seeds. Many plants close their leaves at night. The immediate cause of these activities is something internal to the plants. Seeds are ejected because of the hydration or dehydration of the cell walls in seed pods. Leaves are closed because of water movement in the stems and petioles of the leaves, itself induced by changes in the temperature and light. These inner events or states are surely not phenomenal. There is nothing it is like to be a Venus Fly Trap or a Morning-Glory.
考虑一下，比如说，植物的情况。存在许多不同种类的植物行为：有的植物爬，有的吃苍蝇，还有的射出种子，许多植物晚上还会闭叶。这些活动的直接原因来自于植物内部。种子被射出是因为种子荚中的细胞壁发生水合或脱水作用；叶片闭合是由于叶茎和叶柄中的水分运动，其本身是由温度和光线的变化所引起的。这些内在的事件或状态肯定不是现象学的。成为一棵捕蝇草或是一只牵牛花并不会有什么现象特性。
The behavior of plants is inflexible. It is genetically determined and, therefore, not modifiable by learning. Natural selection has favored the behavior, since historically it has been beneficial to the plant species. But it need not be now. If, for example, flies start to carry on their wings some substance that sickens Venus Fly Traps for several days afterwards, this will not have any effect on the plant behavior with respect to flies. Each Venus Fly Trap will continue to snap at flies as long as it has the strength to do so.
植物的行为并不灵活，这是由其基因所决定的，故而无法通过后天学习来改变。可以说，自然选择是有利于植物行为的，因为从历史上看这对植物大有裨益。但现在则不必。例如，苍蝇的翅膀上开始携带一些能让猪笼草致病的物质长达几天之后，这对与苍蝇有关的植物行为不会有任何影响。每个捕蝇草都将继续捕捉苍蝇，只要它们还有力气那么做。
Plants do not learn from experience. They do not acquire beliefs and change them in light of things that happen to them. Nor do they have any desires. To be sure, we sometimes speak as if they do. We say that the wilting daffodils are just begging to be watered. But we recognize full well that this is a harmless façon de parler. What we mean is that the daffodils need water. There is here no goal-directed behavior, no purpose, nothing that is the result of any learning, no desire for water.
植物不会从经验中学习。它们不会获取信念并根据其所遭遇的事情而改变这些信念。它们也没有任何欲望。诚然，我们有时会说得它们好像有这样的欲望，例如我们说，枯萎的水仙只是在乞求被浇灌。但我们都非常清楚，这只是一种天真无邪的说话方式。我们的意思其实是水仙需要水。在此并没有目标导向性的行为、也没有目的，没有什么学习的结果、也没有对水的渴望。
Plants, on the representational view, are not subject to any qualia. Nothing that goes on inside them is poised to make a direct difference to what they believe or desire, since they have no beliefs or desires.
按表征论的观点来看，植物完全没有任何感受质。植物内部没有什么会对其所相信或意欲的东西产生直接影响，因为它们根本就没有信念或意欲。
Reasoning of the above sort can be used to make a case that even though qualia do not extend to plants and paramecia, qualia are very widely distributed in nature (see Tye 1997, 2000). Of course, such a case requires decisions to be made about the attribution of beliefs and desires (or belief- and desire-like states) to much simpler creatures. And such decisions are likely to be controversial in some cases. Moreover, representationalism itself is a very controversial position. The general topic of the origins of qualia is not one on which philosophers have said a great deal.
以上类型的推理可以被用于支持如下观点，即，尽管感受质不会延伸至植物和草履虫，但感受质还是广泛分布于自然界中（见泰 1997，2000）。当然，这种情况需要对简单生物的信念和意欲（或类似信仰和意欲的状态）的归属做出裁决，在某些情况下，这样的裁决可能是有争议的。而且，表征论本身就是一个非常有争议的立场。关于感受质起源的一般话题，哲学家们说的并不是很多。
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