论文 | 事前竞赛与事后协作：理论与实验室证据
论文：Tournaments as Coordination Devices: Theory and Experimental Evidence
作者：
董志强 华南师范大学教授
张延人 复旦发展研究院助理研究员（通讯作者）
期刊：Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics（in press）
诺贝尔经济学奖得主托马斯•谢林在其著作《冲突的战略》中提出，理性的博弈双方即使在没有直接沟通的情况下也有可能达成某种心照不宣的协作，这种协作均衡被称为“谢林点”。以往的实验结果显示，“谢林点”仅在具有对称支付的协调博弈中有效，而在非对称情况下无效，这无法解释现实中大量存在的非对称“谢林点”。由华南师范大学经济行为科学重点实验室董志强教授与复旦大学发展研究院张延人博士（通讯作者）共同完成的项究，“Tournaments as Coordination Devices: Theory and Experimental Evidence”，解释了非对称“谢林点”的形成。他们通过构造一般化的Fehr-Schmidt效用函数在理论上证明了，当人们具有不平等厌恶时，引入前期对称竞赛有助于在后期协调博弈中形成非对称“谢林点”。这一预测在实验室环境下得到了验证。该项研究即将在国际知名期刊《行为与实验经济学》（Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics）上发表。
Abstract
Thomas C. Schelling proposed that individuals can coordinate more successfully than conventional models of coordination predict if they use payoff-irrelevant features to label strategies. However, recent experimental evidence illustrates that salient labels may lose much of their effectiveness when the payoffs are asymmetric. In this paper, we consider an asymmetric coordination game with two inequity-averse players. The model features a preplay tournament in which the two players compete to justify their future dominance. We argue that, after observing the result of the tournament, both players are more willing to select the label-salient strategy because the inequality in equilibrium is justified by the performance gap in the tournament. To test this prediction, we design an experiment that allows us to adjust the justifiability of inequality. The experimental results demonstrate that a preplay tournament may constitute an effective focal point that increases the likelihood of coordination.
Highlights
We develop a fairness-based coordination model.
We design an experiment to manipulate the justiability of inequality.
A pre-play real-effort tournament may constitute a focal point.
Winning subjects are more likely to take dominant positions.
Losing subjects are more likely to accept dominated positions.
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