【书摘】穆勒丨《论自由》社会对个人权威的限制（2）

《论自由》

《On Liberty》

[英]约翰·穆勒（密尔） 著

谢祖钧 译

河南文艺出版社；2017-1。

（注：感觉这个版本比商务版容易理解一些。英文原文附后，上篇英文原文也附后，供参考。）

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  如果他违反了保护其同胞的准则，不论是个人或集体，那情况就远不是这样的了。

  人们也仅仅只是希望一代一代的后人不要再从使他们祖先致命的同一悬崖上掉下去。

  不论什么时候，不论是对个人或者公众，造成了一定的伤害，或者一定伤害的危险，就都应被视作超越了自由的范围，而应被置于道德或法律的范围之内。

  没有人会永远愿意别人控制他个人的私事。

  如果人类有理由在无关他人利害的事情上干涉彼此的自由，那么又根据什么原则始终如一地排斥这类事件呢？

——穆勒（密尔）

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第四章 社会对个人权威的限度（2）

P80

一个人由于不够慎重或个人尊严方面的缺欠而可能引起的不被尊重，和一个人由于侵犯了他人的权利而应受到的谴责，两者之间的区别就不仅是一个名义上的区别了。一个人不论是在我们认为我们有权利控制他的事情上，还是在我们知道我们没有权利控制他的事情上——这两者在我们对他的感情和行为上都是有极大的区别的——使我们感到不快，我们可以表示我们的厌恶，我们可以像离开一个使我们不快的东西一样，离开一个使我们不快的人。但是我们不应因此而感到我们有责任使他生活不舒服。我们应想到他已承受或者已得到对他的错误的全部惩罚；如果他由于经营不善毁坏了自己的生活，那么我们也不应为了那个缘由，而希望他的处境进一步恶化；我们不但不想惩罚他，我们还愿努力减轻对他的惩罚，并告诉他怎样可以避免或医治他的行为可能给他带来的伤害。（p81）他可以是我们可怜的对象，甚至厌恶的对象，但绝不应是恼怒和愤怒的对象；我们不应把他当作社会的敌人来对待。如果我们不能对他表示仁慈的关怀的话，最坏不过的我们也只有听任他自己。如果他违反了保护其同胞的准则，不论是个人或集体，那情况就远不是这样的了。因为这时他的行为的恶劣后果已不是落在他自己的身上，而是落在了别人的身上；而社会作为其所有成员的保护者就应该对他进行报复，为了达到惩罚的确切目的必须使他遭受痛苦，而且还必须使惩罚足够的严厉。在这种情况下，他在我们的审判面前是一个罪犯，我们是被指派去审判他的人。我们要以这种或那种形式去执行我们的判决；而在别的情况下，我们则没有责任去使他遭受痛苦，除非我们在运用处理我们自己事务的自由时无意中给他造成了某些伤害。与此同时我们也允许他有处理其自身事务的自由。

许多人不愿承认这里我们所指出的——一个有关个人本身生活的职责和一个有关他人生活职责的区分。人们可能会问怎么能把社会成员的行为的任何部分认为是与其他成员无关呢？没有一个人是完全独立的，一个人不可能做了什么对他自身有严重或长期伤害的事情，而不影响到与他有亲密关系的人，而且经常是远远超出了他们。如果他损害了自己的财产，他就会直接或间接伤害依靠其财产资助的人，而且通常还多多少少减少了社会资源。如果他的生理和精神官能衰退，那他不仅要给依靠他的人的幸福带来不好的后果，而且还使他丧失了为他的同胞效力的能力，甚至变成他们感情或仁慈上的负担。如果这种行为经常发生，那么所犯的每一个过失都将使善的总额更加减少。最后，如果一个人的恶行或愚蠢没有对他人造成直接的伤害，那也仍可说他是一个有害的榜样；而且应该强迫他控制自己，以免看见或了解他的行为的人被带坏或误导。

P82

还应加上一点，那就是即使一个人的错误行为的后果仅限于邪恶的或轻率的本人，难道社会就应该放弃对那些显然不适合于自理的人的指导吗？如果保护儿童和未成年人的关注是天经地义的，那么社会对那些无力自理的成年人是否也应提供同样的保护呢？如果赌博、酗酒、不能自制、懒惰或不讲卫生，像法律公开禁止的许多行为一样对幸福都是有害的，对改良是一个极大的障碍，那么人们可能会问，为什么法律不能结合可行性和社会方便竭力去抑制它们呢？同时作为法律不可避免的不完善性的一种补充手段，舆论是否至少应该组织成一个强大的警察力量来对付这些邪恶，并对那些已知的对社会犯有那些恶行的人以严厉的惩罚？这里（可以说）根本不存在限制个性或阻碍生活中进行新的创新尝试的问题。唯一应该受到阻止的是那些从世界的一开始直到现在就已经尝试过，而且一直受到谴责的事情；它们是经验表明对任何人的个性都无用或不适宜的东西。一种道德的或谨慎的真理必须经历一段时间和实践之后，才可以视为建立起来了。人们也仅仅只是希望一代一代的后人不要再从使他们祖先致命的同一悬崖上掉下去。

我完全承认一个人对自己所造成的伤害可以通过同情和利害关系对与他有亲密关系的人造成严重的影响，并在一定程度上影响整个社会。当一个人由于这类行为违反他对别人或他人明确的和指定的义务时，那么事情就超出了自我关注的范围，而应该受到本义上的道德上的不认可。例如一个人由于放纵或挥霍，而成了一个无力偿还债务的人，或者出于同样的原因，在承担家庭的道德责任上，无力抚养或教育子女时，那么他就应该受到谴责，甚至可以有理由对他加以惩罚；但是这是为了他没有能履行其对家庭或债权人的责任，而不是为了他的挥霍浪费。如果原本应专用于他们身上的资源，没有用在他们的身上，而用在了最谨慎的投资，（p83）那么道德上同样应受到惩罚。乔治·巴恩威尔为了给自己的情妇弄钱，杀害了他的叔父。如果他杀人是为了自己开办企业，他同样也会遭到绞死。再者，时常有这种情况，一个人由于沉溺于某些恶习，而使其家庭蒙受痛苦，那么他也应因不关心家人或忘恩负义而受到谴责。不过一个人也可以因养成了一些本身不是堕落的习惯而受到谴责，如果那些习惯使与他共同生活的人感到痛苦，或者使那些安乐在私人关系上依附于他以享的人感到痛苦的话。不论是谁，只要没有能够充分考虑他人的利益和感情，而不是由于某种更加迫切的义务或者有理由的个人优先的原因的话，那么他就要为没有考虑他人的利益和情感而成为道德谴责的对象。同样，当一个人由于单纯的自我关注，而未能履行他对公众义不容辞的义务时，这时他就犯有对社会的渎职罪。没有一个人会单纯因为酗酒而受到惩罚；然而一个战士或一个警察在值班时喝醉了，却应受到惩罚。简而言之，不论什么时候，不论是对个人或者公众，造成了一定的伤害，或者一定伤害的危险，就都应被视作超越了自由的范围，而应被置于道德或法律的范围之内。

P83

至于仅仅属于偶然事故或者可以称作个人对社会所造成的推定性伤害，由于它既不违反对公众的任何特定义务，除了其本人以外，也不对任何确定的个人造成能感觉得到的伤害，那么为了人类自由的更大的利益，这种不便是社会所能承受的。如果一个成年人都要为了没有能够很好地照顾好自己而受到惩罚，那么我宁肯说那是为了他们自己的缘故，而不愿借口说那是要防止他们伤害自己为社会效力的能力，因为社会并没有自称有权要求那些效力。不过我并不同意这一论点。好像社会，除了只有等待他们做了什么非理性的行为，然后才加以法律的或道德的惩罚以外，就没有别的方法能把其较弱的成员培养到理性行为的普通标准。社会在他们成长的整个早期对他们有绝对的权力。这个时期包括整个儿童时期和青春时期，（p84）在这个时期里社会完全可以努力把他们在生活中培养成行为具有理性的人。当代的一代既是训练下一代的主人，又是下一代全部生存环境的主人；的确它不能把他们都培养得聪明和美好，因为当代的一代本身就是如此可悲的缺少美好和智慧；因而它最大的努力在个别具体场合并不总是最成功的；但是它完全有能力使成长的下一代作为一个整体，同它本身一样的好，甚至比它还要好一点。

P84

如果社会让其不少的成员长大了还是同孩子一样，没有远大的理想，不能根据远大的理想来行事，那么社会应为这种结果而受到责备。因为社会不但拥有进行教育的一切权力，而且拥有公认的舆论的权威；它控制着那些最不适宜于为自己作出判断的人们的头脑。而且社会还得到了自然惩罚的帮助，即使了解他们的人对他们产生厌恶和藐视。这是他们谁都逃脱不了的自然惩罚。因此社会就无须再要求在个人事务上发号施令和让人绝对服从的权力。根据公平的原则和政策，在那些事务上应当由承受后果的人来做出决定。没有什么比求助于最坏的办法更能诋毁和挫败较好的影响行为的方法了。如果在那些被强迫谨慎或节制的人们中具有任何构成坚强和独立性格的材料的话，他们绝对会反抗这种枷锁。没有人会永远愿意别人控制他个人的私事，就如同他们必然要阻止他在他们个人的私事中伤害他们一样；而且这种对篡夺来的权威的反抗很容易被视作一种精神和勇气的标志；而且他们会大张旗鼓地反其道而行之，就像在查理二世时代清教徒疯狂地执行道德上的不宽容政策，反而招致粗野的流行一样。至于谈到什么保护社会不受堕落或自我放纵的个别人所树立的坏榜样的影响的必要性，的确坏的榜样可以产生有害的影响，特别是对他人做了坏事而不受到惩罚的时候。不过我们现在所谈论的是对他人无害，而对当事者本人可能有极大的伤害的行为。（p85）同时我也看不出除了上面的例子以外，那些相信这一点的人还能有什么相反的想法。整个地来说，我们现在所说的应该是有益的行为，而不是有害的行为；因为如果这种事例显示了不当的行为，那么它也显示了令人痛苦或堕落的后果，如果那种行为受到了公正的非难，那么在所有场合或大多数场合它也应当视作必然的结果。

P85

在反对社会干预纯个人行为的所有论据中，最强有力的一种是社会干预可能干预错了，干预在不应干预的地方。在社会道德问题上，对他人的义务的问题上，公众的意见，也就是绝大多数人的意见，虽然时常是错误的，但更多的可能是正确的。因为在这类问题上只要求他们判断他们自己的利益，判断某种行为的模式如果允许其实行的话，可能对他们产生什么样的影响。但是把一个类似的大多数人的意见作为法律强加在少数人身上，那么在有关的行为问题上，则完全可能错，虽然也可能对。因为在这些场合公众的意见充其量表示的也不过是某些人对他人个人自身好或坏的看法。而更常见的甚至连这都不是；公众以十足的冷漠的态度完全忽视了他们所指责的那些行为人的欢乐或便利。他们考虑的只是他们自己的偏好。有许多的人把他们厌恶的任何行为都视作对他们的伤害，并且把这种不满看作是对他们的感情的凌辱。当一个宗教的偏执狂被控为无视他人的宗教感情时，他总是反驳说他人的崇拜或教义无视他的感情。但是一个人对坚持自己的意见的感情与另一个人对他坚持其意见而感到受到冒犯的感情——两者之间是不存在等号的；如同一个小偷要想盗窃一个钱包与钱包主人想要保有那个钱包一样，两种欲望之间同样不存在对等。而一个人的情趣正如同他的意见或钱包一样都是他特别关心的事。任何一个人都很希望有这样一个理想的公众，它把所有被打乱的和没有确定的事情都留给个人去自由处理和选择，（p86）而只要求人们不要做已受到经验所谴责的行为。但是什么地方见过这样的一个公众，对其审查权力订下了这样的一个限度？或者说公众又在什么时候为了普遍的经验而麻烦过自己？公众在对私人的行为进行干预时，他所思考的只是行为或感情与其自身的行为或感情存在的巨大差距，而且这个判断的标准，略加粉饰就由百分之九十的道德家和思辨家作为给人类确立为宗教和哲学的训令。那些道德家和思辨家教导说事物之所以正确是因为它们本来就是正确的；是因为我们感到它们是正确的。他们要我们在我们的头脑和心灵中去寻找约束我们自己和他人行为的法规。可怜的公众只有运用这些教导，如果他们在善恶感情方面能够勉强达成一致的话，就使他们对善恶的感情成为世人都要履行的义务，除此之外他们还能做什么呢？

P86

这里所指出的弊端并不是仅存于理论中的弊端。也许人们会指望我会详细地说明一些被这个世纪和这个国家的公众不恰当地把其自身的偏爱赋予道德法则的性质的例子。我不是在写一篇关于现存道德情感失常的论文。那是一个太大的题目，不能用附加说明和插图的方式来加以讨论。不过为了阐明我所维护的原则是具有严肃而且实际的重要性，同时我并不是要致力修建一道抵制想象中的恶行的屏障，举些实例还是必不可少的。通过大量的例子不难看出要扩大可以称作道德警察的范围是人类所有倾向中最普遍的一个，它的唯一界限就是不能蚕食个人的最不成问题的合法的自由。

第一个例子，人们仅仅依据一些人的宗教意见不同，不履行他们的宗教仪式尤其是不遵守他们的宗教戒律，便对他们抱有反感。下面引用了一个极小的例子。在基督教义或生活中，没有比允许其教徒食猪肉这一点更加引起穆斯林们对他们的仇视的了。没有什么行动使基督教和欧洲人本能地感到的厌恶能够胜过穆斯林们对这个填饱肚子的方式所抱有的厌恶之情。（p87）这是因为首先它冒犯了他们的宗教；然而这一情况并不能解释他们抵触的程度或性质。因为在他们的宗教里酒是被禁止的，参与喝酒在所有伊斯兰教徒看来都是错误的，却不是令人厌恶的。他们对这种不干净的“牲畜”的肉的反感，相反是属于一种独特的性质。它有点类似于一种本能的反感，这个不干净的观念一旦进入人的情感，似乎就时常会激起那种本能的反感，甚至在那些个人生活并不十分讲究卫生的人身上也是如此。在印度教徒身上宗教不洁的情感如此强烈，也是那种本能的反感的一个显著例子。因而如果一个民族里大多数都是伊斯兰教徒，那么那个大多数一定会坚持要在那个国家的范围内禁食猪肉。①

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①居住在孟买的印度教徒就是这种情况的一个有趣的例子。当这个勤劳而又有进取心的部落，波斯拜火教的后裔在哈里发（伊斯兰教国家政教合一的称号）立国之前逃离他们的祖国，来到西印度时，印度的君主们接纳他们的条件是不食牛肉。而当这些地区后来落到穆斯林征服者的手里时，教徒继续得到了他们的恩赐，不过其条件是戒食猪肉。最初的对权威的服从变成了他们的第二天性，以致教徒时至今日既不食牛肉，也不食猪肉。虽然这完全不是他们宗教的要求，然而这两个禁食要求经过长时期坚持已成为他们部落的习惯；在东方，习俗就是一种宗教。

P87

他们也真诚地相信那是上帝所禁止和厌恶的，而且这种禁止也不能指责为宗教的迫害。它在起源上可能是宗教性的，但它不是对宗教的迫害。因为没有一个人的宗教把食猪肉当成一个义务，否则加以谴责。它唯一站得住脚的理由，只可能是公众无权去干预个人的趣味和对自我的关怀。

现在我们再来看多少离家更近一点的地方。大多数的西班牙人认为以任何不同于罗马天主教的方式敬奉上帝都是对上帝极大的不敬，都是对上帝最大限度的冒犯，而且其他任何的公开敬奉在西班牙的土地上也都是非法的。南欧各国的人民都把一个结了婚的神父，不仅视作违反宗教的，（p88）而且视作淫荡的、下流的、低级庸俗和令人厌恶的人。那么对这些诚挚的情感，并试图强化这些情感以反对非天主教徒的新教徒又是怎么想的呢？如果人类有理由在无关他人利害的事情上干涉彼此的自由，那么又根据什么原则始终如一地排斥这类事件呢？或者说谁又能指责那些想镇压他们认为在上帝和人的眼中是丑事的人们呢？在禁止任何被视为个人不道德的事情方面，最有说服力的事例莫过于表明那是为了压制那些人心目中认为不虔敬的做法。除非我们愿意接受迫害者的逻辑，并且说因为我们是正确的，所以我们可以迫害别人。而且因为他们是错误的，所以他们不能迫害我们。那么，我们就必须谨防承认这样一个原则，那就是当人们把它运用到我们自己身上时我们将愤怒地把它视作是极大的不公。

前面所举的事例可能遭到反驳（虽然那种反对是不合理的），说那些事例都是在我们中间完全不可能的偶然的事情；在我们国家里不可能有根据他们的教义或意向强行禁食某种肉食的舆论，或者干预人们的崇拜，或者结婚和不结婚。然而下一个例子我们将取自一种对自由的干涉，而且我们怎么样也摆脱不了干涉自由的危险。不论什么地方，只要是清教徒像在新英格兰以及共和时代的大不列颠那样强大和有势力，他们就致力镇压所有的舆论以及几乎所有的私人娱乐活动：尤其是音乐、舞蹈、公共游戏或其他以消遣为目的的聚会和戏剧，并取得了相当的成功。

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本文编录：杨原平

黑体字为本编标

目录

第一章 绪论…01

第二章 论思想自由和讨论自由…15

第三章 论作为幸福要素之一的个性…56

第四章 社会对个人权威的限度…76

第五章 本学说的应用…96

 On Liberty

CHAPTER 1  Introductory…121

CHAPTER2  Of the liberty of thought anddiscussion…140

CHAPTER 3  Of individuality， as one ofthe elements of well-being…192

CHAPTER 4 Of the limits to the authority ofsociety over the individual…218

CHAPTER 5  Applications…244

译者序 

约翰·穆勒（密尔）（John Stuart Mill，1806-1873）是英国19世纪杰出的思想家。他的《论自由》（On Liberty）是欧洲政治思想史中少数经典之一，被誉为近代民主与自由的宣言。

这本书很难读，因为它的每一个句子浓缩的东西太多太多，因而也更难翻译。但一经拿起，又怎么也放不下。因为这个问题太有价值了。谁不要自由，不渴望自由，但什么是自由，我们说得清楚吗？自由对个人，对民族，对国家又有着什么样的意义？带着这些问题，我走进了这本书。经过艰苦的跋涉后，我惊呆了。他讲得太妙，太深刻了！现在我把它献给大家共同来品尝。

译者谢祖钧

2013年9月1日

作者简介

约翰·穆勒（John Stuart Mill，1806-1873），英国哲学家、经济学家，古典自由主义最重要的代表人物之一，被称为“自由主义之圣”。对西方自由主义思潮影响甚广，其代表作《论自由》更被誉为自由主义理论集大成之作，被评价为“对个人自由最动人心弦，最强有力的辩护”。这部著作的要义可以概括为：只要不涉及他人利益，个人（成人）就有完全的行动自由；只有当自己的言行危害他人利益时，个人才应接受社会的强制性惩罚。

译者简介

谢祖钧，中国翻译协会资深翻译家。1928年生。曾为长沙理工大学教授。精通英文、俄文，从事翻译工作几十年，翻译过多部作品。

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本文英文原文：

CHAPTER 4 Of the limits to the authority ofsociety over the individual（2）

P224

  The distinction between the loss consideration which person may rightly incur bydefect of prudence or of personal dignity, and the reprobation which is due tohim for an offence against the rights of others, is not a merely nominaldistinction.' It makes a vast difference both in our feelings and in ourconduct towards him, whether he displeases us in things in which we think wehave a right to control him, or in things in which we know that we have not. Ifhe displeases us, we may express our distaste, and we may stand aloof from aperson as well as from a thing that displeases us; but we shall not thereforefeel called on to make his life uncomfortable. We shall reflect that he alreadybears, or will bear, the whole penalty of his error; if he spoils his life bymismanagement, we shall not, for that reason, desire to spoil it still further:instead of wishing to punish him, we shall rather endeavour to alleviate hispunishment, by showing him how he may avoid or cure the evils his conduct tendsto bring upon him. He may be to us an object of pity, perhaps of dislike, butnot of anger or resentment: we shall not treat him like an enemy of society:the worst we shall think ourselves justified in doing is leaving him tohimself, if we do not interfere benevolently by showing interest or concern forhim. It is far otherwise if he has infringed the rules necessary for theprotection of his fellow-creatures, individually or collectively. The evilconsequences of his acts do not then fall on himself. But on others; (p225)andsociety, as the protector of all its members, must retaliate on him: mustinflict pain on him for the express purpose of punishment, and must take carethat it be sufficiently severe. In the one case, he is an offender at our bar,and we are called on not only to sit in judgment on him, but, in one shape oranother, to execute our own sentence: in the other case, it is not our part toinflict any suffering on him, except what may incidentally follow from ourusing the same liberty in the regulation of our own affairs, which we allow tohim in his.

P225

  The distinction here pointed out between the part of a person's life which concernsonly himself, and that which concerns others, many persons will refuse to admit.How (it may be asked)can any part of the conduct of a member of society be amatter of indifference to the other members? No person is an entirely isolatedbeing; it is impossible for a person to do anything seriously or permanentlyhurtful to himself. without mischief reaching at least to his near connections,and often far beyond them. If he injures his property, he does harm to thosewho directly or indirectly derived support from it, and usually diminishes, bygreater or less amount, the general resources of the community. If hedeteriorates his bodily or mental faculties, he not only brings evil upon allwho depended on him for any portion of theirh  ppiness, but disqualifies himself for rendering the services which heowes to his fellow-creatures generally: perhaps becomes a burthen on theiraffection or benevolence; and if such conduct were very frequent, hardly anyofence that is committed would detract more from the general sum of good.Finally, if by his vices or follies a person does no direct harm to others, heis nevertheless(it may be said) injurious by his example; and ought to becompelled to control himself, for the sake of those whom the sight or knowl.edge of his conduct might corrupt or mislead.

P226

  And even (it will be added) if the consequence of misconduct could be confined tothe vicious or thoughtless individual, ought society to abandon to their ownguidance those who are manifestly unfit for it? If protection againstthemselves is confessedly due to children and persons under age, is not societyequally bound to afford it to persons of mature years who are equally incapableof self-government? If gambling, or drunkenness, or incontinence, or idleness,or uncleanliness, are as injurious to happiness, and as great a hindrance to improvement,as many or most of the acts prohibited b law, why (it may be asked ) should notlaw, so far as is consistent with practicability and social convenience,endeavour to repress these also? And as a supplement to the unavoidableimperfections of law, ought not opinion at least to organise a powerful policeagainst these vices, and visit rigidly with social penalties those who areknown to practise them? There is no question here( it may be said) aboutrestricting individuality, or impeding the trial of new and originalexperiments in living The only things it is sought to prevent are things whichhave been tried and condemned from the beginning of the world until now; thingswhich experience has shown not to be useful or suitable to any person's individuality.There must be some length of time and amount of experience, after which a moralor prudential truth may be regarded as established: and it is merely desired toprevent generation after generation from falling over the same precipice whichhas been fatal to their predecessors.

  I fully admit that the mischief which a person does to himself may seriouslyaffect,(p227) both through their sympathies and their interests, those nearlyconnected with him, and in minor degree, society at large. When, b conduct ofthis sort, a person is led to violate a distinct and assignable obli gation toany other person or persons, the case is taken out of the self-regarding class,and becomes amenable to moral disapprobation in the proper sense of the term.If, for example, man, through intemperance or extravagance, becomes unable topay his debts, or, having undertaken the moral responsibility of a family,becomes from the same cause incapable of supporting or educating them, he isdeservedly reprobated, and might be justly punished; but it is for the breachof duty to his family or creditors, not for the extravagance. If the resourceswhich ought to have been devoted to them. had been diverted from them for themost prudent investment. the moral culpability would have been the same. GeorgeBamwell murdered his uncle to get money for his mistress, but if he had done itto set himself up in business, he would equally have been hanged. Again, in thefrequent case of a man who causes grief to his family by addiction to bad habits,he deserves reproach for his unkindness or ingratitude but so he may forcultivating habits not in themselves vicious, if they are painful to those withwhom he passes his life, or who from personal ties are dependent on him fortheir comfort. Whoever fails in the consideration generally due to theinterests and feelings of others, not being compelled by some more imperativeduty, or justified by allowable self-preference, is a subject of moraldisapprobation for that failure, but not for the cause of it, nor for theerrors, merely personal to himself, which may have remotely led to it. In likemanner, when a person disables himself, by conduct purely sell-regarding, fromthe performance of some definite duty incumbent on him to the public, (p228)heis guilty of a social offence. No person ought to be punished simply for beingdrunk; but a soldier or a policeman should be punished for being drunk on duty.Whenever, in short, there is a definite damage or a definite risk of damage,either to an individual or to the public, the case is taken out of the provinceof liberty, and placed in that of morality or law.

P228

  But with regard to the merely contingent, or, as it may be called, constructiveinjury which a person causes to society, by conduct which neither violates anyspecific duty to the public, nor occasions perceptible hurt to any assignableindividual except himself; the inconvenience is one which society can afford tobear, for the sake of the greater good of human freedom. If grown persons areto be punished for not taking proper care of themselves, I would rather it werefor their own sake, than under pretence of preventing them from impairing theircapacity of rendering to society benefits which society does not pretend it hasa right to exact. But I cannot consent to argue the point as if society had nomeans of bringing its weaker members up to its ordinary standard of rationalconduct, except waiting till they do something rational, and then punishingthem, legally or morally, for it. Society has had absolute power over themduring all the early portion of their existence: it has had the whole period ofchildhood and nonage in which to try whether it could make them capable ofrational conduct in life. The existing generation is master both of the trainingand the entire circumstances of the generation to come; it cannot indeed makethem perfectly wise and good, because it is itself so lamentably deficient ingoodness and wisdom; and its best efforts are not always, in individual cases,its most successful ones; but it is perfectly well able to make the risinggeneration,(p229) as a whole, as good as,  and a little better than, itself. If society lets any considerablenumber of its members grow up mere children, incapable of being acted on byrational consideration of distant motives, society has itself to blame for theconsequences. Armed not only with all the powers of education, but with theascendancy which the authority of a received opinion always exercises over theminds who are least fitted to judge for themselves; and aided by the naturalpenalties which cannot be prevented from falling on those who incur thedistaste or the contempt of those who know them; let not society pretend thatit needs. besides all this, the power to issue commands and enforce obediencein the personal concerns of individuals, in which, on all principles of justiceand policy, the decision ought to rest with those who are able to abide theconsequences. Nor is there anything which tends more to discredit and frustratethe better means of influencing conduct, than resort to the worse.lf there beamong those whom it is attempted to coerce into prudence or temperance, any ofthe material of which vigorous and independent characters are made, they willinfallibly rebel against the yoke. No such person will ever feel that othershave a right to control him in his concerns, such as they have to prevent himfrom injuring them in theirs; and it easily comes to be considered a mark ofspirit and courage to fly in the face of such usurped authority, and do withostentation the exact opposite of what it enjoins: as in the fashion ofgrossness which succeeded, in the time of Charles II, to the fanatical moralintolerence of the Puritans With respect to what is saidk of the necessity ofprotecting society from the bad example set to others by the vicious or theself-indulgent; it is true that bad example may have a pernicious effect, (p230)especiallythe example of doing wrong to others with impunity to the wrong-doer. But weare now speaking of conduct which, while it does no wrong to others, issupposed to do great harm to the agent himself: and I do not see how those whobelieve this. can think otherwise than that the example, on the whole. must bemore salutary than hurtful, since, if it displays the misconduct. it displaysalso the painful or degrading consequences which, if the conduct is justlycensured, must be supposed to be in all or most cases attendant on it.

P230

  But the strongest of all the arguments against the interference of the public withpurely personal conduct, is that when it does interfere, the odds are that itinterferes wrongly, and in the wrong place. On questions of social morality, ofduty to others, the opinion of the public, that is, of an over-ruling majority,though often wrong, is likely to be still oftener right: because on suchquestions they are only required to judge of their own interests; of the mannerin which some mode of conduct, if allowed to be practised, would affectthemselves. But the opinion of a similar majority, imposed as a law on theminority, on questions of self-regarding conduct, is quite as likely to bewrong as right; for in these cases public opinion means, at the best, somepeople's opinion of what is good or bad for other people: while very often itdoes not even mean that the public, with the most perfect indifference, passingover the pleasure or convenience of those whose conduct they censure, andconsidering only their own preference. There are many who consider as an injuryto themselves any conduct which they have distaste for, and resent it as anoutrage to their feelings; as a religious bigot, when charged with disregardingthe religious feelings of others, has been known to retort that they disregardhis feelings, (231)by persisting in their abominable worship or creed. Butthere is no parity between the feeling of a person for his own opinion, and thefeeling of another who is offended at his holding it: no more than between thedesire of thief to take a purse, and the desire of the right owner to keep it.And a person's taste is as much his own peculiar concern as his opinion or hispurse. It is easy for any one to imagine an ideal public, which leaves thefreedom and choice of individuals in all uncertain matters undisturbed, and onlyrequires them to abstain from modes of conduct which universal experience hascondemned. But where has there been seen a public which set any such limit toits censorship? or when does the public trouble itself about universalexperience? In its interferences with personal conduct it is seldom thinking ofanything but the enormity of acting or feeling differently from itself; andthis standard of judgment, thinly disguised, is held up to mankind as thedictate of religion and philosophy, by nine-tenths of all moralists andspeculative writers. These teach that things are right because they are right;because we feel them to be so. They tell us to search in our own minds andhearts for laws of conduct binding on ourselves and on all others. What can thepoor public do but apply these instructions, and make their own personalfeelings of good and evil, if they are tolerably unanimous in them, obligatoryon all the world?

P231

  The evil here pointed out is not one which exists only in theory; and it mayperhaps be expected that I should specify the instances in which the public ofthis age and country improperly invests its own preferences with the characterof moral laws. I am not writing an essay on the aberrations of existing moralfeeling. That is too weighty a subject to be discussed parenthetically, (p232)andby way of illustration. Yet examples are necessary, to show that the principleI maintain is of serious and practical moment, and that I am not endeavouringto erect a barrier against imaginary evils. And it is not difficult to show, byabundant instances, that to extend the bounds of what may be called moralpolice, until it encroaches on the most unquestionably legitimate liberty ofthe individual, is one of the most universal of all human propensities.

P232

  As a first instance, consider the antipathies which men cherish on no better groundsthan that persons whose religious opinions are different from theirs. do notpractise their religious observances especially their religious abstinences. Tocite a rather trivial example, nothing in the creed or practice of Christiansdoes more to envenom the hatred of Mahomedans against them, than the fact oftheir eating pork. There are few acts which Christians and Europeans regardwith more unaffected disgust, than Mussulmans regard this particular mode ofsatisfying hunger. It is, in the first place, an offence against theirreligion; but this circumstance by no means explains either the degree or thekind of their repugnance; for wine also is forbidden by their religion, and topartake of it is by all Mussulmans accounted wrong, but not disgusting. Theiraversion to the flesh of the 'unclean beast' is, on the contrary, of thatpeculiar character, resembling an instinctive antipathy, which the idea ofuncleanness, when once it thoroughly sinks into the feelings, seems always toexcite even in those whose personal habits are anything but scrupulouslycleanly, and of which the sentiment of religious impurity, so intense in theHindoos, is a remarkable example. Suppose now that in a people, of whom themajority were Mussulmans that majority should insist up on not permitting porkto be eaten with in the limits of the country. (p233)This would be nothing newin Mahomedan countries.① Would it be legitimate exercise of the moral authority of publicopinion? and if not, why not? The practice is really revolting to such apublic. They also sincerely think that it is forbidden and abhorred by theDeity. Neither could the prohibition be censured as religious persecution. Itmight be religious in its origin, but it would not be persecution for religion,since nobody's religion makes it a duty to eat pork. The only tenable ground ofcondemnation would be, that with the personal tastes and self-regardingconcerns of individuals the public has no business to interfere.

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①The case of the Bombay Parsees is a curious instance in point. Whenthis industrious and enterprising tribe, the descendants of the Persian fire-worshippers.flying from their native country before the Caliphs, arrived in Western India,they were admitted to toleration by the Hindoo sovereigns, on condition of noteating beef. When those regions afterwards fell under the dominion of Mahomedanconquerors, the Parsees obtained from them a continuance of indulgence, oncondition of refraining from pork. What was at first obedience to authoritybecame second nature, and the Parsees to this day abstain both from beef andpork. Though not required by their religion, the double abstinence has had timeto grow into custom of their tribe; and custom, in the East, is religion.

P233

  To come somewhat nearer home: the majority of Spaniards consider it a grossimpiety, offensive in the highest degree to the Supreme Being, to worship himin any other manner than the Roman Catholic; and no other public worship is lawfulon Spanish soil. The people of all Southern Europe look upon a married clergyas not only irreligious, but unchaste, indecent, gross, disgusting. What doProtestants think of these perfectly sincere feelings, and of the attempt toenforce them against non-Catholic? Yet, if mankind are justified in interferingwith each other's liberty in things which do not concern the interests ofothers, (p234)on what principle is it possible consistently to exclude thesecases? or who can blame people for desiring to suppress what they regard as ascandal in the sight of God and man? No stronger case can be shown forprohibiting anything which is regarded as a personal immorality, than is madeout for suppressing these practices in the eyes of those who regard them asimpieties; and unless we are willing to adopt the logic of persecutors, and tosay that we may persecute others because we are right, and that they must notpersecute us because they are wrong, we must beware of admitting a principle ofwhich we should resent as a gross injustice the application to ourselves.

P234

  The preceding instances may be objected to, although unreasonably, as drawn fromcontingencies impossible among us: opinion, in this country, not being likelyto enforce abstinence from meats, or to interfere with people for worshipping,and for either marrying or not marrying, according to their creed orinclination. The next example however, shall be taken from an interference withliberty which we have by no means passed all danger of. Wherever the Puritanshave been sufficiently powerful, as in New England, and in Great Britain at thetime of the Commonwealth, they have endeavoured, with considerable success, toput down all public, and nearly all private, amusements: especially music,dancing, public games, or other assemblages for purposes of diversion, and thetheatre.

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补上一篇英文原文

CHAPTER 4 Of the limits to the authority ofsociety over the individual（1）

P218

  What, then, is the rightful limit to thesovereignty of the individual over himself? Where does the authority of societybegin? How much of human life should be assigned to individuality, and how muchto society?

  Eachwill receive its proper share, if each has that which more particularlyconcerns it. To individuality should belong the part of life in which it ischiefly the individual that is interested; to society, the part which chieflyinterests society.

  Though society is not founded on a contract,and though no good purpose is answered by inventing a contract in order todeduce social obligations from it, everyone who receives the protection of societyowes a return for the benefit, and the fact of living in society renders itindispensable that each should be bound to observe a certain line of conducttowards the rest. This conduct consists first, in not injuring the interests ofone another; or rather certain interests, which, either by express legalprovision or by tacit understanding, ought to be considered as rights; andsecondly, in each person's bearing his share(to be fixed on some equitableprinciple)of the labours and sacrifices incurred for defending the society orits members from injury and molestation. (p219)These conditions society isjustified in enforcing at all costs to those who endeavour to withholdfulfilment. Nor is this all that society may do. The acts of an individual maybe hurtful to others, or wanting in due consideration for their welfare,without going the length of violating any of their constituted rights. Theoffender may then be justly punished by opinion, though not by law. As soon asany part of a person's conduct affects prejudicially the interests of others,society has jurisdiction over it, and the question whether the general welfarewill or will not be promoted by interfering with it, becomes open todiscussion. But there is no room for entertaining any such question when aperson's conduct affects the interests of no persons besides himself, or needsnot affect them unless they like (all the persons concerned being of full age, andthe ordinary amount of understanding). In all such cases there should beperfect freedom, legal and social, to do the action and stand the consequences.

P219

  It would be a great misunderstanding of this doctrine to suppose that it is one ofselfish indifference, which pretends that human beings have no business witheach other's conduct in life, and that they should not concern themselves aboutthe well-doing or well-being of one another, unless their own interest isinvolved. Instead of any diminution, there is need of great increase ofdisinterested exertion to promote the good of others. But disinterestedbenevolence can find other instruments to persuade people to their good, thanwhips and scourges, either of the literal or the metaphorical sort. I am thelast person to undervalue the self-regarding virtues; they are only second inimportance, if even second, to the social. It is equally the business ofeducation to cultivate both.(p220) But even education works by conviction andpersuasion as well as by compulsion, and it is by the former only that. whenthe period of education is past, the self-regarding virtues should be inculcated.Human beings owe to each other help to distinguish the better from the worse,and encouragement to choose the former and avoid the latter. They should be forever stimulating each other to increased exercise of their higher faculties,and increased direction of their feelings and aims towards wise instead offoolish, elevating instead of degrading, objects and contemplations. Butneither one person, nor any number of persons, is warranted in saying toanother human creature of ripe years, that he shall not do with his life forhis own benefit what he chooses to do with it. He is the person most interestedin his own well-being: the interest which any other person, except in cases ofstrong personal attachment, can have in it, is trifling, compared with thatwhich he himself has: the interest which society has in him individually(except as to his conduct to others) is fractional, and altogether indirect:while, with respect to his own feelings and circumstances, the most ordinaryman or woman has means of knowledge immeasurably surpassing those that can bepossessed by any one else. The interference of society to overrule his judgmentand purposes in what only regards himself, must be grounded on generalpresumptions: which may be altogether wrong, and even if right, are as likelyas not to be misapplied to individual cases, by persons no better acquaintedwith the circumstances of such cases than those are who look at them merelyfrom without. In this department, therefore, of human affairs, Individualityhas its proper field of action. In the conduct of human beings towards oneanother, it is necessary that general rules should for the most part beobserved, in order that people may know what they have to expect but in eachperson's own concerns, his individual spontaneity is entitled to free exercise.Considerations to aid his judgment, exhortations to strengthen his will, may beoffered to him, even obtruded on him, by others; but he himself is the finaljudge. All errors which he is likely to commit against advice and warning, arefar outweighed by the evil of allowing others to constrain him to what theydeem his good.

P221

  I do not mean that the feelings with which a person is regarded by others, ought notto be in any way affected by his self-regarding qualities or deficiencies. Thisis neither possible nor desirable. If he is eminent in any of the qualitieswhich conduce to his own good, he is, so far, a proper object of admiration. Heis so much the nearer to the ideal perfection of human nature. If he is grosslydeficient in those qualities a sentiment the opposite of admiration willfollow. There is a degree of folly, and a degree of what may be called (thoughthe phrase is not unobjectionable)lowness or depravation of taste, which,though it cannot justify doing harm to the person who manifests it, renders himnecessarily and properly a subject of distaste, or, in extreme cases. even ofcontempt: a person could not have the opposite qualities in due strengthwithout entertaining these feelings. Though doing no wrong to any one, a personmay so act as to compel us to judge him, and feel to him, as a fool, or as a beingof an inferior order: and since this judgment and feeling are a fact which hewould prefer to avoid, it is doing him a service to warn him of it beforehandas of any other disagreeable consequence to which he exposes himself. It wouldbe well, indeed, if this good office were much more freely rendered than thecommon notions of politeness at present permit, (p222)and if one person couldhonestly point out to another that he thinks him in fault, without beingconsidered unmannerly or presuming. We have a right, also, in various ways, toact upon our unfavourable opinion of any one, not to the oppression of hisindividuality, but in the exercise of ours. We are not bound, for example, toseek his society; we have right to avoid it( though not to parade the avoidance),for we have right to choose the society most acceptable to us. We have a right,and it may be our duty, to caution others against him, if we think his exampleor conversation likely to have a pernicious effect on those with whom heassociates. We may give others a preference over him in optional good offices,except those which tend to his improvement. In these various modes a person maysuffer very severe penalties at the hand of others, for faults which directlyconcern only himself but he suffers these penalties only in so far as they arethe natural, and, as it were, the spontaneous consequences of the faultsthemselves, not because they are purposely inflicted on him for the sake ofpunishment. A person who shows rashness, obstinacy, self-conceit-who cannotlive within moderate means-who cannot restrain himself from hurtfulindulgences-who pursues animal pleasures at the expense of those of feeling andintellect-must expect to be lowered in the opinion of others, and to have aless share of their favourable sentiments; but of this he has no right tocomplain, unless he has merited their favour by special excellence in hissocial relations, and has thus established a title to their good offices, whichis not affected by his demerits towards himself.

P222

  What contend for is, that the inconvenience which are strictly inseparable from theunfavourable judgment of others, are the only ones to which a person shouldever be subjected for that portion of his conduct and character which concernshis own good, but which does not affect the interests of others in theirrelations with him. Acts injurious to others require a totally differenttreatment. Encroachment on their rights; infliction on them of any loss ordamage not justified by his own rights falsehood or duplicity in dealing withthem; unfair or ungenerous use of advantages over them; even selfish abstinencefrom defending them against injury-these are fit objects of moral reprobation,and, in grave cases of moral retribution and punishment. And not only theseacts, but the dispositions which lead to them, are properly immoral, and fitsubjects of disapprobation which may rise to abhorrence. Cruelty ofdisposition; malice and ill-nature; that most antisocial and odious of allpassions, envy; dissimulation and insincerity; irascibility on insufficientcause, and resentment disproportioned to the provocation; the love ofdomineering over others; the desire to engross more than one's share ofadvantages (the πλεουεξιαof the Greeks) the pride which derives gratification from theabasement of others the egotism which thinks self and its concerns moreimportant than everything else and decides all doubtful questions in its ownfavour: —these are moral vices, and constitute a bad and odious moralcharacter: unlike the self-regarding faults previously mentioned, which are notproperly immoralities, and to whatever pitch they may be carried, do notconstitute wickedness. They may be proofs of any amount of folly  , or want of personal dignity andself-respect-; but they are only subject of moral reprobation when they involvea breach of duty to others, for whose sake the individual is bound to have carefor himself. What are called duties to ourselves are not socially obligatoryunless circumstances render them at the same time duties to others. The termduty to oneself, when it means anything more than prudence, means self-respector self-development; and for none of these is any one accountable to his fellowcreatures, because for none of them is it for the good of mankind that he beheld accountable to them.

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凡事都可行，但不都有益处。凡事都可行，但不都造就人。(哥林多前书 10:23 和合本)

“I have the right to do anything,” you say—but not everything is beneficial. “I have the right to do anything”—but not everything is constructive. (1 Corinthians 10:23 NIV)

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