【目录】《中国与世界经济》（英文刊）2018年第5期目录

Special Issue: Longer-term Perspectives of China–US Relations

Guest editors：Yongding Yu, Adam Posen

China & World Economy  / 1–1, Vol. 26,  No. 5, 2018

Words from the Editorial Office

China & World Economy  / 2–11, Vol. 26,  No. 5, 2018

Economics-based Principles for a Post-conflict China–US Commercial Regime

Adam S. Posen 

Abstract

Neither the Chinese nor US economic systems will fundamentally change as a result of overt trade conflict. The challenge for policy-relevant economics is to design a regime for China–US commerce that accepts the co-existence but also addresses underlying disputes. Many important China–US disputes, notably those over intellectual property protection and state subsidies, cannot be resolved by the World Trade Organization, thus new institutions must be built. Economics-based regime principles should entail recognition that: the China–US bilateral trade imbalance is unique mainly because of macroeconomic and financial factors, not trade; agreements should restrict commercial and government behaviors, not target economic outcomes; Chinese companies must compete and be allowed to succeed in any sector, including high-technology; China is not entitled to US-owned technology, thus intellectual property rights must be enforced; and the US Government should support an increased role for China in global economic governance.

China & World Economy  / 12–37, Vol. 26,  No. 5, 2018

China and the United States: The Contest for Global Economic Leadership

C. Fred Bergsten

Abstract

This paper considers whether there is a “Thucydides trap” in the world economy, referring to the inherent conflict between incumbent and challenger. It assesses the impact of President Trump’s alienation of traditional US allies, which threatens to splinter the “hegemonic coalition” and even push China and Europe together, and his convergence toward some Chinese norms on trade and even politics. It outlines three possible systemic scenarios: a “G0” in which the US is no longer willing to lead but China is not yet able or willing, and whether such a (likely) regime will be stable or unstable; a new “G1,” sooner or later, led by China; and a cooperative “G2” in which the US and China agree to share leadership. It traces the evolution of actual leadership initiatives of the two countries in recent years. It compares US and Chinese attitudes on key systemic issues and concludes with an appraisal of “an international economic order with Chinese characteristics,” a world in which the state plays a greater role relative to market economics, the rule of law defers increasingly to voluntary arrangements, and politics tilt toward central government control more than democracy.

China & World Economy  / 38–61, Vol. 26,  No. 5, 2018

A Trade War That is Unwarranted

Yongding Yu 

Abstract

The Trump Administration has presented three major reasons to justify the initiation of a China?US trade war: China’s large trade surplus against the US, China’s failure to comply with World Trade Organization (WTO) commitments and China’s unreasonable acquisition of US technology and theft of intellectual property rights. The fundamental cause of the US trade deficit is its persistent saving deficiency. China has complied with WTO commitments, although there remains significant room for improvement. The case against China for the so-called unfair acquisition of foreign technologies and cyber-enabled intellectual property rights theft is weak at best, although China needs to redouble its effort in protecting intellectual property rights. President Trump’s trade war will not drive China to abandon its resolve to catch up to the advanced economies. China is ready to fight a war of attrition. Unfortunately, both sides – as well as the rest of the world – will incur heavy losses in the process.

China & World Economy  / 62–82, Vol. 26,  No. 5, 2018

Can the Trading System Survive US–China Trade Friction?

Robert Z. Lawrence

Abstract

Donald Trump has sought to change US trading relationships by raising protection at home and taxing the offshore activities of US companies abroad. These measures, which both use and violate trade rules, have provoked retaliation from other countries. Such friction has restricted and distorted trade and investment, undermined the rules-based trading system and perhaps permanently damaged global value chains that depend on stable rules for market access. Trump has justified some of his measures as a response to China’s alleged unfair practices and indeed, China has adopted industrial and technology policies that are formally neutral between domestic and foreign firms but in practice have led foreign firms to complain about discriminatory practices that favor Chinese firms. The US friction with China is unfortunate because instead of trying to bully China into submission in a tariff war, the US could have dealt with many of its concerns more effectively by cooperating with other countries and taking actions that are consistent with maintaining the rules-based system. While the US has undermined its leadership role, the overall damage to the trading system could still be limited if other countries, especially China, take actions that sustain and strengthen it.

China & World Economy  / 83–103, Vol. 26,  No. 5, 2018

China–US Trade Disputes in 2018: An Overview

Feng Lu 

Abstract

The paper provides an overview of changes in the US policy stance toward China that have resulted in the currently unstable economic and trade relationship between the two countries. It reviews the trade and economic relationship between China and the US during the first year of the Trump Administration, summarizes the systematic changes in trade and external economic policies adopted by the Trump Administration in general, and particularly toward China, and observes the implementation of a hawkish trade policy that ignited dispute between the US and China. The main factors shaping the current situation are examined, including structural difficulties in the US economy, the characteristics of the Chinese institutional setting and policies that have become increasingly unacceptable to the US, the specific personal beliefs and positions of President Trump and his main aides in the economic and trade team, and short-term factors in the US internal political arena.

China & World Economy  / 104–126, Vol. 26,  No. 5, 2018

Foreign Direct Investment in China’s High-technology Manufacturing Industries

Mary E. Lovely, Zixuan Huang

Abstract

This paper provides a survey of foreign investment activity in China’s high-technology manufacturing industry. In addition, we closely examine the relationship between industrial policy, foreign investment and China’s high-technology export success using the development of an indigenous integrated circuits industry as a case study. This paper finds that China’s efforts to raise the productivity and innovative capacity of indigenous enterprises is consistent with rising domestic shares of high-technology assets and profits. Nevertheless, foreign-funded enterprises remain the source of most high-technology manufactured exports, primarily from wholly foreign-owned firms. In sum, despite indigenous development, Chinese high-technology manufacturing and exports remain deeply tied to foreign investment.

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