顶刊前沿 | 《英国政治科学杂志》2020年第1期

让每一个人自由地理解政治

让世界各地的学人成果互联互通

让政治学人的核心关切得到传播

让闪烁的政治学人共享这片充满思考和情怀的天空

政治学人始终在路上

本期国际化部为大家带来了《英国政治科学杂志》2020年第1期文章编译。

编译属国际化部译者志愿提供，如有不妥欢迎指正；如对我们的工作有什么建议，欢迎到后台留言；如有转载请注明出处。学术公益是一条很长的路，我们诚邀您同行，欢迎留言您希望编译的政治学期刊，感谢您的支持。

PART 2

期刊简介

British Journal of Political Science（英国政治科学杂志）自1971年创刊并由剑桥大学出版社出版，其旨在涵盖包括包括政治理论、政治行为、公共政策和国际关系在内的政治学及相关学科（社会学，社会心理学，经济学和哲学）的前沿学术成果。期刊拥有超过40年的出版声誉，被公认为该领域的主要期刊之一。

期刊2018年影响因子为4.292，五年影响因子为3.276（在165种期刊中排名第六）。其主编包括加利福尼亚大学的Shaun Bowler、美国宾夕法尼亚州立大学的Sona Golder、英国埃塞克斯大学的Robert Johns与英国伯明翰大学的René Lindstädt。

PART 2

期刊目录

1. Gender, Incumbency and Party List Nominations

   性别、就任情况，和党内提名

2. The Strategic Origins of Electoral Authoritarianism

   选举式威权主义的战略起源

3. Oilfields, Mosques and Violence: Is There a Resource Curse in Xinjiang?

   油田、清真寺，和暴力：新疆有能源诅咒吗？

4. Dominant Party Rule, Elections, and Cabinet Instability in African Autocracies

   非洲独裁政体中的支配型政党统治、选举，和内阁的不稳定性

5. How Do People Evaluate Foreign Aid To ‘Nasty’ Regimes?

   人们如何评价针对“糟糕”政权的外国援助？

6. Reciprocity and Public Opposition to Foreign Direct Investment

   外国直接投资的互惠与公众反对

7. Uncovering High-Level Corruption: Cross-National Objective Corruption Risk Indicators Using Public Procurement Data

   揭露高级腐败：使用公共采购数据的跨国客观腐败风险指标

8. Risky Business? Welfare State Reforms and Government Support in Britain and Denmark

   冒险举措？英国和丹麦的福利国家改革及政府支持

9. Nuanced Accountability: Voter Responses to Service Delivery in Southern Africa

   微妙的责任：非洲南部国家选民对政府服务表现的反应

10. Ethnic Diversity, Segregation and Ethnocentric Trust in Africa

    非洲的种族多样性、种族隔离，和具有种族优越感的信任

11. Values and Political Predispositions in the Age of Polarization: Examining the Relationship between Partisanship and Ideology in the United States, 1988–2012

    政见两极分化时代中的价值观与政治倾向：考察1988-2012年美国党派和意识形态之间的关系

12. Coalition Bargaining Duration in Multiparty Democracies

    多党制民主国家中的组阁谈判时长

13. Who Gets into the Papers? Party Campaign Messages and the Media

    谁能登报？政党竞选亮点与媒体

14. Beyond the Hazard Ratio: Generating Expected Durations from the Cox Proportional Hazards Model

    风险比之上：由考克斯比例风险模型得出的预计持续时间

15. The Influence of Local Ethnic Diversity on Group-Centric Crime Attitudes

    地区族群多样性对以族群为中心的、对犯罪问题的态度的影响

16. How Exposure to Violence Affects Ethnic Voting

    与暴力接触如何影响基于种族的投票

17. Burden Sharing: Income, Inequality and Willingness to Fight

    责任分担：收入、不平等和斗争的意愿

PART 3

精选译文

01 性别、就任情况，和党内提名

【题目】

Gender, Incumbency and Party List Nominations

【作者】

STEPHEN A. MESERVE, Texas Tech University

DANIEL PEMSTEIN, North Dakota State University

WILLIAM T. BERNHARD, University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign

【摘要】

本文考察了政党的候选人选择策略如何影响女性在议会的“描述性代表”。本文关注比例代表制选举，探究了是什么来决定政党是否将女性列入可行的提名名单[1]中。通过在个体层面评估政党排名，本文直接考察了党内提名这一机制，它是对女性当选议员的经验模式的主流解释的核心。

此外，本文还评估了党员在议会中的就任情况和性别是如何影响党内提名的。这份研究在一院制的背景下，使用欧洲议会的选举情况来比较足够多的、在多种机制下运行的政党。研究发现，“对在职者的偏好”[2]可以很大程度上解释政党候选人选拔中的性别因素所导致的差异，尽管政党的意识形态和女性劳动参与情况能够帮助解释哪些政党会优先推选未在议会中就任的女性。 

[1] 译者注：这里的“可行”指让政党的选举表现最优化。

[2] 译者注：根据正文内容，incumbency bias意指比例代表制下，各政党在选举时倾向于提名已经做过议员的党员，此处译为“对在职者的偏好”，欢迎批评指正。

This study assesses how political parties’ candidate selection strategies influence women’s descriptive parliamentary representation. Focusing on proportional elections, it explores what determines whether parties place women in viable list positions. Evaluating party rankings at the individual level, it directly examines a mechanism – party nomination – central to prevailing explanations of empirical patterns in women’s representation.

Moreover, it jointly evaluates how incumbency and gender affect nomination. This study uses European Parliament elections to compare a plethora of parties, operating under numerous institutions, in the context of a single legislature. It finds that gender differences in candidate selection are largely explained by incumbency bias, although party ideology and female labor force participation help explain which parties prioritize the placement of novice women.

02 选举式威权主义的战略起源 

【题目】

The Strategic Origins of Electoral Authoritarianism

【作者】

MICHAEL K. MILLER, George Washington University

【摘要】

为什么独裁者会举行多党选举？本文认为，向选举式威权主义（EA）的过渡遵循着一种战略考量，其中，独裁者会权衡采取选举的国际动因和操纵选举的成本和风险。本文使用多项logit模型来检验前述假设，该模型以自1946年到2010年的非选举式独裁体制为样本，对向EA的转变和民主同步进行预测。该模型发现，亲民主的国际手段——特别是对民主国家通过贸易联系产生的依赖、军事联盟、国际政府组织，和援助——预示着EA被采用。使选民更容易被控制的社会经济因素，比如低平均收入和高度不平等，也是EA的前奏。相比之下，由于独裁者在民主化后会失去权力，EA的前奏主要是政权的孱弱而非国际参与或社会经济因素。模型检验结果通过洞察独裁政权的机理和民主推广所产生的意想不到的影响，展示了不同的自由化形式有着各自独特的逻辑。

Why do autocrats hold multiparty elections? This article argues that transitions to electoral authoritarianism (EA) follow a strategic calculus in which autocrats balance international incentives to adopt elections against the costs and risks of controlling them. It tests this hypothesis with a multinomial logit model that simultaneously predicts transitions to EA and democracy, using a sample of non-electoral autocracies from 1946–2010. It finds that pro-democratic international leverage – captured by dependence on democracies through trade ties, military alliances, international governmental organizations and aid – predicts EA adoption. Socio-economic factors that make voters easier to control, such as low average income and high inequality, also predict EA transition. In contrast, since democratization entails a loss of power for autocrats, it is mainly predicted by regime weakness rather than international engagement or socio-economic factors. The results demonstrate that different forms of liberalization follow distinct logics, providing insight into autocratic regime dynamics and democracy promotion’s unintended effects.

03 非洲独裁政体中的支配型政党统治、选举，和内阁的不稳定性

【题目】

Dominant Party Rule, Elections, and Cabinet Instability in African Autocracies

【作者】

ALEX M. KROEGER, University of California, Merced

【摘要】

本文通过参考威权主义机制方面的文献，阐释了支配型政党在限制独裁者更换内阁部长能力上扮演的角色。由于对其他政党精英有权力分享的承诺，为使该承诺保持可信，支配型政党领袖频繁更换部长的能力被限制了。这些限制还导致了政局不稳的独特的时间格局[1]，即选举之后接着就会发生内阁大换血。相反地，人格主义[2]的领袖所面临的因权力分享而产生的限制更少，并且会按照更任意的频次对内阁进行更广泛的重组。军人领袖面临的限制是复杂的，取决于占领内阁席位的是军官还是文官，也取决于领袖们在政权表现和民众支持方面依赖文官部长的程度。本文的实证分析用到了1976年到2010年之间37个非洲国家中94名威权主义领袖的内阁的数据，证实了对支配型政党和人格主义领袖的理论假设，但是没有把军人领袖算进去。 

[1] 译者注：也就是内阁换血发生的时间特点。

[2] 译者注：“人格主义”是一种哲学概念，用处颇广，大致意思是将人的性格看作理解现实的关键，详见“Personalism,” accessed March 1, 2020, https://www.iep.utm.edu/personal/.，在本文的语境里，“人格主义”指的是影响政治中发挥作用的是领导人本身而非制度设计。

This article draws on the authoritarian institutions literature to explain the role of dominant parties in constraining the ability of autocrats to reshuffle cabinet ministers. Dominant party leaders are constrained in their ability to frequently reshuffle ministers by the need to maintain credible power-sharing commitments with party elites. These constraints also produce distinct temporal patterns of instability where large reshuffles occur following elections. Conversely, personalist leaders face fewer power-sharing constraints and engage in more extensive cabinet reshuffles at more arbitrary intervals. Military leaders face complex constraints that depend on whether officers or civilians occupy cabinet posts and the extent to which leaders are dependent upon civilian ministers for regime performance and popular support. Empirical analyses using data on the cabinets of ninety-four authoritarian leaders from thirty-seven African countries between 1976 and 2010 support the theoretical expectations for dominant party and personalist leaders, but are inconclusive for military leaders.

04 人们如何评价针对“糟糕”政权的外国援助？

【题目】

How Do People Evaluate Foreign Aid[1] To ‘Nasty’ Regimes?

[1] 译者注：Foreign Aid一词根据语境不同可被译作“对外援助”或“外国援助”，但在文中均指“包括货币或者其他形式的官方赠予和优惠贷款，其目的是将资源从发达国家向欠发达国家转移，或者是从石油输出国组织向第三世界国家转移”。

【作者】

TOBIAS HEINRICH, University of South Carolina

YOSHIHARU KOBAYASHI, Nazarbayev University

【摘要】

最近的对外援助理论认为，道德动机驱使着选民对对外援助的偏好。但是，人们对道德问题与对外援助所扮演的被广泛接受的工具性目的之间的关系知之甚少。此外，这种相互作用对政策行动的偏好又有什么影响呢？本文通过一项调查实验对上述问题进行了评估。在该实验中，受访者评估了针对“糟糕”政权（如违反人权、操纵选举、打压媒体）的外国援助政策。结果表明，公众的确对向“糟糕”政权提供援助有强烈的憎恶情绪，但同时也有意识到其所获得的工具性好处。与其他文献中的主要观点相反，该研究发现，若援助国政府与这个肮脏的国家进行更多的接触，这种道德上的反感就能够在很大程度上得到扭转。这些发现对最近的对外援助理论的微观基础提出了质疑，并对相关领域文献提供了一些启示。

Recent theories of foreign aid assume that moral motives drive voters’ preferences about foreign aid. However, little is known about how moral concerns interact with the widely accepted instrumental goals that aid serves. Moreover, what effects does this interplay have on preferences over policy actions? This article assesses these questions using a survey experiment in which respondents evaluate foreign aid policies toward nasty recipient regimes (those that violate human rights, rig elections, crack down on media, etc.). The results indicate that the public does have a strong aversion to providing aid to nasty recipient regimes, but that it also appreciates the instrumental benefits that aid helps acquire. Contrary to a mainstay assertion in the literature, the study finds that moral aversion can largely be reversed if the donor government engages more with the nasty country. These findings call into question the micro-foundations of recent theories of foreign aid, and produce several implications for the aid literature.

05 外国直接投资的互惠与公众反对

【题目】

Reciprocity and Public Opposition to Foreign Direct Investment

【作者】

ADAM S. CHILTON, University of Chicago Law School

HELEN V. MILNER, Princeton University

DUSTIN TINGLEY, Harvard University

【摘要】

此前的国际政治经济学舆论研究主要检验了经济和社会文化因素如何影响个人对商品、人员和资本流动的看法。这一研究在很大程度上忽略了个人是否也关心根据外国在前述议题上的政策来奖励或惩罚他们。我们通过在美国和中国进行的一系列联合的传统调查实验来检验这种可能性，检验了 “相互性”是如何影响对外国收购本国公司的反对意见的。研究发现，“相互性”是公众舆论对外国投资监管的决定性因素。这表明在解释公众对全球经济一体化的态度时，有必要考虑其他国家采取的相关政策。

Prior international political economy public opinion research has primarily examined how economic and socio-cultural factors shape individuals’ views on the flows of goods, people and capital. This research has largely ignored whether individuals also care about rewarding or punishing foreign countries for their policies on these issues. We tested this possibility by administering a series of conjoint and traditional survey experiments in the United States and China that examined how reciprocity influences opposition to foreign acquisitions of domestic companies. We find that reciprocity is an important determinant of public opinion on the regulation of foreign investments. This suggests the need to consider the policies that other countries adopt when trying to explain public attitudes toward global economic integration.

06 揭露高级腐败：使用公共采购数据的跨国客观腐败风险指标

【题目】

Uncovering High-Level Corruption: Cross-National Objective Corruption Risk Indicators Using Public Procurement Data

【作者】

MIHÁLY FAZEKAS, University of Cambridge

GÁBOR KOCSIS, Government Transparency Institute

【摘要】

衡量高层腐败受到学术界和政策界的广泛关注，并在过去十余年中取得了一定程度的进展。本文针对公共采购中的高层腐败提出了两种客观的指标，即竞争市场中的单一报价和投标“危险信号”的综合得分。研究使用了2009-14年度28个欧洲国家/地区的280万份合同的政府官方数据，直接对腐败下了一个通用定义：通过不合理限制公共合同的获得以利于特定竞标者。腐败指标是在合同层面进行核算的，但产生的总指标与公认的国家层面的指标相一致，并且在微观级别的测试中也得到了验证。数据发布网址为：http://digiwhist.eu/resources/data/。

Measuring high-level corruption is subject to extensive scholarly and policy interest, which has achieved moderate progress in the last decade. This article develops two objective proxy measures of high-level corruption in public procurement: single bidding in competitive markets and a composite score of tendering ‘red flags’. Using official government data on 2.8 million contracts in twenty-eight European countries in 2009–14, we directly operationalize a common definition of corruption: unjustified restriction of access to public contracts to favour a selected bidder. Corruption indicators are calculated at the contract level, but produce aggregate indices consistent with well-established country-level indicators, and are also validated by micro-level tests. Data are published at http://digiwhist.eu/resources/data/.

07 冒险举措？ 英国和丹麦的福利国家改革及政府支持

【题目】

Risky Business? Welfare State Reforms and Government Support in Britain and Denmark

【作者】

SEONGHUI LEE, Aarhus University

CARSTEN JENSEN, Aarhus University

CHRISTOPH ARNDT, Aarhus University

GEROG WENZELBURGER, TU Kaiserslautern

【摘要】

福利国家改革在选举层面对政府是否构成威胁？政治学家直到最近才开始研究这个看似简单的问题，而现有的工作仍然存在两个不足。首先，它从未在足够的时间点上用实际立法决定的数据来测试改革与投票间的联系，以便进行可靠的统计测试。其次，它没有考虑到近几十年来发生的许多扩张性改革。这些扩张通常发生在削减开支的同一年。通过仅着眼于削减开支，对改革对政府声望的影响的判断就产生了偏差。本文尝试解决上述两项不足之处。结果表明，选民因削减开支而惩罚政府，但也因扩大开支而奖励政府，进行所谓的补偿，这是一种可行的避免被指责的策略。该研究还发现，惩罚和奖励的数额大致相同，这表明选民的证据充分的消极偏见并不直接转化为相应的选举行为。

Are welfare state reforms electorally dangerous for governments? Political scientists have only recently begun to study this seemingly simple question, and existing work still suffers from two shortcomings. First, it has never tested the reform–vote link with data on actual legislative decisions for enough points in time to allow robust statistical tests. Secondly, it has failed to take into account the many expansionary reforms that have occurred in recent decades. Expansions often happen in the same years as cutbacks. By focusing only on cutbacks, estimates of the effects of reforms on government popularity become biased. This article addresses both shortcomings. The results show that voters punish governments for cutbacks, but also reward them for expansions, making so-called compensation, a viable blame-avoidance strategy. The study also finds that the size of punishments and rewards is roughly the same, suggesting that voters’ well-documented negativity bias does not directly translate into electoral behavior.

02 选举式威权主义的战略起源 

【题目】

The Strategic Origins of Electoral Authoritarianism

【作者】

MICHAEL K. MILLER, George Washington University

【摘要】

为什么独裁者会举行多党选举？本文认为，向选举式威权主义（EA）的过渡遵循着一种战略考量，其中，独裁者会权衡采取选举的国际动因和操纵选举的成本和风险。本文使用多项logit模型来检验前述假设，该模型以自1946年到2010年的非选举式独裁体制为样本，对向EA的转变和民主同步进行预测。该模型发现，亲民主的国际手段——特别是对民主国家通过贸易联系产生的依赖、军事联盟、国际政府组织，和援助——预示着EA被采用。使选民更容易被控制的社会经济因素，比如低平均收入和高度不平等，也是EA的前奏。相比之下，由于独裁者在民主化后会失去权力，EA的前奏主要是政权的孱弱而非国际参与或社会经济因素。模型检验结果通过洞察独裁政权的动力和民主推广所产生的意想不到的影响，展示了不同的自由化形式有着各自独特的逻辑。

Why do autocrats hold multiparty elections? This article argues that transitions to electoral authoritarianism (EA) follow a strategic calculus in which autocrats balance international incentives to adopt elections against the costs and risks of controlling them. It tests this hypothesis with a multinomial logit model that simultaneously predicts transitions to EA and democracy, using a sample of non-electoral autocracies from 1946–2010. It finds that pro-democratic international leverage – captured by dependence on democracies through trade ties, military alliances, international governmental organizations and aid – predicts EA adoption. Socio-economic factors that make voters easier to control, such as low average income and high inequality, also predict EA transition. In contrast, since democratization entails a loss of power for autocrats, it is mainly predicted by regime weakness rather than international engagement or socio-economic factors. The results demonstrate that different forms of liberalization follow distinct logics, providing insight into autocratic regime dynamics and democracy promotion’s unintended effects.

08 多党制民主国家中的组阁谈判时长

【题目】

Coalition Bargaining Duration in Multiparty Democracies

【作者】

ALEJANDRO ECKER, Mannheim Centre for European Social Research

THOMAS M. MEYER, University of Vienna

【摘要】

为什么一些政府只花几天就能组建起来，而其他政府则要花上几周甚至几个月呢？尽管关于政府组建的文献很丰富，但令人惊讶的是，为组建政府打下基础的谈判过程几乎不为人知。本文通过引入一个新的关于在19个欧洲民主国家中发生的303次组阁谈判尝试的数据库，来分析单个谈判回合的时长。本研究假设以下因素会缩短组阁谈判的时长：1.各政党关心的议题不重合；2.各政党意识形态接近；3.政党在现任政府中占有席位；4.各政党内部领导保持稳定[1]。本研究通过采用连接函数方法来解释样本的非随机选择过程，展示了如下结果：除了整体环境因素如选举后的谈判和政党体制的复杂性以外，（前述四项）具体行为者因素也很重要。这些发现强调了，为解释政府的组建（指组阁的过程和时间，译者注），需要把谈判环境中的具体行为者因素和整体因素都考虑进去。

[1] 译者注：直译原文中的四个短语无法清晰地表达作者的本意，鉴于此，这里四个要素的翻译取自正文中的详细讨论。

Why do some government formation periods end after a few days, while others last for several weeks or even months? Despite the rich literature on government formation, surprisingly little is known about the underlying bargaining processes. This article introduces a new dataset on 303 bargaining attempts in nineteen European democracies to analyse the duration of individual bargaining rounds. The study hypothesizes that (1) preference tangentiality, (2) ideological proximity, (3) incumbency and (4) party leadership tenure decrease the duration of coalition bargaining. Employing a copula approach to account for the non-random selection process of the observations, it shows that these actor-specific factors matter in addition to systemic context factors such as post-election bargaining and party system complexity. These findings highlight the need to consider both actor-specific and systemic factors of the bargaining context to explain government formation.

编  译：夏夕钦 王汉林

审  校：夏夕钦 王汉林

相关阅读：

 

编辑：夏小奇

一审：陈佳林

二审：袁    丁

点击“阅读原文”，输入“kw9c”，可免费获取本期英文原文哦~