国际顶刊 | 《比较政治研究》第55卷（2022年）第3-5期
让每一个人自由地理解政治
让世界各地的学人成果互联互通
让政治学人的核心关切得到传播
让闪烁的政治学人共享这片充满思考和情怀的天空
政治学人始终在路上
本期国际化部为大家带来了Comparative Political Studies（CPS，《比较政治研究》）2022年第55卷第3-5期文章编译。
编译属国际化部译者志愿提供，如有不妥欢迎指正；如对我们的工作有什么建议，欢迎到后台留言；如有转载请注明出处。学术公益是一条很长的路，我们诚邀您同行，欢迎留言您希望编译的政治学期刊，感谢您的支持。
PART 1
期刊简介
CPS各期封面
Comparative Political Studies（CPS，《比较政治研究》）是一个比较政治学者和学生交流思想的国际顶刊之一。期刊刊载的文章包括了全球学者关于比较方法论、理论和研究的创新工作。该刊力图向读者展现全球范围内比较政治研究的全景式画面：从第三世界的民主到中东的文武关系，从东欧的选举制度和政党政治到拉丁美洲的经济表现，从比较北美和西欧的政治庇护到亚洲国家的民族冲突。《比较政治研究》被认为是政治科学中比较政治子领域最为重要的期刊之一。该刊在《科睿唯安2021年期刊引用报告》（Clarivate JCR2021）中JIF=3.955，在187种政治科学类（Political Science-SSCI）期刊中排名第33（Q1）。
PART 2
期刊目录
Volume 55, Issue 3
Which Jobs for Which Boys? Party Finance and the Politics of State Job Distribution in Africa
什么人从事什么工作？政党财政与非洲公职分配政治
When Technocratic Appointments Signal Credibility
当技术官僚任命标志着可信度
(Dis)courtesy Bias: “Methodological Cognates,” Data Validity, and Ethics in Violence-Adjacent Research
（不）礼貌偏见：“方法学同源词”、数据有效性和暴力研究中的伦理
International incentives for women’s rights in dictatorships
独裁政权中妇女权利的国际激励
Strategic State Capacity: How States Counter Opposition to Climate Policy
国家战略能力：国家如何应对气候政策的反对
Volume 55, Issue 4
Parliament, People or Technocrats? Explaining Mass Public Preferences on Delegation of Policymaking Authority
议会、人民还是技术官僚？解释大众对决策权下放的偏好
Do Truth Commissions Really Improve Democracy?
真相委员会真的改善了民主吗？
When Running for Office Runs in the Family: Horizontal Dynasties, Policy, and Development in the Philippine
在家族中竞选公职：菲律宾的横向王朝、政策和发展
Protest Brokers and the Technology of Mobilization: Evidence from South Africa
抗议代理人和动员技术：来自南非的证据
Reshaping the Threat Environment: Personalism, Coups, and Assassinations
重塑威胁环境：个人主义、政变和暗杀
Early Statehood and Support for Autocratic Rule in Africa
非洲早期国家和对专制统治的支持
Volume 55, Issue 5
Political Budgetary Cycles in Autocratic Redistribution
专制再分配中的政治预算周期
Collective Decision-Making and the Economic Vote
集体决策与经济投票
The Logic of Criminal Territorial Control: Military Intervention in Rio de Janeiro
犯罪领土控制的逻辑：里约热内卢的军事干预
Nationalism, Class, and Status: How Nationalists Use Policy Offers and Group Appeals to Attract a New Electorate
民族主义、阶级和地位：民族主义者如何利用政策提议和团体请愿来吸引新选民
Effective Government and Evaluations of Democracy
有效政府与民主评估
PART 3
精选译文
Volume 55 - Issue 3 - March 2022
01 什么人从事什么工作？政党财政与非洲公职分配政治
【题目】
Which Jobs for Which Boys? Party Finance and the Politics of State Job Distribution in Africa
【作者】
Rachel Sigman
【摘要】
许多有关庇护主义的文献将公职分配视为与其他形式的庇护交换相同的方式：它们都是一种政治动员机制。尽管这种观点很流行，但它并未考虑工作接受者除了一次性交换政治支持之外，还经常向其政治负责人提供的服务。本文利用贝宁（Benin）和加纳（Ghana）的大量数据，包括部长传记的综合数据库、官员调查、行政数据和精英访谈，认为领导人分配和管理公职的方式使工作接受者能够攫取并控制国家资金以用于政治融资。无论现任领导人是自己提取国家资源，还是将权力下放给政党的精英代理人，还是诱使并强迫官僚将资金转移到政党，以决定他们在政治上分配哪些工作以及分配给谁。研究结果表明，就业机会与庇护交易的其他方式有着实质上的不同。
Much of the literature on clientelism views the distribution of state jobs in the same way it does other forms of clientelistic exchange: as a mechanism of political mobilization. Despite its prevalence, this perspective does not account for the services that job recipients frequently provide to their political principals beyond the one-time exchange of political support. Drawing on extensive data from Benin and Ghana, including a comprehensive database of minister biographies, surveys of bureaucrats, administrative data, and elite interviews, this article argues that leaders distribute and manage state jobs in ways that enable them to extract and control state money for political financing. Whether incumbent leaders extract state resources themselves, delegate to elite party agents, or co-opt and coerce bureaucrats to divert money to the party shapes which jobs they distribute politically and to whom. The findings suggest that jobs are substantively different from other currencies of clientelistic exchange.
02 当技术官僚任命标志着可信度
【题目】
When Technocratic Appointments Signal Credibility
【作者】
Despina Alexiadou, William Spaniel, Hakan Gunaydin
【摘要】
在金融危机期间，首相们如何管理投资者的期望？我们通过调查部长任命这一新方法来解决这个问题。当首相任命被定义为无党派专家的技术官僚时，他们会放弃政治利益，并能可信地表明他们愿意偿还债务。这会降低债券收益率，但这只发生在市场对预期还款敏感的时候，也就是在危机期间。为了检验该理论，我们开发了一个事件研究分析，它采用了21个西欧和东欧民主国家财政部长背景的新数据。我们发现，投资者通过降低一个国家的借贷成本来奖励技术官僚任命。与这一理论相一致的是，危机下的技术官僚任命预示着较低的债券收益率。我们的发现丰富了金融市场和国内政治相互作用的文献。
How do prime ministers manage investors’ expectations during financial crises? We take a novel approach to this question by investigating ministerial appointments. When prime ministers appoint technocrats, defined as nonpartisan experts, they forgo political benefits and can credibly signal their willingness to pay down their debt obligations. This reduces bond yields, but only at times when the market is sensitive to expected repayments—that is, during crises. To examine the theory, we develop an event study analysis that employs new data on the background of finance ministers in 21 Western and Eastern European democracies. We find that investors reward technocratic appointments by reducing a country’s borrowing costs. Consistent with the theory, technocratic appointments under crises predict lower bond yields. Our findings contribute to the literature on the interplay of financial markets and domestic politics.
03 （不）礼貌偏见：“方法学同源词”、数据有效性和暴力研究中的伦理
【题目】
(Dis)courtesy Bias: “Methodological Cognates,” Data Validity, and Ethics in Violence-Adjacent Research
【作者】
Sarah E. Parkinson
【摘要】
在战争、强迫移民和人道主义危机引起国际关注的环境中，研究参与者先前与记者、倡导团体、国家安全和人道主义组织的经验影响了学术工作。基于在伊拉克和黎巴嫩的长期实地调查，本文认为，个人和社区先前和正在与这些行动者进行的互动影响了收集的数据的内容、质量和有效性，并形成了伦理学术研究的可能性。基于对人道主义服务提供者、记者和流离失所者的观察和访谈研究，本文认为，跨部门使用“方法学同源词”（如调查和结构化访谈），通过四种机制塑造了数据的效度与信度：回流、重定向、不愿意参与和抵抗。我认为，研究过程的这些特征应该集中在学术研究设计、项目选址、案例选择和数据分析方面。
In settings where war, forced migration, and humanitarian crisis have attracted international attention, research participants’ prior experiences with journalists, advocacy groups, state security, and humanitarian organizations influence scholarly work. Building on long-term fieldwork in Iraq and Lebanon, this article argues that individuals’ and communities’ previous and ongoing interactions with these actors affect the content, quality, and validity of data gathered as well as shaping possibilities for ethical academic research. Drawing on observational and interview-based research with humanitarian service providers, journalists, and displaced persons, this article argues that the cross sector use of “methodological cognates” such as surveys and structured interviews shapes data validity and reliability via four mechanisms: regurgitation, redirection, reluctant participation, and resistance. I contend that these features of the research process should centrally inform academics’ research designs, project siting, case selection, and data analysis.
04 独裁政权中针对妇女权利的国际激励
【题目】
International incentives for women’s rights in dictatorships
【作者】
Daniela Donno, Sara Fox, Joshua Kaasik
【摘要】
民主和妇女权利被国际社会“捆绑”在一起。这意味着独裁政权可以通过展示两性平等方面的进展来表明遵守国际规范，而展示方式通常与独裁统治的永久化相一致。利用一个新的妇女权利法律进步数据集，我们表明独裁政府大力制定了与性别有关的立法，其速度超过了发展中世界的民主国家。这种模式是由国际（西方）压力形成的：在专制政体中，对外援助的依赖和国际非政府组织的羞辱与妇女权利的法律进步有关，但与选举、政治竞争和镇压等其他政治成本更高的领域的改革无关。因此，我们的叙述强调了选择性遵守作为适应国际压力的一种形式，并强调了国际激励对独裁政权中妇女权利的国内“自下而上”压力的补充作用。
Democracy and women’s rights are integrally “bundled” by the international community. This means that dictatorships can signal adherence to international norms by demonstrating progress on gender equality, often in a manner that is consistent with the perpetuation of authoritarian rule. Using a new dataset of de jure advances in women’s rights, we show that dictatorships have vigorously enacted gender-related legislation, at a rate that surpasses democracies in the developing world. This pattern is shaped by international (Western) pressure: Among autocracies, foreign aid dependence and international nongovernmental organization shaming are associated with legal advances in women’s rights, but not with reforms in other, more politically costly areas related to elections, political competition, and repression. Our account therefore highlights selective compliance as a form of adaptation to international pressure and underscores the role of international incentives as a complement to domestic “bottom-up” pressure for women’s rights in dictatorships.
05 国家战略能力：国家如何应付气候政策的反对
【题目】
Strategic State Capacity: How States Counter Opposition to Climate Policy
【作者】
Jonas Meckling, Jonas Nahm
【摘要】
国家什么时候可以实施应对强大利益集团反对的政策？有关国家能力的研究考察了能力的官僚来源，但没有解释为什么官僚能力水平相似的国家在目标实现方面存在差异。我们引入战略国家能力的概念来解释这个难题。它是指国家为追求政策目标而动员或遣散利益集团的能力。我们确定了四种常见的国家对抗反对派的策略：招募盟友、协调利益、限制接触和平息利益。我们在加利福尼亚、法国、德国和美国的气候和清洁能源决策案例中研究了这些问题。气候政治是分配政治中一个日益重要的领域，受到利益集团的强烈反对。战略国家能力的概念是对官僚能力概念的补充，以表明国家如何积极组织其与利益集团的关系，以推进政策目标。
When can states implement policies against the opposition from powerful interest groups? Research on state capacity has examined bureaucratic sources of capacity, leaving unexplained why countries with similar levels of bureaucratic capacity vary in goal attainment. We introduce the notion of strategic state capacity to explain this puzzle. It refers to the ability of the state to mobilize or demobilize interest groups in pursuit of policy goals. We identify four general types of strategies states use to counter opposition: recruiting allies, aligning interests, limiting access, and quieting interests. We examine these in cases on climate and clean energy policymaking in California, France, Germany, and the United States. Climate politics is an increasingly important field of distributive politics with powerful opposition from interest groups. The concept of strategic state capacity complements bureaucratic notions of capacity to show how the state actively organizes its relations with interest groups to advance policy goals.
Volume 55 - Issue 4 - March 2022
01 议会、人民还是技术官僚？解释大众对决策权下放的偏好
【题目】
Parliament, People or Technocrats? Explaining Mass Public Preferences on Delegation of Policymaking Authority
【作者】
Liam F. Beiser-McGrath, Robert A. Huber, Thomas Bernauer, Vally Koubi
【摘要】
虽然将决策权从公民交给议会是代议制民主最具决定性的特征，但公众将这种权力从立法机构/政府转交给技术官僚或返还给公民的需求似乎有所增加。基于投票的空间模型，我们认为，个人的理想政策点、现状、专家的政策立场和聚合的社会政策偏好之间的距离可以帮助解释个人是否愿意将决策权从议会下放给谁，如果愿意，则向谁下放决策权。对于个人而言，政策问题越突出，个人偏好距离对这些理想点的影响可能越大。我们使用德国、瑞士和英国的调查实验来检验这一论点。该分析为我们的理论论点的实证意义提供了证据。本项研究有助于更好地理解公民对代议制民主的支持和将决策权从议会以外下放的偏好的差异。
While delegation of policymaking authority from citizens to parliament is the most defining characteristic of representative democracy, public demand for delegating such authority away from legislature/government to technocrats or back to citizens appears to have increased. Drawing on spatial models of voting, we argue that the distance between individuals’ ideal policy points, the status quo, experts’ policy positions and aggregated societal policy preferences can help explain whether individuals prefer to delegate decision-making power away from parliament and, if so, to whom. The effects of individual’s preference distance from these ideal points are likely to be stronger the more salient the policy issue is for the respective individual. We test this argument using survey experiments in Germany, Switzerland and the United Kingdom. The analysis provides evidence for the empirical implications of our theoretical arguments. The research presented here contributes to better understanding variation in citizens’ support for representative democracy and preferences for delegating policymaking authority away from parliament.
02 真相委员会真的改善了民主吗？
【题目】
Do Truth Commissions Really Improve Democracy?
【作者】
Geoff Dancy, Oskar Timo Thoms
【摘要】
本文提出并检验了一个原始理论，即真相委员会激励民主行为，但对民主制度几乎没有明显影响。通过对1970年至2015年期间经历转型的国家进行定量分析，并考虑真相委员会的内生性，我们发现这些临时机构与更大程度的民主参与和国家机构对人身安全权利的遵守有关。然而，它们对公平选举、管理政治协会的规则、对行政部门的自由检查或司法独立等机构没有显著影响。这与过渡时期司法文献中的一个关键论点相矛盾，即过渡时期司法通过调查和广泛的建议促进了体制改革。本文的研究结果可能会鼓励那些打算利用这些机构作为工具来促进公民行动主义或警察克制的人。然而，这些调查结果可能会打消那些希望真相委员会能够启动司法改革或建立防火墙以防止行政越权的人的信心。
This article presents and tests an original theory that truth commissions (TCs) inspire democratic behaviors, but have little discernible impact on democratic institutions. Using quantitative analyses of countries undergoing transitions between 1970 and 2015, and accounting for endogeneity of TCs, we find that these temporary bodies are associated with greater democratic participation and state agent observance of physical integrity rights. However, they have no measurable effect on institutions like fair elections, rules regulating political association, liberal checks on the executive, or judicial independence. This contradicts a key argument in the transitional justice literature that TCs catalyze institutional reform through investigation and extensive recommendations. This article’s findings might encourage those who intend to use these bodies as a tool to promote citizen activism or police restraint. However, the findings might discourage those who hope TCs could jump-start judicial reforms or create a firewall against executive overreach.
03 在家族中竞选公职：菲律宾的横向王朝、政策和发展
【题目】
When Running for Office Runs in the Family: Horizontal Dynasties, Policy, and Development in the Philippines
【作者】
Dean Dulay, Laurence Go
【摘要】
政治王朝几乎存在于每种类型的民主中，但在不同的地方采取不同的形式。然而，王朝结构的类型仍然没能得到探索。我们认为，来自同一政治家庭的多个成员同时担任不同的政治职务，通过用家庭成员替换可能反对现任者政策选择的潜在政治对手来影响决策。但在发展中国家，由于王朝地位而产生的政策变化可能不会导致更高水平的经济发展。我们在菲律宾测试了这一论点的影响。在市长样本上使用紧密选举断点回归设计，研究表明：（i）横向王朝市长的政府支出水平较高，（ii）直接的制度约束是驱动这一核心结果的机制，以及（iii）横向王朝市长不会导致更高的经济增长或更低的贫困。
Political dynasties exist in practically every type of democracy, but take different forms in different places. Yet the types of dynastic structures have remained unexplored. We argue that horizontal dynasties—multiple members from the same political family holding different political offices concurrently—affect policymaking by replacing potential political rivals, who may oppose an incumbent’s policy choices, with a member of the family. But in developing countries, the policy change that accrues from dynastic status may not lead to higher levels of economic development. We test this argument’s implications in the Philippines. Using a close elections regression discontinuity design on a sample of mayors, we show that (i) horizontally dynastic mayors have higher levels of government spending, (ii) direct institutional constraints are the mechanism that drives this core result, and (iii) horizontally dynastic mayors do not lead to higher economic growth economic growth or lower poverty.
04 抗议代理人和动员技术：来自南非的证据
【题目】
Protest Brokers and the Technology of Mobilization: Evidence from South Africa
【作者】
Sarah J. Lockwood
【摘要】
为什么有的共同体以抗议的方式寻求变革，而另一些看似相似的共同体却并不这样？大量文献发现精英在该问题上发挥着重要作用，并记录了精英所使用的各种动员策略。尽管这些论点在一定程度上解释了抗议模式，但迄今为止，现有文献还很难解释——为什么一些精英能够比其他人更有效地运用这些动员策略。根据南非的民族志田野调查，作者认为更加密切地关注动员技术能更好地解释这一问题。具体而言，作者指出了抗议代理人所发挥的关键作用——即作为联系起渴望动员的精英与潜在抗议者的中间人。作者认为，如果没有这些中间代理人，许多精英会缺乏动员集体行动所必需的当地知识、关系和信任，抗议发生的可能性从而大大降低。这一观察同时还有助于解释抗议发生的地点。
Why do some communities protest to demand change, while other seemingly similar communities do not? A large body of literature has found that elites play an important role in this regard, and documented the wide variety of mobilization tactics they use. While such arguments go some way toward explaining protest patterns, however, the literature has so far struggled to explain why some elites are able to employ these mobilization tactics so much more effectively than others. Drawing on ethnographic fieldwork in South Africa, I argue that closer attention to the technology of mobilization helps to explain these patterns. Specifically, I identify the critical role played by protest brokers—intermediaries who connect elites desiring mobilization with potential protesters. Without these brokers, I argue, many elites lack the local knowledge, connections, and trust necessary to mobilize collective action, significantly decreasing the likelihood of protest occurrence, and helping to explain where protests happen.
05 重塑威胁环境：个人主义、政变和暗杀
【题目】
Reshaping the Threat Environment: Personalism, Coups, and Assassinations
【作者】
John Chin, Abel Escribà-Folch, Wonjun Song, Joseph Wright
【摘要】
独裁者会塑造政权结构以应对其所面临的威胁。个人化意味着权力在独裁者手中逐步积累，以减少来自军队和党内有组织精英的内部威胁。然而，精英们有动力去抵制个人化，以避免被个人主义的强人边缘化。作者认为，随着个人主义的增加，协调政变企图能力较弱的敌对精英们，会转而采取无需大量精英协调的策略——暗杀。在个人主义较低的状态下，精英们倾向于协调内部政变以推翻统治者，对领导层重新洗牌并保留权力。在个人主义的中等水平上，由于发动彻底改组式的政变更为困难，因此精英们会发动组织化的政变。当处于高度个人主义之下，政变难以发动，进而越来越多的被边缘化且绝望的对手转向暗杀行动。作者使用关于个人主义、暗杀和政变企图的新数据检验了假设，数据涵盖了1946年至2010年间的所有独裁国家。
Dictators shape regime structures to counter the threats they face. Personalization entails the progressive accumulation of power in the hands of the dictator to minimize internal threats from organized elites in the military and party. However, elites have incentives to resist the personalization to avoid being marginalized by personalist strongmen. We argue that as personalism increases, rival elites, less able to coordinate coup attempts, turn to strategies that do not require substantial elite coordination: assassinations. At low levels of personalism, elites coordinate insider coups to oust the ruler, reshuffling leadership and still retaining power. At middle levels of personalism, elites organize regime change coups as reshuffling coups become more difficult. At high levels of personalism, even regime change coups become difficult to mount, and increasingly marginalized and desperate rivals turn to assassinations. We test these expectations with new data on personalism, assassination, and coup attempts, covering all autocracies over the 1946–2010 period.
06 非洲早期国家和对专制统治的支持
【题目】
Early Statehood and Support for Autocratic Rule in Africa
【作者】
Vladimir Chlouba, Daniel S. Smith, Seamus Wagner
【摘要】
最近的研究强调了前现代政治实践对解释持续性制度特征（包括代议制民主）的重要性。通常来说，这一论点本质上是制度性的——即假设前工业化实践能够支持或阻碍民主制度的传播。本文提出了一个单独的路径，早期国家的遗产通过该路径继续影响民主治理的前景。作者使用来自非洲的调查数据，记录了国家早期发展与普通非洲人对专制统治的支持之间的正相关关系。这一发现对于广泛的前处理和后处理协变量（pre- and post-treatment covariates）、国家和调查周期的固定效应，以及工具变量设计都是稳健的。这种关系在来自前英国殖民地且具有集中化特征的族群的受访者中尤为突出，这表明当地留存下来的传统机构对于传播规范的重要性，而这些规范的源头即是殖民前专制社会化。
Recent work highlights the importance of pre-modern political practices for explaining persistent institutional features, including representative democracy. Typically, this argument is institutional in nature—pre-industrial practices are hypothesized to either bolster or retard the transmission of democratic institutions. This article proposes a separate channel through which legacies of early statehood continue to impact the prospects of democratic governance. Using survey data from Africa, we document a positive relationship between early statehood development and support for autocratic rule among ordinary Africans. This finding is robust to a wide range of pre- and post-treatment covariates, country and survey round fixed effects, as well as an instrumental-variable design. The identified relationship is particularly prominent in respondents from precolonially centralized ethnic groups in former British colonies, suggesting the importance of locally surviving traditional institutions for propagation of norms that owe their origins to precolonial autocratic socialization.
Volume 55 - Issue 5 - March 2022
01 专制再分配中的政治预算周期
【题目】
Political Budgetary Cycles in Autocratic Redistribution
【作者】
Kangwook Han
【摘要】
尽管过去几十年来人们对民主国家的政治预算周期进行了严格的研究，但令人惊讶的是，人们对独裁政权中出于选举动机的政策操纵却知之甚少。本项研究分析了即便在选举结果预先确定的条件下，独裁者如何策略性地改变专制政策的优先次序以培养选举优势。作者认为，选举期间独裁者在再分配政策上的花费更多。本文使用了1972年至2015年间涉及63个独裁国家的预算支出数据，提出了在专制再分配中存在选举周期的跨国证据。通过分析2008年至2015年间涉及18个非洲独裁国家的非洲晴雨表调查数据（Afrobarometer survey data），本项研究还发现，公民对再分配政策的评价会随选举日程的变化而波动。这些研究结果探讨了独裁者通过宏观和微观层面机制即兴操纵政策以形成选举主导权的问题，进而为有关专制政治的文献做出了贡献。
While political budgetary cycles in democracies have been rigorously studied for the past several decades, surprisingly little is known about electorally motivated policy manipulation in authoritarian regimes. This study analyzes how dictators strategically change the priorities of autocratic policies to cultivate electoral dominance even when election results are predetermined. I argue that dictators spend more money on redistributive policies in election periods. Using budgetary spending data from 63 autocratic countries between 1972 and 2015, this paper presents cross-national evidence of the existence of an electoral cycle in autocratic redistribution. Analyzing Afrobarometer survey data from 18 African autocracies between 2008 and 2015, this study also finds that citizens’ evaluations of redistributive policy fluctuate according to the electoral calendar. These findings contribute to the literature on authoritarian politics by exploring macro- and micro-level mechanisms through which authoritarian rulers improvise policy manipulation to cultivate electoral dominance.
02 集体决策与经济投票
【题目】
Collective Decision-Making and the Economic Vote
【作者】
Raymond M. Duch, Albert Falcó-Gimeno
【摘要】
实验证据表明，拥有提案权的决策者应对集体决策负责。在联合政府的案例中，选民启发式地将相关经济结果的责任分配给各个政党，并将经济投票引向总理所在党。利用1988年至2010年间涉及28个民主国家的大范围调查数据，我们证明，选民也会根据联盟背景是否夸大或减弱其感知的议程权力来确定财政部长所在政党的责任。当政党在特定政策领域拥有所有权且决策被划分开时，选民会认为财政部长拥有提案权，并得到更多的经济投票。在爱尔兰和荷兰进行的在线调查实验证实，受试者采用分门别类的信号来识别和惩罚具有提案权的联盟党。
Experimental evidence suggests that decision makers with proposal power are held responsible for collective decisions. In the case of coalition governments, voter heuristics assign responsibility for economic outcomes to individual parties, directing the economic vote toward the Prime Minister party. Using extensive survey data from 1988 to 2010 in 28 democracies, we demonstrate that voters also identify the Finance Minister party as responsible depending on whether the coalition context exaggerates or mutes its perceived agenda power. When parties take ownership for particular policy areas, and decision-making is compartmentalized, voters perceive the Finance Minister as having proposal power and it receives a larger economic vote. Online survey experiments in Ireland and the Netherlands confirm that subjects employ compartmentalization signals to identify, and punish, coalition parties with proposal power.
03 犯罪领土控制的逻辑：里约热内卢的军事干预
【题目】
The Logic of Criminal Territorial Control: Military Intervention in Rio de Janeiro
【作者】
Nicholas Barnes
【摘要】
有组织的犯罪集团 (OCG) 如何应对旨在削弱和镇压他们的军事干预措施？在许多情况下，这类镇压往往会适得其反——因为有组织的犯罪集团会军事化，参与暴力并与国家军队直接对抗。现有研究提供了几种解释：包括犯罪分子间的竞争、无条件的军事化方式，以及现有的刑事治理安排。然而，这些研究大多集中在国家、地区甚至市级层面的变化和解释上。本文采取了一种微观比较方法，对里约热内卢一组贫民区（贫困和非正式社区）展开了18个月的民族志研究，这些贫民区在2014年至2015年被巴西军队占领，并被三个贩毒团伙瓜分。本项研究认为，导致有组织犯罪集团对军事干预做出暴力反应的主要机制是来自对手主动的领土威胁。研究还表明，在干预期间内且在有组织犯罪集团的竞争转向暴力的地方，招募的地理模式起着重要作用。
How do organized criminal groups (OCGs) respond to military interventions intended to weaken and subdue them? In many cases, such crackdowns have proven counterproductive as OCGs militarize, engage in violence, and confront state forces directly. Existing studies have pointed to several explanations: inter-criminal competition, unconditional militarized approaches, and existing criminal governance arrangements. Much of this work, however, has focused on national, regional, or even municipal level variation and explanations. This article takes a micro-comparative approach based on 18 months of ethnographic research in a group of Rio de Janeiro favelas (impoverished and informal neighborhoods) divided between three drug trafficking gangs and occupied by the Brazilian military from 2014 to 2015. It argues that an active territorial threat from a rival is the primary mechanism leading OCGs to respond violently to military intervention. It also demonstrates that geographic patterns of recruitment play an important role in where OCG rivalries turn violent during intervention.
04 民族主义、阶级和地位：民族主义者如何利用政策提议和团体请愿来吸引新选民
【题目】
Nationalism, Class, and Status: How Nationalists Use Policy Offers and Group Appeals to Attract a New Electorate
【作者】
Philip J. Howe, Edina Szöcsik, Christina I. Zuber
【摘要】
民族主义政党如何吸引选票？本文提出了一种以地位为中心的新的供给侧解释，即认为民族主义者通过将对本国民族的团体请愿（group appeals），与改善民族的政治和文化地位及中间成员的社会经济地位的政策承诺相结合而获得成功。借助几个原始数据集，这一假设在1907年的奥地利帝国案例上得到检验，多个民族主义政党在该国首次大规模选举中展开竞争。作者发现，针对民族的团体请愿和改善其政治和文化地位的承诺，在经济部门正处于衰退阶段的农业工人中产生了很好的共鸣；但与产业工人却没有共鸣，因为其所在行业正在崛起。相比之下，提供社会政策有助于产业工人中的民族主义者，但在农业工人中则不太显著。本文表明，民族主义动员并非只是对阶级政治的分散；相反，民族主义、阶级和地位政治是紧密交织的。
How do nationalist parties attract votes? This article develops a novel supply-side explanation centered on status, arguing that nationalists succeed by combining group appeals to the nation with policy promises to improve the nation’s political and cultural status and the socio-economic status of its median member. Drawing on several original datasets, this expectation is tested on Imperial Austria in 1907, where multiple nationalist parties competed in first-time mass elections. We find that group appeals to the nation and promises to improve its political and cultural status resonate very well with agricultural workers, whose economic sector was declining, but not with industrial workers, whose sector was on the rise. By contrast, offering social policy helps nationalists among industrial workers, but less clearly so among agricultural workers. This article shows that nationalist mobilization is not a mere distraction from class politics; rather, the politics of nationalism, class, and status are closely intertwined.
05 有效政府与民主评估
【题目】
Effective Government and Evaluations of Democracy
【作者】
Christopher Claassen, Pedro C. Magalhães
【摘要】
众所周知，无效治理会削弱大众对政府及领导人的支持。然而，目前尚不清楚这些影响是否会蔓延到政权上并削弱对民主制度的支持。本文回到这一经典议题，使用时间序列、横截面数据来检验政府在维持经济增长、提供优质医疗保健服务和打击暴力犯罪方面的有效性是否会影响大众对民主的态度。作者发现，民主满意度是由经济表现和暴力犯罪（而非医疗保健质量）的波动所驱动的。相较之下，政府的有效性变化对民主的弥散性支持（diffuse support）的影响相对有限。暴力犯罪是唯一对民主支持有影响的有效性指标，而且是通过其对民主满意度的影响而间接发挥作用。上述结果证明，民主支持——与民主满意度不同，被认为有助于维持民主——在很大程度上不受绩效危机的影响。
Ineffective governance is known to weaken support for governments and leaders. However, it is less clear whether these effects spill over to the regime and erode support for the democratic system. This article returns to this classic question, now using time-series, cross-sectional data to test whether the effectiveness of governments in sustaining economic growth, providing quality healthcare, and tackling violent crime affects popular attitudes to democracy. We find that satisfaction with democracy is driven by fluctuations in economic performance and violent crime (but not healthcare quality). Diffuse support for democracy, in contrast, remains relatively impervious to changes in government effectiveness. Violent crime is the only indicator of effectiveness which has an impact on democratic support, and does so indirectly, via its influence on democratic satisfaction. These findings confirm that democratic support—which, unlike democratic satisfaction, is thought to help sustain democracy—is mostly immune to crises of performance.
翻 译：郭见田、马丝妮
校 对：郭见田、马丝妮
相关阅读：
编辑：焦 磊
一审：郭见田
二审：李璐雅