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The Journal of Finance publishes leading research across all the major fields of financial research. It is the most widely cited academic journal on finance. Each issue of the journal reaches over 8,000 academics, finance professionals, libraries, government and financial institutions around the world. Published six times a year, the journal is the official publication of The American Finance Association, the premier academic organization devoted to the study and promotion of knowledge about financial economics.Together with the Journal of Financial Economics and the Review of Financial Studies,it is considered to be among the top three finance journals.
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【顶级期刊目录】
JF 2021年2月目录摘要
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目录
The Limits of Limited Liability: Evidence from Industrial Pollution
Do Household Wealth Shocks Affect Productivity? Evidence from Innovative Workers During the Great Recession
Mortgage Design in an Equilibrium Model of the Housing Market
The Capitalization of Consumer Financing into Durable Goods Prices
Inalienable Customer Capital, Corporate Liquidity, and Stock Returns
A Dynamic Model of Optimal Creditor Dispersion
A Unified Model of Firm Dynamics with Limited Commitment and Assortative Matching
Information Consumption and Asset Pricing
Learning From Disagreement in the U.S. Treasury Bond Market
Information Inertia
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作者与摘要
Abstract:We study how parent liability for subsidiaries' environmental cleanup costs affects industrial pollution and production. Our empirical setting exploits a Supreme Court decision that strengthened parent limited liability protection for some subsidiaries. Using a difference‐in‐differences framework, we find that stronger liability protection for parents leads to a 5% to 9% increase in toxic emissions by subsidiaries. Evidence suggests the increase in pollution is driven by lower investment in abatement technologies rather than increased production. Cross‐sectional tests suggest convexities associated with insolvency and executive compensation drive heterogeneous effects. Overall, our findings highlight the moral hazard problem associated with limited liability.
Abstract:How can mortgages be redesigned to reduce macrovolatility and default? We address this question using a quantitative equilibrium life‐cycle model. Designs with countercyclical payments outperform fixed payments. Among those, designs that front‐load payment reductions in recessions outperform those that spread relief over the full term. Front‐loading alleviates liquidity constraints when they bind most, reducing default and stimulating housing demand. To illustrate, a fixed‐rate mortgage (FRM) with an option to convert to adjustable‐rate mortgage, which front‐loads payment reductions relative to an FRM with an option to refinance underwater, reduces price and consumption declines six times as much and default three times as much.
Abstract:Borrowing from multiple creditors exposes firms to rollover risk due to coordination problems among creditors, but it also improves firms' repayment incentives, thereby increasing pledgeability. Based on this trade‐off, I develop a dynamic debt rollover model to analyze the evolution of creditor dispersion. Consistent with empirical evidence, I find that firms optimally increase creditor dispersion after poor performance. In contrast, cross‐sectionally higher‐growth firms can support more dispersed creditors. Frequent debt renegotiation limits firms' ability to increase pledgeability by having more creditors. Finally, holding a cash balance while borrowing from multiple creditors improves firms' repayment incentives uniformly across all future states.
Abstract:We develop a unified theory of dynamic contracting and assortative matching to explain firm dynamics. In our model, neither firms nor managers can commit to arrangements that yield lower payoffs than their outside options, which are microfounded by the equilibrium conditions in a matching market. The model endogenously generates power laws in firm size and CEO compensation, and explains differences in their right tails. We also show that our model quantitatively accounts for many salient features of the time‐series dynamics and the cross‐sectional distribution of firm investment, dividend payout, and CEO compensation.
Abstract:We study whether firm and macroeconomic announcements that convey systematic information generate a return premium for firms that experience information spillovers. We use information consumption to proxy for investor learning during these announcements and construct ex ante measures of expected information consumption (EIC) to calibrate whether learning is priced. On days when there are information spillovers, affected stocks earn a significant return premium (5% annualized) and the capital asset pricing model performs better. The positive effect of the Federal Reserve Open Market Committee announcements on the risk premia of individual stocks appears to be modulated by EIC. Our findings are most consistent with a risk‐based explanation.
Jayant Ganguli (University of Essex)
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顶级期刊,Journal of Financial Economics13篇文章
顶级期刊,Review of Financial Studies 最新12篇文章
2021 Financial Markets and Corporate Governance Conference
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